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ABSTRACT 
Clare McKay 
‘A history of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), 1956-1970’, 
DLitt et Phil, History, University of South Africa, August 2015 
 
The aim of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was to represent the 
interests of all South African students nationally and internationally. The challenge then to 
the liberal NUSAS leadership was how to meet the demands of black students for a 
politically relevant policy while simultaneously retaining the loyalty of its white middle class 
and often conservative membership. In 1957, the black University College of Fort Hare 
returned to NUSAS to participate in the national union’s campaign against the imposition of 
apartheid on the universities. Consequently, NUSAS adopted the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as the foundation of its policy. Sharpeville and the increasing 
number of black students associated with NUSAS contributed to the further politicisation and 
leftward movement of the national union.   
 
The emergence of two new exclusively African student organisations together with the 
decision of a student seminar in Dar es Salaam that NUSAS be barred from all international 
student forums as its demographics precluded it from representing the aspirations of the 
black majority was the pretext for a far-reaching interrogation of NUSAS’s structure and 
functioning. Henceforward NUSAS would play a ‘radical role’ in society. This played into the 
hands of the government and its proxies, the new conservative students associations which 
sought to slice away NUSAS’s moderate to conservative white membership. The arrest of 
current and former NUSAS officers implicated in sabotage provided more grist to the right 
wing mill. In an attempt to manage this most serious crisis, as well as to continue functioning 
in the increasingly authoritarian and almost wholly segregated milieu of the mid-1960s, 
NUSAS abandoned its ‘radical role’ and increasingly focussed on university and educational 
matters. 
 
Nonetheless, the state intensified its campaign to weaken NUSAS. By means of legislation, 
the utilisation of conservative student structures and the intimidation of university authorities, 
the government attempted to ensure that segregation was applied at all NUSAS-affiliated 
universities.  It was the application of segregation by cowed university authorities that 
precipitated the New Left-inspired student protests at NUSAS-affiliated campuses in the late 
1960s as well as the establishment of the separate black South African Students 
Organisation, the latter leading to the exodus of all black students from NUSAS.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
 
‘I also salute the Black Sash and the National Union of South African Students. 
We note with pride that you have acted as the conscience of white South 
Africans. Even during the darkest days in the history of our struggle you held the 
flag of liberty high.’ Nelson Mandela, Cape Town, 11 February 1990.1 
 
During his first public speech delivered from the balcony of the Cape Town City Hall on 11 
February 1990 after his release from twenty seven years in prison, Nelson Mandela greeted, 
thanked, saluted and paid tribute to a host of organisations and individuals for their 
ceaseless struggle against apartheid and racial domination and their commitment to the 
establishment of a non-racial democracy in a unitary South Africa. Included amongst these 
were two liberal and almost exclusively white structures, the Black Sash and the National 
Union of South African Students (NUSAS),2 the latter the object of this study. This 
dissertation will investigate some of the possible reasons why NUSAS was singled out for 
such honour. 
 
By 1990 NUSAS had aligned itself with the liberation movement. In so doing it threatened 
the privileged racial and class position of the white middle class students at the English-
medium universities where it operated. At its foundation in 1924, NUSAS aimed to represent 
students nationally and internationally and defend and champion their interests. The 
challenge then to the liberal NUSAS leadership in the period 1956 to 1970 (my earlier 
Master’s dissertation addresses the period 1945-19553) was how to pursue a progressive 
political programme based on the defence of fundamental human rights while at the same 
time remaining true to its rationale for existence and retaining the loyalty of its white student 
base, much of which upheld the political status quo.  
 
That NUSAS was not always a wholly white body is attested to by the withdrawal of its entire 
black membership by 1972 following the establishment of the exclusively black South African 
Students Organisation (SASO) in 1968. Incorporating into one structure both conservative 
white students and radical, mainly black students, placed additional strains on the integrity 
and cohesion of the national union.  
 
                                                          
1 ‘Nelson Mandela’s address to a rally in Cape Town on his release from prison, 11 February 1990’, 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4520 accessed 25.6.2014. 
2 ibid.  
3 C. Larkin, ‘Becoming liberal –a history of the National Union of South African Students, 1945-1955’, MA 
dissertation, University of Cape Town, 2001. 
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Altbach has argued that significant differences existed between student activism in the 
industrialised nations of the (former) First World and those of the (former) Third World 
regarding their degree of radicalism, the issues which this activism addressed and the extent 
to which student activism was regarded as legitimate by the societies of which these 
students formed a part.4 It could be argued that NUSAS, composed of both black and white 
students was an uneasy amalgamation of both a First and Third World student union. For 
many white South Africans opposed to the National Party (NP) government, South Africa 
was a democracy, albeit an imperfect one.5 Thus for some anti-NP whites, the measures 
taken by the government after 1948 represented the dismantling of the democratic state. 
Thus, their protests, if any, were couched in preserving the status quo or harked back to a 
mythically better past. Many white students thus believed that NUSAS should have a very 
limited political role, if one at all, and that it should simply act as a student trade union and 
benefit society, adopting a ‘students-as-such’ orientation. For the majority of South Africans, 
denied civil rights and citizenship, South Africa was hardly democratic. Many black students 
believed then that NUSAS ought to pursue an overtly political agenda, a ‘students-in-society’ 
approach and like student organisations in the colonial world, play a leading role in the 
national liberation movement.  
 
Divergence of opinion regarding the nature of a student union became more acute with the 
proscription of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) 
following the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960. Though two new African student 
organisations aligned to the banned liberation movements did emerge in 1961, they all but 
collapsed at the universities in the face of the national security crackdown of 1963-4. Thus, 
with few legal alternatives, black students and some radical white ones came increasingly to 
view NUSAS as a potential vehicle for national liberation. This, together with the realisation 
that there was an inclination for black separatism led NUSAS to interrogate both its future 
political role in society and student affairs as well as grapple with the almost insoluble 
problem of how as a colour-blind body it could racially transform its leadership and 
membership to reflect the demographic realities of South African society without 
simultaneously compromising its commitment to non-racialism. The fallout from this attempt 
to recast itself within a more activist mould was used to great effect by the state in its efforts 
to fatally weaken NUSAS – by then one of the most radical organisations still legally 
                                                          
4 P. Altbach, ‘Perspectives on student political activism’,  P. Altbach (ed), Student political activism: an 
international reference handbook, Greenwood Press, New York, Westport and London, 1989, pp. 4, 11, 13-15; T. 
Luescher-Mamashela, ‘Theorising student activism in and beyond the 20th century: the contribution of Philip G. 
Altbach', http://nasdevsa.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/theorising-student-activism-abstract-luescher-
mamashela.pdf accessed 1.1.2015, p. 6. 
5 D. Everatt, The origins of non-racialism: white opposition to apartheid in the 1950s, Witwatersrand University 
Press, Johannesburg, 2009, p. 160. 
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operating – by slicing away its moderate and conservative and often apathetic mass 
membership. 
 
Henceforward NUSAS charted a course dictated by the practical realities of an authoritarian 
political system and an almost fully segregated society by focussing on educational issues. It 
re-affirmed its commitment to working towards the restoration of academic freedom lost after 
the passage of university apartheid legislation in 1959, legislation against which NUSAS had 
fought a decade long, increasingly sophisticated national and international campaign. 
Protests against further encroachments into academic freedom were couched in terms of 
defending Western civilisation, a defence utilised by the white opposition in its rejection 
(often half-hearted) of apartheid measures and also by the government in its justification for 
its actions. NUSAS’s policy during the latter half of the 1960s served only to further distance 
it from black students, the vast majority of whom were involuntarily cloistered in the isolated, 
authoritarian, ethnic universities which followed the implementation of university apartheid 
and the prohibition of further black student enrolment at the racially ‘open’ Universities of the 
Witwatersrand and Cape Town and the semi-‘open’ Natal. Students at the ethnic universities 
were denied basic human rights including freedom of movement and association – they 
faced drastic sanctions merely for associating with NUSAS – and had no experience of 
academic freedom. Like NUSAS they adapted to their environment and concluded that their 
quest for national student contact could only take place outside the bounds of NUSAS.  
 
Significance of the study 
 
A history of NUSAS reads like a ‘who’s who’ of South Africa and elsewhere. It could be 
contended that participation in student structures provides an apprenticeship in leadership. A 
study of student organisations then can shed light on the earlier formative influences of 
those who in later life achieve prominence in public and private life - in academia, the arts, 
trade unions, business and politics. Historically, students have played an important role in 
politics and society. This is particularly the case with regards to nationalism. German and 
Italian students, for example, were leading protagonists in the nationalist revolutions of 1848 
in their respective countries, while during the 1920s and 30s student unions were some of 
the first groups in Germany and Italy to embrace the integral nationalism of Hitler and 
Mussolini.6 In South Africa, Afrikaans-speaking students played a prominent role in the 
Afrikaans Language Movement (which resulted in the replacement of Dutch with Afrikaans 
                                                          
6 P. Altbach, op. cit., pp. 2, 3; G. Giles, Students and National Socialism in Germany, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton and Guildford, 1985.  
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as South Africa’s co-official language in 1924)7 while they and their publications were at the 
forefront of developing and disseminating the new exclusive Afrikaner nationalism of the 
1930s.8 It was black students (using a broader definition of ‘students’ to include school 
children) who rejected Afrikaans as a co-medium of instruction in 1976, precipitating the 
Soweto Uprising, a turning point in South Africa’s history which marked the rejection of the 
entire system of apartheid and the claims of Afrikaner nationalism. During the 1960s 
students brought down governments in places as diverse as South Korea, South Vietnam, 
Japan, Turkey, Indonesia, Bolivia and Sudan9 while General De Gaulle fled France in the 
wake of the 1968 student revolts in Paris.10  
 
Provided that their actions were grounded in and informed by Scientific Socialism, Lenin 
recognised the revolutionary potential of students in Tsarist Russia, even those from the 
middle class.11 Herbert Marcuse, a leading neo-Marxist philosopher of the 1960s New Left 
(the New Left rejected Soviet-style Marxism, embraced the humanist writings of the early 
Marx, challenged traditional power structures and championed participatory democracy and 
new forms of consciousness) and ‘guru’ of the student left argued that in the face of the 
deradicalisation of the working class, students and other marginalised groups were the new 
revolutionary class.12 The worldwide student revolts of the late 1960s, which had an impact 
on student activism in South Africa seemed to bear this out.       
 
Altbach argues that perhaps the most lastingly important impact of student activism, 
particularly in the Western industrialised states, has been in the cultural sphere and the 
influence that student activism has had on ‘broader societal norms’. The claims of the rights 
of minorities such as African-Americans, women and homosexuals, together with lifestyle 
choices such as abortion and birth control generally deemed permissive and immoral, were 
accepted and endorsed by students and through them, percolated into the rest of society, 
eventually gaining acceptance there too.13 The American Civil Rights and Anti-War 
Movements would perhaps less speedily have achieved the desegregation of the American 
South and the enfranchisement of African-Americans and the withdrawal of US troops from 
Vietnam had it not been for the leading role played by students. It was African students in 
                                                          
7 J. Fick, ‘Afrikaner student politics – past and present’, H. van der Merwe and D. Welsh (eds), Student 
perspectives on South Africa, David Philip, Cape Town, 1972, pp. 58-63. 
8 D. O’ Meara, Volkskapitalisme: class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, 1934-
1948, Ravan, Johannesburg, 1983, p. 70.  
9 D. Emmerson, ‘Conclusion’, D. Emmerson (ed), Students and politics in developing nations, Frederick Praeger, 
New York, Washington and London, 1968, p. 390. 
10 P. Altbach, op. cit., p. 11. 
11 V.I. Lenin, ‘The tasks of the revolutionary youth, first letter, published in September 1903 in “Student”, no. 2-3, 
signed N. Lenin’,  http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1003/sep/30b.htm accessed 3.1.2015.   
12 A. Heywood, Politics (third edition), Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2007, pp. 58, 59, 79, 308.    
13 P. Altbach, op. cit., pp. 11-12. 
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the United Kingdom-based Committee of African Organisations who initiated the first 
economic boycott of South African goods in Britain in June 1959, this boycott being one of 
the forerunners of the all-embracing global Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM).14 
 
NUSAS was a liberal organisation and committed to democracy. The strains of liberalism it 
espoused and the degree to which it embraced democracy changed over time. Liberalism is 
concerned with individual freedom and human rights, reason, tolerance and progress, the 
rule of law and constitutionalism.15 In the South African context it is intimately connected to 
race relations. Liberalism is universalist and disregards differences of race, ethnicity, culture 
and creed. Though South African liberalism is derived from classical Western liberalism, it is 
not an exclusively white phenomenon – there are and were black liberals. Cape liberalism - 
the form that classical liberalism took when transplanted in a racist society argued 
Friedman16 - was instrumental in the adoption of a non-racial franchise for all ‘civilised’ men 
in the nineteenth and twentieth century Cape Colony and Province respectively who met 
stringent educational and property criteria.  
 
Cape liberalism existed side by side and often at odds with what Friedman refers to as a 
‘developmental liberalism’, a social democratic strain.17 Developmental liberals were ‘those 
who sought to build a liberalism rooted in the black majority’ and who attempted ‘to 
demonstrate that liberalism [was] consistent with majority aspirations’ rather than the classic 
liberal assumption that ‘majority aspirations ought to tailor themselves to liberal values’.18 In 
the context of liberal universalism, some liberals rejected Black Consciousness as black 
racism while others ‘sanctioned’ it.19 In 1994 South Africa became a liberal democracy. 
Though this had little to do with the influence and legacy of liberal organisations like NUSAS 
– a post-Cold War global and national liberal consensus pertained – literature relating to 
‘Third Wave’ democratisation suggests that a democratic heritage improves the prognosis 
for the consolidation of democracy.20 
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Review of literature 
 
To date, the history of NUSAS has yet to be written. In an examination of the foundation and 
early history of NUSAS, Linda Chisholm21 argues that though the all-white national union 
was ‘non-political’ and committed to nurturing a broad white South African nationalism, it 
contradictorily engaged with deeply divisive national political issues in its annual student 
parliaments and in its segregation-based “Bantu Studies Department’. However, she 
contends that it was the staging of the Student Christian Association’s ‘Multi-racial student 
conference’ at the black South African Native College, Fort Hare in 1930 that had the 
potential to shatter the national union’s fragile white unity. My MA dissertation22 argues that 
NUSAS effectively abandoned segregation and white South Africanism in 1945 when it 
resolved to admit to membership students at Fort Hare and other black higher educational 
institutions. Henceforward NUSAS charted a distinctly liberal and even radical course in 
pursuit of ‘democracy in education’. Against the background of mass political mobilisation 
and Cold War partisanship, the radical (mainly black) and liberal left parted company over 
the degree to which the still ostensibly non-political national union could oppose the 
apartheid measures of the new NP government. Consequently, by the end of 1955 most 
black affiliates had seceded, the radical left had been routed, leaving an avowedly liberal 
faction closely associated with the Liberal Party at the helm of the organisation.  
 
In his 1985, six page case-study on NUSAS and ‘the plight of liberalism’, derived from 
secondary sources,23 Benjamin Kline argues that NUSAS made the tactical compromise that 
South African liberalism has always accepted, namely:  in order to win wide white support for 
its opposition to university apartheid in the 1950s, NUSAS ‘side-stepped’ segregation and 
focussed on the autonomy of the universities.24 Nonetheless, its activism against university 
apartheid led to its much wider political and social engagement during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. This alienated much of its white membership and led to the ‘moderation’ of 
NUSAS’s more ‘extreme’ policies. A black backlash followed.25 Kline concludes then that 
‘the incorporation of either moderate or radical ideals in a liberal framework has consistently 
alienated those left out and their failure to compromise has debilitated liberal activities’.26 
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In 1974, the South African Outlook published a series of articles on NUSAS to mark the 
national union’s fiftieth anniversary. Former NUSAS president, John Daniel’s, ‘A history of 
NUSAS in action’ is a skeletal account of the organisation from its foundation to 1974,27 
while his ‘NUSAS 1963-73: ten years of conflict’ is an incisive analysis of government 
strategy intended to weaken and ultimately silence NUSAS.28 However, Martin Legassick’s 
seminal monograph on the history of NUSAS from its inception until the mid-1960s remains 
the most significant and substantial study of the national union to date, even though it was 
penned almost half a century ago.29 This argues that the structural reforms undertaken by 
NUSAS in the early 1950s brought together the politically diverse student bodies of the 
English-medium and black universities but only at the end of the decade were these reforms 
given ‘ideological expression’ thus enabling NUSAS to engage in political action and 
facilitating the return of its former black affiliates.30 This doctoral thesis and the earlier 
Master’s dissertation owe much to Legassick’s insights. ‘South Africa’,31 co-authored by 
Legassick and 1960 NUSAS president, John Shingler, covers similar ground to Legassick’s 
slightly earlier study, though in much abbreviated form as this book chapter also chronicles 
the history of white Afrikaans-speaking student organisations as well as developments within 
black student politics. Though written prior to the formation of SASO, Legassick and Shingler 
predicted that a new separate black student body would emerge - though probably abroad - 
as black students felt that NUSAS could not represent them.32 Moreover, given the complete 
rupture with black politics of the 1940s and 50s signalled by the security clampdown of the 
early 1960s, the ‘attitudes, perspectives and policies’ formulated by students at the ethnic 
universities (and schools) would, they prophetically believed, ‘shape the strategy of the 
freedom struggle…for the next generation’.33 
 
Neville Curtis, Clive Keegan and Geoffrey Budlender, all leading members of NUSAS during 
some of the periods which they address in their respective brief histories of NUSAS believed 
that the inflexible, intolerant and ideological liberalism on which NUSAS based its actions 
during the latter half of the 1960s was alienating to NUSAS’s black membership and was 
one of the reasons precipitating fissure.34 In her pioneering study, Mabel Maimela contends 
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that a co-operative, supportive and mutually dependent relationship existed between key 
figures within the Black Consciousness Movement and various liberal organisations. In so 
doing, she challenges the prevailing orthodoxy that the relationship between NUSAS and 
SASO was hostile and that Steve Biko, the founder of SASO, was anti-liberal and anti-
white.35 Ian Macqueen similarly argues that NUSAS and SASO activists ‘maintained a 
dialogue’ even after black students broke with the national union.36 In their detailed history of 
the establishment and development of SASO and the Black Consciousness Movement, 
Mzamane, Maaba and Biko argue that relations between key NUSAS and SASO figures 
were cordial and co-operative. SASO was initially envisaged as a black pressure group 
within NUSAS and it was only the reaction of NUSAS which precipitated complete fissure.37 
This view seems to be implicitly supported by Legassick and Saunders, who, in their very 
brief account of NUSAS in the 1960s,38 transcribe a letter from Steve Biko, one of the 
founders of SASO, to Duncan Innes, the 1968/9 NUSAS president in which Biko justifies the 
formation of the new black organisation.39  
 
Salim Badat asserts that SASO and its non-racial successor, the South African National 
Students’ Congress were ‘revolutionary national student organisations that constituted black 
students as an organised social force within the national liberation movement’.40 He 
contends that SASO’s initial recognition of NUSAS as South Africa’s sole legitimate national 
student union was for strategic reasons as SASO did not have the support of all black 
students, many of whom were uncomfortable with the idea of a separate black body.41 
 
Helen Lunn’s study on identity, socialisation, education, student politics and the counter-
culture, particularly music, concludes that the impact of a cosmopolitan counter-culture and 
the New Left was quite considerable on students at Wits and at Durban during the decade of 
the mid-1960s to 1970s.42 The title of N.L Combrink’s Master’s dissertation suggests that it 
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would cover similar ground to that of Lunn’s.43 However, the bulk of this study is concerned 
with the chronicling of international student protest, the early history of NUSAS and the 
Afrikaans student movement and NUSAS’s campaign of 1956-9 against the enactment of 
university apartheid legislation.44 Combrink argues that a small group of dedicated activists 
constructed a powerful, tightly knit organisation which, with its creation and co-option of the 
‘Standing Committee of SRC Presidents’, embarked on well-co-ordinated, centrally directed 
‘agitation’45 against, for example, the 1962 General Law Amendment Act46 and the new 
apartheid university authorities at Fort Hare in 1960.47 Though Curtis and Keegan aver that 
NUSAS was arguably the most powerful student union globally during the early 1960s,48 
Combrink overstates its power and monolithic character. Students at Rhodes and the two 
white Natal centres were notoriously conservative and guarded their autonomy jealously. 
Hence they were often hesitant or were unambiguously opposed to the employment of, or 
any association with, ‘unorthodox methods of manipulation’, ‘uproar’ and ‘agitation’, attested 
to by their complete absence from the events at Fort Hare discussed by Combrink. 
 
Based on in-depth interviews, Daniel Massey paints a vivid picture of student affairs at Fort 
Hare prior to and after the state expropriation of the college in 1960. He charts the 
emergence of the ‘student resistance’, an ANC grouping actively opposed to the 
transformation of Fort Hare into an apartheid ‘tribal’ institution and engaged too in political 
work outside the college.49 Donovan Williams’s history of Fort Hare to 1960 also devotes 
considerable attention to student activities.50 Bruce Murray’s scholarly and detailed history of 
the University of the Witwatersrand from 1939 until the imposition of university apartheid in 
195951 was an invaluable source of information for this study both in terms of the information 
it uncovered and the insights it offered. Various university, college and seminary institutional 
histories consider the activities of their respective student bodies, including their relationship 
to NUSAS.52 Particularly useful was Sean Greyling’s Master’s dissertation,53 which threw 
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new light on the fateful decision of the Rhodes University Council to impose social 
segregation on NUSAS’s 1967 national congress. A number of studies of student politics at 
the various individual campuses affiliated or not to NUSAS provide a rich source of 
information54 though they are not always readily accessible. Jonty Driver very generously 
sent me a chapter of his unpublished memoir relating to his critical NUSAS presidency.55 
Glenn Moss’s ‘generational memoir’ of the 1970s examines the re-structuring of NUSAS 
during the early 1970s and the changing nature of Wits student politics.56  
 
For many white students at NUSAS’s affiliated campuses, contact with their counterparts at 
the Afrikaans-medium universities was of great importance. Accordingly, NUSAS devoted 
much time and effort to this controversial issue, even publishing a history of its relations with 
the Afrikaans-medium centres and their student organisations written by 1958-9 NUSAS 
president, Neville Rubin.57 Few studies exist of white Afrikaans-speaking university students. 
Joanne Duffy takes a ‘town and gown’ approach in her study of Afrikaner unity, the NP and 
the ‘radical right’ at Stellenbosch between 1934 and 1948. She highlights the role played by 
‘political professors’ in championing various radical right Afrikaans organisations and 
discusses the rise and fall of the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond (ANS) at Stellenbosch, 
an extreme Afrikaner nationalist student union founded soon after the three northern 
Afrikaans-medium universities seceded from NUSAS in 1933.58 In his study of the 
Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) in the period between 1948 and 1980, C. Heymans 
engages with the oft-asserted allegation that the ASB was the student front of the NP. 
Through an examination of this Afrikaner nationalist student organisation’s establishment, its 
Christian National ideology, its concern with Afrikaner identity and unity, its commitment to 
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apartheid and its attitudes towards other white and black South Africans, he concludes that 
the ASB largely mirrored NP policy even though it had no formal connections to the party.59   
 
Enjoying both a close relationship and an overlapping membership with NUSAS was the 
liberal, anti-apartheid-inclined National Catholic Federation of Students (NCFS), the subject 
of Anthony Egan’s monograph. Like NUSAS, the NCFS experienced a conservative 
backlash in the mid-1960s against both its growing activism and, following disclosures that 
some of NUSAS’s past officers were implicated in sabotage, its association with NUSAS. 
Much of this opposition was driven by students and clergy at Pretoria, where, unlike NUSAS, 
the NCFS enjoyed official recognition. With the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement, 
the NCFS, like NUSAS, was confronted with the exodus of its black membership.60 
 
Sources and method 
 
The sources for this study are drawn largely from the NUSAS Archive, housed in the 
Manuscripts and Archives division of the Jagger Library at the University of Cape Town. 
During the last decade, selected items from the NUSAS Archive, mainly congress minutes 
and sources relating to key events in South African history, have been digitized and can be 
accessed at ‘Aluka’, the online library of resources from and concerned with Africa. The 
NUSAS Archive is extensive. It is composed of annual reports to and minutes of NUSAS’s 
annual congresses and executive meetings, executive circulars and correspondence 
between the members of the NUSAS executive and members of affiliated SRCs. Other files 
are devoted to the activities of the NUSAS-affiliated and non-affiliated student bodies, civil 
society bodies and individuals connected with these as well as the various campaigns 
mounted by NUSAS. For the period spanning the mid-1950s and the first half of the 1960s, 
the challenge to the researcher is how to make sense of too much information, rather than 
too little. After 1965, the volume of material, particularly in terms of the correspondence, 
dwindles significantly; an indication perhaps of both the crisis and decline faced by NUSAS 
during the latter half of the 1960s as well a growing concern for security. NUSAS’s mail was 
opened from as early as 1955. The number of spies on SRCs and even in NUSAS increased 
incrementally during the 1960s. By 1963, NUSAS’s telephone was tapped and its office 
bugged. In the post-apartheid period, Jonty Driver (NUSAS president from 1963-4) was 
presented with typed copies of his originally handwritten letters as well as transcripts of 
conversations occurring in the NUSAS head office in Cape Town discovered by a researcher 
in no less than the personal files of John Vorster, then Minister of Justice and later prime-
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minister61 – an indication of the degree to which Vorster believed NUSAS posed a threat to 
state interests. During the early 1960s, correspondence relating to the new ethnic 
universities was conducted in code.62 Horst Kleinschmidt, NUSAS vice-president in 1969, 
relates that during his period of association with NUSAS, information was conveyed through 
hand-delivered messages and was often not recorded.63 
 
The monthly, fortnightly, and in the case of Wits and UCT, weekly campus newspapers 
provide a rich and varied source of information on NUSAS, student politics and campus life. 
Campus newspapers reflect the characteristics and concerns of the different student bodies, 
in the process offering a unique perspective on how NUSAS, student and sometimes even 
national politics were perceived by individual student bodies. With the establishment of a 
NUSAS-aligned student press union in the 1960s, the unique factor declined as reports on 
campus and NUSAS activity became syndicated. However, this was made up for by the 
increase in volume of NUSAS and national campus news disseminated which mitigated too 
the thinning out of the NUSAS Archive.  The student publications of the Afrikaans-medium 
universities were also consulted though not as extensively as those at the English-medium 
centres. They (particularly Die Matie at Stellenbosch and Die Wapad at Potchefstroom) offer 
a fascinating insight into the conflict and divisions within the Nationalist world which was one 
of the factors which propelled both English- and Afrikaans-speaking students at their 
respective campuses to seek co-operation with one another, a frequent phenomenon which 
posed a challenge to NUSAS’s hegemony. However essential student newspapers and 
periodicals were to this study, their numbering systems often posed problems when 
referencing. With a rapid turnover of student editors, numbering systems changed and often 
became confused or were omitted altogether. Accordingly, when citing some student 
periodicals, the volume and/or issue numbers have been omitted entirely. Those for Varsity, 
the Witwatersrand Student and Rhodeo are usually cited in full designations, though there 
are some omissions too. National newspapers were also a valuable source of information 
and were helpful in locating NUSAS in the wider social and political milieu. 
 
Universities were the object of government attention during the 1950s and 1960s and so 
official publications in the form of reports of commissions of inquiry as well as records of 
parliamentary debates have also been consulted. 
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Oral information was collected late in the study. Though the timing for this was unorthodox in 
the sense that the thesis was nearing completion, such an approach allowed for the 
identification of issues and events requiring further clarification and elaboration as well as 
confirmation that they were indeed of sufficient importance to merit discussion. Those 
selected to be interviewed were chosen on the basis of their involvement in NUSAS and/or 
membership of their SRC, their attendance at an annual congress or the leading role they 
played in an important event discussed in this study. Most importantly, they needed to be 
locatable and contactable. The latter consideration proved to be a significant hurdle as most 
candidates were retired people whose contact details were generally not publicly available. 
Letters or emails were sent to seventeen prospective interviewees. Eight replied, seven 
agreeing to participate while another initiated contact himself. Of those who did not reply, I 
subsequently discovered that three were critically ill or incapacitated. Personalised questions 
were drawn up for each interviewee and were either answered via email or telephonically. 
Given that this study focuses on events that occurred half a century or more ago, it was not 
surprising to discover that most protagonists had rather hazy recollections of their student 
days and often had little to add to the minutiae of events in which they were participants. 
Nonetheless, some surprising new information did surface particularly when interviewees 
volunteered information, which they believed was of importance and which was not directly 
related to any of the specific questions posed. Unfortunately, as the deadline for the 
submission of the thesis loomed, the responses of two key informants were still outstanding.  
 
Chapter breakdown 
 
Much of the material for the first section of chapter two is drawn from my Master’s 
dissertation, discussed earlier.64 The first part of this introductory chapter will locate NUSAS 
within the social and university milieu in which it operated. It will examine the composition 
and ideological orientation of the different student bodies represented in the national union 
as well as the changes wrought in student life during the 1940s, 50s and 60s.  
 
The second section will trace the early history of NUSAS from its establishment in 1924 until 
the starting point of the current study in 1956. It will examine the challenges posed to the 
‘non-political’ NUSAS by the rise of an exclusive Afrikaner nationalism on the one hand and 
a more inclusive liberalism on the other. It will argue that the efforts to build a united student 
front to fight the imposition of apartheid on the universities, the declared policy of the NP 
after its 1948 electoral victory, were hampered by conflict between the liberal and radical left 
                                                          
64 C. Larkin, op. cit. 
34 
 
over the degree to which NUSAS could engage in political action as well as its alignment in 
the Cold War.    
 
Chapter three will evaluate how successful NUSAS was in crafting a united front against the 
legislation of university apartheid during the period of 1956-7. It will also examine the 
implications for the future direction of NUSAS policy following the re-affiliation of Fort Hare to 
NUSAS in 1957, the adoption of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
as the basis of NUSAS policy and the decision taken to defy the provisions of the ‘church 
clause’ of the 1957 Native Laws Amendment Act which proscribed multi-racial gatherings in 
white urban areas.  
 
Chapter four will be concerned with the relationship between NUSAS and its affiliated SRCs 
on the one hand and the ASB and its respective affiliates on the other. White student co-
operation posed a challenge to NUSAS because while its primary reason for existence was 
to foster and facilitate student contact, contact outside its structures threatened its 
hegemony. 
 
Chapter five will argue that though NUSAS continued to base its opposition to university 
apartheid on the defence of university autonomy, it came to the realisation that this was 
morally untenable because in so doing, it upheld the right to racially discriminate. Equally 
contradictory was the commitment to defending a colour-blind academic programme and 
admissions policy while simultaneously upholding a social colour bar. This was brought 
sharply into focus when the United Party’s opposition to the passage of the Extension of 
University Education and Fort Hare Transfer Bills were based on the defence of university 
autonomy. Further, this chapter will attempt to demonstrate that the claim by the government 
that its university apartheid policy was motivated by altruistic developmentalism, had only a 
thin veneer of sincerity, the majority of NP members of parliament employing overtly racist, 
white supremacist and even Eugenecist arguments in justification for the removal of black 
students from the predominantly white universities and the establishment of separate black 
higher education institutions. 
 
Chapter six will point to the growing distance developing between NUSAS and much of its 
mass membership in the wake of Sharpeville, the former pursuing an ever more radical 
policy, the latter becoming more conservative and attempting to effect white student co-
operation. 
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The relationship of NUSAS to the new black ethnic universities will be the subject of chapter 
seven. This chapter will evaluate how successful NUSAS was in endeavouring to render 
university apartheid unworkable. It will be argued that NUSAS was radicalised by its 
increased association with the banned or semi-restricted Congresses at Fort Hare and the 
black section of Natal University (UNNE), the latter the springboard into the new ethnic 
university colleges in Natal. On the other hand, the emergence of two new exclusively 
African student organisations aligned to the banned liberation movements threatened 
NUSAS with the loss of its African membership. 
 
Chapter eight will examine the smear campaign against NUSAS launched by John Vorster in 
1963. It will be argued that this campaign was aimed at fatally weakening NUSAS by slicing 
away its moderate to conservative student base. Moreover, it will be contended that the 
newly established conservative student societies were closely associated with the state and 
were intended to absorb all of those expected to resign from NUSAS in the wake of the 
smear campaign.   
 
Chapter nine will address the core problem for NUSAS and radical white activists in general, 
namely: how to play a meaningful role in the struggle against apartheid. At the Botha’s Hill 
Leadership Seminar in April 1964, NUSAS activists grappled with this central problem as 
well as the equally pressing issue of how NUSAS as a white-led but colour-blind body could 
effect Africanisation without compromising its commitment to non-racialism. Some former 
NUSAS leaders came to the conclusion that the resolution of the central problem lay in 
abandoning the liberal commitment to non-violence and embracing the extra-legal African 
Resistance Movement.  
 
Chapter ten will examine the attempts by the government to impose social segregation on 
the universities. It will be argued that this had a dual function: firstly to bring the universities 
into line with government policy and secondly to deliver the mortal blow to both the anti-
apartheid student governments and NUSAS. Both the campus conservative societies and 
the government-intimidated university authorities were the vehicles for achieving these 
goals. It was the application of campus social segregation which precipitated both the 
formation of SASO and the New Left-inspired student protests.  
 
This thesis will generally follow a chronological approach. The exceptions to this will be the 
thematic chapters four, seven, eight and nine. One of the drawbacks associated with a 
thematic approach in an historical study is the danger of repetition. This will be largely 
avoided in the first two instances but much less so in the last two. Incorporating chapter nine 
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into chapter eight was seriously considered. However, the impact of chapter nine, arguably 
the core of the thesis as it engages with NUSAS’s attempts to resolve the central problem 
faced by a predominantly white anti-apartheid organisation in white apartheid South Africa, 
would be seriously compromised in so doing. Thus, in order to understand how the state and 
the conservative student associations exploited the revelations and disclosures arising from 
Botha’s Hill and the ARM, it will be necessary to provide a skeletal synopsis of these in 
chapter eight.   
 
South Africa’s racial categorisation system from the apartheid era still pertains. This study of 
necessity will employ these racial terms, namely ‘African’, ‘coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘white’. 
‘Black’, unless otherwise specified, will refer to all those (African, coloured and Indian) 
oppressed and discriminated against because they were not classified ‘white’. Offensive and 
derogatory racial terms for South Africa’s population, employed extensively in the period 
covered by this study, will only be used if a contemporary source is quoted directly. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
A history of NUSAS to 1955 
 
Introduction 
 
By 1956, the starting point of this study, the National Union of South African Students had 
been in existence for more than thirty years. It grew substantially in terms of the scope of 
its activities, reflecting changes in South African society, and developed a composition and 
political orientation very different to that envisaged by its founders and its early 
membership. This chapter will chart the establishment and early development of NUSAS 
and its response in the 1930s and 1940s to the dual challenges of Afrikaner nationalism 
and the desire for a more racially inclusive organisation. The accession to power of the 
ethnically exclusive National Party on a platform of extreme racial separation in 1948 
presented NUSAS with new, ultimately insoluble problems. The attempt to build a united 
student front against the implementation of apartheid at the universities was hindered by 
disagreement over the degree to which NUSAS could adopt an overtly political programme 
and, in the context of the Cold War, the alignment of its international policy. This chapter 
will conclude by chronicling how this conflict was temporarily resolved in 1955 at the 
expense of NUSAS’s black and radical left membership when power shifted decisively to a 
faction closely associated with the South African Liberal Party.  
 
The foundation of NUSAS 
 
NUSAS was founded in 1924 as a forum for white English- and Afrikaans-speaking 
students, who, despite their disparate backgrounds and bitter history of conflict, were 
believed to have, as students, common interests, needs and concerns.1 The inspiration for 
the creation of a national union came from Leo Marquard, a graduate of Grey University 
College, Bloemfontein, who, while a Rhodes scholar at Oxford, had witnessed and 
participated in the formation of both the international student body, the Confederation 
Internationale des Etudiants (CIE) and the British National Union of Students (NUS). 
Informed by the liberal nationalism which underpinned the newly established League of 
Nations, the student founders of the CIE, many of whom had experienced the horrors of 
the First World War, hoped that an international forum fostering tolerance and 
understanding between students of different nations would defuse conflict and so avert 
                                                          
1 Objects of NUSAS 
‘To represent the students of this country nationally and internationally and to maintain their co-operation with 
students of other countries. To promote the education and social interests of the students in entire 
independence of all religious and political propaganda. To co-operate with any organisation having kindred 
aims.’ NUSAS Handbook 1932. An earlier source is unavailable; Cited in L. Chisholm, ‘The early history of 
NUSAS: Leo Marquard’s presidency, 1924-1930’, BA (Honours) dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1976, p. 
95. 
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another world conflagration. NUS and NUSAS were both established for the purpose of 
participating in the CIE. 
 
NUSAS was modelled on NUS and thus absorbed the former’s ideological orientation. 
Thus, like NUS, NUSAS styled itself ‘non-political’.2 In South Africa, the meaning of the 
term ‘non-political’ shifted and was re-interpreted over time. This generated much conflict 
within the national union and is a major theme of this study. When NUSAS was formed in 
1924, a ‘non-political’ organisation eschewed ‘party politics’ and specifically refrained from 
aggravating the ‘racial issue’, the fragile relationship between English- and Afrikaans-
speaking whites shattered by the South African War and again ruptured during the First 
World War. Marquard, an Afrikaner impatient with narrow patriotism and nationalism,3 
desired a student organisation which championed student internationalism, and within 
South Africa looked beyond the differences of ethnicity to the common interests of all white 
students. This objective - the need to foster a broad white South African national feeling - 
accorded well with the political sentiments of a significant portion of the white electorate. 
Based on a policy of reconciliation between the two white ‘races’, the South African Party 
(SAP) government took both the former Boer republics and British colonies into the Union 
of South Africa in 1910. The National Party (NP), which ruled (initially in an electoral pact 
with the English-orientated white working class Labour Party) from 1924 to 1933, though a 
vehicle of Afrikaner nationalism, was also committed to a broad white South African 
nationalism within the framework of a two streamed policy of equality between the two 
white language groups. Nearly all whites shared a common fear of ‘swamping’ by the 
majority black African population. Thus a broad white South African nationalism and white 
reconciliation were founded on a ‘common native policy’, namely, segregation. Segregation 
envisaged the creation of ‘separate worlds’ for black and white and thus eventual spatial, 
political, economic and social separation. Segregation and the pursuit of a common white 
studenthood were the reasons for the exclusion of the black South African Native College 
(Fort Hare) from NUSAS in 1924. As Marquard, no segregationist himself, put it later: ‘at 
that time most [white] people … would have thought such a step “premature” and I do not 
believe the inaugural conference would ever have been held if I had invited Fort Hare’.4 
South African inter-war liberalism 
Marquard, like a significant minority of active members of NUSAS in the 1920s and 1930s, 
                                                          
2 E. Ashby and M. Anderson, The rise of the student estate in Britain, MacMillan, London, 1970, p. 61; M. 
Shaw, ‘Great Britain’,  P. Altbach (ed), Student political activism: an international reference handbook, 
Greenwood Press, New York, Westport and London, 1989, p. 238. 
3 L. Chisholm, op. cit., p. viii. 
4 L. Marquard, ‘A national union of students’, South African Outlook, January 1974, p. 2. 
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was a liberal. South African liberalism is difficult to define because it is composed of a 
number of diverse strands and in the context of the black-white racial order has a 
peculiarity of its own which sets it apart from Western liberalism from which it is derived. A 
South African liberal could be described as a ‘friend of the native’ – someone who 
advanced a ‘more generous’ policy towards the black population than other whites.5 This 
somewhat unflattering description erroneously implies that liberalism is an exclusively white 
phenomenon, which it is not. Leading members of, for example, the African National 
Congress, were, and are liberals. South African liberals uphold and defend vigorously 
individual rights, freedoms, justice and the rule of law. Liberals believe in the possibility of 
human progress and thus many South African liberals of the inter-war years were ‘welfare 
liberals’ championing black education, health care and the improvement of living 
conditions. The major providers of black welfare were mission Christians, who preached a 
social gospel rooted in the ‘brotherhood of man’6 which implied a belief in a common 
society and political equality. However, for mission and welfare liberals, a common society 
and black political and social equality were distant goals to be achieved incrementally.  
Many white liberals of the interwar period paternalistically believed that they knew what 
was good for Africans and what they should be protected from and thus either supported 
segregation or operated within such a framework. Liberals believed in the power of 
persuasion. They thus lobbied influential liberal public figures and worked within 
government departments to achieve their goals. The ‘non-political’ South African Institute of 
Race Relations (SAIRR), to which NUSAS was affiliated, was as the former’s name 
suggests, the premier liberal research think tank on black–white relations, providing welfare 
liberals with scientifically derived data on which to base their campaigns for the 
amelioration of black living conditions. Liberals believe in the efficacy of contact, co-
operation and dialogue. Liberal bodies such as the Joint Councils of Europeans and 
Africans provided a forum for liberal, moderate black and white opinion and acted as a 
political safety valve for the black population, most of who were excluded from political 
participation. On a political level, the crowning achievement of South African liberalism was 
the nineteenth century non-racial Cape constitution, which granted the franchise to all 
‘civilised’ men in the Colony. This qualified franchise was enshrined in the Union 
constitution of 1910 though liberals failed to extend it to the rest of the country. Extending 
the Cape’s non-racial franchise and increasingly, in the hostile segregationist racist milieu 
after 1910, preserving it, became the major political project of South African liberalism. 
                                                          
5 R. Elphick, ‘Mission Christianity and inter-war liberalism’,  J. Butler, R. Elphick and D. Welsh (eds), 
Democratic liberalism in South Africa: its history and prospect, Wesleyan University Press and David Philip, 
Middletown, Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1987, p. 66.  
6 R. Elphick, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 
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From the mid-1930s, the inclusion of Fort Hare in NUSAS on the basis of a common 
studenthood was the major aim of NUSAS liberals and was one of the primary reasons for 
splitting the fledgling organisation straight down the middle. In order to discuss this, it is 
necessary briefly to examine the nature of the universities whose student bodies comprised 
NUSAS.  
The characteristics and composition of South African universities 
In 1918 the South African College (founded in 1829) and Victoria College (founded in 
1866) were transformed by an Act of Parliament into fully autonomous institutions of higher 
education and became the Universities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch respectively. At 
the same time, the Transvaal University College (TUC) with branches in Johannesburg 
(founded as the South African School of the Mines and Technology in 1904) and Pretoria 
(founded in 1908), Grey University College (GUC), Bloemfontein (founded in 1904), the 
Natal University College (NUC), in Pietermaritzburg (founded in 1909), Rhodes University 
College, Grahamstown (founded in 1904) and Huguenot University College (HUC), 
Wellington (founded in 1874) became constituent university colleges of the federal 
examining body, the University of South Africa, formerly the University of the Cape of Good 
Hope. To these were added at a later stage, Potchefstroom University College for Christian 
Higher Education (PUCCHE), established in 1919 and the Durban branch of Natal 
University in 1923, which had evolved from the Durban Technical College.7 In 1922, TUC 
Johannesburg became the independent University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) and in 
1930, TUC Pretoria became the University of Pretoria. In 1949, Natal, Potchefstroom, the 
Orange Free State and Rhodes became independent universities with Fort Hare falling 
under Rhodes. Over time, each institution developed a distinctive character and ethos of its 
own. 
The Universities of Cape Town (UCT), the Witwatersrand (Wits), Natal and Rhodes were 
regarded as English-speaking institutions. UCT, like its predecessor, the South African 
College, adopted a ‘universalist’ approach to education and within the local context 
embraced a policy of broad white South Africanism. South Africanism was not really put 
into practice as the university failed to adopt bilingualism and moreover, maintained its 
British character and orientation.8 Wits owed its existence to the needs of the rapidly 
industrialising and expanding Witwatersrand, and, like UCT, exuded an air of ‘minor British 
provincialism’.9 The British orientation of Wits and UCT occurred despite the presence at 
                                                          
7 E. Brookes, A history of the University of Natal, University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 1966, p. 29. 
8 H. Phillips, The University of Cape Town 1918-1948, UCT Press, Cape Town, 1993, pp. 114, 116-117. 
9 B. Murray, Wits - the early years: a history of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg and its 
precursors (1896-1939), Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1982, p. 327. 
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both institutions of a significant minority of Afrikaans-speaking students. At Wits their 
numbers declined from a quarter of the student body in 1939 to less than seven percent in 
1964 while at UCT during the same period they dropped from a high of forty percent to just 
over nine percent.10 Their numbers declined for cultural and political reasons11 as well as 
because more course offerings became available at the Afrikaans-medium universities in 
the 1940s and 1950s. Faculties of Medicine and Engineering were opened at Pretoria in 
1943 and 1956 respectively and at Stellenbosch in 1956 and 1943.12 NUC was located in a 
province where strong ties to Britain and sporadic separatist tendencies characterised its 
English–speaking inhabitants, the bulk of the white population. Thus NUC was an 
overwhelmingly English-speaking institution, though its Durban branch (UND), with its 
(white) part-time classes13 attracted an Afrikaans-speaking minority, as did 
Pietermaritzburg’s Agricultural Faculty.14 In 1936 a separate black branch of NUC 
(University of Natal Non-European – (UNNE) was opened at Sastri College in Durban. It 
offered a limited number of degree courses to black students (initially mainly Indian) on a 
part-time basis, staff from the white UND duplicating their lectures at the black campus 
after hours.15 Post-matric students at Adams College were regarded as internal students of 
NUC too, until the mission institution’s closure in the 1950s.16 The establishment of Rhodes 
in Grahamstown, as the university’s name suggests, was intimately connected to the 
British imperial project.17 As such it was composed of students almost solely of English-
speaking background and, like NUC (Pietermaritzburg), attracted a large number from 
across the Limpopo.18 Nonetheless, Afrikaans-speakers played a prominent role in student 
affairs at Rhodes during the 1950s and 60s. Although these universities were defined as 
‘English’, English speakers were ethnically, culturally and even linguisticly heterogeneous, 
being of English, Scottish, Afrikaans, Yiddish, East European, Mediterranean and North 
European background. This was particularly true of Wits, where the student body, even in 
                                                          
10 Report of the Youth Worker at the University of the Witwatersrand of the Nederduits Hervormde or 
Gereformeerde Church to the Synod of the Church cited in Spoorslag vol. 1 no. 3, June 1951; H. Phillips, op. 
cit., p. 225; B. Murray, Wits the ‘open’ years: a history of the University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg, 
1939-1959, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1997, p. 166; G. Viljoen, ‘The Afrikaans 
universities and particularism’, H. van der Merwe and D. Welsh (eds), The future of the university in Southern 
Africa, St Martin's Press, New York, 1978, p. 175. 
11 H. Phillips, op. cit., p. 368. 
12 ibid., p. 225; B. Murray, Wits the ‘open’ years, p. 173. 
13 E. Brookes, op. cit., p. 51. 
14 In 1956 Afrikaans-speaking students comprised approximately 8% of the total Natal student body and 3.1% 
in 1964. T.F Pettigrew, ‘Personality and socio-cultural factors in inter-group attitudes: a cross national 
comparison’, Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 2 no. 1, March 1958, p. 35; G. Viljoen, op. cit., p. 175. 
15 E. Brookes, op. cit., pp. 44-45; SA Student, October 1950.  
16 E. Brookes, op. cit., p. 45. 
17 R. Currey, Rhodes University 1904-1970 – a Chronicle, Rhodes University Library Press, Grahamstown, 
1970, p. 12; R. Buckland and T. Neville, A story of Rhodes: Rhodes University 1904 to 2004, MacMillan, 
Braamfontein, 2004, pp. 3-4. 
18 R. Buckland and T. Neville, op. cit., p. 11.  
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the early 1970s, reflected the cosmopolitan origins19 of the founders of the Witwatersrand 
mining towns. To the category of ‘English-speakers’ could be added some of the black 
(coloured, Indian and African) students who enrolled in very small but increasing numbers 
at UCT and Wits from the 1920s onwards. In 1949 black students comprised approximately 
four percent of the student bodies of UCT and Wits.20 At UCT in 1956 they made up less 
than eight percent, in 1959, over twelve percent and in 1966 just over six percent. In the 
corresponding years at Wits these figures were under five percent, rising to six percent and 
dropping to just two and a half percent.21 
The South African Native College (SANC), or Fort Hare University College from 1952, 
could also be considered an English-medium institution. Established on the old Eastern 
frontier of the Cape Colony at Alice in 1916, by missionaries of the United Free Church of 
Scotland, it was intended to provide higher secondary education and from 1923, university 
tuition for Africans in Southern Africa.22 Fort Hare embodied the benevolent paternalism of 
mission Christianity and conservative liberalism. Students were groomed into ‘Christian’, 
‘English’, ‘gentlemen’ and ‘women’ and on this basis could expect to enter the ‘civilised’ 
white world, albeit on an unequal basis. This quasi-assimilationist missionary paternalism 
was at odds with that of the white segregationist electorate and from the 1950s came to be 
resented by many Fort Hare students too.23 This will be discussed later. Fort Hare was a 
prestigious institution. It could count amongst its alumni many Africans prominent in public 
life and Southern Africa’s liberation movements.24 The college attracted a significant 
number of coloured and Indian students but to retain its African character, non-African 
enrolment was kept below thirty percent.25 For those who attended the college, Fort Hare 
embodied, uniquely for South Africa, an embryonic non-racial society. Most students came 
                                                          
19 T.F. Pettigrew, op. cit., p. 35; H. Lunn, ‘Hippies, radicals and the sounds of silence’: cultural dialectics at two 
South African universities 1966-1976, PhD thesis, University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, 2010, pp. 28-30.  
20 Percentages derived from student enrolment in Union of South Africa (UG 64), Department of Education, Arts 
and Science Annual Report 1950, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1950.  
21 At UCT the actual number of black students to the total was 1956: 339/4377; 1959: 633/5104; 1966: 
401/6392. At Wits these were: 1956: 213/4656; 1959: 307/5120; 1966: 195/7650. M. Horrell, A Survey of Race 
Relations 1956-7, 1961, 1966, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1957, 1961, 1966. At 
Natal these figures were 1949: 227/1869 (12%); 1956: 415/2604 (19%); 1959: 726/3405 (21%); 1966: 
688/5242 (13%). Union of South Africa (UG 64), Department of Education, Arts and Science Annual Report 
1950, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1950; Union of South Africa (No UG no), Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry on separate training facilities for non-Europeans at universities, 1953-4 (Holloway Commission), 
Government Printer, Pretoria, 1954, p. 33; M. Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations 1956-7, 1961, 1966, South 
African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg,1957, 1961, 1966. 
22 D. Williams, A history of the University College of Fort Hare, South Africa – the 1950s: the waiting years, 
Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter, 2001, pp. 3-4. 
23 BC 586 M1 (Z45), ‘Minutes of mass meetings 1951-1956’, 28.3.1951; 23.5.1951; 17.3.1952; 21.5.1952; 
24.3.1954; South African Native College Calendar, 1951, p. 63; 1952, p. 82. 
24 These included Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Govan Mbeki, Z.K. Matthews, Chris Hani of the African 
National Congress, Robert Sobukwe and Anton Lembede of the Pan Africanist Congress, Robert Mugabe of 
the Zimbabwe African National Union –Patriotic Front and Ntsu Mokhele of the Basutoland Congress Party. 
25 H. Burrows, A. Kerr, Z. Matthews, A short pictorial history of the University College of Fort Hare 1916-1959, 
Lovedale, Alice, 1961, p. 48. A quota was imposed on the enrolment of Indian students in 1944 when they 
comprised fifteen percent of the student population. Fort Hare Calendar, 1945, p. 70.  
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from the Eastern Cape but by the 1950s larger numbers hailed from the Transvaal26 and 
Natal. By 1958, half the student body came from the urban areas27 accounting perhaps for 
the growing militancy of the student body - urbanised youth being regarded as more 
politicised than their counterparts from rural schools.28 Most students (with the exception of 
the small number of female students) came from modest to impoverished backgrounds, 
even those from the increasingly pressurised traditional ruling elite, gentry and educated 
middle class. Black students were generally older than their white counterparts, having 
worked beforehand to earn the requisite tuition and residence fees, fees that were 
nonetheless lower than those at any other South African university.29  
With the exception of those at Fort Hare, the bulk of students at the English-medium 
universities were middle class. In 1956 approximately twenty seven percent of white 
students at the University of Natal categorised their fathers as ‘manual workers’30 while by 
1959 it was estimated that few Wits students came from Johannesburg’s working class 
southern suburbs. As the state subsidised university education by only sixty percent in 
1959, tuition fees were high, those at Wits reputed to be the highest in the Commonwealth 
in 1954.31 Residential universities like Rhodes and Pietermaritzburg were out of reach to all 
but the wealthy. A minority of students owned motorcars. From the mid-1950s there was an 
acute shortage of parking on campuses like Wits and UCT, indicating that a significant 
number of students were nonetheless privileged enough to have access to motor vehicles. 
For those less affluent, the provincial education departments offered bursaries to 
prospective teachers32 while some students supplemented the cost of their education – 
estimated at 300 pounds per annum in the mid-1950s33 - through part-time and holiday 
employment. NUSAS operated a vacation employment scheme and a loan fund both of 
which were always over-subscribed. South African universities were dubbed the 
‘playgrounds of the idle rich’.34 Thus it is safe to assume that the majority of students at the 
Afrikaans-medium universities were also from middle-class backgrounds though perhaps 
not as affluent.  
The University of Stellenbosch, TUC, GUC and PUCCHE were all regarded as Afrikaans-
                                                          
26 D. Burchell, ‘The emergence and growth of student militancy at the University College of Fort Hare in the 
1940s and 1950s’, Journal of the University of Durban- Westville, New Series 3, 1986, p. 151. 
27 H. Burrows et al., op. cit., pp. 24, 50. 
28 D. Burchell, op. cit., p. 151. 
29 Union of South Africa (UG no. 64), Department of Education, Arts and Science, Annual Report 1951, p. 99. 
30 T.F. Pettigrew, op. cit., p. 34. 
31 BC 586 G1, M. O’ Dowd, ‘Statement on the high proportion of failures amongst first year university students, 
11.3.1954’; J. Muller, ‘South Africa’, P. Altbach (ed), International higher education: an encyclopaedia, Garland, 
New York and London, 1991, p. 418.  
32 SA Student vol. 10 no. 2, March 1955. 
33 I. Suttner (ed), Cutting through the mountain: interviews with South African Jewish activists, Viking Penguin, 
Johannesburg, 1997, p. 473. 
34 SA Student vol. 21 no. 1, August 1955. 
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speaking institutions. PUCCHE was Dutch/Afrikaans-medium from its inception as was 
Stellenbosch from 1918. TUC and GUC began as essentially English-style institutions, but 
serving the needs primarily of Afrikaans-speaking students. Yet, beginning in the 1920s 
both GUC and TUC underwent Afrikanerisation as proponents of the Afrikaans Language 
Movement fought protracted battles at both institutions for Afrikaans to be used as a 
medium of instruction. Bilingualism was formally adopted at Pretoria in 1930 and at GUC in 
1938. Eventually, Afrikaans became the sole medium of instruction at Pretoria in 1932 and 
at the University College of the Orange Free State (UCOFS - the former GUC) in 1943.35 
Nonetheless, a small but significant number of English-speakers enrolled at Pretoria, the 
Orange Free State and Stellenbosch – in 1964 they numbered less than nine percent at 
Pretoria and just over six percent at the UOFS and Stellenbosch.36 
The Afrikaans universities could be classified as ‘volksuniversiteite’ (peoples/nation 
universities), institutions with a strong link and commitment to the (Afrikaner) ethnic group 
and thus Afrikaner nationalism (‘volksnasionalisme’).37 PUCCHE, which grew out of the 
Gereformeerde Kerk seminary at Burgersdorp rooted the concept of the volksuniversiteit 
not only in volksnasionalisme but also in Reformed Calvinism. God created nations and 
thus the volksuniversiteit was commanded by God to serve and protect the identity and 
unique character of the divinely ordained Afrikaner nation.38 This exclusive Christian 
Nationalism of PUCCHE – the college had no real conscience clause even though it was 
publicly funded - ensured that PUCCHE had a different ethos to the other Afrikaans 
universities and its student body did not always act in concert with those on other Afrikaans 
campuses. Students at Stellenbosch often behaved at variance to their northern 
counterparts. Stellenbosch was the cradle of Afrikaner nationalism, but a nationalism 
which, in the nineteenth century, could conceive of a broader more inclusive definition of 
‘Afrikaner’ that could include English-speakers committed to South Africa.   
The Afrikaans universities’ concept of the volksuniversiteit was diametrically at odds with 
the generally accepted Western liberal understanding of a university adopted by the 
English universities, namely: an ‘autonomous community of teachers and students 
dedicated to the search for and service of truth’.39 This had implications for university 
autonomy and academic freedom. The volksuniversiteit was subordinate to the Afrikaner 
nation and thus to the state whereas the English-medium universities asserted their 
                                                          
35 H.B.  Thom (ed.), Stellenbosch 1866-1966: Honderd jaar hoër onderwys, Nasionale Boekhandel, Cape 
Town, 1966, p. 38; G. Viljoen, op. cit., pp. 172, 176-181. 
36 G. Viljoen, op. cit., p. 175. 
37 J. Degenaar, ‘The concept of a volksuniversiteit’, H. van der Merwe and D. Welsh (eds), op. cit., pp. 148, 
152. 
38 ibid., pp. 152, 158-160. 
39 ibid., p. 160. 
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independence of both. English universities believed in academic freedom: the freedom to 
choose who to teach, what to teach, how to teach and who would teach. H.B. Thom, the 
principal of Stellenbosch believed that academic freedom was ‘possible only on condition 
that the university [was] bound to the volk’.40 Being bound to the nation meant that the 
university could not threaten it and thus there was no need for interference in its internal 
affairs.41 When the government adopted the volksuniversiteit as the national model of the 
university after 1948, it came into conflict with the English universities, their student bodies 
and NUSAS, regarding university autonomy and academic freedom – a major theme of this 
study. 
Afrikaner nationalism and Fort Hare’s membership    
The rise of a more exclusive volksnasionalisme was a response to the dire socio-economic 
situation Afrikaners found themselves in during the late 1920s and 30s as well as to a 
realignment of Afrikaner Nationalist forces during the gold standard crisis which followed 
the 1929 Wall Street Crash. In the ensuing economic depression, Hertzog’s ruling NP was 
forced into a coalition and finally in 1934 a fusion with Smuts’s South African Party (SAP). 
A small group of Nationalists led by Cape leader, D.F. Malan rejected Fusion and the 
United Party (UP) which flowed from it, and formed the Gesuiwerde (Purified) National 
Party (GNP). GNP intellectuals recast Afrikaner nationalism by infusing its earlier more 
secular version with Potchefstroom’s Christian Nationalism and nineteenth century 
‘Krugerism’ and the cultural, ‘volkisch’ integral nationalism which was giving rise to Nazism 
in Europe.42 Thus it was held that a nation (‘volk’) could only fulfil its God-given calling in 
complete independence from other nations, and that the individual could only achieve 
his/her full potential by service to the volk and not apart from it.43 This exclusive ethnic 
nationalism became the driving force behind the emergence of the Afrikaans Economic 
Movement and the creation of separate Afrikaans cultural and community organisations 
and trade unions44 including student unions. 
However, it was NUSAS’s relationship with black students which precipitated the rise of an 
exclusive Afrikaans student movement and marked the failure of broad white South 
Africanism in the student sphere. By the late 1920s the ‘native question’ had begun to take 
precedence over inter-white relations. The promulgation of the segregatory Land Act of 
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1913, which stripped Africans of the bulk of their land and by implication their limited 
franchise in the Cape, led to the formation of the South African Native National Congress 
(SANNC) in 1912. The respectable constitutional protests and lobbying by the largely 
middle class SANNC for their inclusion in white society was eclipsed in the 1920s by the 
militant struggles of the urban and rural working class championed by the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) and to a lesser extent the Communist Party of South 
Africa (CPSA). The CPSA was founded in 1921 and in 1928 adopted a policy of a black 
‘native republic’.45 The white electorate reacted in alarm. The 1929 ‘black peril election’ 
followed a raft of oppressive security and segregatory legislation and an unsuccessful 
attempt at disenfranchising Cape Africans.46 To the consternation of some students in the 
NUSAS constituency who believed that this marked the onset of imported liberal 
missionary equality,47 a few prominent NUSAS leaders attended a life changing inter-racial 
youth conference at Fort Hare in June 1930 hosted by the Student Christian Association 
(SCA).48 (The SCA was a multi-racial organisation of students and school children brought 
to South Africa from the United States by the founder of the Huguenot University College 
(HUC) in the nineteenth century.49) In July 1933 it was suggested that Fort Hare be invited 
to join NUSAS.50  A commission to investigate this found that the black college was 
constitutionally ineligible for membership because it was affiliated to Rhodes and that 
general student opinion made its inclusion impracticable,51 effectively an appeasement to 
segregation and specifically Afrikaans-speaking students.  
In August 1933 GUC seceded from NUSAS on the grounds that the national union was too 
‘negrophilistic’ in that it followed ‘a negative native policy’ with regard to admitting Fort 
Hare. It was also argued that NUSAS was ‘unafrikaans’, in that English-speaking members 
wished to couple South Africa to Britain. Moreover, it had a ‘liberalistic tendency’ which was 
the ‘result of the strong influence of socialistic, international-minded Jews … who wish to 
effect a general world citizenship, without founding it on genuine nationalism’.52 The 
reasons for Potchefstroom’s secession later that year were similar but more explicitly anti-
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Semitic and overtly nationalistic.53 Pretoria left shortly after the others. In September 1933, 
a month after GUC had left NUSAS, the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond (ANS) was 
‘hastily’ launched in Bloemfontein.54 Its founders were Piet Meyer, the chief protagonist of 
GUC's disaffiliation from NUSAS55 and Nico Diederichs, a former NUSAS executive 
member.56 While studying abroad, both had assimilated the Neofichtean political 
philosophy of Northern Europe57 while in addition, Diederichs had cultivated strong ties 
with the ultra-nationalist European student organisation, the Dietsche Orde,58 the 
inspiration for the ANS.59 The ANS was an extreme nationalist organisation based on 
Christian National principles60 which became increasingly pro-Nazi, even accepting an 
invitation to attend the congress of the German Nazi Party in 1938.61 The ANS was later 
absorbed into the Ossewabrandwag (OB), a para-military organisation established in 1937 
which also had ties to the Third Reich and was intent on setting-up a republican, national-
socialist Afrikaans state.62 The ANS newspaper, Die Wapenskou, was at the forefront of 
developing and disseminating Christian Nationalism.63 The student bodies of the three 
northern Afrikaans universities as well as those from the Afrikaans teacher training colleges 
(Normal Colleges) joined this student union64 and by 1938 had the support of forty eight 
percent of all Afrikaans-speaking students.65 
Stellenbosch remained in NUSAS and called on the disaffiliated centres to return to the 
national union and discuss their grievances - grievances with which Stellenbosch identified 
too. Accordingly, in late 1933 Stellenbosch negotiated on behalf of the northern universities 
that NUSAS would inter alia become fully bilingual and that ANS would be recognised as a 
cultural and religious organisation complementing the work done by NUSAS. No unanimity 
could be reached however, on the requirement that no black students would be admitted to 
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membership.66 These, and attempted negotiations by NUSAS with ANS regarding dual 
membership, failed67 and in 1936 Stellenbosch disaffiliated from NUSAS and joined ANS.68 
By 1936 then, two distinct student organisations had emerged, one stridently Afrikaner 
nationalist, the other, still clinging to its inclusiveness and goal of cultivating a broad white 
South Africanism, but consisting by default only of students enrolled at English-speaking 
universities. Within NUSAS tensions existed between those advocating rapprochement 
with the Afrikaans centres, and those liberals and radicals - particularly at Wits - who felt 
that NUSAS should abandon segregation, become truly inclusive and admit Fort Hare and 
other black students to membership.69   
The divisive issue of Fort Hare’s affiliation was shelved during the Second World War.70 
The UP’s decision to enter the War on the side of Great Britain and the Allies and the 
subsequent departure of J.B.M. Hertzog from the party, dealt a blow to the ideal of a broad 
white South Africanism symbolised by Fusion. It posed a dilemma for NUSAS. By 
supporting the Allied struggle for democracy and freedom, ideals that were also enshrined 
in the NUSAS constitution, NUSAS would both jeopardise its non-political position as well 
as destroy all hopes of a re-united white national student union. In 1940 NUSAS made its 
first foray into ‘party politics’ and adopted, far from unanimously,71 an anti-fascist ‘War 
motion’ which endorsed all UP War policy, including controversially, black mobilisation and 
the neutralisation of pro-Nazi groupings within South Africa.72 The War contributed to the 
political polarisation of student affairs at the linguistically mixed Wits and UCT. This had 
consequences for NUSAS too: both the pro-War UC Tattle and the anti-War/pro-Axis Die 
Spantou were suppressed by the UCT authorities and SRC for jeopardising the War effort 
and generating ‘racial hatred’.73 The enlistment of a sizeable number of mainly English-
speaking UCT students74 - presumably UP supporters - led to a shift in the balance of 
power in campus politics. Arguing that NUSAS was 'unafrikaans' and 'political' in 
supporting the War, the substantially augmented NP and ANS contingent on the UCT SRC 
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succeeded in abolishing UCT's automatic membership of the national union.75 A statement 
allegedly made at a Wits mass meeting in June 1941 in support of Fort Hare being invited 
to join NUSAS, that Wits would ‘rather co-operate with a hundred natives than with a 
thousand Afrikaners’76 was the pretext for the unofficial one hundred and twenty-strong 
Wits ANS branch’s decision to embark on an anti-Semitic, racist, and eventually successful 
campaign to persuade Afrikaans universities to sever all ties with Wits students.77 The 
exclusion of Fort Hare led to the virtual extinction of NUSAS at Wits. In 1943 a rival, but 
overtly political national union, the Federation of Progressive Students (FOPS) was 
established by Wits students to champion the creation of a democratic and non-racial 
society and secure Fort Hare’s entry to NUSAS.78 However, FOPS was refused recognition 
at UCT79 but won control of the Wits SRC in 1944, a position it retained for a number of 
years.80   
The structure and functioning of NUSAS after the Second World War 
In order to elaborate further, it is necessary to examine the political views held by students 
at NUSAS universities as well as the structure and functioning of the national union. During 
the Second World War, NUSAS was in theory a federation of the SRCs of all the English-
medium universities as well as the Afrikaans-medium HUC. In practice however, because 
of its indecisive policy on segregation, NUSAS came to be divorced from the SRCs and 
power resided in individuals and members of campus NUSAS branches. Largely because 
of the shelving of the divisive Fort Hare issue, a thriving three hundred and fifty-strong 
NUSAS branch operated at UCOFS throughout the War, though not on the other ANS-
affiliated campuses where NUSAS was proscribed.81 Partly to mitigate the effects of the 
ANS’s recruitment of the Afrikaans Normal Colleges and its indoctrination of teachers and 
school children with Christian National Education (CNE), NUSAS invited the English-
medium teacher training colleges to affiliate in 1936.82 Each affiliated SRC paid 
membership fees to NUSAS based on the number of students registered at their university. 
Thus all registered students at a NUSAS-affiliated centre automatically became members 
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of the national union whether they wanted to or not. Branches like those at UCOFS paid 
membership fees only for those students who had voluntarily joined them. Thus the bulk of 
NUSAS’s membership fees were derived from the large centres of Wits and UCT.  
NUSAS convened an annual council, later renamed a ‘student assembly’, where 
representatives of the affiliated SRCs and local branches made policy for the national 
union, policy which remained ‘non-political’ and limited to student and educational matters 
– a ‘students-as-such’ orientation. The council elected an executive, headed by a 
president, the executive and president being responsible for carrying out NUSAS policy. 
Until the late 1950s, the presidency was an unpaid, part-time office, usually occupied by a 
leading student at Wits or UCT. The day-to-day administration of NUSAS was in the hands 
of a paid General Secretary based at the NUSAS head office in Cape Town. Contact 
between the scattered executive members, the head office and SRCs, was through written 
correspondence.  
NUSAS was also a student trade union providing welfare services for its membership 
through its Student Relief Department. Thus it operated an Employment Bureau, which 
sourced part-time and vacation jobs for students, a Supply Association which sold 
textbooks at discounted rates and a facility for the printing of lecture notes and examination 
papers.83 More benefits were introduced after the War. These included the Loan Fund 
which offered interest-free loans to students,84 mostly black by the 1960s, a discount 
scheme arranged with various commercial undertakings patronised by students, a baby-
sitting scheme offering student employment, and even a facility for acquiring short and long 
term insurance.85 The Travel Department offered quality overseas tours to students, 
though only the very affluent could afford these.86 The capital reserves accumulated from 
these tremendously popular ventures allowed NUSAS to survive the Second World War 
financially intact even though with the disruption of shipping the tours ceased. During the 
1950s, the Travel Department expanded its offerings and co-ordinated the issuing of the 
International Student Card. In 1972 the Travel Department was incorporated as the not-for-
profit South African Students’ Travel Service.87 
A Department of Social Research conducted studies into national issues such as white 
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poverty,88 the Transkei,89 and the origins of segregation in South Africa.90 On the 
campuses this research, as well as more parochial projects aimed at identifying and 
ameliorating social problems91 (in the manner of the liberal SAIRR), was undertaken by the 
newly created Local Committees, the ‘nuts and bolts’ of NUSAS.92 In addition, the Local 
Committees administered NUSAS student welfare projects, undertook fundraising, 
organised lectures, and linked up with external welfare organisations such as the Adult 
Night School Movement,93 the South African National Tuberculosis Association and in the 
1960s, the Kupugani feeding scheme and the South African Blood Service. Local 
Committees, to which students joined voluntarily, became the training grounds of the new 
generation of student leaders, both of NUSAS and the SRCs. They were the most ‘political’ 
structures in NUSAS and were frequently out of touch with current student opinion. On 
occasion they became the home of a particular political grouping or a battleground for 
competing political ideologies and sometimes challenged the hegemony of the 
democratically elected SRCs on the campuses and in NUSAS forums.94  
The ideological orientation of students at the NUSAS-affiliated universities  
Few studies have been conducted into students’ political attitudes and thus it is difficult to 
gauge the political allegiances of the student bodies at the NUSAS universities. Based on 
the understanding that most white students were middle-class, most were English-
speaking and at Wits, UCT and Durban, most were day students, it can be assumed that 
until the early 1960s, most white Wits, UCT and Durban students supported the UP, the 
party which held the middle class urban constituencies from which most of them came. In 
1956 less than twelve percent95 of white Natal undergraduate students supported the NP, 
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but nonetheless the bulk of the student body upheld white supremacist ideas similar to 
those of the NP, believing for example that Africans were inherently ‘primitive’ and 
‘uncivilised’ and thus suited to manual labour rather than skilled, responsible work.96 
Presumably then, Natal students were UP adherents and assuming that many of them 
came from Natal, a significant number probably identified with the Natal separatist and 
communal segregationist ideas of Heaton Nichols who left the Natal UP to form the Union 
Federal Party (UFP) in 1953. 
The residential universities of Pietermaritzburg and Rhodes attracted students from the 
Witwatersrand as well as a significant minority from Northern and Southern Rhodesia,97 the 
white inhabitants of the latter being known for their strongly segregationist views. Many 
Rhodes students came from nearby Port Elizabeth, its middle class suburbs the domain of 
the UP until the 1970s. Albany, the constituency in which Grahamstown was located, was a 
UP stronghold. Some Rhodes students voted there, thus suggesting they were UP.98 
Legassick has suggested that Rhodes students were liberal conservatives.  
The affluent urban constituencies of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand frequently returned 
candidates aligned to the liberal left wing of the UP which in the late 1940s was 
represented by the deputy prime-minister, J.H. Hofmeyr.  In 1953 and 1959, a liberal 
minority split from the UP to join the newly formed Liberal Party (LP) and Progressive Party 
(PP) respectively, both of which at their foundation endorsed a common society and a 
qualified non-racial franchise. This will be discussed in more detail during the course of the 
study. A significant number of NUSAS activists supported the ever radicalising LP and by 
1966, the NUSAS president estimated that of the thirty percent of politically aware students 
at the NUSAS-affiliated universities, the vast majority were adherents of the PP.  The 
apathetic ‘non/a-political’ complement supported the UP or NP, though not out of 
ideological commitment but rather because of lack of exposure to a rationally argued 
alternative viewpoint and the political indoctrination stemming from ‘Current Affairs’ type 
programmes99 (the voice of the NP) aired by the state-controlled South African 
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Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) on the English radio service. The politically 
conscientised liberal and the non-political/apathetic/NP/UP dichotomy is reinforced when it 
is realised that large mass meetings, marches and demonstrations at Wits and UCT during 
the 1950s and 1960s drew a maximum of forty percent of the student body and could be 
relied on to deliver a liberal vote. 
Branches of political parties and overtly political organisations were banned on all 
campuses100 but nonetheless operated unofficially at, for example, Wits and UCT.  At 
Rhodes,101 Pietermartizburg, and Durban, as well as at the teacher training colleges, 
elections to the SRCs were not on a political basis, most offices being filled by 
representatives of the faculties and residences. Without pre-secured mandates, this made 
it difficult for these SRCs to represent the viewpoints of their student bodies in the NUSAS 
assembly where increasingly complex political and ethical issues were debated and stands 
taken. More often than not, delegates presented their own personal views sometimes with 
serious repercussions for themselves subsequently with their student bodies. At UCT and 
Wits, ideological groupings put up slates of candidates for election and by means of 
‘schlentering’ (lobbying in a manner perceived to be underhand) hoped to ensure the 
adoption of their policies by student government. Election manifestoes were published in 
the student press and aspirant SRC candidates faced the student constituency at specially 
convened electoral mass meetings. By the 1960s, some candidates spent large sums on 
their electoral campaigns.102  
In most years on all campuses, at least one ideologically committed Nationalist sat on the 
SRC. Thriving Afrikaans student societies existed at Wits, UCT103 and Rhodes, though the 
latter’s was small.  The Wits Afrikaanse Studenteklub became a vehicle for NP mobilisation 
from the late 1950s onwards (discussed during the course of this study) but during the late 
1940s and early 1950s, many Afrikaans-speaking students at Wits were believed to be 
neither ‘conscious of the struggle of the Afrikaner’104 nor members or regular attenders of 
the Afrikaans churches105 leading, for example, in 1951 to the closure of the campus 
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branch of the Afrikaanse Taal en Kultuur Vereeniging for lack of student interest.106 The 
Afrikaans student associations at UCT and Rhodes were largely non-political social clubs, 
hosting concerts, day trips and ‘volkspele’ (traditional dancing),107 and were led on 
occasion by liberals. For example, the Rhodes 1957 chairperson was Jan Breitenbach 
who, as headmaster of St Johns College, Johannesburg, opened the school to all races 
and abolished cadets108 while the 1964 chair was Johan Maree, later a Marxist sociologist 
with ties to the progressive trade union movement. A poll conducted at UCT in 1958 
revealed that most campus Afrikaans-speakers were not in favour of the removal of black 
students from the university,109 official government policy, suggesting that like those at Wits 
a decade earlier, they were either NP dissidents or UP-aligned. 
A small but politically more powerful group than committed Nationalists was the diverse 
radical socialist left. With the entry of the Soviet Union into the Second World War, the 
Comintern-aligned CPSA threw itself enthusiastically into the Allied war effort winning for 
itself for a time a hitherto unknown respectability in South Africa. Some student members 
and adherents of the CPSA were attracted less to the doctrinaire Soviet communism of the 
party but more to its non-racialism and political equality – unique in South African politics. 
The Trotskyite left was committed to permanent revolution and was anti-Stalinist. It was 
composed of inter alia, the predominantly coloured Anti-CAD, the Progressive Forum, 
various ‘Fellowship’ societies and after it fissured in the late 1930s, the rump of the All 
African Convention, the latter an African united front formed in 1935 to oppose the Native 
Trust and Land Act which disenfranchised Cape African voters in 1936. In 1939 these 
various Trotskyite groupings united to form the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM). 
NEUM opposed any collaboration with ruling class, implicitly white structures, including the 
SRC and NUSAS, thus relegating NEUM adherents to the role of armchair intellectuals 
rather than political activists. Exceptions to this passive/non-collaborationist rule occurred 
after NEUM split in 1958, some members of Anti-CAD, the Fellowships and the 
Witwatersrand branch of the AAC affiliate, the Society of Young Africa (SOYA), demanding 
a greater commitment to socialism, non-racial organisational structures and substantial 
white participation.110 Between 1958 and late 1960 a number of NEUM adherents served 
on the UCT and Wits SRCs, pushing these bodies to the left. Both campuses witnessed 
the establishment of non-racial, NEUM-leaning but largely non-partisan Student Fellowship 
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Societies.111  
To the radical left could be added various independent Marxists as well as democratic 
socialists and social democrats, the latter two who accepted a constitutional route to 
socialism. Formative influences on the radical left included Zionist socialist youth groups 
like Hashomair Hatzair, family backgrounds rooted in trade unionism and the white Labour 
Party, the Indian Congresses (established initially in 1894 by Mahatma Gandhi to oppose 
trading restrictions on Indians), the Springbok Legion (a radical ex-servicemen’s ‘trade 
union’ which had a branch at Wits112) and even the Catholic Church.  
Socialists were organised into various campus societies. A student branch of the CPSA113 
competed with its anti-Stalinist rival, the Progressive Forum (with which NUSAS stalwarts 
Philip Tobias and Sydney Brenner sympathised114) for the loyalty of the Wits radical left.115 
However, the major socialist organisation at Wits during the Second World War was the 
Students’ Labour League (SLL), initially affiliated to the white Labour Party. The SLL put up 
a candidate in the Johannesburg municipal elections. Following its banning on the Wits 
campus, the SLL was replaced by FOPS.116 FOPS at Wits and UCT was not sectarian and 
was composed of an ideologically diverse group of radicals, as was the Diogenes Society 
at the Wits Medical School and UCT’s (unofficial?) Student Socialist Party.117  
UCT’s long-standing Modern World Society, in existence since at least 1940118 and still 
extant in the mid-1960s was an uneasy mix of CPSA adherents, Trotskyites and other 
Marxists. Moreover, it had close ties to the Modern Youth Society which in turn had links to 
the ANC’s youth wing, the Youth League (ANCYL),119 established in 1944. During the late 
1940s and early 1950s, almost the entire executive of the Transvaal ANCYL was studying 
at Wits. Reflecting the organisation’s ideological characteristics, Wits Youth Leaguers, 
including Law student, Nelson Mandela, were African nationalist and anti-communist and 
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suspicious of the white left in general.120 Nonetheless, some Youth Leaguers like Diliza Mji 
and Peter Tsele served on the Wits SRC121 with well-known CPSA adherents such as Joe 
Slovo and Harold Wolpe and with them participated in the NUSAS assembly deliberations.  
During the 1940s, the political allegiances of Fort Hare students were divided unequally 
between the nationally weak ANC and the more prominent All African Convention (AAC). 
Eddie Roux, the botanist, visited Fort Hare to recruit members to the CPSA in 1933. 
Whether he succeeded to do so is unclear – students did read the CPSA magazine Indlela 
Yenkululeko - but his visit led to an official ban on political discussion on the campus.122 
Nonetheless, student life at Fort Hare was deeply political. Political debate was the 
‘favourite pastime’, the ‘main game’.123 Moreover, seemingly non-political issues such as 
how students viewed the future,124 the quality of food, compulsory attendance at church 
services or rules imposed by the Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian ministers who 
administered the university residences in a somewhat rigid fashion could provoke student 
mobilisation.125   
Radical left wing societies were seemingly absent at Rhodes and Natal, though radical 
students did at times make their presence felt there. A radical grouping of students from 
UNNE and Durban were sometimes gathered together by Durban Psychology lecturer, Kurt 
Danziger (a member of the Communist Party) during the mid-1950s, if only to establish 
their suitability for recruitment to the Communist Party.126 Many UNNE students were 
deeply politicised and were aligned to the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the ANC127 and the 
NEUM. While waiting for their late afternoon/evening classes to commence, they spent 
their time arguing about philosophy, socialism and communism. The UNNE student 
newspaper, Student Call (edited in the mid-1950s by Mac Maharaj, a communist member 
of the NIC and later a member of the ANC’s armed wing and presidential advisor to Jacob 
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Zuma) was banned by the Natal University authorities because of its confrontational tone 
and was thus brought out clandestinely.128  
The white campuses of Durban and Pietermaritzburg had peculiarities which led to the 
existence of distinctly conservative pockets of students. Pietermaritzburg’s Faculty of 
Agriculture had a dual system of control whereby staff members were both university 
employees and bilingual civil servants answerable to the state.129 Many were Afrikaner 
Nationalists, some of whom were members of the Broederbond, a secret Afrikaans male 
organisation established in 1918 to champion Afrikaner language, culture and economic 
interests which was intimately entwined with the NP. This institutional conservatism added 
to the conservativeness of agriculture students, many of whom hailed from rural farming 
communities in South Africa and across the Limpopo (forty percent from the 
‘Rhodesias’).130 Many would become farmers themselves or enter the civil service as 
agricultural officers. Agricultural students (‘agrics’) were a powerful presence at 
Pietermaritzburg. Known for their drinking, rugby and rowdiness, the ‘farmer’s song’ was 
the ‘anthem’ of Pietermaritzburg sung at inter-university sports events. Agrics were not 
interested in the ‘political issues of the day’, ‘accepted the prevailing paternalistic attitudes 
regarding race relations’ and were generally anti-NP.131 During some years agriculture 
students stirred from their apathy and awoke to their political strength and took control of 
the SRC, pushing it in a more conservative, less ‘political’ direction.  
Relative to other faculties in the university and to other universities, Durban had a 
preponderance of commerce and engineering students, students known for their 
conservative bent,132 presumably because they dealt with numbers and inanimate objects 
rather than people as in the humanities and medicine. Unlike at Wits, where engineers 
were a vocal and disruptive force at mass meetings,133 but generally eschewed organised 
student politics, ‘engineers were the main drivers of political life on the Durban campus’.134 
‘We are the engineers from varsity’ was the anthem of Durban.135 Adding to the 
conservativeness of Durban was the existence of a very powerful Accountancy Society 
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during the 1950s and 1960s.136 Many accounting students were part-timers holding down 
full-time jobs. They were often older and had more responsibilities and were probably less 
affluent than the average student, making it likely that they had outgrown or could not 
afford the youthful idealism which drove much left wing student activism.  
Rhodes opened a Faculty of Divinity in the 1950s. This lent a new character to the campus. 
During the 1960s divinity students played a prominent role in student life, also in campus 
politics, where they were often liberal left.137 The Universities of Cape Town and the 
Witwatersrand were liberal in the sense that they upheld a conscience clause and did not 
subscribe to any religious beliefs. Official university functions were devoid of religious 
trappings and students were not asked their religious affiliations on their application 
forms.138 Wits established a Divinity Faculty in 1962 but it was only in 1967 that UCT 
introduced any faith studies, and even then, these took the form of comparative religion139 
rather than the theology of any specific faith. Nonetheless, like at the other universities, 
religion played an important role in many students’ lives.  
Student Jewish Associations (SJA) existed on all the English-medium white campuses as 
well as at Stellenbosch.140 Their affiliation to the cautious South African Union of Jewish 
and Zionist Students tempered the liberalism and radicalism of much of the SJAs’ 
membership. Large branches of the evangelical ecumenical SCA existed on all university 
campuses. Though it preached a social gospel141 and ecumenicism tends to tolerance, the 
SCA was apolitical and implicitly conservative in the 1950s and 60s. This conservatism 
possibly stemmed from appeasing the conservative Afrikaans-speaking section.142 The 
SCA divided into racially and linguistically separate structures in 1951 because of English 
fears of Afrikaans domination. However, Afrikaans-speakers had long demanded 
separation and had taken the bulk of its membership into a new Afrikaanse Christen 
Studentevereniging.143 During the mid-1960s the SCA left the World Student Christian 
Federation after the world body condemned apartheid. This is discussed in chapter ten.  
Separate to the SCAs were the Anglican Students’ Societies (affiliated to the Anglican 
Students’ Federation) established after the War on all English-medium campuses as well 
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as at Fort Hare and Stellenbosch.144 The ASF preached non-racialism and liberalism and 
during the 1960s engaged with radical theology and political thought, its newsletters, for 
example, interrogating the ideas of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a Lutheran theologian murdered by 
the Nazis.145 The National Catholic Federation of Students (NCFS) was established in 
1945 by a socialist vice-president of NUSAS, Jimmy Stewart, and had branches on most 
university campuses. The NCFS remained closely associated with NUSAS, even bearing 
the inscription ‘in association with NUSAS’ and hosted its congresses simultaneously with 
NUSAS at the same venue. It remained consistently liberal – most members in the 1960s 
were believed to be supporters of the Progressive or Liberal Parties - although pressure 
from students and priests at Pretoria pulled it to the right and even in opposition to NUSAS 
on occasion.146 At Fort Hare religious societies like the NCFS and ASF provided an outlet 
for political expression during the politically oppressive 1960s.147  
The conservative Cold War environment of the 1950s witnessed a religious revival in 
Britain.148 South Africa was no exception. At Pietermaritzburg, attendance at religious 
meetings surpassed that of all other society meetings together.149 Campus crusades led by 
Canon Bryan Green and Dr John Stott of the London-based evangelical Anglican 
University Christian Mission inspired a mass following150 as did the Oxford Movement or 
the Moral Rearmament Movement which eschewed politics and sought a change in heart 
and a dedication to a life of purity amongst its adherents.151 During the late 1960s, Michael 
Cassidy’s African Enterprise also drew packed meetings.152  
An Islamic Society existed at Wits during the 1950s and early 60s153 and a Muslim prayer 
room existed at UCT along with those provided for other faiths. In the late 1960s a series of 
controversial debates, political rather than religious, between Zionists and Muslims 
regarding Israel/Palestine took place at UCT.154 UCT hosted inter-faith meetings during the 
late 1950s155 while Wits launched an ‘ecumenical dialogue’ in 1967.156 Flowing from the 
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1960s counter-culture movement, Sufism, Buddhism and Taoism won a following at UCT 
and Wits.157 The Dissenters Society at Rhodes hosted a Hindu swami158 while 
Atheist/Rationalist societies existed at Wits159 and UCT. Considering how alien atheism 
was to South Africa,160 it is surprising that the UCT society upheld white South African 
racism and in defiance of a student body decision still hosted a whites-only dance in 
1967.161 
The English-medium universities offered a rich variety of clubs and societies for those who 
were interested, but the continuous complaints of student apathy meant that these were 
probably led and patronised only by a minority of the student body. The majority of 
students enthusiastically attended and participated in fun-filled intervarsity rugby matches, 
dances and ambitious charity rag activities,162 but though social, these became deeply 
controversial and politicised because of black participation – discussed in this study.  
Gender relations reflected those of white South African society where women were shut 
out of public life and confined to the domestic arena where they were expected to fulfil the 
role of wife and mother. Thus women enrolled for arts and education courses – teaching 
being regarded as a suitable career for a woman - rather than in, for example, engineering 
and medicine, the Faculty of Medicine at Wits maintaining a twenty to twenty two percent 
female quota.163 Rhodes offered a practical secretarial course during the 1950s, which 
student commentators believed was having the effect of turning the university into a 
‘French finishing school for young ladies’.164  
With the exception of the Second World War period, which witnessed a significant exodus 
of men from the universities,165 women, a minority on all campuses, played a subsidiary 
role in organised campus life and student government. Student newspapers of the 1950s 
and 1960s were littered with pictures of rag queens, drum majorettes, ‘girl of the month’ 
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and even articles on fashion and beauty.166 A somewhat paternalistic and moralistic 
proposal by radical Christian and SJA male SRC members to abolish UCT’s rag queen 
competition and drum majorettes because they bred a ‘definite class of floozy’ was howled 
down because it brought ridicule to the SRC.167 NUSAS was similarly sexist. Amongst the 
wide-ranging topics addressed by its annual winter school, none addressed women’s 
issues or gender. Moreover, the Local Committee at Barkly House Nursery Training 
College even hosted a series of lectures on beauty culture.168 Mannequin parades raised 
funds for NUSAS welfare activities169 and a ‘harem’ of female NUSAS congress goers was 
auctioned off by its male counterparts.170 NUSAS had only two female presidents until the 
1970s, Patricia Arnett and Margaret Marshall. Both headed their campus Local Committees 
and in the case of Patricia Arnett, the outgoing 1951 president, Philip Tobias actively 
championed her candidacy.171 The natural successor to the 1962/3 presidency was a 
woman. Though she was not keen to take up the position, the male NUSAS president, 
Adrian Leftwich, said that however emancipated he was regarding women’s role in society, 
he could not ‘accept…a woman at the head of NUSAS, particularly in the tough political 
context of 1962’.172 Sexism slowly began to give way at the very end of the 1960s following 
the emergence of an international youth counter culture and the rise of the New Left in the 
wake of the student revolutions in the USA and Europe in the second half of the 1960s.  
The New Left stressed popular participation in and democratisation of all institutions within 
society and the cultivation of new forms of consciousness and political mobilisation. An 
international women’s movement emerged which took root on the English-medium 
campuses and in NUSAS in the early 1970s.  The sexual revolution led to suggestions that 
the contraceptive pill be made available at campus student health facilities173 while 
homosexuality became a topic for serious open discussion, though partly because of new 
legislation further criminalising it.174 NUSAS supported the rights of minorities and 
accordingly was represented on a ‘Homosexual Alliance’ aimed at stopping the new 
legislation.175 It is significant that Margaret Marshall, as chief justice of Massachusetts, 
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wrote the ground-breaking and precedent-setting judgement legalising same-sex unions in 
her state in 2003.176 UCT’s famous 1968 ‘Mafeje sit-in’ (discussed during the course of the 
study) embraced ‘free love’ and so incorporated a ‘love-in’.177 ‘Sit-ins’ were new forms of 
protest which entailed the occupation of a building of some power institution in society. 
These often included ‘teach-ins’, open ended participatory seminars pioneered by 
American student Vietnam war protesters and were frequently accompanied by guitar 
playing and folk-singing. The political and social conscience lyrics of musicians like Bob 
Dylan and in the 1970s, Sixto Rodriguez,178 made a deep impression on left wing South 
African students. Not surprisingly then, folk singing and attendance at the Gorrelpot folk 
singing club were banned by the Pretoria SRC because they would promote liberal 
values.179 Denim, the sartorial symbol of the 1960s youth counter-culture, finally displaced 
the conservative university dress code180 against which students had chafed since the 
1940s.181 Despite these social and cultural changes, South African students, both black 
and white, were far more socially, morally and politically conservative than their American 
and European counterparts. For example, a drug culture did not take root at South African 
universities during the 1960s, though in 1970 preparations for a NUSAS protest was 
accompanied by marijuana.182  
Liberalism during the Second World War 
The Second World War led to an influx of people into the urban areas to take advantage of 
the labour opportunities opened up by the expanding war-time economy. Linked to this, 
South Africa experienced an increase in industrial action and subsistence protests. During 
the early stages of the War, when the Allies were on the defensive, the UP government 
appeared to be liberalising. The social and economic interdependence of black and white 
began to be recognised as well as the permanence of a settled urban black population – a 
situation accepted by the 1947 Fagan Commission on urban Africans. However, this did 
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not necessarily imply a commitment to extending voting rights to urban Africans.183 The 
pass laws were applied less rigorously while African trade unions were promised official 
recognition.184  At the same time, the recognition of Africans as ‘social citizens’ was implicit 
in the mooted extension of state social welfare benefits, for example, a national health 
insurance scheme, to all South Africans.185 Importantly, in 1942, Smuts announced that 
‘segregation had fallen on evil days’. The Atlantic Charter and its vision of a post-War 
democratic dispensation had reverberations in South Africa. So too did the ‘Four 
Freedoms’, which with their origins in Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’, ‘marked a new era in 
Western liberalism’. The SAIRR investigated ways of applying the Atlantic Charter to 
African conditions,186 while the Four Freedoms inspired the ANC’s ‘African Claims’ and bill 
of rights, the former demanding inter alia full enfranchisement, justice and state social 
welfare for Africans.187 Against the background of European fascism and far-right 
extremism in South Africa, Marquard made a case for socialism.188 Marquard argued that 
South Africa had reached the limits of liberal reformism and thus future improvements in 
African living conditions would only be achieved by a militant, non-racial industrial working 
class movement.189 Marquard, along with other liberals in the employ of the Union Defence 
Force’s Army Education Service, exposed soldiers to liberal democratic ideas and in 
Marquard’s case, an inclusive non-racial South African nationalism.190 
NUSAS after the Second World War 
 
The cessation of hostilities in Europe and North Africa in 1944-5 led to a large influx of ex-
service people (mainly male) into the English universities.191 Imbued with anti-fascist 
democratic ideals instilled by the War itself and by the Army Education Service,192 ex-
service people came to play an influential role in university life until the late 1940s.193 They 
also tipped the balance of power in NUSAS away from the white South Africanists and 
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ensured that it moved in a far more recognisably liberal and racially inclusive direction. The 
first post-war NUSAS executive under the presidency of Arnold Klopper, an Afrikaans-
speaking medical student, vice-president of the Wits SRC, member of FOPS and the 
Students’ Labour League,194 was devoid of segregationists and with a further three 
socialist195 and two liberal incumbents, was probably the organisation’s most radical until 
the 1970s.   
 
At the annual council meeting in July 1945, NUSAS took what many white South Africanist 
students believed was another dangerous step into party politics and the white ‘race’ 
question by denouncing in the name of ‘defending democracy in education’ the opposition 
NP’s attempt to impose racial segregation on the universities.196 This private member’s bill 
arose from an unsuccessful attempt by the ANS and Nationalist students to remove a 
coloured member of the Student Socialist Party from the UCT SRC in 1944.197 This in turn 
led to the adoption by the UCT student body of the ‘Status quo agreement’ which upheld 
academic non-segregation (integrated lectures, academic societies and SRCs) but 
acknowledged the existence of a social colour bar on the campus – mainly a prohibition on 
racially mixed dances, residences and sport198 - but not the tea room and ablutions. Far 
more controversially, Fort Hare’s application for membership of NUSAS was finally 
approved in 1945.199 This paved the way for the affiliation of other black educational 
institutions such as Hewat Training College in Athlone,200 UNNE (whose representation on 
the Durban SRC was abolished by the university authorities in 1946)201 and somewhat 
later, both the Pius the Twelfth Catholic University College in Basutoland202 and the Bantu 
Normal College in Pretoria.203 
 
The admission of Fort Hare to NUSAS marked a decisive turning point for the organisation. 
NUSAS effectively abandoned segregation and embraced a liberal, racially inclusive 
understanding of South Africanism. At the same time, it dealt a blow to exclusive white 
South Africanism and a possible rapprochement with the Afrikaans universities, some of 
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whose representatives observed the 1945 council meeting. The UCOFS NUSAS branch 
disaffiliated and dissolved, its mandate for continued existence being predicated on 
NUSAS remaining white.204 The UCT SRC voted to disaffiliate from NUSAS too, but was 
unable to secure a mandate from the ex-service people-augmented student body to effect 
this.205 Simultaneously, the conservative UP-supporting SRC members, the 1944 NUSAS 
president, and some Stellenbosch students, attempted unsuccessfully to establish a new 
white national student federation206 by exploiting the organisational chaos in the Afrikaans 
student world that followed the terminal decline of the ANS, a victim of the 1943 internecine 
turf war between the Ossewabrandwag and the NP. Meanwhile in NUSAS itself, the FOPS-
controlled Wits SRC and the newly affiliated black centres attempted equally 
unsuccessfully to transform NUSAS into an overtly political organisation which would 
promote ‘equality of political opportunity’ and not just ‘equality of educational and economic 
opportunity’ for all South Africans and would actively ‘build democracy’ in South Africa and 
not just ‘defend’ South Africa’s partial, flawed, white ‘democracy’.207 These measures 
indicated that the radical left was moving against the grain of the white electorate. 
 
The political triumph of the hitherto disunited forces of radical Afrikaner nationalism 
represented by the shock 1948 electoral victory of the Herenigde Nasionale Party (HNP) 
and its Afrikaner Party (AP) ally - the latter a moderately nationalist party established by 
Hertzog following his exit from the HNP in 1943, which ironically included OB members 
excluded by the HNP208- was the greatest disaster to befall South Africa in the twentieth 
century. It also dealt a mortal blow to white South Africanism as represented by the 
defeated UP. The South African radical left, including the ANC, realised with foreboding 
that the extreme racial separation envisaged in the Nationalist Alliance’s apartheid policy 
and the fascist tendencies exhibited by many of its adherents, posed a far greater threat to 
the interests of the black majority and the pursuit of democracy than the UP and its 
segregation policy ever had. Nonetheless, like UP adherents, many radicals believed that 
the Nationalist election victory was a temporary aberration (the Alliance won less than forty 
percent of the vote), which would be reversed at the next election.209 Accordingly, FOPS 
and the Springbok Legion approached Wits UP supporters with a view to forming an anti-
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Nationalist front, but were spurned for their efforts.210 UP-supporting students focussed 
their attention instead on shoring up white South Africanism and winning non-Nationalist 
Afrikaners and moderate Nationalists to this cause. 
 
The first NUSAS assembly meeting a few months after the fateful general election formed 
part of a ‘congress’, a student festival composed of a drama festival, sports tournament, art 
exhibition and debating competition intended to draw all South African students into the 
national union on the basis of a common studenthood.211 However, participants in the 
NUSAS assembly deliberations came away from the congress anything but united. The 
UCT delegation, composed of a conservative SCA member and UP Youth activists,212 was 
determined that NUSAS would pursue white co-operation. The radical Wits SRC213 was 
equally determined that in view of the change of government and the fact that the NP had 
threatened to implement university apartheid in its election manifesto that NUSAS would 
adopt an actively progressive policy in student affairs. Against the wishes of Durban and 
UCT, the latter because such a measure would forever deter the return of the Afrikaans 
centres, the assembly voted to enshrine in the constitution the principle of equality and 
non-segregation in university affairs.214 However, it was the social colour bar that proved to 
be the most fatally divisive measure of the 1948 assembly. Against the strident opposition 
of Wits and the black centres, the 1947 NUSAS assembly had adopted a social colour bar 
aimed at excluding black students from the thoughtlessly and insensitively arranged official 
1947 congress ball held at UCT where the ‘Status quo agreement’ was in force.215 Arguing 
in 1948 that it could not remain in an organisation which discriminated against its student 
body, the Hewat College delegation was instrumental in the lifting of this colour bar and the 
decision that in future all NUSAS congress functions would be open to all.216 This was the 
last straw.  
In August 1948 the UCT SRC voted to secede from NUSAS. In doing so it joined Rhodes 
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and Natal Training College,217 the former defending its 1947 disaffiliation by alleging that 
NUSAS was dominated by Jews and Indians who with the black centres and 
unrepresentative branches made policy opposed by the large (white) universities.218 
Durban followed soon after with similarly racist reasons and an objection to the inclusion of 
academic non-segregation in the NUSAS constitution.219 With NUSAS effectively 
shattered, the stakes were high for winning over its former membership. In August 1948 
the Broederbond was instrumental in the launch of a new Afrikaanse Studentebond 
(ASB)220 which brought together a whole host of competing Afrikaans-speaking student 
organisations hitherto divided by ideological, regional and organisational differences.221 
The ASB was open to Afrikaans-speaking Protestant whites and aimed to champion their 
cultural interests. One of its chief objectives was to challenge NUSAS, which because of its 
pursuit of racial integration, it regarded as ‘communist’. In accordance with the ASB’s 
apartheid principles, it envisaged the creation of a confederally linked ‘English Bond’ to 
replace NUSAS.222 
The NUSAS executive under the presidency of Phillip Tobias mounted an all-embracing 
campaign to win back the university centres.223  NUSAS’s honorary president, J.H. 
Hofmeyr, privately advised NUSAS to stick to its principles even if it meant the death of the 
organisation, and not back-down on the inclusion of Fort Hare, a decision he nonetheless 
had regarded at the time as premature and the reason for the disaffiliations.224 Under the 
close interested scrutiny of ASB observers from Pretoria University and the hostile 
interventions of local Nationalists, Tobias, the Local NUSAS Committee and ex-service 
people failed by ten votes to convince UCT’s largest ever student mass meeting to 
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withdraw the SRC’s notice of disaffiliation.225 
The UCT SRC went ahead with its plans to host an inter-SRC conference, the prelude to a 
new national student organisation. In January 1949 a preliminary meeting of 
representatives of all the white universities failed to reach a consensus regarding future co-
operation. With the exception of Durban, all the English-medium representatives refused to 
be part of any organisation which excluded black students, the demand of their Afrikaans-
medium counterparts.226 Gerrit Viljoen227 of the University of Pretoria’s compromise that 
Pretoria would forego its affiliation to the ASB and join instead a whites-only body that 
would liaise with a separately constituted black structure at federal executive level, was 
found unacceptable.228 This inter-SRC meeting demonstrated to many white South 
Africanists that their dream of white unity was becoming increasingly unrealistic and that 
support for the ASB, radical Afrikaner nationalism and extreme racial separation, was not 
just a minority phenomenon as many of them had mistakenly believed.  
The realities of NP rule were becoming apparent by the end of 1948. In response to the 
ASB’s plea that black students be removed from Wits and UCT,229 Malan, the new prime 
minister, announced in parliament in August 1948 that an ‘intolerable state of affairs’ and 
an ‘unpleasant relationship’ between black and white existed at some universities which 
would be remedied by the introduction of university apartheid.230 Rhodes returned to 
NUSAS in August 1948. It argued, inaccurately, that the national union’s racial policy was 
less progressive than that of the SCA231 but in reality it did not wish to be associated with 
the NP which opposition to NUSAS implied.   
Campus politics re-aligned in the face of the change of government and new distinctly 
liberal organisations came into existence. At UCT and Wits these won control of their 
respective SRCs.232 At UCT, the student UP split, its left wing joining socialists and other 
liberals in the new Students Liberal Association (SLA) established in August 1948 to fight 
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university apartheid and secure re-affiliation to NUSAS.233 At Wits FOPS lost control of the 
SRC and ultimately disbanded because it had become too sectarian to mobilise campus 
support against university apartheid.234 Its adherents moved into a new Wits Students 
Liberal Association (SLA) and in so doing turned it into a more radical and overtly political 
body than its liberal founders, such as Michael O’ Dowd  (later of Anglo American who 
espoused capitalist modernisation as a remedy for apartheid), had intended.235 Evidently 
precipitated by the anti-British tendencies displayed by the NP in its republican orientation 
and immigration policy, a Students’ Commonwealth Liberal Union was founded at Rhodes. 
This organisation espoused closer unity with the British Commonwealth and a conservative 
liberal policy of co-operation with the black population ‘as the only means of preserving 
Western civilisation and averting communism’.236  
A branch of the ANCYL was established at Fort Hare in November 1948 by the 
organisation’s national president, A.P. Mda. This branch was militantly African nationalist 
and non-collaborationist. At Fort Hare’s ‘Completers Social’ in 1949, Robert Sobukwe, 
president of the Fort Hare SRC and later founder of the Pan Africanist Congress, 
denounced missionary liberalism and called on students to transform Fort Hare into an 
African nationalist institution like Stellenbosch was to Afrikaners.237 The branch devoted 
much of its time to the drawing up of the ANCYL’s Programme of Action,238 which 
advocated the use of strikes, boycotts and non-collaboration to achieve African liberation. 
Under pressure from its youth league, this was eventually adopted by the hitherto 
moderate, constitutionally-orientated ANC at its 1949 national congress as its new militant 
anti-apartheid action plan. The ANCYL took control of the Fort Hare SRC in 1948, eclipsing 
the AAC, which in the aftermath of the NP victory appeared too compliant to white rule.239 
Emerging from the AAC and the NEUM in 1951 were the Society for Young Africans 
(SOYA) and the Durban Students’ Union (DSU) respectively, the former winning strong 
support at Fort Hare and the latter at UNNE.240 Although Fort Hare later denied this, at the 
end of 1948 unverified reports suggested that it had disaffiliated from NUSAS.241 
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In early 1949, the SLA-controlled UCT SRC voted to re-affiliate to NUSAS.242 In order to 
ensure the total collapse of NUSAS, the NP SRC members, their campus supporters and 
UP right wingers did their utmost (often underhandedly) to postpone having this decision 
taken to the student body for its ratification.243 NUSAS and the SLA again mounted a huge 
publicity campaign including the hosting of a NUSAS gala week to impress on students the 
practical benefits of NUSAS.244 The mass meeting voted to re-affiliate as did, 
overwhelmingly, a referendum.245 
In the meantime, NUSAS had done much to address the grievances of the disaffected 
campuses. The voting power of the large centres was substantially augmented so as to 
dilute the power of the small (black) centres and branches.246 Under the leadership of 
Tobias, NUSAS adopted the organising slogan, ‘unity without uniformity’. The loyalty of 
NUSAS’s vast conservative student base would be won and retained through the provision 
of an efficient student welfare/benefits programme and exciting varied congress 
programme. To ensure that NUSAS policy was broadly representative of its conservative 
base, the student assembly and policy making powers were firmly vested in the hands of 
the affiliated SRCs. Student bodies and SRCs could dissociate from policy with which they 
were not in agreement.247 Legassick argued that these reforms of Tobias provided NUSAS 
some space in which to embark on a moderate political programme.248 At the 1949 NUSAS 
conference, the constitutional enshrinement of academic non-segregation, which had 
caused so much dissatisfaction the previous year, was revisited. The black centres and the 
tiny radical Pretoria University branch refused to have this removed from the constitution to 
an entrenched schedule of policy from which centres could dissociate. Eventually a Wits 
CPSA-brokered compromise was accepted. The actual words ‘upholding academic non-
segregation’ were removed from the constitution but the sentiment was retained. Durban 
was permitted to uphold segregation249 and thus returned to NUSAS in early 1950.  
With its mass student base secured and moreover, united in the defence of university 
autonomy,250 NUSAS laid the foundations for its eventually vast, all-embracing local and 
international academic freedom campaign. On the basis of the freedom of the university to 
decide who, what, how and by whom to teach – adapted by Tobias from a speech 
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delivered at Wits by J.H. Hofmeyr on Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’251 - NUSAS enlisted the 
support of civil society groups such as university staff associations, the SAIRR, churches 
and the press, as well as members of parliament, against the removal of black students 
from UCT and Wits.252 The divided cabinet, in particular its AP Minister of Education, Arts 
and Science, J.H. Viljoen, was initially reluctant to interfere in the universities’ autonomy 
and legislate university apartheid.253 It thus attempted to force the university authorities to 
do its dirty work for it by using the Nationalist press to sway public opinion against racially 
mixed universities by raising the old bogey of miscegenation.254 It also adopted 
administrative measures to restrict black enrolment at Wits and UCT. In 1949 the state 
scholarships awarded to Africans studying medicine at Wits were withdrawn255 and all 
foreign Africans were barred from white universities including, for example, Wits student, 
Eduardo Mondlane, the future founder of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO).256 
From 1949 the government limited the issuance of inter-provincial permits to prospective 
Indian students making it increasingly difficult for those from Natal to study at Wits and 
UCT.257 
Other apartheid measures appeared thick and fast on the statute books. In 1949 and 1950, 
the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages and Immorality Amendment Acts prohibited marriages 
and sexual relations between whites and any other race group. The Population 
Registration Act of 1949 classified all according to their race with dire consequences for all 
regarding marriage, the franchise, living areas and schooling. In 1950 the Group Areas Act 
designated urban residential and business areas according to race, enabling the removal 
from these areas of those of the ‘wrong’ race. 
In May 1950, the Suppression of Communism Bill was introduced in parliament. This Bill 
provided for the proscription of the CPSA and all communist organisations. However, its 
definition of ‘communism’ was so broad that anyone or anything advocating fundamental 
political, social or economic change could fall victim to its tenets. Although strictly outside 
the scope of education and thus outside the domain of a non-political body like NUSAS, the 
national union led by Tobias opposed the Bill as an abrogation of the rule of law and the 
right of freedom of association and academic freedom, predicting depressingly 
prophetically that its enactment could lead to the banning of NUSAS, the removal of staff 
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and students from the university, and the censorship of the contents of courses258 and 
library holdings. Four centres abstained from voting. Some students supported the Bill, 
because like most white South Africans, they were anti-communist. Others did not care 
what happened to communists,259 while some avowed liberals in the Wits SLA did not 
initially believe that students should take a stand on a matter which had nothing to do with 
them. Nonetheless, many Wits liberals - like those off-campus caught in the dilemma 
between supporting the anti-communist aims of the Bill but not its illiberal methods of doing 
so - threw themselves behind their student body’s resolve to oppose the measure by any 
lawful means available.260 Opposition to the Bill came from an unexpected quarter. When 
the intensely anti-communist UP elected to oppose the bill in defence of civil liberties, so 
too did the UCT SRC and student body, the latter led by UP Youth leaders Zac de Beer, 
the future leader of the Progressive Federal Party, and Maureen Strauss, the daughter of 
J.G.N. Strauss, the future leader of the UP.261  
Even though NUSAS’s decision to oppose the Bill by any available legal means accorded 
with UP policy and was thus the ‘right politics’ and thus ‘not politics’, it was nonetheless a 
deeply political decision which set a precedent for the adoption of and active opposition to 
other overtly political measures not directly concerned with student and educational 
matters. Shortly before the enactment of the Suppression of Communism Act in June 1950, 
the CPSA dissolved itself.  In 1951, former Wits CPSA branch member Harold Wolpe 
(sometimes accused of being ‘politically homeless’ by liberals afraid of communist 
entryism) announced that he intended transforming NUSAS into a militant, progressive 
body which would operate in both the student sphere and society.262 The stage was set for 
a new battle within NUSAS. The old white South Africanist-liberal inclusiveness struggle 
was superseded by a new liberal-radical struggle to turn the ‘students-as-such’ orientation 
of NUSAS into that of a ‘students-in-society’ one.  
A battery of new apartheid laws would ensure that NUSAS could not fail to take an 
increasingly political stand. In June 1951 the abolition of the coloured franchise in the Cape 
was enacted in flagrant contravention of the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds 
majority in both houses of parliament. This measure goaded the mobilisation of coloured 
voters into the Franchise Action Committee (FRAC) which, with African workers, struck in 
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Cape Town in May 1951.263 The ‘constitutional crisis’ also precipitated the emergence from 
the ranks of the Springbok Legion, the UP and English capital, of the War Veterans Torch 
Commando. This mass organisation drew tens of thousands of white, coloured (and 
student) supporters to its huge torchlight demonstrations and processions staged in all the 
main urban centres of South Africa. These protested the dismantling of the constitution by 
the ‘Malanazi’ NP government and in the case of the ‘Steel Commando’ were aimed at 
forcing the government to an early election and even perhaps insurrection.264  
With an eye on the critical 1953 general election in which it hoped to increase its minority 
vote and thus as an attempt to forge white unity, the NP mounted a national festival to 
mark the tercentenary of the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape. The ANC staged 
large protest rallies at the commencement of the Van Riebeeck Festival in April 1952 and 
students at Rhodes, angered by the organiser’s failure to include Fort Hare in the (all white) 
student component of the festival, initially elected to boycott it along with many of their Wits 
and UCT counterparts, politicised like many Rhodes students, by their involvement in the 
Torch Commando.265 The success of the Van Riebeeck rallies encouraged the ANC, the 
South African Indian Congress and the FRAC to launch their Gandhiist passive resistance 
Defiance Campaign in May 1952, against six unjust laws targeting inter alia the pass laws, 
the franchise, segregation, stock culling, Bantu Authorities and group areas.266 This 
campaign elicited much support in the Eastern Cape in particular where the ANCYL, 
including some Fort Hare students, were active organisers and volunteers.267  
The government’s continued bulldozing of its unconstitutional disenfranchisement of 
coloured voters led to the Torch Commando peaking in its popularity. With a view to 
ousting the NP during the 1953 election, the Commando was co-opted into a United 
Democratic Front (UDF) with the UP and the Labour Party in April 1952,268 becoming 
embroiled in Natal separatist politics at the same time. Pietermaritzburg students attended 
the forty five thousand-strong ‘Voice of Natal’ UDF rally in their numbers in June 1952 and 
distributed their Nux Crisis Edition which accused the NP government of being ‘Malanazi’. 
They called on students to come down from their ivory towers and enter politics directly, as 
politics had already entered the student domain with the assaults by Malanazi on academic 
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freedom and liberty.269 A United Student Front (USF) was established which aimed at 
safeguarding basic rights of intellectual freedom.270 It was welcomed by Wits and UNNE 
students,271 SLA adherents of the former taking a keen and active interest in both the 
Torch Commando and the Defiance Campaign.272 UCT’s response is unknown but a 
Students’ Democratic Association supporting the open discussion of politics and equal 
rights for all students was formed there in March 1952 by the liberal and radical left.273 
However, despite its potential support, the USF unravelled, as did the Torch Commando,274 
on the issue of black membership, since, were black students permitted to join, the USF 
would be obliged to champion their political and social rights too.275 Being an UP-orientated 
body, it was not prepared to do so. Thus it was quite clear that taking a political stand was 
acceptable if it was a UP stand, but unacceptable if it was not. 
In the midst of all of this, the Fort Hare student body - overwhelmingly ANCYL-inclined but 
containing a powerful SOYA minority276 - voted by one hundred and forty seven votes to 
forty seven to disaffiliate from NUSAS because it was ‘a non-political organisation, unequal 
to approve the ideals of equality held by African nationalism’.277 This decision stemmed 
from events at the 1951 NUSAS congress. NUSAS was always of secondary importance to 
Fort Hare students, whose primary allegiance was to the liberation struggle. However, a 
significant group of Fort Hare students wished to maintain the association with the national 
union so as to harness it to the liberation movement in the manner of student organisations 
in the colonial world.278 It was probably for this reason then that the Fort Hare student body 
refused to endorse the ANCYL-initiated disaffiliation decision taken by the SRC in March 
1951.279 The rebuffed SRC then placed a carefully crafted constitutional amendment before 
the 1951 NUSAS assembly which proposed that NUSAS would ‘stand for political and 
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social equality of all men in South Africa’.280  
At risk of simplifying a five hour assembly debate and endless discussion within SRCs 
beforehand, UCT, Durban and Rhodes, as well as many liberals on the Wits SRC were 
against NUSAS moving out of the educational domain and becoming overtly political as 
implied by the constitutional amendment.281 However, underlying their stand was the 
largely unspoken opposition to the explicit demand that NUSAS champion a universal 
franchise, which few, if any, endorsed in their personal capacities. The Wits radical left, 
black and white, was faced with a dilemma. Though supporting the political sentiments of 
the Fort Hare motion and wishing to transform NUSAS into a progressive political body, 
they realised that for tactical reasons, this would have to be achieved incrementally and 
that the motion as it stood went too far and too fast with mortal consequences for the still 
fragile and tenuously united NUSAS.282 The Wits radicals thus proposed that no vote be 
taken on the Fort Hare motion, but this was narrowly rejected and the constitutional 
amendment was comprehensively defeated by nineteen votes to two.283  
When a year later representatives from the disaffiliated Fort Hare failed to arrive at the 
NUSAS congress, the devastated congress delegates postponed the commencement of 
the student assembly by a day in order to locate them and persuade them to attend, but in 
vain.284 A ‘statement of attitude’ and an amendment were proposed which read that as 
‘society and education [were] inseparably linked’, NUSAS would accordingly ‘uphold the 
principle of political and social equality of all’ and would mobilise its members in the 
‘struggle against the undemocratic action of the government’. These motions were 
remarkably similar to Fort Hare’s 1951 constitutional amendment and the fact that they 
were only narrowly defeated285 suggests that white NUSAS members had been 
significantly radicalised by both Fort Hare’s withdrawal and the mobilisation surrounding 
the constitutional crisis and even perhaps the Defiance Campaign.  
Shortly after the conclusion of the 1952 congress, at a time moreover when the Defiance 
Campaign was becoming increasingly anti-white and ultra-nationalistic, the new NUSAS 
president, Patricia Arnett, visited Fort Hare to persuade the student body to return to 
NUSAS. In a carefully managed mass meeting, Frank Mdalose an ultra-nationalistic, 
though conservative, Youth Leaguer (he was later to become a Bantustan functionary and 
founder member of the Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party) ensured that only one 
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student spoke in favour of NUSAS, and badly at that.286  
Ties with NUSAS were effectively broken for a number of years. SOYA and the ANCYL 
established a non-collaborationist Progressive South African Students’ Union in late 
1952,287 which delivered a blistering attack on NUSAS for its liberalism and diversion of the 
black liberation struggle.288 However, because of the escalating conflict with the Fort Hare 
authorities regarding the latter’s paternalistic high school missionary attitude towards 
discipline and politics, the Progressive South African Students’ Union was banned from 
holding its inaugural conference on the campus.289 Fort Hare was isolated and homeless 
as far as national student unions were concerned. Arguing inter alia that black majority 
membership would mitigate its liberal connections, Joe Matthews and Tennyson 
Makiwane, the more racially-inclusive nationalist ANCYL SRC members290 persuaded the 
Fort Hare student body to affiliate to the South African Union of Democratic Students 
(SAUDS), established by the Wits SLA. The Africanists and SOYA dismissed SAUDS as 
the  ‘kitchen department of NUSAS’ presumably because they suspected it of being a 
NUSAS front whose members still participated in NUSAS. Nonetheless, SAUDS, to which 
was affiliated the UNNE SRC and UCT’s Modern World Society, was a ‘militant student 
union’ which intended both to mobilise students in the general democratic struggle and 
render assistance to other political organisations.291 Against the wishes of Durban and 
Rhodes and the dissociation of UCT, NUSAS agreed to co-operate with its overtly political 
and sectional rival if their interests coincided.292 However, as was often the case with 
overtly political student unions, SAUDS was too sectarian to attract a wide constituency 
and eventually fizzled out.  
Renewed attempts by Fort Hare students to cultivate co-operation between black students 
in South Africa were overtaken in May 1955 by the unprecedented closure of Fort Hare by 
the college authorities. Conflict over subsistence issues between the student body and the 
college authorities had continued unabated and was reinforced by external political events 
and insecurity regarding the future of Fort Hare. A few weeks before the introduction of 
Bantu Education into African schools in April 1955, a stone was thrown through the window 
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of the hall where a Moral Rearmament film, ‘Africa untamed’, believed to disparage 
Africans was being shown.293 Sometime later the introduction of new stricter visiting hours 
at the women’s residence precipitated a boycott of the annual graduation ceremony and 
the resignation of the SRC. Believing that a secret ‘communist’ ‘caucus’ using violence and 
intimidation was responsible for these actions, the Fort Hare Council and Senate sent the 
entire student body home under armed police guard.294 Students’ return to the campus a 
month later was conditional on completing a questionnaire relating to their participation in 
events leading up to the closure.295 In what ultimately played into the government’s hands 
as it signified an admission by the college’s missionary authorities that they were unable to 
control their charges, a commission of inquiry into the closure was appointed under Dr J.P. 
Duminy, principal of the Johannesburg Technical College, M.C. Botha, a retired Nationalist 
academic and Edgar Brookes of Natal University,296 also a member of the LP. Students 
were mystified about the existence of the alleged ‘secret caucus’ but eventually concluded 
that the college authorities had fatally misapprehended their intention to celebrate a 
sporting victory with a barbeque and the consumption of the ‘carcass’.297 Like the ANCYL 
and the UNNE SRC, the radical Wits SRC vehemently protested against the unjustified 
closure of Fort Hare.298 NUSAS however reserved judgement until it had more facts at its 
disposal.299 It did however rule that it was unethical to link readmission to the college on 
the satisfactory completion of a questionnaire as this implied that politically undesirable 
students would be weeded out.300 By the time of this fateful Fort Hare crisis, the student 
radical left had found a new national political home for itself.    
By the end of 1952, white radicals signalled their willingness to participate in the Defiance 
Campaign. Moreover, in the face of increasing black anti-white sentiment, the Congresses 
recognised the importance of drawing progressive-minded whites into their orbit. 
Accordingly, the ANC and SAIC invited white ‘democrats’ to a meeting in Johannesburg’s 
Darragh Hall in November 1952 from which there emerged the Congress of Democrats 
(COD) in January 1953. Along with other similar like-minded organisations in other parts of 
the country, COD submerged itself in the South African Congress of Democrats (SACOD), 
established in October 1953 as the white arm of the multi-racial Congress Alliance, the 
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other members of the Alliance being the ANC, the SAIC and the South African Coloured 
Peoples’ Organisation.  Although originally intended as a ‘broad church of democratic 
opinion’, COD (and later SACOD too) was composed primarily of radical socialists, many of 
whom were politically homeless ex-members of the CPSA. Moreover, liberal-orientated 
whites would not co-operate with white communists nor would they accept COD’s and then 
SACOD’s immediate universal franchise policy nor their separate white structures.301 
Following the defeat of the United Democratic Front in the 1953 general election, the left 
wing broke away from the UP and established a Liberal Party (LP) under the leadership of 
Native Parliamentary Representative, Margaret Ballinger. The LP was a ‘broad church’. It 
encompassed older Cape liberals steeped in welfare liberalism, the parliamentary tradition 
and the politics of persuasion, many of whom were based in the Cape, and a younger more 
radical grouping, some of them socialists, coming from a Springbok Legion background 
and located in the Transvaal. Despite these differences, the LP advocated an incrementally 
extendable qualified franchise and a non-racial structure.302 
With the establishment of the LP and SACOD, the political, ideological and tactical 
differences between the radical and liberal left became ‘organisationally fixed’303 making it 
increasingly difficult for them to work together as they had done to a significant degree in 
the past. Campus politics and NUSAS mirrored these national developments. Crudely put, 
the increasingly liberalising UCT SRC – many of whose members would in future be 
attached to the LP304 - could be said to represent the LP, while the Wits SRC and 
particularly its NUSAS Local Committee could be said to represent SACOD. From 1953, 
the radical and liberal left clashed more than in the past over the degree to which NUSAS 
could indulge in overtly political activity, identify with the liberation movement and in the 
context of the Cold War, the direction of international policy. The dominant faction within 
the LP was parliamentary-orientated (thus focused on white politics) and utilised 
constitutional tactics. Thus unlike the extra-parliamentary SACOD, the LP would not 
consider employing strikes, boycotts and marches.305 This was true of the dominant liberal 
faction in NUSAS too. Soliciting support only from Western overseas educational bodies, 
the NUSAS president carefully explained that NUSAS did not use strikes and other extra-
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legal means to advance its academic freedom campaign306 and when approaching political 
parties to use their influence against university apartheid307 it raised the ire of the radical 
left for ignoring black organisations like the ANC.308 
Determining the tactics to be employed against government intervention in the universities 
became more urgent in 1953. Calls by the NP for the removal of black students from UCT 
and Wits as well as the legislation of university apartheid occurred three times during the 
1953 election.309 In August 1953, two Africans were elected to the UCT SRC, provoking an 
outraged debate in the Afrikaans press and parliament. NP MPs called on Viljoen to 
legislate apartheid alleging that Africans were too ‘uncivilised’ to warrant higher education, 
educated Africans became political agitators, and UCT’s SRC election result revealed the 
degree to which communism, liberalism and inter-racial mixing, and thus implicitly 
miscegenation, had taken root at the mixed universities.310 Viljoen was still reluctant to 
intervene directly – the Wits authorities had of their own volition imposed a racial quota on 
the Medical School311 - but significantly he revised the contemporary understanding of 
academic freedom to mean the unfettered freedom to teach and research but not who 
would be admitted.312  
In December 1953 Malan announced the appointment of a commission of inquiry ‘to 
investigate… the practicality and financial … implications of providing separate training 
facilities … for Non-Europeans at universities’.313 From the outset a split occurred between 
the liberals and radicals regarding participation in the Commission. The Wits and UNNE 
SRCs refused to participate, the former because even the act of appointing a commission 
amounted to an invasion and erosion of university autonomy. After a long delay, the 
divided NUSAS executive decided to submit evidence, though, like the liberal-dominated 
UCT SRC, making it clear that it did not accept the Commission’s terms of reference.314 
The composition of the Commission was a reason for cautious optimism. Dr J.E. Holloway, 
whose tenure as Secretary of Finance long predated the NP election victory, chaired. He 
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was assisted by Dr W.F. Willcocks, a former rector of Stellenbosch, and Dr E.G. Malherbe, 
principal of Natal University, a respected educationist and conservative liberal who did not 
shrink from reminding his NP adversaries of their recent Nazi sympathies. Beale has 
argued that the appointment of Malherbe underscored Viljoen’s approval of the segregated 
system which pertained at Natal, thus further reinforcing the view that Viljoen understood 
apartheid as meaning little more than tightening up segregation.315 The absence of any 
apartheid ideologues like Hendrik Verwoerd and Werner Eiselen (an ethnologist), Minister 
and Secretary respectively of the increasingly powerful Native Affairs Department, 
responsible for the Bantu Education Act of 1953, was heartening. This Act imposed an 
inferior system of education on African children fitting them for their inferior position in the 
South African economy to which they would forever be doomed were they to remain 
outside the ethnic states of the future hazily envisaged for them by the apartheid racial 
engineers. NUSAS rejected Bantu Education in toto because ‘one cultural heritage of 
mankind’ and one economic system implied that there ought to be only one system of 
education.316 It gave evidence to the Eiselen Commission to this effect,317 but feared 
correctly that the ideologues intended extending apartheid into higher education too.   
NUSAS’s evidence to the Holloway Commission against the disadvantages of segregated 
education accorded with that of the universities and other participating liberal institutions.318 
It argued that the introduction of parallel classes at existing institutions or the construction 
of one new black university had serious financial and human resources implications for 
both the state and university authorities and staff. Drawing on the experiences of 
segregated higher education in both the American South and South Africa, it argued that 
even the best endowed institutions were chronically underfunded, failed to attract the best 
staff and were unable to maintain academic standards. In classic liberal fashion, NUSAS 
argued that segregated institutions deprived students of contact with one another.319 On 
the weight of all the evidence, the Holloway Report tentatively concluded that university 
apartheid was not practical and proposed that Africans be concentrated at Fort Hare and 
Natal but that those pursuing specialised post-graduate studies would be exempted from 
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segregatory measures as would coloured and Indian students.320 The government delayed 
the release of the Commission’s report probably because, as Beale surmised, its 
controversial recommendations would only have compounded the bruising NP succession 
battle which saw the baasskap-orientated Transvaal NP leader, J.G. Strijdom take over the 
reins of the NP and government on the retirement of D.F. Malan in 1955. Even then, the 
government was slow to respond to the Holloway Report probably because there was no 
agreement over the meaning of apartheid.321 Churches, social workers, the apartheid think 
tank, the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA), and the Native Affairs 
Department advocated to differing degrees, total apartheid - the removal to the reserves of 
all Africans from the urban areas of South Africa. Afrikaner business depended on cheap 
freely available African labour made cheaper by the presence of a large African population 
surplus to their requirements and thus the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut promoted a 
‘practical’ apartheid which would not jeopardise the cheap labour supply.322 The 
continuation of racially mixed universities and the congregation of ethnically 
undifferentiated African students at the urban Natal University did not accord with total 
apartheid and thus probably because of pressure from SABRA and the Department of 
Native Affairs, Viljoen rejected the Holloway recommendations.323  
In addition to threats of university apartheid, NUSAS faced new challenges from the left, 
effectively weakening the united front it was attempting to craft against government 
university measures. In what was probably a NEUM initiative, but had the backing of both 
the ANCYL and some within the NIC - the latter including Mac Maharaj and M.J. Naidoo324 
(later a leading member of the United Democratic Front) - the UNNE student body 
presented a list of its grievances to the 1954 NUSAS congress. As with Fort Hare in 1952, 
these were related to the limited political role that NUSAS was prepared to play, its 
Western-aligned foreign policy (discussed later) and significantly considering that Maharaj 
was in favour of a new separate black student organisation, its unspelled out allegedly 
‘European… structure’.325 NUSAS took this indictment seriously as UNNE would be the 
third black centre to disaffiliate, Hewat having left shortly after Fort Hare.326 Nonetheless, 
NUSAS vigorously defended its anti-apartheid record as attested to by its continued 
opposition to Bantu Education and its participation in the campaign against the Western 
                                                          
320 Holloway Commission, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
321 M. Beale, op. cit., p. 85.   
322 D. Posel, The making of apartheid 1948-1961: conflict and compromise, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 
50-58. 
323 M. Beale, op. cit., p. 86.   
324 BC 586 A2.2, Trevor (Coombe) to Ernie (Wentzel), 14.1.1956; T. Beard, op. cit., p. 160.  
325 BC 586 B1 Assembly Minutes 1954, pp. 10-12; Advance, 22.7.1954; Cape Times, 7.7.1954; S. Maharaj to 
New Age, 3.11.1956;  P. O’ Malley, Shades of difference: Mac Maharaj and the struggle for South Africa, 
Viking, New York, 2007, pp. 71-72.   
326 BC 586 B3 Executive Minutes 1952; Dome vol. 7 no. 1, 1.4.1953.  
82 
 
Areas Removal Scheme.327 where this entailed the removal of educational institutions 
under the Group Areas Act. It upheld its non-racial structure and rejected a racially 
organised multi-racial body – the interpretation it put on ‘European in structure’,328 thus 
implicitly aligning itself with the LP over the Congresses. Although mandated to put forward 
a case for disaffiliation, UNNE offered to co-host with Bantu Normal College a meeting of 
all black centres and NUSAS at which the changes required in NUSAS to effect the return 
of the black centres would be discussed.329 NUSAS held high hopes for the success of this 
proposed meeting, a meeting which dictated its attitude towards its participation in the 1955 
Congress of the People. 
In July 1954, NUSAS like other organisations, was invited to participate in or co-sponsor 
with the Congress Alliance, a ‘Congress of the People’ – a national convention - which 
would draw up a ‘Freedom Charter’,330 a statement of core liberal democratic and 
moderately socialist principles on which a future non-racial democratic South Africa would 
be founded.331 The NUSAS executive probably regarded the invitation as unimportant and 
so delayed its response. However, it was alerted to the fact that the black centres regarded 
the event as important (a bus load of UNNE students bound for the Congress of the People 
would be turned back by the police) and NUSAS’s decision regarding participation could 
sway the soon to be convened UNNE and Bantu Normal College conference either for or 
against NUSAS.332 Thus a postal motion proposed by two members of the NUSAS 
executive who were simultaneously leading members of the NCFS, that NUSAS should not 
participate in the Congress of the People because it risked both being associated with a 
political movement and the loss of its membership, was carried overwhelmingly.333 Though 
the Wits SRC voted for non-participation, presumably like the majority for mainly tactical 
reasons,334 there was not unanimity on the question. Bob Hepple, chairperson of the Wits 
SRC and a member of both COD and the NUSAS executive, together with E. Habedi of 
Bantu Normal College, proposed an amendment that NUSAS participate in the educational 
proceedings of the Congress. This was defeated overwhelmingly,335 not surprisingly 
considering that the radical left bloc was considerably weakened following the temporary 
tactical defection of the Wits SRC and the disaffiliation of three black centres. 
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NUSAS’s response to the Congress of the People was similar to that of the LP’s. The LP 
had initially agreed to participate fully in the event. Against the wishes of its more radical 
social democratic Transvaal division, the party withdrew entirely because of fears that 
COD, which many anti-communist LP members viewed as a communist front, had acquired 
undue influence over proceedings. Like NUSAS, it also underestimated the future historical 
and mythical significance of the Congress of the People and felt that it was not important 
enough to warrant splitting the party.336 It is important to note that John Didcott, the 1954-5 
NUSAS president, in his capacity as a Cape LP member was part of a LP delegation which 
attempted to persuade the ANC to abandon the Congress of the People and instead co-
host a national convention with the LP.337 Despite the official absence of NUSAS and the 
LP, members of the Wits SLA, the Wits Local NUSAS Committee (unofficially) and UCT’s 
Modern World Society were part of the historic gathering at Kliptown, Johannesburg,338 
which on 26 June 1955 adopted the Freedom Charter. This document - a compilation of 
the ‘freedom demands’ of those present - became the official policy of the ANC in 1956.339 
At the annual NUSAS congress a week later, a proposal by a socialist member of the UCT 
SRC that NUSAS endorse the Freedom Charter was lost by ten votes to twenty four,340 
probably because NUSAS did not want to be identified with any political organisation and 
the charter was believed to be vague and had elements of sloganeering.341   
The struggle between the liberal and radical left regarding a political programme and 
identification with the extra-parliamentary left occurred against the background of the Cold 
War and the battle over NUSAS’s international policy. The Confederation Internationale 
Etudiants (CIE) to which NUSAS joined in 1926 became factionalised and Nazi-ridden 
resulting in the disaffiliation of most of its member unions,342 NUSAS included, in 1932. 
Breaking out of its long international isolation and being part of a new post-War democratic 
student world order was thus important to the post-War NUSAS. Accordingly the NUSAS 
president, Arnold Klopper, attended an International Student Congress in Prague in 
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November 1945 where he denounced the colour bar in education343 and with 
representatives of other student unions helped establish the ‘non-political’ International 
Student Federation.344 Initially based in Paris, its headquarters subsequently shifted to 
Prague because, as the dominant East bloc argued and the other student unions accepted, 
Czechoslovakia was a bridge between the East and the West and Czech students had 
resisted Nazism while the French student union had collaborated.345 NUSAS affiliated to 
the International Students’ Federation in 1946346 which shortly thereafter transformed itself 
into the overtly political International Union of Students (IUS) which espoused radical socio-
economic and political rights for students, actively denounced fascism and racism and 
pledged its support to anti-colonial liberation movements.347  
During the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, students protesting 
against the overthrow of the elected National Front coalition government were arrested and 
expelled from the universities. The IUS refused to condemn the actions of the universities 
and recommended that no sanctions be imposed on them.348 NUSAS felt that events in 
Czechoslovakia were too distant to pass judgement on.349 Nonetheless it stated its 
objection to both the ‘partisan and political alignment’ of the IUS and the organisation’s 
concern with non-student political matters and so claimed the right to dissent from all policy 
with which it disagreed.350 The reaction of both NUSAS and student unions in Western 
Europe and the Commonwealth was less accommodating when the IUS ‘severed ties’ with 
the Yugoslav National Students Union following the Tito-Stalin showdown and Yugoslavia’s 
expulsion from the Cominform in 1948.351  
The first two serious attempts to end NUSAS’s association with the IUS occurred against 
the background of firstly, the onset of the Cold War and the division of the world into two 
hostile political, ideological and military camps; secondly, the departure from the 
universities of ex-service people desperate for student unity and the avoidance of another 
world war; and thirdly, the growing worldwide anti-communist sentiment signified in South 
Africa and the United States respectively by the passage of the Suppression of 
Communism Act and the communist/leftist witch hunt of Joseph McCarthy’s Senate 
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Committee of Un-American Activities. In 1950 and 1951, members of the UCT SRC, 
aligned to the centre of the UP, proposed that NUSAS disaffiliate from the IUS because 
firstly, the IUS was an overtly political organisation pursuing the aims of communism and 
secondly, had illegally expelled the Yugoslav student union.352 In the first case the 
assembly decided to await what it hoped would be a positive outcome of the 1950 World 
Student Congress before taking a decision.353 The 1951 disaffiliation motion was lost by 
eight votes to twenty two and instead NUSAS voted to remain in the IUS for the sake of 
maintaining world student unity but in so doing would attempt to change the organisation 
from within.354  
The radical-liberal left coalition Wits SRC, strengthened by a mandate from the Wits 
student body, was implacably opposed to disaffiliation,355 as were the black centres, the 
latter because of the IUS’s strong anti-colonial stance.356 Also in favour of continuing 
affiliation were the left liberals, traditionally composed of the non-apathetic, politically 
conscious section of the Wits student body and the powerful minority on the UCT SRC.357 
The constitutional crisis and, to a lesser extent, the battery of apartheid legislation of the 
early 1950s, politicised and liberalised a larger number of English-speaking students and 
temporarily pushed Rhodes358 and Pietermaritzburg359 into the left liberal camp too. The 
left liberals were opposed to the division of the student world into hostile ideological camps 
and while acknowledging that the IUS was communist-dominated, argued that the problem 
with the organisation was the (mis)treatment of the non-communist minority by the 
communist majority. It argued further, that like in NUSAS, there was room for all political 
viewpoints in the IUS, and unity did not necessarily imply unanimity. It also realised that 
disaffiliation would mean the loss of contact with students in East-Central Europe and 
Asia.360 
By 1953, conditions both within South Africa and abroad had changed. The differences 
between the liberal and radical left became more marked, particularly as far as liberal anti-
communism was concerned and as mentioned earlier, became organisationally fixed by 
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the end of the year. As importantly, a ‘non-policy making’ Co-ordinating Secretariat 
(COSEC) was inaugurated in 1952 to administer the ‘International Student Conferences’ 
(ISCs) held annually by Western student unions since 1950. COSEC was secretly 
championed and funded by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which planted its 
personnel (attached to the National Student Association of the USA) in the secretariat’s 
Leiden headquarters.361  
In 1953, UCT and Rhodes proposed that NUSAS leave the IUS for the same reasons as 
before. Each side had researched and prepared their arguments and gathered their troops 
months prior to the bitter, often personal, mud-slinging twenty two hour marathon assembly 
debate. Wits, UNNE and the Transvaal Pharmaceutical Students Association attempted to 
answer the UCT-Rhodes indictment. Using NUSAS as an analogy they argued that 
students remained within NUSAS even though they disagreed about the extent to which it 
should oppose apartheid and accordingly there was unlikely to be agreement within the 
IUS about how political it ought to be. Moving onto stronger ground it averred that should 
NUSAS leave the IUS because it was too political, it would have no grounds to expect the 
black centres to remain in NUSAS, or, in the case of Fort Hare and Hewat, re-affiliate. 
When it became clear that disaffiliation would succeed, Wits and UNNE attempted to 
persuade the waverers and their former liberal-left allies to support their proposal for a 
postponement until after the next World Student Congress which they believed held great 
promise for world student unity. This was defeated and the assembly voted twenty four to 
sixteen for disaffiliation from the IUS – the last ‘Western’ union to leave - and by the same 
number for participation in the ISC and COSEC.  
UNNE gave notice of its intention to disaffiliate and with Wits dissociated itself from both 
decisions. The Wits SRC remained a member of the IUS and with the SLA, SAUDS and 
the NUSAS Local Committee continued uncompromisingly to oppose apartheid both on 
and off the campus. It demanded the removal of the racial quota secretly introduced at the 
Medical School in 1953 and likewise in 1954 mounted a successful boycott of the Great 
Hall when segregation was suddenly imposed there too.362  
An ugly atmosphere pervaded the 1954 NUSAS congress. Wits was determined to 
overturn the disaffiliation motion, UNNE was on the verge of leaving363 and there was talk 
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of Wits doing so too.364 The Soviet policy of ‘peaceful co-existence’ which followed the 
death of Stalin eased international tension and as predicted by the pro-affiliation group the 
previous year, held promise for the normalisation of international student relations too.365 
Like the Soviet Union, the IUS tentatively reached out to its Yugoslav counterparts366 and 
offered fraternal membership to those outside the IUS,367 an offer taken up by the British 
and Israeli national student unions.368 Accordingly, Didcott, leading LP member, chief 
protagonist for disaffiliation and president of NUSAS hammered out a ‘bi-partisan’ 
international policy with Dan Goldstein, president of the Wits SRC, whereby NUSAS 
increased its participation in COSEC and applied for associate membership of the IUS. 
This was adopted unanimously.369 The terms of the associate membership agreement 
negotiated by Hepple at the Moscow World Student Congress dissociated NUSAS from all 
IUS policy, ensured that the IUS took no action regarding events in South Africa and 
allowed for NUSAS’s vetting of all print on South Africa destined for IUS publications.370 
In the context of its increasingly vulnerable position in communist-phobic apartheid South 
Africa, NUSAS could not afford its association with the East bloc. NUSAS was under 
increased pressure from the NP. The imposition of university apartheid remained on the 
government agenda, NUSAS’s mail was being opened, including a letter from the IUS, and 
IUS publications were banned.371 Without warning then, leading members of the LP at UCT 
proposed that NUSAS disaffiliate from the IUS as it had not published to NUSAS’s 
satisfaction the terms of its dissociation from IUS policy, had dubious sources of income, 
had communist political aims and because of the hostile South African environment in 
which it found itself, NUSAS could not afford to be seen consorting with such ‘unsavoury’ 
bodies. The left countered that COSEC too had suspicious sources of funding, the 
omissions in the published dissociation of policy agreement were trivial, the IUS’s political 
communist orientation was irrelevant as NUSAS had dissociated from its policy and 
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harking back to previous reasons for remaining in the IUS, stated its belief in ‘unity without 
unanimity’.372  
In what probably won the waverers over, the NUSAS president argued that the terms 
‘unity’, ‘contact’ and ‘co-operation’ were confused.373 Spelling this out in more detail after 
the congress, he argued that as a liberal humanist organisation which attached great 
importance to notions of academic freedom and the independence of education from the 
state, NUSAS could not seek unity with a body like the IUS which did not.374 With the 
disaffiliation of three black centres and reluctantly, the Transvaal Pharmaceutical Students 
Association too, the pro-IUS grouping was reduced to Bantu Normal College, Wits and 
some mandated UCT votes and a few radicals on the NUSAS executive. Students at Pius 
the Twelfth in Basutoland were influenced by the strong anti-communist line of both the 
Catholic Church375 and their Catholic university authorities and were assiduously courted 
by NUSAS-NCFS activists into the anti-IUS camp.376 Disaffiliation from the IUS and full 
membership of COSEC was carried twenty three votes to fourteen. Dan Goldstein resigned 
the NUSAS vice-presidency in protest against the breach of faith of the liberals.377 The 
radical left put up no candidates for the NUSAS executive378 allowing it for the first time to 
be entirely captured by liberals, some of whom were members of the NCFS and/or LP.379  
The Wits SRC and Local Committee dissociated from NUSAS’s new international policy380 
but their days as powerful campus forces were coming to an end. In an attempt to break 
the hold of the radical left in student affairs, the Wits University Council resolved to 
subordinate student government to its authority by imposing a new constitution on the Wits 
SRC. The student body and the radical SRC fought tooth and nail against this measure.381 
The SRC reconstituted itself off-campus as the Wits University Students’ Association and 
urged a boycott of the elections to the Council SRC, a decision it reversed at the last 
minute.382 An organised liberal constituency within the NCFS exposed the duplicity of the 
radical left in standing for election to both the statutory Council SRC and the unofficial non-
collaborating Wits University Students Association.383 Thus in addition to the new 
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constitutional dispensation, this was probably another reason for the eclipse of the radical 
left in Wits student politics and their reduction to just four members on the new Council 
SRC. This new SRC was composed of liberals (some of them Catholic) and a large 
number of apolitical, non-political and/or cautiously liberal faculty representatives384 and 
one government spy.385 It wrested control of the student press from the radical left386 for a 
time, but was less successful in doing so with the NUSAS Local Committee. 
Conclusion 
By the end of 1955, NUSAS was under the control of the liberal left, a liberal left which 
adhered to liberal humanistic values and freedoms including the separation of education 
and the state and which moreover, identified strongly with the LP. All NUSAS presidents 
between 1954 and 1965 were to differing degrees, active members of the LP. However, 
NUSAS was effectively an all-white organisation, little different in composition to that of 
1945 before the affiliation of Fort Hare. The opening of NUSAS to black students led to the 
disaffiliation of the majority of NUSAS’s white membership who were not prepared to 
accept either the new liberal and even radical policy of NUSAS or the jettisoning of 
segregation and a broad white South Africanism which black participation in practice 
entailed. The election victory of the NP in 1948 had contradictory results for NUSAS. It 
united students against the threat of university apartheid and brought back to NUSAS its 
conservative student base, which faced with an exclusive Afrikaner nationalism was either 
disabused of its dream of the construction of a white South African nation or felt that the 
rights and privileges of English-speaking whites were under threat. More importantly, the 
change of government led to the radicalisation of NUSAS’s black and radical white 
membership who demanded that the national union adopt an overtly political anti-apartheid 
programme. This conflict over the degree to which NUSAS could indulge in political 
activities was exacerbated by the Cold War. Thus, the restructuring of NUSAS as a student 
trade union and federation of SRCs under the slogan of ‘unity without uniformity’ or 
‘unanimity’ was successful in bringing back and retaining within NUSAS its conservative 
student base, but, in the face of the onslaughts of the apartheid government and to a lesser 
extent the Cold War, was not able to retain its black membership. Only when the legislation 
of university apartheid became an incontrovertible reality in the later 1950s did the black 
centres return to NUSAS. This will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The academic freedom campaign, the re-affiliation of Fort Hare and the 
adoption of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1956-
1957 
 
Introduction 
 
The liberal leadership which took control of NUSAS in July 1955 was freed from the 
divisive debates about international affiliations but faced far more serious domestic 
challenges. The first was how to confront the looming spectre of university apartheid and 
the second was how to substantiate its claim, particularly in respect of opposing racially 
separated higher education to be a national union of South African students when it 
effectively represented only white students at the predominantly English-medium 
universities. With the tabling in parliament of the Separate University Education Bill which 
provided for inter alia the transfer of the University College of Fort Hare to the state, the 
Fort Hare student body re-affiliated to NUSAS, their five year absence precipitated by the 
national union’s earlier refusal to pursue an all-embracing anti-apartheid policy. To 
accommodate Fort Hare and win back other black centres, as well as to allow it the space 
to indulge in political activity outside the strictly educational field, the ‘non-political’ NUSAS 
adopted the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as its guiding 
principles. As constitutional methods of protest against government intentions seemed to 
offer ever diminishing prospects of success, NUSAS, like other organisations, adopted 
more radical tactics such as protest marches and even gave its tacit approval to student 
strikes. The threat posed by the ‘church clause’ of the Native Laws Amendment Bill to the 
continued existence of the multi-racial NUSAS led to a decision to defy the provisions of 
the Bill upon its enactment and to co-operate in a limited way with overtly political 
organisations such as the ANC, hitherto regarded by the liberal NUSAS leadership as too 
radical and closely tied to the banned CPSA to risk an association. This chapter will 
examine and evaluate the success of NUSAS’s attempt to build a broad-based university-
wide and even off-campus united front against government plans to segregate the 
universities. Further, it will explain how NUSAS’s ‘united front’ tactic coincided with the 
‘united front’ tactic of the ANC and Congress Alliance. This then facilitated the return of 
Fort Hare to NUSAS and brought NUSAS closer to the extra-parliamentary left, leading, for 
example, to the national union’s participation in the historic conference on apartheid in 
December 1957 endorsed by the ANC but held under the auspices of the 
Interdenominational African Ministers’ Federation (IDAMF).  
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Apartheid and the creation of a ‘united front’  
 
The state’s response to popular militancy in the first part of the 1950s had severely 
weakened the ANC by 1956. Black resistance was met with further state repression in the 
form of bannings and the enactment of security legislation such as the Public Safety Act. 
The extension and entrenchment of apartheid continued, illustrated by, for example, the 
implementation of Bantu Education and the introduction of passes for African women.  
 
The accession to the premiership of Transvaal NP leader, J.G. Strijdom boded ill for the 
black majority. An arch republican, Strijdom was committed to white baasskap 
(overlordship) and, moreover, quite prepared to forego constitutional niceties in order to 
achieve his aims, such as in the disenfranchisement of the coloured population achieved 
by packing the Senate and Supreme Court. The increased importance of the Native Affairs 
Department headed by the mighty apartheid ideologue, H.F. Verwoerd, Strijdom’s chief 
backer against the more moderate N.C. Havenga in the NP succession battle which 
followed Malan’s retirement,1 was equally disquieting.  
 
In addition, the ANC itself was riven with internal conflict. The radical African nationalists 
objected to their organisation’s tactical working relationship with the multi-racial Congress 
Alliance which in their opinion resulted in other races subverting ANC policy and diluting or 
replacing African nationalism with foreign ideologies like communism.2 This was 
exacerbated in 1956 with the adoption of the Freedom Charter as the foundation of ANC 
policy, thus pointing the organisation in a more explicitly multi-racial direction and further 
away from militant African nationalism. Finally, in December 1956, almost the entire 
leadership of the ANC and Congress Alliance was arrested for treason, the resulting five 
year trial based on inter alia, the charge that the Freedom Charter was a revolutionary 
communist document. The cumulative effect of all of this was that the ANC found itself 
seriously weakened by 1956. It accordingly ‘amended its militant African nationalism’ and 
committed itself to building a united front of all those opposed to apartheid,3 which could 
even include some within the NP camp.  
 
The Treason Trial arrests brought the LP closer to the ANC, the former being party to the 
establishment of the Treason Trial Defence Fund, eventually a vast London–based 
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operation funding political trialists over the following three decades.4 For COD, like its 
alliance partners, the arrests and other security measures meant the paralysis of its current 
leadership. A new, younger generation of leaders, often less ideologically radical than their 
predecessors, embraced the ‘united front’ and not without reservations sought alliances 
with the LP’s equally reluctant membership.5  
 
Other possible participants in the Congress Alliance’s united front included a distinctly 
liberal wing within the UP. This was increasingly at odds with its party’s cautious and 
vacillating policy aimed at maintaining organisational cohesion in the face of its deep 
political and social divisions. Within the NP’s apartheid think-tank, SABRA, academics and 
churchmen expressed their uneasiness about the unjust and expedient manner in which 
apartheid was being implemented. In Natal, the UFP was ploughing its own separatist and 
imperialist furrow within a conservative, liberal framework while its close associate, the 
rapidly growing, secessionist Anti-Republican League (ARL) was broadcasting its militant, 
subversive, anti-Afrikaans, pro-British Freedom Radio nationwide by 1956.6 The ARL was 
formed in 1955 by Natal English-speakers who feared that Strijdom would unilaterally 
impose a republic on South Africa. In so doing, the 1910 ‘compact’, the terms under which 
Natal entered the Union of South Africa would be broken, entitling Natal to secede. 
Through mass rallies and unconstitutional appeals to the British crown (some even 
supported violence), the ARL demanded a separate referendum on the republican issue for 
Natal.7  
 
Also on the extra-parliamentary front was the ‘Black Sash’. The Black Sash or ‘Women’s 
Defence of the Constitution League’ was initially formed in 1955 to protect civil rights and 
parliamentary democracy such as the constitutional enshrinement of the coloured 
franchise. But by 1956 it had mutated into a far broader anti-apartheid movement. Its all-
female members, donning their distinctive black sashes ‘haunted’ cabinet ministers 
embarking from aeroplanes and trains and staged silent protests outside parliament 
against apartheid measures.8 As far as additional members of a united front were 
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concerned, the ANC could also not but help notice the campaign against university 
apartheid being waged by NUSAS and the universities from 1956 onwards. 
 
NUSAS’s conception of a university, academic freedom and university autonomy 
 
Within the context of debates in 1954-5 regarding both NUSAS’s continuing affiliation to the 
IUS as well as white student unity, liberals had embarked on much soul searching as to 
why they could not ‘achieve unity’ with students in either the Eastern-aligned IUS or at the 
Afrikaans-medium universities and came to the conclusion that liberals, Marxists and 
Afrikaner nationalists had entirely different understandings of education and the university. 
This examination resulted in a more detailed, more sharply focussed and specifically liberal 
exposition of university education, academic freedom and university autonomy than 
hitherto ventured. 
   
Like the English-medium South African universities discussed in chapter two, NUSAS had 
a Western understanding of the nature of a university and thus a Western understanding of 
the function of a university, the relationship between the state and the university and the 
concepts of university autonomy and academic freedom. NUSAS argued that the function 
of a university in Western society was corporate devotion to the ‘search for truth’.9 As such 
then, ‘academic freedom’ meant ‘freedom for the truth’.10 By convention in ‘non-autocratic 
Western societies, universities assumed the right to decide independently their method of 
searching for the truth. Thus, ‘universities … claimed autonomy in regard to [the] admission 
of students, the appointment of staff, … the subject matter taught’,11 and ‘how it was 
taught’. In other words, NUSAS liberals in 1955/6 reasserted ‘the four essential freedoms’ 
of a university enunciated by T.B. Davie, principal of UCT, which underpinned NUSAS’s 
first campaign against university apartheid initiated by Tobias in 1949/50. The university 
was free to seek the truth even if in the process this clashed with the political party in 
power.12 NUSAS argued that ‘the governmental system and the university [were] both 
component parts of the state, each acting in its own sphere’.13 As such then, NUSAS 
denied the government the right either to decide the methods by which the university 
sought the truth, or, define the ‘true function’ of a university.14 Moreover, in a multi-racial 
society, the pursuit of the truth could only occur in an environment where all races and 
cultures were represented, hence ‘academic non-segregation’ as it was practiced at the 
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‘open’ universities of Wits and UCT. However, in the defence of university autonomy, 
NUSAS upheld the right of racially segregated institutions to remain segregated.  
 
This Western, liberal conception of the university contrasted sharply with the NP belief that 
the university was there to serve the volk and that the university could not pursue interests 
in opposition to those of the volk and its government, discussed in chapter two. For liberals 
this had totalitarian implications.15 NUSAS frequently compared South African government 
policy to that of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Within the specific context of 
apartheid education, NUSAS believed that Western civilisation and Western education 
were ‘the inheritance of all’ and thus rejected entirely the apartheid education principle that 
different races required different educational systems. Moreover, NUSAS believed that 
education was ‘above party politics’ and so denounced government intervention in 
education as ‘party political interference’. Its own opposition to ‘party political interference’ 
in the universities was justified in terms of serving the interests of its student membership 
and was not to be equated with the government’s foray into ‘party politics’.16     
 
The Interdepartmental (Van der Walt) Commission 
 
The reprieve to the universities offered by the findings of the long-awaited Report of the 
Holloway Commission that university apartheid was impractical, came to an end with the 
rejection of the report by the government in May 1955.17 Later that year an 
Interdepartmental Commission was appointed and tasked with procuring further 
information with regard to the financing and construction of five separate ethnic 
universities. These would include two new institutions in the Western Cape and Durban for 
coloured and Indian students respectively, the transformation of Fort Hare into an ethno-
linguistic Xhosa institution under state control, the establishment of an ethno-linguistic Zulu 
university college in Natal and for those Africans not from the Eastern Cape and Natal, 
another in the Northern Transvaal.18 These terms of reference flowed from the submission 
of the Department of Native Affairs to the Holloway Commission presented by W.M. 
Eiselen, the architect of the Bantu Education Act of 1953. The Native Affairs Department’s 
submission, intended to extend Bantu Education and direct government control to African 
higher education, was rejected by the Holloway Commission as impractical and too 
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expensive.19 Eiselen, as Secretary of Native Affairs, was appointed to serve on the 
Interdepartmental Commission (or Van der Walt Commission) together with H.S. van der 
Walt, Secretary of Education, D.H. Steyn, Secretary of Finance and I.D. du Plessis, 
Secretary for Coloured Affairs. I.D. du Plessis was a distinguished Afrikaans Dertigers poet 
and academic who was partially responsible for casting the Cape Malay people as a 
separate ethnic group in South Africa: Afrikaans-speaking and closely connected to, but 
separate from the dominant white population of South Africa.20 
Beale has argued that the appointment of the Interdepartmental Commission revealed that 
the Ministry of Education, Arts and Science was no longer to be the sole arbiter of the form 
and direction of higher education policy and that significant responsibility for this had been 
assumed by the Department of Native Affairs. Moreover, the commission’s appointment 
signified ‘a shift from relatively open-minded investigation and decision-making to a more 
driven, ideological approach that ignored dissenting views and warning voices’.21 Adding to 
this incipient authoritarianism, the Van der Walt Commission was devised as an internal 
investigation which allowed for no public submissions, either sympathetic or opposed to 
university apartheid, Verwoerd apparently having become ‘scornful of the tradition of public 
commissions of enquiry’.22 
 
How did NUSAS respond to the establishment of the Van der Walt Commission and how 
well did the leadership gauge the changed political landscape? Didcott, the immediate past 
president of NUSAS (later a constitutional court judge) was ‘astounded’ by the appointment 
of the commission. His immediate presidential predecessors, Patricia Arnett and Michael 
O’Dowd, naively believed that as a consequence of this new development, university 
apartheid would be temporarily shelved, as anything produced by Eiselen would be too 
impractical to implement.23 Ernie Wentzel, the current president (a former member of the 
Torch Commando, a leading member of the LP and later a human rights lawyer) was not 
so optimistic, fearing that the ‘presence of fanatics like Werner Eiselen and I.D. du Plessis 
on the new commission suggest[ed] that the government [was] prepared to push ahead 
with this quite fantastic plan’ which he remembered, had earlier been rejected by the 
Holloway Commission.24 The current leadership also realised that ‘other counsels in the 
[National] Party ha[d] prevailed’ and that Viljoen’s 1951 assurance that the government 
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would not legislate university apartheid would not be honoured.25 With the sudden death of 
T.B. Davie, who had championed the cause of the ‘open universities’ since the 1940s, 
NUSAS became even more fearful that ‘the government would go full steam ahead [with 
university apartheid] knowing that [Davie would] not [be] there to shoot them down with his 
logic and clear reasoning’.26  
 
Publicly, NUSAS responded to these new government developments with a controversial 
and strongly worded letter to the Minister of Education, Arts and Science which was later 
released to the press. The Van der Walt Commission was denounced as ‘a commission of 
bureaucrats [which] gives but some respectability to a plan for apartheid which we know 
has no foundation in practicality and morals’.27 The commissioners themselves were 
dismissed as mere civil servants who were neither economists nor educationists, who were 
pledged to do the bidding of the government and institute apartheid.28 NUSAS decided 
against submitting evidence to the commission partly because it did not wish to be 
associated with it, but also because the terms of reference (the financial aspects of 
establishing separate universities) were outside the national union’s expertise.29  
 
When the new academic year opened in February 1956, the SRCs at the affiliated NUSAS 
campuses, either on their own initiative or at the prompting of NUSAS which was beginning 
to re-launch its academic freedom campaign, reacted to looming university apartheid. The 
responses of the student bodies at the various universities will be described in a fair 
amount of detail so as to highlight their different preoccupations and political cultures. 
 
At UCT, the academic freedom campaign faced significant opposition from some sections 
of the student body and members of the SRC.30 It could be surmised that many students 
felt that the campaign was firstly a foray into party politics and secondly, the UP, supported 
by the majority of students, had not yet taken a stand on university apartheid. So as to 
appease this conservative grouping and win as much support as possible,31 the SRC under 
the chairmanship of NUSAS executive member, Neville Rubin, rejected university 
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apartheid in the most minimal form by voting to defend only university autonomy.32 A mass 
meeting subsequently confirmed this with an overwhelming majority.33  
 
Whether the Wits SRC would follow UCT’s lead was unclear to NUSAS. There had been 
little contact between Wits and NUSAS34 following the acrimonious NUSAS congress in 
1955 and moreover, the new statutory SRC was intended to be a less politicised structure. 
Observers at Wits believed that the new SRC was more apathetic than conservative and 
would be prepared to support a moderate NUSAS academic freedom campaign.35 This 
analysis proved to be correct as in March 1956, the Wits SRC rejected university 
segregation and the Van der Walt Commission by an overwhelming majority, pledged itself 
to defend academic non-segregation and to participate in the Transvaal region of the 
NUSAS-co-ordinated campaign against government interference in the universities.36 
Despite concerns about the reliability of its SRC, the Wits student body remained as 
implacably opposed to university apartheid as before, voting by six hundred to fifteen to 
take a strong stand on academic non-segregation.37 
 
For those universities which were segregated, such as Rhodes and Natal, protests against 
new government plans for higher education followed a different path. 
 
The Rhodes student body38 followed its SRC in rejecting the Van der Walt Commission. It 
asserted that ‘the open universities h[ad] proved an unqualified success’ and committed 
itself to upholding their autonomy.39 However, influential student opinion was more 
equivocal about the interdepartmental commission and the establishment of separate 
ethnic universities. An editorial in the student newspaper, Rhodeo, argued that mother 
tongue education envisaged at the ethnic universities was a ‘humane’ consideration, but 
impractical to implement. Likewise, the establishment of separate universities and closing 
off alternative educational opportunities to black students would be ‘immoral’ until the 
ethnic institutions were equally endowed.40 Another student enquired whether Rhodes 
students, who would vote to uphold academic non-segregation out of Christian belief, 
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would accept the logical outcome of such a policy when ‘a few shiny faces’ retaining 
contact with their ‘unhygienic kinsmen’ share ‘our toilet facilities’.41 
 
Similar objections to social integration, the logical outcome of academic non-segregation, 
were raised at a student mass meeting held at the University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg - 
UNP) to discuss the opening of post-graduate classes to black students on a non-
segregated basis. Somewhat ambiguously as to whether this was acceptable or not, the 
SRC president and NUSAS vice-president argued that miscegenation was unlikely to occur 
as ‘the vast majority of Non-Europeans wished to preserve their identity just as much did 
the Europeans’42 and that ‘in all the years’ there had never been a single case of inter-
racial marriage at either Wits or UCT. Another argument in favour of partially desegregating 
the university was one current in NUSAS and other liberal organisations at that time: 
namely that institutions like Fort Hare with limited inter-racial contact became breeding 
grounds of a virulent anti-white nationalism which was absent at Wits and UCT.43  
 
The generally more conservative student body at the University of Natal (Durban - UND), 
which until then, upheld only university autonomy, did not respond immediately to the 
threat of university apartheid. However, it did endorse a resolution rejecting the prevailing 
segregation at Natal University which had been carried at the combined Natal University 
Student Conference on ‘Education for a common society’ in May 1956.44 This conference, 
organised and largely patronised by students from UNNE, proposed that apartheid should 
be rejected in toto. This went beyond the official NUSAS position which restricted its 
activities to the educational field and thus only opposed apartheid in education.  
 
The academic freedom campaign 
 
With this injection of support, NUSAS set about reworking and expanding upon its multi-
faceted academic freedom and university autonomy campaign. At university level, it 
envisaged a nation-wide front of all campus constituencies ranging from students, senates, 
councils and convocations united against university apartheid. It aimed to include itself in 
what came to be known as ‘the open universities campaign’ already mounted by the 
authorities at UCT and Wits. To this end, NUSAS encouraged its executive members to 
cultivate relationships with ‘sympathetic’ academic staff at their institutions.45 Outside the 
universities, NUSAS aimed to extend its existing network of sympathetic individuals and 
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organisations who publicly campaigned against government interference in higher 
education. Earlier NUSAS had assembled a group of prominent individuals on the 
Witwatersrand under the loose leadership of the Bishop Ambrose Reeves of the Anglican 
dioceses of Johannesburg, who were prepared to lobby for the open universities when 
asked to do so by NUSAS. In 1956, Peter Storey of the Methodist Church and Christian 
Council of Churches agreed to issue press statements on university apartheid when 
necessary. It was hoped that Storey would play the same role in Cape Town as Reeves in 
Johannesburg and as such the executive attempted to recruit more ‘people of standing’ to 
support the campaign.46 A year later, NUSAS was to regard ‘responsible opinion’ and a 
broad front as critical. Without these, there was the danger that the campaign would be 
dismissed as just an extremist student affair.47 
 
Nonetheless, the main thrust of NUSAS’s organisation was directed at its student base. It 
was envisaged that the campaign would be structured on a regional basis48 and to this 
end, the 1956 NUSAS congress voted to establish ‘Standing Committees on University 
Autonomy’ at Wits and UCT.49 An ‘Academic Freedom Committee’ under the control of the 
SRC and composed of representatives of faculty councils, cultural organisations and even 
sports’ codes was in place at Wits, and by July 1956 had, through a ‘barrage of publicity 
material’, put the ‘facts of the case before the student body’.50 Academic Freedom 
Committees on other campuses were slower to take-off and most were only setup51 after 
the Minister of Education made known that he would respond to the Van der Walt 
Commission, then being printed, during the budget vote in parliament.52 This he did in 
October 1956 with the announcement that legislation would be introduced in 1957 to create 
five black university colleges as well as prohibit black students from registering at Wits and 
UCT.53  
 
This goaded student bodies into action. In September 1956, a mass meeting at Wits 
overwhelmingly rejected government plans for the open universities and voted to hold a 
strike, in the hope, widely held in liberal circles, that swift action would stop government 
legislation. Partly because this would jeopardise their delicate negotiations with the 
                                                          
46 ibid., 28.3.1956. 
47 ibid., 28.2.1957. 
48 BC 586 O6.1, Wits SRC Minutes, 6.3.1956, p. 5. 
49 B. Murray, op. cit., p. 304. 
50 SA Student vol. 22 no. 1, August 1956, p. 7. 
51 BC 586 O5.1, UCT SRC Minutes, 10.9.1956, p. 5; O5.1, E. Wentzel to Neville (Rubin), 4.3.1957; O3.1, 
‘Minutes of an SRC meeting held in the Howard College Common Room at 8pm on Thursday, 25 April 1957’, p. 
1.   
52 BC 586 B4.1, E. Wentzel to the Executive, 9.8.1956. 
53 M. Beale, p. 112. 
101 
 
government, the university authorities banned the strike, making it impossible for the 
statutory SRC, now subservient to the University Council, to be associated with this action. 
An ad hoc body of seven hundred students took responsibility for this one hour stay-away 
from classes on 19 September 1956.54 This set a precedent for other student bodies such 
as Rhodes and UCT to add the radical boycott tactic,55 until then shunned because of its 
association with the Congresses, to their more constitutional methods of struggle. Probably 
because it smacked of radicalism, NUSAS decided not to associate itself with the Wits 
strike.56 
 
The UCT SRC also considered holding a strike.57 This signified that the fortune of the 
academic freedom campaign had changed58 with opposition no longer confined to the right 
but extended to those who felt the campaign was not radical enough.59 At a mass meeting 
in October 1956, the student body voted overwhelmingly (only fifteen against)60 to uphold 
university autonomy and pledged itself to ‘utilise every possible avenue…. to obtain full 
public support for the university’.61 Presumably for tactical reasons, this motion was led by 
the liberal SRC president, Neville Rubin and his conservative vice-president, Denis 
Worrall.62 Worrall was a political chameleon: he was associated with the PP in 1959 and a 
member of the NP in the 1970s; in 1987 he stood against his party as an independent and 
subsequently submerged himself in the Democratic Party, but in 1956, Worrall was, 
conveniently for NUSAS, a leading member of the Cape UP Youth, assuming its vice-
chairpersonship in 1957. The protagonists of the academic freedom campaign hoped that 
Worrall’s association with the UP would convince other UP-aligned students into defending 
university autonomy, the party itself still having taken no stand on the matter in the face of 
the ill-health of its leader, J.G.N. Strauss.63 An amendment to the Rubin-Worrall resolution 
was put forward by NEUM activists, Abdullah (Dullah) Omar, 1980s UDF leader and 
Minister of Justice in the Mandela government and Neville Alexander, an academic later 
imprisoned on Robben Island for sabotage. Omar and Alexander argued that a democratic 
system of education was inseparably linked to the struggle for a democratic South Africa 
and thus sought to extend the conservative (for the radical NEUM) university autonomy 
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position to one of upholding full equality for all in a non-racial educational system. This was 
overwhelmingly defeated64 on tactical grounds by the liberals who claimed to support the 
contents of the amendment but felt that its adoption would lose the university apartheid 
campaign much needed moderate student support.65   
 
Despite an attempted bid for disaffiliation from NUSAS by conservatives at 
Pietermaritzburg in August 195666 (discussed in the following chapter), support for the 
stand of the open universities came from all the SRCs of Natal University.67 Students at 
Durban had difficulty in responding to government interference at Wits and UCT because 
most of them supported segregation and believed that an association with the open 
universities’ protest signified an entry into party politics. Nonetheless, the student body 
voiced its strong support of the protests of staff and students at Wits and UCT against 
government interference in their institutions, but made it clear that as a ‘non-political’ 
student body, Durban students would only themselves protest were their university 
autonomy placed in jeopardy. They further called on all universities, particularly Afrikaans-
medium ones, to protect university autonomy.68 
 
The SRCs at the Afrikaans universities did not respond to the Durban students’ request69 
but did in November 1956 condemn in the strongest possible terms the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary and the suppression of student rights there. NUSAS did too, linking the loss of 
academic freedom in South Africa to the same in Hungary and warning that the passing of 
the proposed university apartheid Bill opened the door for any future government imposing 
its ideological will on the universities.70 The invasion of Hungary was also an opportunity 
for NUSAS to reinforce its anti-communist credentials for both its conservative student 
base and the government while mitigating the effect of this with anti-imperialist rhetoric for 
the black student left, still largely outside the national union. Thus, NUSAS denounced the 
crushing of the Hungarian ‘struggle’ for ‘self-determination’, ‘freedom’ and ‘students’ rights’ 
by ‘Russian colonialism’.71    
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Despite the Hungarian interlude, the academic freedom campaign gathered momentum. By 
1957, a united front of students, staff and council at Wits and Cape Town had coalesced 
into the Wits-initiated ‘Open Universities Liaison Committee’. Murray has noted that this 
level of co-operation between students and staff at Wits was made possible by the 
administration-driven disempowerment of the Wits SRC in 1955 which ended years of 
confrontation between the Wits authorities and the radical left; slight changes in the 
composition of the Wits Council; the increasing liberalisation of the academic staff and the 
decision by the conservative Wits principal, to delegate responsibility for the university 
autonomy campaign to a senior member of the Senate, I.D. MacCrone,72 a psychologist 
and committed liberal. The Open Universities Liaison Committee forged ties with Rhodes 
too, threatened with the loss of Fort Hare, but members of the committee intimated 
privately to NUSAS that they feared the Rhodes principal might dilute the force of their 
protest.73 Natal University, as yet unaffected by looming university apartheid, paddled its 
own boat. E.G. Malherbe, principal of Natal, issued a ‘strong plea’ for the preservation of 
university autonomy and the defence of the open universities in his pamphlet, ‘Die 
autonomie van ons universiteite en apartheid’74 while at the same time extolling the virtues 
of the Natal system which for pedagogical reasons he believed was rightly segregated.   
 
In January 1957, the councils of Wits and UCT hosted a conference in Cape Town at which 
twenty eight eminent academics, educationists and judges defended the claims of the open 
universities to remain non-segregated. The proceedings were later collated into a 
publication entitled, ‘The open universities in South Africa’.75 NUSAS was not officially 
involved in this conference but lauded it as the dignified ‘type of opposition one expects 
from a university’ and perhaps heralding its own adoption of more radical tactics, added 
that the conference ‘was not a militant form of opposition’.76 In December 1956, with the 
help of current and past NUSAS office bearers, the convocations of both Wits and UCT 
condemned the government’s intentions of closing their alma maters77 and by January their 
councils, senates and staff associations had too.78    
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The cultivation of outside organisations was also paying off. The South African Institute of 
Race Relations (SAIRR) issued a statement about the expense and academic inequity of 
ethnic universities and repeated the liberal mantra that no inter-racial contact bred 
exclusive nationalism79 while the Christian Council (chaired by Storey) passed a resolution 
condemning the loss of academic freedom.80 The LP was all prepared to come on board, 
but NUSAS delayed this until the UP had taken a position, fearing that the campaign would 
appear to be a LP one.81 
 
NUSAS’s international campaign was bearing fruit too. The Wits and UCT SRC minutes of 
this period are strewn with messages of support from student organisations and academic 
institutions around the world. Even though NUSAS had severed all ties with the 
International Union of Students (IUS) and the World Federation of Democratic Youth 
(WFDY) and the Wits left were too weak to retain their SRC’s official association with 
them,82 the liberal majority on the Wits SRC did reluctantly allow the use of an IUS film 
during the academic freedom campaign on the campus.83 NUSAS did not. It drew closer to 
the anti-communist, Leiden-based Co-ordinating Secretariat (COSEC) and its policy-
making body, the International Student Conference (ISC). At the Sixth ISC in Ceylon, a 
number of resolutions condemning university apartheid were passed84 which were 
subsequently placed before the United Nations.85   
 
Parliamentary parties and the Separate University Education Bill   
 
On 18 January 1957, the Governor-General announced in his speech from the throne that 
university apartheid would be enacted during that session of parliament. This was followed 
on 11 March 1957 by the tabling of the three pronged Separate University Education Bill 
which coincided with the recommendations of the Department of Native Affairs to the 
Holloway Commission of 1954. The Bill aimed to establish four separate ethnic universities, 
those for Africans under the control of the Ministry of Native Affairs. It would transfer to 
government both Fort Hare and, to the consternation of Natal University, its segregated 
Medical School too and ultimately remove all black students from UCT and Wits.86 Much of 
the Bill comprised an authoritarian code of conduct for students and staff, the latter to be 
state-appointed civil servants.87 The Bill was soon withdrawn however, as it was found by 
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Albert van de Sandt Centilivres, chancellor of UCT and former chief justice, to be hybrid, 
affecting both public and private interests.88 Thus, an amended version was introduced on 
8 April 1957 which omitted Fort Hare and the Natal Medical School89 and placed the onus 
of not enrolling at the open universities on the black students themselves, instead of, as in 
the withdrawn Bill, on the university authorities.90 Thus the government was able to claim 
that it was not restricting university autonomy, a claim held by NUSAS to be false, because 
as was the case with the revised Native Laws Amendment Act (to be discussed later), the 
university (or multi-racial institution) would remain an accessory to the crime.91 Government 
claims of respecting university freedom rang hollow in the light of the prime minister’s 
statement a few days earlier that state-aided institutions would not be allowed to teach 
doctrines undermining Christianity and the existence of the white state.92  
 
How did NUSAS react to these earlier developments? The Academic Freedom Committees 
on the various campuses which had been making preparations throughout the vacation 
swung into action. Following the speech from the throne, the NUSAS president co-
ordinated a complicated simultaneous exchange of press releases by NUSAS SRCs 
across the country.93 Despite fears that the timing was wrong as the press was focusing on 
other matters to be put before parliament,94 university apartheid did receive good 
coverage.95 The UP-supporting Argus published from the NUSAS and SRC press releases 
those arguments in accord with its own views and those of its white readership and 
followed up with an editorial entitled ‘Shackling the universities’.96 NUSAS was quoted as 
calling on the public to insist that ‘the government … drop their proposed legislation’ as this 
represented the ‘introduction of politics into learning’97 while the Wits SRC was ‘fear[ful of] 
the international isolation which will result when we become universities so different from 
what the rest of the world regards as a true university’.98 The more radical and prophetic 
joint warning of the SRCs of Pietermaritzburg and non-NUSAS-affiliated UNNE that 
university apartheid was ‘no less than a catastrophe for race relations’ was also carried99 
but could be interpreted ambiguously as meaning the two white ‘races’. 
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A few days later, the Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences would accept neither a 
petition and letter from the SRCs of Wits and UCT respectively nor entertain a request to 
meet a student deputation to discuss university apartheid.100 Protest tactics radicalised. In 
the same manner as the eminently respectable, white, middle-class, liberal Black Sash, 
which offered to stand outside parliament during the First Reading,101 small groups of 
students from UCT, Wits and Rhodes, dressed in academic gowns, staged placard 
protests outside UCT during rush hour denouncing ‘political interference with universities’ 
and claiming that ‘closed universities mean[t] closed minds’.102 Later, larger groups were to 
stand in other parts of the peninsula and outside parliament too.103 Similar protests took 
place in Johannesburg under the auspices of the Wits Academic Freedom Committee and 
SRC.104   
 
One of the most important means of halting university apartheid was to persuade the UP to 
oppose it in parliament. However, by December 1956, the official opposition had yet to 
formulate its response to this measure and judging by its past record, it was quite possible 
that it would side with the government. At the UP congress in November 1956, Sir De 
Villiers Graaff succeeded the absent, ill JGN Strauss as leader of the deeply divided and 
somewhat directionless party. As an anglicised Afrikaner committed to the British 
Commonwealth with personal links to the old Boer generals, Loius Botha, Jan Smuts and 
Barry Hertzog,105 it was hoped that Graaff would win wide electoral support.106 This would 
entail successfully holding together in one party the bloedsappe (who stood by the party of 
Botha and Smuts out of family tradition), ‘near Nationalist’ conservatives (many of them 
anglicised, upper class Afrikaners or English jingoists) and liberals.107 In the face of its 
1953 electoral defeat, the exodus of its left wing to the LP and the UFP and the right wing 
‘Bailley Bekker Group’ to the National Conservative Party, the UP either failed to take a 
decisive stand on ‘race’ issues for fear of further splitting the party - sometimes finding no 
agreement even when a bill was before parliament108- or simply moved to the right. Thus, 
in November 1954, it reneged on its pledge to reinstate the coloured franchise were the UP 
re-elected to government, committed itself to retaining the Mixed Marriages Act as a means 
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of breeding out miscegenation and rejected the extension of indirect black parliamentary 
representation.109 In addition, from 1953 onwards, it usually endorsed the government’s 
new authoritarian security measures such as the Criminal Law Amendment, Public Safety 
and Suppression of Communism Amendment Acts110 all of which further criminalised 
protest.  
 
In preparation then for the UP’s caucus meeting in January 1957, NUSAS lobbied Zac de 
Beer, MP for Maitland, and other liberally-inclined MPs to take a strong stand against 
university apartheid and for this purpose offered to make available to them the national 
union’s academic freedom files.111 NUSAS ‘made excellent contacts’ with Margaret 
Ballinger and Leo Lovell,112 leaders of the LP and Labour Party respectively, (the latter 
moving away from its segregatory protection of the white working class to a race policy 
more liberal than that of the UP’s). And, moreover, NUSAS could presumably count on the 
influence of Labour Party MP, Alex Hepple, and Leslie Rubin, LP Native Representative in 
the Senate, fathers of former and current Wits and UCT SRC presidents, Bob Hepple and 
Neville Rubin respectively. Not unexpectedly then, following the speech from the throne, 
the LP and Labour Parties announced their opposition to proposed university apartheid. 
The UP however remained mute,113 precipitating much press speculation as to which way it 
would vote.114 NUSAS was privately worried about the UP’s silence. It feared firstly, that 
the party would only oppose the proposed Bill in terms of defending university autonomy 
and secondly, that in response to negative public opinion might change its stance during 
the Second Reading as it had just done in regard to the ‘Flag Bill’115 - a bill aimed at 
curtailing the official display of the Union Jack in South Africa.116 NUSAS’s first concern 
seems strange in the light of NUSAS’s broad-based academic freedom campaign built on 
tactical alliances with moderate conservatives on the basis of the defence of university 
autonomy. However, the concern related to the universities which could be embarrassed 
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were government supporters to raise the issue of miscegenation117 and presumably in 
addition use miscegenation to shift public opinion against the UP’s stand. 
 
To the surprise then of NUSAS, and equally the government, the UP strongly opposed the 
Separate University Education Bill during its First Reading on 11 March 1957.118 Couched 
in traditional UP terms but utilising arguments advanced by NUSAS and the open 
universities, Graaff accused the government of ‘giving way to the ideological theories of 
hon. the Minister of Native Affairs’119 and warned the assembly that the Bill was an attack 
on ‘traditional’ academic freedom and university autonomy and ‘open[ed] the door’ to 
further state ‘interference in the internal policy of the university’.120 NUSAS expanded on 
Graaff’s words by arguing that with the enactment of the Bill, black students would ‘not 
receive a true university education but would be trained ‘in a government department 
designed to perpetuate baasskap’.121 NUSAS warned the public that if it did not ‘rally to the 
support of the universities’, South Africa would find itself in the same position as that of 
Nazi Germany, where the universities capitulated to Nazi control and ‘contributed materially 
to the rapid growth of Nazism’.122 
 
Campus opposition to the Separate University Education Bill 
 
After this, the focus of the academic freedom campaign shifted to the various NUSAS-
affiliated campuses. NUSAS believed that its role should be that of ‘prod[ding] other bodies 
to take their rightful prominent place in the apartheid campaign’ so as to avoid creating the 
impression (quite correct) that the national union was ‘poking [its] nose in wherever [it] 
could’.123 Thus, just prior to the announcement of the contents of the Separate University 
Education Bill, NUSAS requested its executive members to coax statements of opposition 
to university apartheid from the councils, senates, convocations and SRCs of their 
respective universities.124 The stand taken by the UP lent respectability, moderation and 
legitimacy to the hitherto perceived left-leaning academic freedom campaign and its foray 
into party politics. This perhaps persuaded many more within the university community, the 
majority of whom would have voted for the UP, to leave their ivory towers and participate in 
the campaign. The next few months witnessed the various constituencies of the 
universities passing resolutions, circulating petitions, hosting public meetings and 
organising pickets. This culminated in the hitherto unheard of cancellation of lectures to 
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allow for university council and senate-led mass protest marches through the streets of the 
various university towns and cities of South Africa.125  
 
The Special Edition of the Witwatersrand Student of March 1957 claimed that Wits was ‘a 
completely united front against apartheid’.126 This view was echoed by I.D. MacCrone, co-
ordinator of the Wits university autonomy campaign. Did Wits reject all aspects of apartheid 
or only university apartheid and to what extent was the university a united front? During the 
1956/7 vacation, all components of Wits participated in a public meeting on academic non-
segregation addressed by the chancellor, Justice Richard Feetham,127 who, as Murray 
noted, was, like his counterpart at UCT, playing a far more prominent role in university 
affairs than chancellors hitherto.128 In February 1957, the NUSAS president proclaimed 
himself generally ‘satisfied’ with the campaign in Johannesburg but regretted that the Wits 
staff was ‘not quite as co-operative as it might have been’.129 This is not spelt out, but 
presumably many staff members were wary of taking a ‘political stand’ even though Sutton, 
the Wits principal, was at pains to state that the university’s opposition to the Bill was ‘not 
political’.130 Moreover, an association with what many in the public believed was juvenile, 
irresponsible student protest, diminished the possibility of avoiding government action. As 
far as the Wits student body was concerned, a mass meeting rejected overwhelmingly the 
Separate University Education Bill before parliament and pledged itself ‘to defend in every 
way possible’ the ‘traditional policy of academic non-segregation maintained’ by all 
constituencies of the university.131 However, only nine hundred students attended this 
meeting,132 fewer than the thirty percent of the student body generally held to be politically 
conscientised. This, despite the fact that the UP had already indicated its intention to fight 
the Bill and students had been exposed to the issue of university apartheid through the 
‘Academic Freedom Week’,133 an annual event introduced by NUSAS some years before. 
 
The Wits student leadership was uneasily united. Despite the defeat of the radical left in 
1955, this grouping, organised into a non-racial campus COD branch, made a determined 
but limited comeback in student politics, Legassick arguing that COD provided the radical 
left with the platform it had lost in NUSAS. Moreover, playing an active role in LP-
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dominated campus politics was entirely compatible with the Congress Alliance’s policy of 
forging a united front with all anti-apartheid forces. Thus Wits returned to its traditional 
liberal-left coalition in student politics,134 albeit with a far less powerful radical left than in 
the past. The Wits Academic Freedom Committee was a liberal-COD coalition which 
generally functioned harmoniously. It was widely representative of student campus 
societies and sought representation on the Wits Council’s Academic Freedom 
Committee.135 The presence of COD members in student governing structures could 
explain the radical, unconstitutional tactics adopted by Wits students in their efforts to fight 
university apartheid. Probably influenced by the ANC’s Anti-Pass campaign, a ‘Burn the 
Bill’ protest was held on the Great Hall steps which was interrupted by war-cry chanting 
students hurling home-made teargas bombs136 and ended in a scuffle when twenty five 
apartheid supporters tried to save the Bill from the flames.137 Following this, counter 
demonstrations against the academic freedom campaign were led on the campus by S.W. 
Postma.138 
 
With the exception of three NP supporters, the SRC agreed in principle to hold a protest 
march through Johannesburg,139 a decision which won the support of the university-wide 
Open Universities Liaison Committee.140 A national student conference hosted by the Wits 
SRC to discuss university apartheid and attended by representatives of almost all of 
NUSAS’s affiliated SRCs as well as those from Fort Hare and UNNE141 resolved to 
‘prosecute the most vigorous campaign’142 against the Separate University Education Bill. 
This would include the staging of simultaneous protest marches around the country.143 On 
the 22 May 1957, Wits closed for most of the day. With the full permission of the 
Johannesburg City Council,144 a three thousand-strong ‘united front’ of Wits Council 
members, staff, students and alumni processed from the campus to the Johannesburg City 
Hall under the watchful eye of the security police.145 
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At UCT, the academic freedom campaign followed a similar course to that of Wits. A 
special Academic Freedom Edition of the student newspaper, Varsity, was brought out to 
coincide with a special mass meeting to protest the introduction of the Separate University 
Education Bill in parliament. Nearly a third of the UCT student body attended this gathering 
which was addressed by the SRC and in a precedent-setting move, a member of the UCT 
Senate too.146 Shortly after the introduction of the revised Bill in parliament, the UCT 
convocation, as at Wits, sponsored a public meeting to plead the case of the open 
universities. This was presided over by Albert van de Sandt Centilivres.147 Wide 
prominence had already been given to Centilivres’s uncompromising defence of university 
autonomy and his belief in the importance of the presence of black students at the open 
universities for the development of good race relations, tolerance and the maintenance of 
‘western civilisation’.148 On 7 June 1957, Centilivres led the three thousand-strong UCT 
protest march up Cape Town’s Adderley Street to the university’s city campus. Although 
the student followers of NEUM had refused to participate in the academic freedom 
campaign because the SRC would not put university apartheid in its ‘proper perspective’,149 
black students were in evidence scattered amongst the white majority.150 Also participating 
in the demonstration as either Medical School staff or alumni were doctors attached to 
state hospitals. They were later subjected to intimidation by the Cape Provincial 
Administration.151 
 
The severing of the Natal Medical School from the University of Natal and its proposed 
transfer to the Native Affairs Department created neither a university-wide nor student 
united front against the Separate University Education Bill at the geographically scattered 
and racially and ideologically diverse University of Natal. The vice-president of NUSAS and 
president of the Pietermaritzburg SRC, Trevor Coombe (a devout Christian and member of 
the SCA) was unable to accede to NUSAS’s request to coax statements from the different 
constituencies of the university as in his opinion, the University Council was pro-
segregation and the Senate held strictly under the thumb of the principal, Malherbe. 
Eventually however, with the support of the Natal Provincial Council and the Natal Coastal 
Doctors’ Association, both the Senate and Council concurred with the principal that the 
takeover of the essentially apartheid-organised Medical School was an unnecessary ‘act of 
pillage’.152 NUSAS played no role in the Medical School controversy because, as 
                                                          
146 Argus, 14.3.1957; Cape Times, 14.3.1957; New Age, 21.3.1957.  
147 Cape Times, 8.5.1957.   
148 Argus,11.2.1957. 
149 New Age, 21.3.1957. 
150 Argus, 7.6.1957; Cape Times, 8.6.1957; New Age, 13.6.1957. 
151 Cape Times, 5.7.1957. 
152 BC 586 A2.2, Trevor (Coombe) to Ernie (Wentzel), 12.2.1957.  
112 
 
mentioned earlier, it could not afford to be seen as a serial meddler but believed however, 
that the ‘more trouble… stir[red] up in Natal… the better’.153  
 
Trouble was indeed stirred up in Natal, but despite the efforts of the bridge-building 
Coombe and to a lesser extent M.J. Naidoo, president of the non-NUSAS affiliated UNNE 
SRC, this did not result in a student united front but rather exacerbated the differences 
between the four Natal campuses. Because the Durban SRC upheld only university 
autonomy, it was unable to associate itself with either a strong statement against university 
apartheid issued jointly by UNNE and Pietermaritzburg in February 1957,154 nor with the 
ultimately abortive national student protest strike proposed by UNNE.155 Similarly it 
declined to participate in pickets in Durban and Pietermaritzburg against government 
interference in the open universities as this was ‘a little to [sic] advanced and a little too 
public for the UND student body’.156 However, the Durban student body did move to the left 
in this period, and after some persuading by the SRC president and the visiting NUSAS 
executive, ratified the SRC’s endorsement of the principle and ideal, but not the practice of 
academic freedom.157 
 
Without first informing the rest of the student body or the UNNE SRC of their intentions, the 
Durban medical students formed an ‘Action Committee’ to co-ordinate their protest against 
government plans to take-over their institution.158 The UNNE SRC,159 on which the medical 
students chose not to be represented, unsuccessfully attempted to organise a university-
wide demonstration to foster student unity between the divided black campuses. The 
Medical School would only participate if the demonstration rejected apartheid in toto while 
Durban would if it was limited to university autonomy.160 Ultimately, the proposed march 
through Durban by Pietermaritzburg and UNNE was banned by the mayor of Durban 
because the organisers had failed to obtain permission from the City Council and more 
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ominously in NUSAS’s opinion, because the public knew enough about academic freedom, 
in the opinion of the mayor.161 
 
At UNP, the campus newspaper, Nux, urged students to oppose university apartheid and 
the educational indoctrination which this entailed with the same level of commitment they 
had displayed in their demonstrations against the invasion of Hungary the previous year.162 
Was this successful? Possibly because the campus was misinformed about the nature of 
the meeting - it is not clear why nor whether this was intentional - only one hundred and 
twenty students attended an SRC mass meeting held shortly after the introduction the 
Separate University Education Bill in March 1957. However, those present did agree to the 
adoption of a militant programme of action against university apartheid163 which included 
Black Sash-type pickets, petitions, mass meetings and upside down flag flying 
demonstrations.164 These were subsequently well patronised. 
 
The UNP university apartheid campaign was not limited only to public group 
demonstrations. Nux exhorted its readers to educate family and friends regarding the 
distinction between ‘personal, voluntary segregation and enforced, unwanted apartheid’. It 
warned that ‘dictatorship’ and ‘bloodshed’ would, like in Nazi Germany ‘inevitably’ follow 
were Pietermaritzburg students to refrain from resisting the ‘encroachment’ on their civil 
liberties.165 This Nazi analogy echoed not only the sentiments of NUSAS but also those of 
the Anti-Republican League (ARL), the largest political organisation in Natal. After the 
battle to retain the Union Jack and ‘God save the queen’ had been lost in 1957, the ARL 
shifted its attention to the deteriorating state of ‘race relations’ in the Union and defending 
the liberties of the English universities.166 NUSAS had no official ties with the extra 
parliamentary ARL but considered the organisation useful in ‘publicising demonstrations 
and mtgs [sic] amongst [its] considerable membership in Natal’.167 The chairman of the 
Pietermaritzburg Academic Freedom Defence Committee was described by the NUSAS 
executive as a ‘useful’, ‘Federal Party John Bull’168 and as such was probably associated 
with the ARL. Using the same tactics as the ARL, Pietermaritzburg students attended and 
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picketed NP gatherings, provoking racially and sexually offensive responses from the NP 
devotees.169  
 
Targeting governing party meetings could certainly be construed as engaging in party 
political activities, something that was generally held to be taboo by the UNP student body. 
In an analysis of the ‘non-political’ British National Union of Students (NUS), it was argued 
that ‘no politics’ to the NUS in the Cold War 1950s meant ‘no left wing politics’.170 Similarly, 
when the political interests of white English-speaking students were aligned with those of 
mainstream political bodies with which these students identified, for example the UP, the 
UFP and the ARL, student political concerns achieved respectability and were no longer 
regarded as ‘political’ and outside the student domain.   
 
The ARL successfully expanded its operations into the Eastern Cape.171 English-speakers 
there shared some of the fears and sentiments of their Natal counterparts. This could 
partially explain the unexpected enthusiasm displayed by the Rhodes student body for the 
academic freedom campaign in 1957. Russell has argued that defending university 
autonomy ‘evoked all the dormant anti-Afrikaner feeling which is very much part of the 
South African English academic tradition – “they” were trying to push “us” around’.172 
However, one of the leaders of the Rhodes academic freedom campaign was Jan 
Breitenbach, the Afrikaans-speaking chairman of the SRC and Afrikaanse 
Studentevereeniging173 who was also partially responsible for the surprising, in the opinion 
of the NUSAS executive, co-operation between the Rhodes and Fort Hare student 
bodies.174  
 
Return of Fort Hare  
 
Rhodes was the examining body of Fort Hare, a valued status it would lose were the 
neighbouring university college transferred to the Native Affairs Department. Consequently, 
many exchanges occurred between the governing bodies and senates of the two (black 
and white) institutions to decide on their joint approach to imminent government 
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intervention.175 However, NUSAS remained cut-off from the Fort Hare student body as it 
had largely been since 1952, despite numerous attempts to initiate contact and dialogue. 
For NUSAS, securing the re-affiliation of Fort Hare was critical. Its claim to represent all 
those opposed to university apartheid was severely weakened with Fort Hare - vitally 
affected by university apartheid - outside the national union’s ranks. The Fort Hare student 
body was certainly concerned about government intentions regarding higher education and 
during what they described as a ‘very critical time’ for Fort Hare and the open 
universities176 publicly condemned the appointment of the Van der Walt Commission in 
April 1956. Moreover, there were signs that a significant number of Fort Hare students 
favoured breaking free from their isolation and seeking contact with other students. A 
motion introduced by T.W. Gcabashe to rescind the 1954 resolution which had severed all 
ties with the Rhodes student body because of the latter’s patronising and racist attitude 
towards their Fort Hare counterparts was comfortably defeated by a student mass meeting 
in April 1956.177 Shortly thereafter, NUSAS reminded Fort Hare of its 1954 undertaking to 
‘assist NUSAS whenever NUSAS works for the common interest’ and at the same time 
disclosed the details of its new campaign to ‘resist apartheid’178 at UCT and Wits. Fort Hare 
students were urged to co-operate with the national union if only to hear the ‘other man’s 
[sic] point of view’.179 As was usually the case, this letter went unanswered by an SRC and 
student body dominated by those hostile to collaboration with white liberals.  
 
Despite this rebuttal, NUSAS began to put in place the conditions necessary for securing 
Fort Hare’s return. Probably flowing from the work of Jan Breitenbach, the vice-president of 
the Fort Hare SRC attended the 1956 NUSAS congress in his personal capacity. The 
content of his address to the student assembly is not recorded but it probably included the 
latest developments arising from the closure of the college the previous year. Subsequently 
the congress passed a resolution that the closure of Fort Hare in 1955 was ‘not justified’,180 
a stand it had balked at taking the previous year (against the strong opposition of the 
radical left) because the liberal majority were reluctant to question the actions of the 
college’s missionary authorities whose judgement it implicitly trusted. In another new 
departure, the 1956 assembly offered its full support to the ANC-initiated African Education 
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Movement181 (aimed at establishing alternative education to Bantu Education) which it had 
also been equivocal about doing before. Following the example of the ISC which was 
competing with the IUS to win the loyalty of ‘colonial’ students, the student assembly 
adopted a resolution rejecting the negative impact of colonialism on education182 which 
was in similar vein to resolutions emanating from the IUS which again in the past NUSAS 
had refused to endorse. This change in direction was probably also influenced by the 
experience of some NUSAS leaders attending international gatherings composed largely of 
students from the Third World. NUSAS, they realised, was perceived to be a white student 
organisation by Third World students and thus could not afford to be as selective as it was 
in South Africa about the policies with which it would associate itself.183 That colonialism 
was an issue to Fort Hare students was underlined in August 1956 when Gcabashe argued 
that Fort Hare’s disaffiliation in 1952 was motivated by the ‘anti-colonial’ foreign policy of 
NUSAS and the patronising and paternalistic attitude of NUSAS officials towards Fort Hare 
students and not racism and anti-white hostility as insinuated by liberals in the SAIRR. 
Gcabashe stated that Fort Hare was ‘ever ready to join hands with all who see in us that 
which makes a man’ and not that which makes a level headed native’.184 However, all of 
these measures to accommodate Fort Hare threatened to lead to nothing when the 
assembly took a decisive step into the Cold War by applying for full delegate status of the 
Western-aligned ISC and reversed its decision taken earlier in the congress to send an 
observer to the Fourth World Student Congress of the IUS.185  
 
Shortly after the conclusion of the NUSAS Congress, the new NUSAS president, Ernie 
Wentzel, to his surprise, was invited to address the Fort Hare ‘Students’ Social Studies 
Committee’ on the implications of university apartheid.186 It was unclear what motivated the 
invitation: whether a genuine interest in university apartheid, or the start of overtures for 
rapprochement with the national union or an opportunity to attack NUSAS policy.187 
Ultimately only one student ‘hammered’ NUSAS on its refusal to fight for complete political 
and social equality while the rest of the large, seemingly sympathetic audience appeared 
impressed by the national union’s academic freedom campaign.188 The SRC, markedly 
more inclined towards the now dominant non-racial orientation of the ANC, agreed on the 
necessity of rekindling relations with NUSAS and intimated that if it received a mandate 
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from the student body to do so, it would re-affiliate. For NUSAS this was the ‘most 
significant event…in the last five years…not just in student affairs, but in South Africa 
generally’.189  
 
However, much of the student body remained sympathetic to the anti-colloborationist 
SOYA and militant Africanist position. Thus, it did not debate re-affiliation, refused to send 
observers to the NUSAS executive meeting and instead voted to convene an ‘All-In 
Student Conference’ to discuss opposition to university apartheid which would exclude 
‘collaboration with NUSAS’.190 Nonetheless, the tentative discussions between the Rhodes 
and Fort Hare SRCs begun in September 1956 regarding the possibility of mounting a joint 
campaign against university apartheid continued.191 In February 1957, shortly before the 
tabling of the Separate University Education Bill, Wentzel wrote at length to the Fort Hare 
SRC on the importance of ‘contact between students of different races’. Wentzel believed 
that suspicions between people who did not know one another as friends disappeared 
when they were able to debate ideas together. He argued further that in South Africa, it 
was not race that divided people but rather ideas and assured Fort Hare that in NUSAS 
with its many divergent points of view, Fort Hare would find support for its position from 
students of all races. NUSAS was also held up as one of the few forums in which all races 
could meet, something which could rapidly come to an end were university apartheid and a 
new mooted Native Laws Amendment Bill (which sought to close off all multi-racial contact 
- discussed later) enacted.192 This letter resulted in the Fort Hare student body voting 
unanimously to accede to the request of NUSAS and their SRC, the latter led by Ambrose 
Makiwane (an ANCYL leader fired by the Native Affairs Department from his teaching post, 
later a member of the SACP and head of the ANC’s exile mission in Cuba193), that the 
national union be allowed to visit the college.194  
 
The reasons for the disaffiliation in 1952 were revisited and to NUSAS’s surprise it 
discovered that racial snubbing by white delegates at NUSAS congresses had been more 
galling to Fort Hare students than the national union’s limited political programme. For the 
first time publicly, NUSAS argued that it was for tactical reasons that it fought apartheid 
only in the educational sphere and that those who opposed educational apartheid were 
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also likely to reject all aspects of the ideology.195 From the scant attention paid to its 
international loyalties,196 it was clear that NUSAS’s decision to leave the IUS was no longer 
the issue it had been when Fort Hare disaffiliated and that the SRC was prepared to 
overlook differences in foreign policy for the sake of fighting university apartheid. The 
NUSAS leadership realised that university apartheid was behind the rapprochement and 
for this reason took ‘the strongest possible line’ as ‘the stronger the line we take, the more 
likely they are to support us’.197 Although some NEUM supporters were against this, the 
SRC decided to re-affiliate to NUSAS were the student body to agree. Before the mass 
meeting, the NUSAS visitors attended a college social and so as to avoid accusations of 
social snubbing and racism, danced ‘wildly’ with as many students as they could, raising 
the eyebrows of some members of the college staff.198 Later that evening, Wentzel 
addressed a mass meeting on the policy and structure of the national union and even 
though objections to NUSAS policy similar to those raised earlier by the SRC came from 
the floor, the student body voted unanimously to rejoin the national union.199                          
 
Why had this occurred? In a later interview with the Congress-aligned press, SRC 
members, Ambrose Makiwane and Lovemore Mutambanengwe (a Southern Rhodesian) 
explained that the decision to re-affiliate was motivated by the need to form a united front 
against university apartheid. This had become possible when the threat of university 
apartheid had forced NUSAS ‘to face political issues whether [it] liked it or not’ and take a 
political stand. Makiwane said Fort Hare still had differences with the national union but it 
was ‘not the time to split the opposition’ to university apartheid.200 Moreover, the Fort Hare 
decision accorded with ANC policy on constructing a united front against apartheid. The 
important role of individuals - and particularly politically connected individuals - in securing 
re-affiliation cannot be discounted. In 1956, Z.K. Matthews, acting principal of Fort Hare, 
Treason Trial defendant and an ANC executive member who inspired the Defiance 
Campaign and Congress of the People, impressed on students the seriousness of looming 
university apartheid and the importance of presenting a united front against it. This could 
perhaps have also included a rapprochement with NUSAS. Shortly after Fort Hare’s re-
affiliation, Matthews, away at the Treason Trial, observed from a distance that the current 
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SRC was doing well, and noted, seemingly approvingly, that it would be represented at 
meetings in Cape Town and on the Rand.201 It was - the ‘Open Universities Conference’ in 
Cape Town and the Wits ‘Inter-SRC Conference on University Apartheid’ in May 1957. The 
influential, strong-willed Makiwane was on occasions known to act independently without a 
mandate from the SRC and student body and sometimes even flouted their wishes. He had 
much to do with the re-affiliation.202 Moreover, the national ANCYL had devoted some time 
to analysing the consequences of university apartheid and denounced it in no uncertain 
terms. The ANC maintained ties with the ANCYL at Fort Hare via Govan Mbeki, ANC 
leader in Port Elizabeth.203 Thus the role of the ANC cannot be discounted in the re-
affiliation. Whether or not the ANC was involved in propelling Fort Hare back into NUSAS, 
it is quite clear that by 1957 the political goals of Fort Hare and NUSAS coincided fairly 
closely and thus it made sense for Fort Hare to return to the national union and access its 
superior resources to fight apartheid. For NUSAS, the re-affiliation meant that it could 
legitimately claim to represent all students and, in a big setback for the government, could 
fight university apartheid on behalf of Fort Hare and black students in general. 
 
With Fort Hare back in the NUSAS fold and the ban on contact with Rhodes lifted, the two 
Eastern Cape SRCs cemented their unofficial joint campaign against university apartheid. 
In March 1957 they issued a statement rejecting the Separate University Education Bill204 
and voiced their objections to comments made by Verwoerd to the Stellenbosch NP 
Jeugbond that the open universities were being used to transform Africans into black 
Englishmen hostile to Afrikanerdom.205 A joint petition was circulated at both campuses 
calling for the immediate withdrawal of the Bill206 and Fort Hare students participated in 
what became a controversial symposium on university apartheid organised by the Rhodes 
SRC.207 This symposium drew unwanted attention from the NP press partly because of 
black participation. Moreover, in his argument in favour of opening Rhodes to all races, 
Guy Butler, the distinguished South African playwright based at the university, claimed that 
he would rather teach ‘coffee coloured bastards’ to ‘barbarous whites’,208 in the process 
mocking and ridiculing the NP’s concerns with miscegenation. 
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The first ever university protest march (termed the more neutral ‘procession’) took place in 
Grahamstown in March 1957. Lending legitimacy to this unprecedented event was the 
participation of the Rhodes Senate, Council and Convocation which condemned the 
transfer of Fort Hare to the government and the abrogation of Rhodes’s autonomy.209 After 
the heady excitement of the first phase of the campaign, participation dwindled and 
academic freedom again became the preserve of Rhodes’s ‘old faithful’.210 
 
For the Fort Hare student body, embarking on militant protest action was not initially a 
unanimous decision. Many students regarded university apartheid (like Bantu Education 
before it) as a foregone conclusion and thus reasoned that opposition to government plans 
was futile. The most that many students could envisage was some sort of symbolic protest 
rather than actually confronting the government.211 Adherents of the non-collaborationist 
SOYA had a predisposition to ‘armchair politics’ and refused to demonstrate at all.212 It 
could also be argued that for black Fort Hare students (unlike their privileged and basically 
free white counterparts), active politics posed a threat to their future careers as it exposed 
students to the real possibility of university exclusion (as occurred after the closure of Fort 
Hare in 1955) and post university unemployability, or government harassment, as the 
arrest on the charge of treason of Z.K. Matthews illustrated. In what was otherwise a 
remarkable display of inter-racial solidarity, some Fort Hare students questioned the 
legality of their participation in a joint Rhodes-Fort Hare placard demonstration to be held in 
Port Elizabeth.213 Donovan Williams (a member of staff who subsequently authored a 
history of Fort Hare) argues that the strong line taken by Fort Hare students stemmed 
partly from the influential presence of the somewhat older Makiwane.214 
 
Makiwane, as SRC president, played a leading role in the official three hundred and sixty-
strong, university-wide march to the town of Alice protesting the Second Reading of the 
university apartheid Bill in May 1957. The march concluded in the passing of a resolution 
sent to the Minister of Education, Arts and Science, which limited itself to reaffirming Fort 
Hare’s commitment to academic freedom and university autonomy and total rejection of the 
establishment of tribal institutions. Banners carried by the marchers proclaiming ‘We are 
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Africans not Zulus or Sothos’ and ‘We shall not be brainwashed’215 asserted a strong 
African nationalism but more importantly, reflected the deep fear of the imposition of Bantu 
Education and the removal from Fort Hare, not only of coloured and Indian students, but 
also non-Xhosa-speaking Africans. Speeches from African members of staff deplored, in 
liberal terms, the closing of the open universities and the associated implications for black 
advancement and inter-racial contact.216 Students sympathetic to SOYA did not 
participate,217 presumably because demonstration was deemed to be futile, was limited to 
educational apartheid only and associated with white liberals and NUSAS. However, this 
stance lost SOYA much ground on the campus.218 A member of the Fort Hare SRC 
reflected on the importance of having for the first time mounted a joint protest with the 
college staff as without a united front, ‘resistance’ could have been ‘seriously impaired’ and 
divisions sown by those hostile to the campaign.219   
 
Was Fort Hare a united front? Williams argues that staff protest against the Separate 
University Education Bill was led by a group of anti-Afrikaans, LP supporters/members on 
the college Senate (many of them ‘foreigners’) who were irresponsibly and selfishly 
‘sacrificing’ the futures of black staff members220 by using the academic freedom campaign 
for their own wider ‘political’ purposes.221 As such, he argues, they had little support from 
African members of staff who were more sympathetic to the ‘cautious’, ‘practical’, 
‘judicious’222 white fence-sitters on the Senate who wanted no truck with the ‘political’223 
activities of the ‘Liberals’ and who often allied themselves with the supporters of 
government takeover.224 Whether the academic freedom campaign was foreign LP-
dominated or not, the second part of Williams’ argument is patently untrue and not even 
borne out by Williams’ own evidence. All African members of the Senate voted against the 
imposition of apartheid as did the Lecturers’ Association. African staff members certainly 
participated in the march to Alice. Suspicions of LP domination were evidently rife as 
Makiwane felt obliged to refute allegations that students were ‘incited’ by white (LP) college 
staff members.225 These allegations were probably made by the government and 
conservative whites intent on undermining African agency and the significance of black-
white and student-staff co-operation. Fort Hare students ‘disliked intensely’ the white 
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conservative grouping who, as well as attempting to ‘inhibit’ and ‘forestall’ strong protest 
action against government takeover, had ‘unpleasant relations’ with their students. This 
was in sharp contrast to the esteem in which their well ‘liked’ LP colleagues were held.226  
 
The Separate University Education Bill: Second Reading  
The Fort Hare and nation-wide university protests intentionally coincided with the Second 
Reading of the Separate University Education Bill. Beale argues that the Bill and its 
justification were quite clearly authored by the Native Affairs Department and not the 
segregationist Viljoen who during the Second Reading stuck closely to his typewritten 
speech with a ‘grim looking Verwoerd sitting directly behind him’.227 Moreover, Viljoen 
claimed not even to have read the report of the Van der Walt Commission before it was 
printed228 while six months earlier he had stated at a University of South Africa (UNISA) 
graduation that ‘our universities must not be determined from outside’ and ‘must transcend 
the volk’.229 Nonetheless, Viljoen argued firstly that the removal of black students from the 
open universities was required to safeguard the security of the state which was threatened 
by ‘mounting African political opposition’. Many of these black activists he alleged, were 
educated at the open universities and consequently became culturally alienated from their 
communities, becoming ‘agitators’ and ‘traitors’ instead of leaders and ‘social assets’.230 
Secondly, Viljoen disingenuously argued that the open universities discriminated against 
black students by practicing social segregation. Viljoen’s third argument, that the open 
universities would inevitably become black institutions were there no intervention in their 
admission policies, was according to Beale, an ‘echo’ of earlier ‘simpler segregationist’ 
models of university apartheid.231 Viljoen justified the transfer of responsibility for African 
education from his department to that of Native Affairs by arguing for the necessity of 
streamlining African education and ‘Bantu development’ in one department. Crudely, the 
Native Affairs Department would control the supply and demand of university trained 
Africans required for the government’s separate development policy.232  
Many opposition speakers pointed to the startling change of policy followed by Viljoen in 
his years as Minister of Education, Arts and Science. They noted their awareness that the 
Separate University Education Bill was not his craftsmanship but that of the Native Affairs 
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Department. They thus drew particular attention to a statement made by Viljoen in 1951 
that he would not interfere with the autonomy of the universities.233 This challenge to 
Viljoen was orchestrated in part by NUSAS, as executive members going through old files 
had come across his 1951 statement and had realised what a powerful weapon it could be 
in the university apartheid campaign. NUSAS recognised that serious divisions existed 
within the NP which could be exploited to defeat the apartheid Bill.234  
 
Press coverage too was believed to be critical in exposing and opposing the Separate 
Universities Bill. NUSAS deliberately cultivated the press and by January 1957 had built up 
such a cordial relationship with the Cape newspapers that it had the free use of the Cape 
Times’s telex machine.235 The Witwatersrand Student reported that the liberal English 
South African press stood ‘four square’ behind the open universities236 as it devoted 
hundreds of columns of print in the form of press reports and editorials to the academic 
freedom campaign. In the opinion of a NUSAS executive member, overseas press support 
on the editorial side had by May 1957, ‘reached almost the same degree of coverage as in 
South Africa’, while international denunciation of university apartheid forced ‘the 
government to tone down its extremism’.237  
 
This put the NP-aligned Afrikaans press at a disadvantage. Unable (like the government) 
‘to stem the tide of protest against university apartheid’ it had resorted (like the 
government) to ‘Jew baiting’ and reports of miscegenation (‘deurmekaarboerdery’).238 In an 
attempt to undermine the academic freedom campaign, the Minister of Education claimed 
that a ‘leftish’ and even ‘communist’ element was behind this anti-government opposition. 
This claim was embellished by NP-supporting newspapers with a discussion of the leading 
role played by Jewish students in the academic freedom campaign. Historically Afrikaner 
nationalism had elided communism and its internationalism (both the absolute enemy of 
Afrikaner nationalism) with the ‘unassimilable’, ‘cosmopolitan’ ‘Jew’.239 The avowedly anti-
communist NUSAS executive rejected the Minister’s allegations and challenged him to 
repeat them outside parliament.240 Communist labelling was an effective weapon against 
NUSAS because of its working relationship in the university apartheid campaign with the 
radical left, many of whom were probably sympathetic to the banned CPSA. Moreover, if 
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the national union appeared too anti-communist, it risked alienating its black membership, 
particularly the newly affiliated Fort Hare student body. 
 
The Separate University Education Bill successfully passed its Second Reading, but 
instead of continuing its passage through the House of Assembly and Senate was 
dispatched to a Select Committee which itself was later transformed into a parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry. This was surprising considering that the government appeared to 
be in a hurry to implement university apartheid and had already begun construction of the 
new university colleges for this purpose. When pressed by NUSAS for an explanation of 
these developments – developments which  Coombe, the new NUSAS president mused 
signalled the government’s ‘extraordinary conception of parliamentary government that 
enables an act to be implemented before it is passed’241- the Secretary of the Native Affairs 
Department untruthfully alleged that the new buildings were intended for training 
colleges.242 For Coombe, the stalling of the Separate Universities Education Bill offered a 
‘welcome’, ‘temporary’ reprieve to the open universities, which he surmised had come 
about because of the reluctance of the government to alienate leading academics just prior 
to the 1958 general election.243  
 
Clearing the decks of contentious legislation and healing the divisions which had opened 
up within the NP ranks regarding university apartheid seemed to be a government priority 
before the 1958 election. With regard to the latter, idealistic total apartheid intellectuals 
(dubbed ‘Visionaries’ by Lazar and discussed in more detail in chapter four) within the NP’s 
premier race relations body, SABRA, together with members of the Afrikaans churches 
expressed their reservations about the degree of state control envisaged at the 
government’s new ethnic institutions. Overwhelming overseas criticism against the 
university apartheid Bill,244 largely the fruit of NUSAS’s international campaign was, 
Coombe surmised, another possible reason for the appointment of the Select Commission. 
Less likely considering the levels of depravity to which the government had already and 
would in the future stoop to secure racial separation, was Coombe’s speculation that there 
was a collective pricking of the Nationalist conscience at having gone too far.245  
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Adoption of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
With university apartheid temporarily out of sight and out of mind, NUSAS was able to 
focus its attention on both cementing Fort Hare’s position in NUSAS as well as winning 
back other black centres like UNNE. Just prior to Fort Hare’s re-affiliation, the Fort Hare 
SRC and the NUSAS leadership agreed that henceforward the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights would form the foundation of NUSAS policy.246 It is possible 
that the Fort Hare SRC suggested this, as its predecessor had considered the adoption of 
the Universal Declaration as an alternative to its eventually unsuccessful attempt to amend 
the NUSAS constitution in 1951.247 The Declaration primarily upheld individual rights 
associated with liberal democracy, but also more radically, included a minority of socio-
economic rights such as employment protection and the right to access a minimum level of 
resources such as housing, health care and education.248 Its preamble declared that all 
were born free, equal in dignity and rights and entitled to these rights irrespective of race 
and colour. The Universal Declaration was an excellent foundation for a national union 
composed of students of different socio-economic and racial backgrounds intent on 
opposing a level of racial discrimination often compared at the time to Nazism. The 
Declaration emerged out of both the Nuremberg Trials249 and the earlier Atlantic Charter. 
The Atlantic Charter inspired both the ANC’s ‘African Claims’ of 1943250 and NUSAS’s 
‘Four Freedoms of a University’. In addition the Declaration resonated with the Freedom 
Charter. Moreover, the liberal wing of the UP also defended the fundamental rights of 
humankind as espoused by the United Nations.251  
 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the suitability of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
to NUSAS, a resolution based on this document was difficult to draft because firstly, it had 
to be radical enough to satisfy black students’ demands for a more politicised student 
organisation, but not so radical as to alienate NUSAS’s conservative, white student base. 
Secondly, as the NUSAS president pointed out, ‘a bald statement of support for the Univ. 
[sic] Declaration is absolutely useless because if that’s what we are going to do, we might 
as well go into politics and get it over with’.252 By adopting the Universal Declaration, 
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NUSAS by implication would have to endorse a non-racial franchise (endorsed by no white 
political party at the time) and reject the land acts, job reservation and migrant labour, in 
other words, the entire segregatory foundations on which modern South Africa was built. 
Even more controversially for the constitutionally-inclined NUSAS was that the preamble of 
the Universal Declaration sanctioned ‘recourse…to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression’.253 Thus, the resolution had to state unambiguously that NUSAS would still 
restrict its activities to educational affairs and by implication would not then have a policy 
regarding other political issues such as the franchise.254       
 
The apartheid and Universal Declaration resolution was to be moved at the annual 
congress in July 1957 by Wentzel and Coombe, the latter then president of the 
Pietermaritzburg SRC. So as to have a mandate from Pietermaritzburg,255 Coombe 
successfully persuaded his SRC to pass a motion declaring its opposition to apartheid,256 
which at Wentzel’s request made no mention of the Universal Declaration,257 presumably 
because of the Declaration’s universal franchise and other radical clauses. A student mass 
meeting unanimously ratified this resolution but this decision was later invalidated as there 
was no quorum.258 Nux recognised the significance of this change of policy for NUSAS. 
The realisation by Pietermaritzburg students that apartheid interfered with education and 
thus could not be ignored, Nux contended, brought the student body closer to the thinking 
of Fort Hare students who had disaffiliated from NUSAS because of the national union’s 
limited political programme. Thus national student unity had been strengthened at a time 
when student unity was essential.259   
 
Shortly before the NUSAS Congress, the Wits SRC (with the exception of those associated 
with the NP) adopted a resolution declaring its opposition to apartheid and its belief ‘in a 
truly democratic system of education’ which ‘can only prevail in a society based on the … 
principles … expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. The resolution 
accepted that students were part of society and declared that the SRC would ‘play its role 
in the total life of the community’. However, it was more qualified than that of 
Pietermaritzburg’s in that it stated that it would ‘as far as possible’ engage in political 
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activity only in the ‘strictly academic and student fields’.260 The six member-strong left led 
by Treason Trial defendant, Ismael Mohammed (later a defendant in the 1985 
Pietermaritzburg and Delmas treason trials, vice-president in the 1980s of the United 
Democratic Front in the Transvaal, ANC member of parliament and professor of 
Mathematics at Wits) and COD activist Ada Bloomberg (sister of Charles Bloomberg, the 
fearless Sunday Times journalist who exposed the Broederbond), attempted to persuade 
the SRC to adopt a true ‘student-in-society’ position, but to no avail. Their amendment, that 
‘under conditions such as prevail in South Africa, student conditions cannot be 
restricted…to the university but must be directed…against all discriminatory racial 
measures in South Africa’ was soundly defeated.261 
 
A slightly modified version of the Wits SRC apartheid motion was adopted by forty votes to 
none with two abstentions by the NUSAS assembly in July 1957. It read: 
‘In order to clarify this Assembly’s actions in regard to important issues of 
basic policy, this Assembly affirms the following: 
a) This Assembly asserts its belief in a truly democratic system of 
education and holds that such a system can only prevail in a society 
based on the fundamental principles of human rights as expressed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and accepted in principle in 
Resolution 80 of 1952. 
b) Further, this Assembly considers that as it is a student body and not 
a political body, it should engage in only those aspects of life having 
particular reference to the student and education. 
c) However, this Assembly realises that education cannot be 
separated from the society in which it takes place, and that apartheid in 
education is an integral part of, and stands and falls with, the total policy 
of apartheid applying to all spheres of South African life.  
d) Consequently, Assembly declares its opposition to the government 
policy of Apartheid, which deprives South Africans of freedom of 
movement, association, expression, study and worship and inter alia, 
impedes the full development of a truly democratic system in South Africa. 
e) Nonetheless, this Assembly, both from its nature as a student 
organisation and from the realisation that its effectiveness in carrying out 
its policy is greatly enhanced by its non-party political character reaffirms 
that it will not affiliate or identify itself with any political movement or party 
and will, as far as possible, engage only in the strictly academic, 
educational and student fields of activity. 
Thus, this Assembly declares that it will play its role in the total life of the 
community by defending and seeking to implement all factors relating to 
the basic principles of academic freedom and academic equality.’262 
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In introducing the motion, Wentzel argued in strictly educational terms that the lives of 
black students were ‘a daily history of oppression’ and NUSAS could not thus ignore their 
plight when they were discriminated against in the educational sphere as this was ‘side-
stepping’ policy making decisions. In seconding the motion, Coombe said that to remain 
silent about apartheid meant to acquiesce and condone it.263 In analysing this resolution, 
clauses c and d represent a significant radicalisation of NUSAS policy. But to win the 
support of conservative students for the shift in policy, this is tempered by clause e. This 
apartheid resolution, taken overall, is more limited than the 1952 ‘statement of attitude’ 
narrowly lost after Fort Hare seceded, that read that NUSAS recognised ‘that society and 
education [were] inseparably linked’ and would thus ‘uphold the principle of political, social 
and economic equality of all’ and accordingly would mobilise its members in the ‘struggle 
against the undemocratic action of the government’.264   
 
Legassick argued that the adoption of the Universal Declaration gave ‘ideological 
expression’ to the structural reforms of the national union undertaken by Tobias in the early 
1950s. These brought together African nationalists, radical leftists and NUSAS’s mass 
conservative base in one organisation under a moderate leadership tied to the SRCs. 
However, this structural reform failed to provide an ideological foundation on which political 
action could be based, with the result that most black students left the national union. With 
the liberal left leadership of 1957 able to create the space needed for political action which 
the radical left had earlier been unsuccessful in doing,265 the liberal left was faced with the 
onerous task of persuading NUSAS’s conservative student base into endorsing this. 
 
Thus after the 1957 congress, SRCs were required to review their assembly delegates’ 
endorsement of the apartheid and Universal Declaration resolution. So as to avoid the 
embarrassment and setback to NUSAS were some centres to dissociate themselves from 
the resolution, the new NUSAS president, Coombe, compiled a memorandum on the 
issue.266 All NUSAS affiliates in the Transvaal ratified this new policy, including the teacher 
training colleges267 which usually abstained on political matters. However, at UCT and 
Rhodes the adoption of the apartheid motion was more complicated. 
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In August 1957, the UCT SRC adopted the NUSAS ‘apartheid motion’ with two 
abstentions.268 However, this was only put before the student body in the form of an 
amendment to the all-embracing anti-university apartheid motion, similar to the one lost in 
1956269 which was put before a mass meeting at the request of ‘a certain group of non-
white students’270 associated with the NEUM in October 1957.271 The proposers of the 
motion argued that UCT’s ‘conciliatory’ and limited campaign against university apartheid 
had been ‘catastrophic’. They rejected any collaboration with the Select Committee272 and 
presumably also the commission of inquiry which followed the Second Reading of the 
Separate University Education Bill, with which the UCT SRC had already agreed to co-
operate.273 No final decision was taken on either the motion or the amendment as the 
quorum was lost halfway through the meeting.274  
 
Both the SRC and student body at Rhodes adopted the apartheid resolution but when it 
was discovered that the mass meeting had been inquorate the matter was deferred until 
the presidential visit of Coombe.275 In the meantime, the resolution became entangled in 
three separate but interlinked developments. Firstly, the burgeoning white co-operation 
movement (the topic of chapter four) which saw NUSAS as an obstacle to achieving this; 
secondly, the NP and the Broederbond’s smear campaign aimed at thwarting Rhodes’s 
expansion into Port Elizabeth;276 and thirdly the unmasking of three student police 
informers who were suspected of being part of a ‘spy ring’ centred around W.E.G. Louw (a 
Dertigers poet and professor of Afrikaans-Nederlands at Rhodes and soon to be Arts editor 
of Die Burger) and other leading Nationalists in the Grahamstown Wool Research 
Institution.277 One informer, who was a student of Louw’s, voluntarily confessed to the SRC 
to reporting on the activities of students and staff to the CID and the Security Branch. 
Because no university regulation had been contravened, no disciplinary action was taken. 
However, the SRC released a statement expressing its ‘extreme distaste’ of spying which it 
believed amounted to an ‘invidious inroad on academic freedom’.278 The Chief of Police, 
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Brigadier Rademeyer, refused to comment on the ‘Rhodes affair’ but warned that ‘no 
university could regard itself immune from security procedures’,279 thus insinuating that the 
universities were harbouring subversive elements. At the same time, Makiwane was 
arrested for obstructing the police during an ANCYL congress in Queenstown. The warrant 
authorising the police to search the congress listed it was valid for other organisations, 
including NUSAS.280 Earlier that year a spy had been discovered at Fort Hare too.281 In 
view of both this and Rademeyer’s statement, the Fort Hare Lecturers’ Association 
demanded the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry into spying at universities. 
Die Burger welcomed this believing that a commission’s findings would vindicate the need 
for state security surveillance of the universities.282  
 
In the midst of these events, the Cape NP press decried the negotiations taking place 
between the Rhodes authorities and the Port Elizabeth Town Council with regard to 
procuring a site for the establishment of the new Rhodes branch. Rhodes, the government 
press argued, discriminated against Afrikaans-speaking students – an allegation 
strenuously denied by the Afrikaanse Studentevereniging. It was moreover a hotbed of left 
wing NUSAS-inspired subversion – the apartheid resolution being a case in point - and as 
such could not be entrusted with the control of the independent bilingual university in Port 
Elizabeth which the NP had in mind.283 By this time the student body was allegedly so 
‘cross’ about the spies and informers that it was expected to respond by supporting the 
apartheid resolution.284 This proved correct although the SRC vice-president, Chris Murray, 
argued that ‘if the student body agreed with any one aspect of segregation’ it should reject 
the resolution,285 a line of reasoning similar to that adopted in 1959 by proponents of the 
white co-operation movement with regard to Rhodes’ endorsement of the academic 
freedom campaign (see chapter five). Murray ‘pointedly’ inquired whether rejection of the 
apartheid motion would affect Rhodes’ relationship to NUSAS,286 presumably in the hope 
that this would lead to disaffiliation.  
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Defying the Native Laws Amendment Act 
 
Adopting a student-in-society orientation acceptable to its mass student base and bringing 
Fort Hare back into the NUSAS fold was a considerable achievement which resulted in the 
national union becoming stronger, more representative and united than it had been in 
many years. However, the Native Laws Amendment Bill tabled in parliament in February 
1957 (at the same time as the Separate University Education Bill) and enacted in May 
1957 threatened not only to reverse these advances but also struck at the very existence of 
the national union. The Bill (particularly clause 29(c), the infamous ‘church clause’) forced 
multi-racial organisations such as churches, hospitals and welfare bodies operating in 
urban areas outside the townships to apply to the Minister of Native Affairs for permission 
to continue functioning.287 This Bill was aimed at further restricting the movements of urban 
Africans but also at closing off all avenues of inter-racial contact, which in the opinion of the 
NP, so threatened the success of apartheid.   
 
The new Bill was badly phrased and ambiguous and it was unclear whether it would 
actually apply to organisations like NUSAS and the SAIRR.288 While the shocked NUSAS 
leadership considered its response, it pondered the consequences for NUSAS of the 
enactment of both university apartheid and the Native Laws Amendment Bill.289 Because 
this was an abrogation of freedom of association, a capitulation to the government and in 
any case would prove futile, it was agreed that NUSAS would not apply for permission to 
hold its annual student assembly.290 However, if prohibited from doing so anyway, would 
NUSAS risk prosecution of its entire leadership under the punitive Public Safety Act, or 
worse, risk the proscription of the national union were it to defy the minister’s proclamation 
and go ahead with the congress?291 In order to comply with the new act, NUSAS would 
have to abandon its congress and student assembly and transform itself into a 
correspondence organisation held together by frequent executive visits to ‘evangelise’ the 
various black and white ‘tribalised’ campuses still allowed to associate themselves with the 
national union. With the legislation of university apartheid, NUSAS’s rallying cry of 
academic non-segregation would become entirely academic in the immediate future thus 
severely diminishing the appeal of the national union both to its student base and to its 
future leadership. It was felt that perhaps NUSAS’s new rallying call could be that it was 
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one of the few forums for inter-racial student contact,292 an argument it was already using 
in its academic freedom campaign. However, NUSAS could also be eclipsed by the ASB293 
were the latter’s proposal for ‘federal executive’ co-operation along separate racial lines294 
be found acceptable to NUSAS centres. With the enactment of university apartheid, the 
obstacle for the ASB of the representation of mixed student bodies from the ‘open’ 
universities at meetings would fall away, making the emergence of some kind of national 
confederal student body organised along apartheid lines a distinct possibility.295 
 
Until it had finalised its response to the Native Laws Amendment Bill and seen how the 
churches, the SAIRR and other affected ‘non-political’ bodies reacted, Wentzel issued an 
instruction to NUSAS SRCs to desist from discussing the Bill at all.296 The Wits left 
disagreed and although dissuaded by NUSAS executive members at Wits from doing so, 
secured the adoption by the SRC of a strongly worded denunciation of the measure297 as 
the ‘most pernicious Bill ever to be brought before parliament’ which could ‘only lead to a 
tragic outcome for South Africa’ because it limited ‘contact’ between the races. 
Controversially, the SRC also committed itself to co-operating with any bodies opposed to 
the Native Laws Amendment Bill but to placate the liberals who like NUSAS believed in co-
operation with selected non-political bodies only, added ‘where [this was] in the interest of 
the SRC’.298 
 
In the run up to the passage of the Native Laws Amendment Bill in May 1957, NUSAS 
confined itself to attending protest meetings hosted by like-minded, ‘non-political’ 
organisations affected by the measure.299 Once the law was enacted however, NUSAS, 
like the LP, became very wary observers at ANC-convened forums too.300 The adoption by 
NUSAS of more radical tactics of protest against university apartheid was extended to its 
approach to the Native Laws Amendment Bill. At an SAIRR conference attended by twenty 
two organisations to discuss the Bill, the NUSAS representatives persuaded the tactically 
timid delegates to ignore the measure once it was enacted and in the face of prosecution 
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for doing so, all would stand together. This was the kind of support NUSAS needed for its 
intended defiance of the Native Laws Amendment Act.301  
 
At the NUSAS annual congress in July 1957, the student assembly voted in future to ignore 
the prohibition of multi-racial gatherings in urban areas, convene its meetings and take the 
consequences.302 The responsibility for this act of defiance would be jointly shouldered by 
the NUSAS president and the two vice-presidents.303 However, in order to avoid taking this 
drastic action immediately, NUSAS arranged, eventually unsuccessfully, to hold its annual 
congress at the Pius the Twelfth Catholic University College in Basutoland the following 
year.304  
 
How had NUSAS prepared its mass student base for this provocative new policy which 
represented an abandonment of the purely educational sphere and a sortie into party 
politics? Firstly, NUSAS was not alone. The Catholic and Anglican churches, both non-
political institutions of which many students were members, had already indicated their 
intentions of disregarding the ‘church clause’ and Group Areas Amendment if enacted. An 
official announcement to this effect was made shortly after the conclusion of the NUSAS 
congress.305 Secondly, the Native Laws Amendment Bill was linked to the Separate 
University Education Bill, in that they both threatened to curtail students’ freedom of 
association and NUSAS’s reason for existence as a forum for students. It was argued that 
the Native Laws Amendment Bill was ‘entirely foreign to [South Africa’s] democratic 
heritage’ and instead of protecting students’ freedom of association, the Bill transformed 
this right into ‘a favour of Dr Verwoerd’.306 Thirdly, an analogy was made with the loss of 
freedom suffered by the Hungarians after the Soviet invasion of their country the previous 
year and finally,307 NUSAS pointed out a fact that was becoming increasingly obvious to 
liberals generally, that a loss or denial of freedom to the black community represented a 
concomitant loss of freedom to the white community too.308 NUSAS was evidently 
successful in winning over its conservative student membership as even the avowedly non-
political Durban reluctantly agreed to affiliate to the Council for the Defence of Freedom of 
Association.309  
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NUSAS continued to join other organisations in opposing the applicable provisions of the 
Native Laws Amendment Act. However, with the return of Fort Hare and the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights it was obliged to co-operate with the ANC too, to 
the regret of some NUSAS executive members. The ANCYL was suspected of having a 
‘fairly strong red element in its ranks’ while its parent body was allegedly an ineffective 
force in the fight against the Native Laws Amendment Act.310 Despite these reservations, 
NUSAS was represented at the ANC Native Laws Amendment conference in Cape Town 
in August 1957 by its politically astute international relations vice-president and UCT SRC 
president, Neville Rubin.311 Rubin was sufficiently adroit to ensure that NUSAS’s image 
remained untarnished,312 presumably from associating with such a radical black political 
organisation like the ANC. In some relief, NUSAS judged the ANC initiative a failure but 
believed that contact with the African nationalist organisation remained important. 
 
Interdenominational African Ministers’ Federation (IDAMF) Multi-racial Conference 
 
In a more positive vein, Coombe agreed to co-sponsor and serve on the Education 
Commission313 of a conference entitled ‘Human relations in a multi-racial society’ to be held 
at Wits in December 1957.314 Coombe believed that as a racially open organisation 
committed to certain policies, NUSAS had an obligation to attend the conference which he 
far-sightedly gauged as having ‘immediate and historical importance’.315 This ‘Multi-racial 
Conference’, as the event became known, was convened by the Interdenominational 
African Ministers’ Federation (IDAMF) to discuss the overtly political resolution passed at 
their 1956 conference that the only ‘guarantee’ for ‘peaceful and harmonious relations 
between Black and White’ was a non-racial South African citizenship and ‘the abolition of 
discriminatory laws’.316 Originally the ANC leadership was to have sponsored the 
conference,317 in accordance with its ‘united front’ policy, but presumably because of being 
hamstrung by the Treason Trial, much of the organisation of the event was left to the LP. 
Thus Alan Paton found sixty individuals318 from a diverse range of institutions and political 
                                                          
310 BC 586 A2.2, Magnus Gunther to Trevor Coombe, 11.8.1957. 
311 BC 586 A2.2, Magnus Gunther to Trevor Coombe, 8.8.1957; Trevor Coombe to Magnus Gunther, 
28.8.1957. 
312 BC 586 A2.2, Magnus (Gunther) to Trevor Coombe, 5.9.1957. 
313 BC 596 T60, N. Rubin to A. Hepple, 12.9.1958; ‘Multi-racial Conference of South Africa: Register of 
Commissions in which participants will sit’, nd. 
314 BC 586 B4.1, Trevor Coombe to the Executive, 31.10.1957; T60, T. Coombe to Chairman of the Planning 
Committee, Multi-racial Conference of South Africa, 31.10.1957. 
315 BC 586 B4.1, Trevor Coombe to the Executive, 14.9.1957, pp. 4-5.  
316 ibid.  
317 BC 586 T60, ‘Minutes of a Meeting of Sponsors of the Multi-racial Conference held in the Trades Hall, Week 
Street, Johannesburg on Monday, 1st September 1957 at 10.am’.  
318 R. Vigne, Liberals against apartheid: a history of the Liberal Party of South Africa, 1953-1968, MacMillan 
and St Martin’s Press, Houndsmill and New York, 1997, p. 77.  
135 
 
parties which included the universities (for example, Makiwane of the Fort Hare SRC), the 
LP, Labour Party, the ANC and COD to sponsor the event.319 The conference unanimously 
adopted universal adult suffrage and the inclusion of a bill of rights in the constitution of a 
future democratic South Africa.320 However, NUSAS only endorsed the educational 
findings of the conference.321 The education commission’s ‘Education in a multi-racial 
society’ was hailed as an authoritative commentary on the subject which ‘provided 
justification of NUSAS’s fundamental educational policies’.322 In typical liberal terms, the 
NUSAS representatives expressed their admiration for the ‘genuine air of co-operation’323 
and ‘harmony’324 which prevailed at the conference which ‘showed that people of different 
races… could still get together…..and decide in a very rational manner what the future of 
South Africa should be’.325 Almost as remarkable as the spirit of co-operation prevailing at 
the conference was the fact that it took place at all. Already some multi-racial organisations 
had fallen victim to the provisions of the Native Law Amendment Act and been denied 
permission to hold their gatherings. Perhaps the presence of observers from SABRA lent 
the IDAMF conference privileged status.  
 
Conclusion 
 
By the end of 1957 then, NUSAS was a substantially different organisation - structurally, 
ideologically and tactically to what it had been just two years before. With the return of Fort 
Hare, NUSAS’s claim to be a national union of students rang less hollow. The adoption of 
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided the organisation with an 
ideological foundation and the licence to embark on political activity, absolutely necessary 
if it were to retain and expand its black membership. The UN Declaration could be 
compared to the Freedom Charter. Following the adoption of the former, NUSAS moved 
ideologically closer to the Congresses. In its campaigns against university apartheid and 
the ‘church clause’, NUSAS employed the Congresses’ radical, unconstitutional methods of 
struggle and defiance. Ironically for the government, both the Separate Universities 
Education Bill and the Native Laws Amendment Act were intended to put an end to inter-
racial contact and not to foster it as happened with NUSAS and the Congresses. Despite 
its radicalisation in terms of its tactics and ideological foundation, NUSAS still based its 
academic freedom campaign on the conservative defence of university autonomy. This 
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enabled NUSAS to craft a substantial united front against university apartheid which 
included a significant proportion of its conservative and generally apathetic student base. 
University autonomy was a limited enough defence to persuade the UP to denounce 
government plans for the universities and moreover, the UP’s support was critical to the 
success of building a campus united front. However, for black students, the radical left and 
much of the NUSAS leadership, the tactical expediency of upholding the right of 
universities to segregate was morally untenable. So too was the inconsistency of the ‘open’ 
universities’ practice of upholding ‘academic non-segregation’ but applying campus social 
segregation. Both of these issues would be debated during the following couple of years 
and will be discussed in chapter five.     
 
137 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
National student contact: NUSAS, the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) and their 
affiliates, 1955-1959 
Introduction 
As shown, NUSAS was established in 1924 to bring together white English- and 
Afrikaans-speaking students on the basis of their common studentship. By 1956 it was 
clear that it had quite spectacularly failed to achieve this goal. No student body of any 
extant Afrikaans-medium university had been officially associated with NUSAS since 
1936, all electing instead to be organised into ethnically exclusive Afrikaner nationalist 
organisations such as the ultra-nationalist Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond (ANS) and 
from 1948 onwards, the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB), both of which were hostile to 
NUSAS. NUSAS did not accept this situation. It attempted unsuccessfully to initiate 
contact and co-operation with the ASB and students at the Afrikaans-medium universities, 
spurred on in part by the need to respond to the residual broad white South Africanist 
sentiment within its own ranks. This grew more strident the more racially inclusive and 
consequently more radical NUSAS became. More importantly, NUSAS was motivated to 
win the support of students at the Afrikaans-medium institutions for the concept of 
university autonomy and the right of the open universities to remain open, but to no avail. 
By 1956, however, a questioning of the desirability of isolation and a more positive 
attitude towards contact with other students, both in South Africa and abroad, was 
discernible within Afrikaans-medium student bodies and the ASB. Linked to this was 
increasing criticism of the outmodedness of the Christian-National foundation of the ASB 
and the obstacle this posed to the creation of a new national student organisation 
constructed on a racial and ethnic basis which many students hoped would come into 
being following the introduction of university apartheid. Not all NP adherents held that a 
new organisation was the prerequisite for student co-operation. In 1959, members of the 
Stellenbosch SRC entered serious, but ultimately failed negotiations with NUSAS to re-
affiliate. Had this succeeded and some of the Stellenbosch negotiators not been 
motivated by the desire to effect a right wing takeover of NUSAS, this would have marked 
a significant milestone on the road to national student co-operation and the attainment of 
NUSAS’s primary function. For the new prime-minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, this apparent 
rapprochement with NUSAS and other manifestations of ‘liberalism; together with the 
rejection of university apartheid by a sizeable number of Stellenbosch students on the 
eve of the enactment of the Extension of University Education Bill, was too much. 
Through the efforts of orthodox NP members, many of them associated with the newly 
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formed ‘Ruiterwag’, the junior branch of the Broederbond, this dissident revolt was 
suppressed and Stellenbosch was brought back to NP orthodoxy.   
The contact and co-operation movement generated its own momentum. Increasing 
dissatisfaction with the ASB on the Afrikaans-medium campuses led to heightened 
expectations of white co-operation on the English-medium ones and a concomitant 
dissatisfaction with NUSAS as an obstacle to this rapprochement. Similarly, these 
auspicious developments at the English-medium universities generated further optimism 
for co-operation at the Afrikaans-medium campuses. However, the inter-SRC 
conferences which followed these developments, all aborted on the refusal of the 
NUSAS-aligned SRCs to accept apartheid representation. These conferences placed 
NUSAS in a difficult situation. Even though they posed a potential threat to NUSAS’s 
continued existence, the conferences could not be condemned publicly as NUSAS policy, 
reaffirmed annually, was committed to student rapprochement. More importantly, these 
events excluded representatives from black higher educational institutions and could thus 
not be welcomed particularly as black students and the white left accused NUSAS of 
ranking white co-operation above that of a committed anti-apartheid programme. 
Ironically Afrikaans-speaking student leaders accused NUSAS of valuing its small black 
membership more highly than co-operation with thousands of Afrikaners. NUSAS thus 
remained aloof from these inter-SRC gatherings and instead pursued contact with 
Afrikaans-medium centres in an uncompromisingly liberal fashion. NUSAS believed that 
support for apartheid arose from ignorance and so encouraged its affiliated student 
bodies to make use of every possible occasion to expose their Afrikaans-speaking 
counterparts to the realities of apartheid and the benefits of liberalism.1 Trevor Coombe, 
the evangelical Christian NUSAS president and sometime Moral Rearmament Movement 
(MRA) activist believed implicitly in the efficacy of personal contact and thus embarked on 
a personal proselytization of student leaders at the Afrikaans-medium centres some of 
whom had also embraced MRA. It could be argued that it was partly due to Coombe’s 
efforts both within and outside the context of the MRA that co-operation advanced to the 
degree it did in the period between 1956 and 1959. The desire for contact with English-
speaking white, and to a lesser extent black, students by their Afrikaans-speaking 
counterparts reflected debates, developments and realignments within the state, society, 
political parties and specifically the NP, the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs 
(SABRA) and other sectors of Afrikaans-speaking society. 
 
                                                          
1 BC 586 O1.2, Trevor to ‘Des’ (?) 23.7.1957. 
139 
 
Background to contact and co-operation 
Large scale black resistance during the 1950s revealed that the majority of the population 
rejected apartheid. Thus many within the NP alliance (particularly SABRA) realised that 
for apartheid to succeed contact with black leadership, to win it over to the ideology, was 
a matter of national urgency. Moreover, African nationalism and decolonisation in the rest 
of the continent with its parallels to black resistance in South Africa was proceeding at a 
vigorous pace. It was quite clear that within a relatively short period of time most of the 
European colonial powers would depart the continent, leaving in their wake a string of 
independent states antagonistic to South Africa and possibly allied to the Union’s black 
majority. Nestled at the tip of a hostile continent, South Africa would have to ally itself with 
Western Cold War powers, including Afrikaner nationalism’s old imperial enemy, Britain. 
According to Lazar, because Afrikaner nationalists could not throw in their lot with anti-
colonial African nationalists without ceding their privileged racial position, Afrikaner 
nationalism was recast from a struggle against British imperialism to an anti-communist 
crusade to uphold white Western civilisation, a Western civilisation moreover which 
Afrikaners had played a significant role in planting in Africa and in which they had a 
continued stake. Nonetheless, a republic remained a cherished political goal. But political, 
economic and strategic necessity dictated that this republic, unlike the models proposed 
during the Second World War, would take a constitutional form, entrench the two official 
white languages, accept a common white citizenship, win wide white approval and be 
located within the Commonwealth.2      
A common white nationalism was not without its attendant problems. Although, as 
theorists within the NP alliance and ASB pointed out, Afrikaners controlled the political 
realm and had made significant inroads into the economy, there was still a danger of 
English domination. Thus contact and co-operation was not aimed at integration and 
assimilation or the development of a common white culture, except perhaps the 
Afrikanerisation of English speakers, but rather at nurturing a common white South 
African patriotism which most importantly could be flaunted overseas. 
The ASB, the Afrikaans-medium centres and contact and co-operation before 1956 
One of the greatest concerns of the ASB and other student leaders at the Afrikaans-
medium universities was the lack of an Afrikaner nationalist and ‘patriotic’ South African 
voice in international student forums. South Africa was represented abroad by NUSAS, 
which, in the opinion of the ASB, brought South Africa, its government and Afrikaners, 
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into disrepute. Participation in international student organisations was one of the factors 
driving students at the Afrikaans-medium universities out of their isolation and seeking 
contact with others domestically and abroad. In addition to establishing a Nationalist voice 
abroad, the ASB at its inception in 1948 was prepared to co-operate with separately 
organised white English-speakers sharing its views3 and for this purpose intended to 
open branches on the NUSAS-affiliated campuses.4 Thus from the beginning, the ASB 
set itself on a collision course with NUSAS.  
The organisation performed dual functions, both as a student benefits trade union5 where 
it planned to challenge the success of NUSAS6 (ultimately unsuccessfully), and as a 
Christian National cultural body.7 This ‘dualisme’, in addition to automatic (ipso facto) 
membership of all students on the Afrikaans campuses, was important to Potchefstroom 
for religious-political reasons and to Pretoria for the purposes of constructing and 
controlling a homogeneous Afrikaner nationalist student consciousness. However, these 
proved problematic to Stellenbosch. Thus unlike its northern counterparts, Stellenbosch 
was unable to garner sufficient student support to secure its affiliation to the ASB until 
1949.8 The Stellenbosch student body, being more heterogeneous than those at the other 
Afrikaans-medium universities, often favoured a broad white South Africanism over an 
exclusive ethnic Afrikaans identity. Thus it was often more ‘enlightened’ and open-minded 
and less fearful of contacts with those outside Afrikanerdom than the insular, ‘narrow’ 
Christian Nationalists. Thus in 1949 Stellenbosch students championed in vain the idea 
that NUSAS be recognised on all the ASB campuses in the hope that this gesture was 
reciprocated by NUSAS affiliates.9 In addition they rejected out of hand the attempt by the 
northern universities to proscribe intermarriage between English and Afrikaans-speaking 
whites.10 
Playing an influential role in the thinking of Stellenbosch students was SABRA, its 
research institution being housed at the university. SABRA ‘visionaries’ believed that the 
only morally acceptable form of apartheid was total territorial and economic separation of 
black and white and the attendant sacrifices to be made by whites to achieve this. They 
placed great store on the findings of the 1956 Tomlinson Commission, an ambitious 
research undertaking (in which many of them were involved) aimed at establishing the 
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means by which the reserves could be developed into economically viable entities 
capable of adequately providing for the majority of South Africa’s black population. With 
the rightless urban African population increasing rather than diminishing in size and black 
resistance against apartheid unlikely to recede in the face of this, as well as the looming 
independence of Ghana and other African states, time was running out (less than a 
generation or even ten years it was feared) for a solution to South Africa’s race problem 
and ultimately the survival of a white Afrikaner nation. Thus, for SABRA ‘visionaries’ it 
was imperative that Afrikaner nationalism reach out to the black population and persuade 
its members of the merits, justice and honesty of apartheid.11 Much of SABRA visionary 
thought regarding the provision of an ethical basis for apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism 
was derived from the concepts of ‘survival in justice’ and ‘liberal nationalism’ arrived at by 
the Afrikaans poet and public intellectual, N.P. van Wyk Louw. Louw rejected the 
application to South Africa of liberal democracy, a doctrine which had arisen in ethnically 
homogenous societies, as it could lead to the deprivation of the freedom and eventually 
the demise of numerically small nations like the Afrikaner. However, liberalism was too 
important a doctrine to reject and should thus co-exist with nationalism. Black nationalism 
had as much right as white (Afrikaner) nationalism to its freedom. The conflict arising from 
competing nationalisms could be resolved by allowing each nation the right to develop 
and enjoy its freedom separately. Moreover, South Africa was composed of many 
nations.12 If a nation concluded that it ‘need not exist in justice with other ethnic groups’, it 
had reached a crisis.13 With the uncertainty of Afrikanerdom’s future, seeking contacts 
with other nations became important policy for SABRA visionaries. A commitment to 
stage a conference of black leaders was made at the 1956 Volkskongres on the ‘Future 
of the Bantu’, an event sponsored by SABRA, the Federasie van Afrikaanse 
Kultuurverenigings and the churches14 and attended by other constituencies within the 
NP fold, including the ASB and its affiliated SRCs. 
In 1953 the chairman of SABRA urged delegates to the ASB annual congress to practise 
apartheid in their everyday lives as most people did so only for ‘egotistical’ [sic] rather 
than altruistic reasons.15 Accordingly, the ASB adopted the SABRA visionary position of 
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total apartheid16 and in a gesture denounced as ‘liberal welfarism’ by the baasskap right, 
endowed a bursary to a student studying at Fort Hare.17 However, the ASB would not 
accede to the request of Stellenbosch and the UOFS in 1954 that it abolish its ipso facto 
membership and transform itself into a purely ideological cultural organisation for 
adherents of Christian Nationalism.18 Nor would it agree to the establishment of a non-
sectarian, non-political national student federation which could include students at 
Pietermaritzburg and Rhodes unhappy with NUSAS.19 Nonetheless, a theoretically 
racially open South African Federation of Student Unions came into existence, but faded 
into oblivion after its inaugural conference.20 The ideas behind it, however, namely that 
Afrikaans-speaking students should come out of their isolation and pursue all avenues of 
contact with white English-speaking and black students, did not.  
It was this desire for contact that led the Stellenbosch SRC to support the Wits SRC’s 
campaign against a statutory SRC in 1955 and to consider accepting the invitation issued 
annually by NUSAS to attend its 1955 congress.21 Ultimately this invitation was declined 
but did lead to the ASB president pondering whether his organisation’s traditional policy 
of ignoring NUSAS was the most effective means of fighting it.22 Shortly thereafter, the 
ASB resolved to investigate all avenues which might lead to contact with white English-
speaking and black students. To placate those opposed to and/or fearful of contact, it was 
understood that this interaction would be on terms posing no threat to Afrikaner identity 
and independence.23 
Thwarting the ASB’s efforts to secure international recognition 
Emerging from isolation and finding a voice in international student forums assumed the 
greatest urgency for Stellenbosch and the ASB in 1955. By this time NUSAS was playing 
an increasingly prominent role in the ISC and using this body to denounce the South 
African government’s apartheid education policy.24 This was deplored by both the 
government and the ASB, the former consequently refusing to renew the passport of 
Sidney Katz, LP member and NUSAS vice-president for international relations mandated 
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to attend the Fifth ISC in Birmingham in June 1955.25 NUSAS believed that this was an 
intimidatory tactic aimed at ensuring that only the NP voice was heard overseas.26             
Ostensibly (see below) presenting the views of the government at the Birmingham ISC, 
was the ASB.27 Although winning the support of student unions from the former British 
dominions as well as from some in Western Europe, the ASB failed to win the coveted 
‘observer’ status and was designated a ‘visitor’ because NUSAS (still an observer) with its 
open membership criteria and allegedly greater numbers, was recognised as 
representing South Africa.28 The ASB believed however that the real reasons for NUSAS 
being preferred to the ASB were that the ISC feared NUSAS might return to the IUS (it 
was still an associate member of the IUS at the beginning of the ISC) as might other 
wavering national unions if the ASB was admitted. Moreover, it believed that NUSAS had 
effectively poisoned the ISC against the Afrikaans organisation by translating one of its 
anti-NUSAS articles into English and submitting it to the international body.29 Despite this 
setback, those within the ASB in favour of ending isolation (and not all were - particularly 
those at Pretoria and Potchefstroom) remained optimistic that membership was only a 
matter of time. This would depend on the ASB making itself known overseas and putting 
its house in order with regard to its relationships with black and English-speaking white 
students as well as NUSAS.30  
NUSAS also feared that the ASB’s membership bid might succeed. Firstly, the ASB 
representative, David Bosch, had made a very good impression at Birmingham.31 Bosch 
was a former president of the Pretoria SRC undertaking postgraduate studies at the 
University of Basel,32 who as a missionary and academic would later assume a leading 
anti-apartheid role within the Dutch Reformed Church. Probably unknown to the ASB, 
NUSAS and the ISC, Bosch had already rejected apartheid33 and thus probably did not 
accurately present the views of the ASB and the government to the ISC. Secondly, the 
changing international situation favoured the ASB. In response to the thaw in the Cold 
War, many student unions (particularly the Canadian) attempted to rekindle world student 
unity and hoped to woo, among others, students from Eastern Europe into the ISC. As an 
organisation committed to democracy, the ISC’s definition of democracy would have to be 
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more loosely interpreted than in the past so as to accommodate the Eastern European 
student unions. By logical extension then, exceptions would also have to be made for 
student bodies from fascist Spain and apartheid South Africa. The French student union, 
which was sensitive to possible criticism of its government’s colonial policy in Algeria, was 
particularly sympathetic to the cause of ASB membership.34 
Although at this time the ISC, like NUSAS, followed a ‘students-as-such’ policy35 and thus 
limited its activities to the educational sphere and accordingly refrained from judging its 
membership’s domestic political arrangements, the ASB’s support for university apartheid 
could count against it. Already by 1954 the ISC had pledged support for NUSAS’s 
academic freedom campaign and had thus denounced apartheid in education in South 
Africa as well as violations of university autonomy elsewhere.36 However, realising that it 
could not pass judgement on countries about which it was politically ignorant, the ISC 
constituted a Research and Investigation Commission (RIC), tasked with investigating the 
suppression of academic freedom in South Africa, East Germany and Venezuela.37 The 
ASB rejected the RIC as an unconstitutional interference in the domestic affairs of a state 
and moreover, illegitimate, as it owed its origin to the unrepresentative NUSAS.38 The 
ASB then invited its own (‘fascist’ in the opinion of a former NUSAS leader) RIC from the 
‘stamlande’ (the Netherlands and Belgium) to investigate conditions in South Africa and 
set the record straight.39 This became even more urgent when, following an address by 
NUSAS-affiliated student leaders at Oxford in late 1955,40 the foundations were laid for a 
university-wide anti-university apartheid committee in the United Kingdom.41 
Thus to put its case across to potential allies, the ASB undertook a successful cultural 
concert tour to Europe in December 195542 resulting in its members gaining entrance to a 
Belgian student conference where, the NUSAS president surmised, they might have 
found ‘an opportunity for some chicanery’.43 The ASB and the Afrikaans universities 
intensified their relationship with student organisations in the ‘Dietslande’ of the 
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Netherlands, Belgium and Germany,44 and inaugurated student exchanges between 
Afrikaans universities and those abroad.45 It also became a regular contributor to the 
World Student News, the official organ of the ISC. 
Despite its continuing misgivings about the liberal, internationalist flavour of the ISC,46 the 
very antithesis of Afrikaner nationalism, the ASB believed there were many student 
unions within the ISC sympathetic to the cultural aspirations of the Afrikaner, thus more 
than justifying membership. The ASB thus set about fulfilling the requirements for ISC 
‘delegate’ status. In order to claim the largest student membership in South Africa, the 
ASB embarked on a massive recruitment drive. It attempted to sign up all the Afrikaans-
medium training colleges,47 as well as students at the bilingual Natal Training College in 
Pietermaritzburg, jeopardising further NUSAS’s unstable relationship there.48 At a time 
when there was a possibility of Rhodes disaffiliating from NUSAS, the ASB attempted to 
establish a branch there too.49 The SRC feared that the ASB might be successful, as it 
had opportunistically offered to open its membership to students of all races at this wholly 
white campus.50 
In order to regularise its relationship with the black population, the ASB invited a 
moderate coloured political leader to address its 1956 congress51 and finally acceded to 
the demand of Stellenbosch that contact be made with black students.52 At a time when 
most black higher educational institutions were outside NUSAS because it was too 
moderate, the ASB naively discussed the possibility of creating a separate black student 
organisation to counter NUSAS.53 To oppose NUSAS among white English-speaking 
students, the ASB decided to call a conference of all white university SRCs to discuss the 
‘calling and duty of a university’.54 These were the only positive responses to the plea of 
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Johan van der Vyver, the SABRA-inclined ASB vice-president and later human rights 
lawyer, that the ASB abandon isolation in South Africa and abroad as a matter of urgency 
and reach out to ‘well-disposed non-whites’55 and also ‘right-thinking’ white English-
speakers in NUSAS’s ‘empire’ too.56 On balance though, the 1956 ASB congress was 
inward looking and reactionary.57 Probably influenced by his contact with NUSAS-
affiliated SRC presidents on the Abe Bailey Travel Bursary,58 Tom Langley, a past-
president of the Pretoria SRC and later a leading member of the Conservative Party, 
successfully introduced a number of resolutions, among them that the work of NUSAS be 
exposed and that liberalism, communism and Catholicism represented the greatest 
threats to the Afrikaner as they all aimed at world domination.59 With its implicit 
authoritarianism and threats to freedom of religion,60 this second resolution was given full 
exposure by NUSAS in press releases61 and its publications.62 Thus, ASB leaders for 
some years to come were forced to explain that their organisation upheld freedom of 
religion as indicated in its draft republican guidelines and that the Catholic Church was 
censured for its ‘political’ encouragement of integration and not for its religious beliefs.63 
More damning to the ASB in its quest for ISC membership was its refusal to accede to the 
ISC’s request that it persuade the South African government to grant visas to the RIC 
team64 which had earlier been declined. In addition, the 1956 ASB congress called on the 
government to implement university apartheid.65 Ernie Wentzel concluded that the ASB 
had ‘torpedoed’ itself without the help of NUSAS and there was thus no more reason to 
be concerned about it in the international field.66 However, as a precaution, NUSAS did 
have an article entitled ‘ASB demands university segregation’ placed in the ISC’s 
Information Bulletin67 and NUSAS-affiliated SRCs passed resolutions deploring the ASB’s 
action.68 
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What had NUSAS done to stymie the ASB’s membership of the ISC? It had compiled an 
initially secret memorandum to submit to the international body detailing the national 
union’s relationship with the Afrikaans-medium universities and NUSAS’s right to be 
regarded as the legitimate representative of South Africa overseas. In this memorandum, 
based on the NUSAS archive and Tobias’s 1948 ‘History’, it quite unambiguously 
demonstrates that students at the Afrikaans-medium universities, under the influence of 
extreme nationalism were responsible for destroying South African student unity when 
they broke ties with the national union in 1933 and rebuffed any attempts at reconciliation 
or contact initiated thereafter by NUSAS. This refuted the ASB version of the break which 
alleged that NUSAS’s intention to invite Fort Hare into the national union and its 
preference for a few black students (‘troetelkindertjies’: ‘favourites’ or ‘pets’) over 
thousands of Afrikaners, pushed Afrikaans-speakers out.69 To strengthen the NUSAS 
case,70 the memorandum highlighted the undemocratic and fascist nature of the ASB’s 
forerunners and by implication that of the ASB itself. The memorandum also chronicled 
the Nazification of the ANS, its incorporation into the Nazi OB, the at one time close co-
operation of the pro-Nazi NP with the OB and the acts of minor sabotage committed by 
the OB.71 This precipitated a debate within the NUSAS leadership72 as to whether 
sufficient evidence existed to substantiate, in the case of a possible defamation suit, the 
allegations that the NP ‘as an organisation’ (underlined in the original) was pro-Nazi and 
that the OB ‘as an organisation’ had committed sabotage.73 As a precaution then, OB 
sabotage was omitted and the pro-Nazi NP was amended to read that ‘members of the 
NP’ were ‘pro-Nazi’.74 This was a particularly effective weapon against the ASB because, 
as Nico Smith points out, one of the first tasks of the Broederbond in 1948 was to destroy 
all documentary evidence of OB sabotage and Afrikaner nationalism’s relationship with 
Nazi Germany.75 The ASB itself in its histories of Afrikaner student movements makes no 
mention of the OB or the ideological direction of the student movement during the war.76 
In one version, it claims erroneously that the ANS became part of the Nasionalejeugbond 
and by implication the NP,77 and not the Boerejeug of the OB.     
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The memorandum was distributed to all South African SRCs. Despite NUSAS leaders’ 
fears that there might be an angry response from the Afrikaans student bodies,78 the 
Potchefstroom SRC dismissed it as merely a ‘meagre’ effort.79 The ASB appeared 
however to be concerned at the ‘large number of flagrant misrepresentations’ made about 
the organisation and the ‘stress on its ‘”Nazi past”’80 (inverted commas in the original) and 
requested a list of all the national unions to which NUSAS had sent the document as it 
planned to respond to it.81 As far as its affiliated SRCs were concerned, NUSAS hoped 
that its memorandum would be powerful enough - though not so negative that it would 
have the opposite effect - to dissuade those SRCs of whose loyalties it was doubtful 
(including erroneously the new Wits statutory SRC), of agreeing to participate in the 
apartheid-type student organisation envisaged by the proposed ASB inter-SRC 
conference. The memorandum was ultimately destined, along with the report of the RIC 
commission, for discussion at the forthcoming ISC in Ceylon in September 1956.82 
The Research and Investigation Commission (RIC)  
The RIC was another weapon with which NUSAS could prevent the ASB acquiring 
membership of the ISC. This was intended to be an independent, impartial investigation 
into South African higher education conducted under the auspices of the ISC.83 However, 
Didcott, the previous NUSAS president, based at the Leiden headquarters of COSEC 
was privy to confidential information about the RIC and even played a role in the selection 
of the final team to visit South Africa.84 The first RIC commissioners were denied South 
African visas.85 To make it more difficult for the South African government to do the same 
again, the new team was carefully assembled and eventually comprised Harry Brinkman, 
a Dutch Calvinist, Cyril Ritchie, of Northern Ireland who had chaired the Birmingham ISC 
ASB debate at which David Bosch was present,86 and Olaf Tandberg from Norway.87 
The RIC commissioners received their visas and arrived in South Africa in May 1956 
much to the surprise of the NUSAS leadership88 who, after the ASB congress, had 
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expected that the ISC investigation would either be replaced by the ASB’s ‘carefully 
selected fascist team’ or arrive after the former had completed its investigation.89 The 
team was to visit all South African universities and interview rectors, principals, academic 
staff, student organisations, as well as representatives of the government and political 
parties, including the ANC and South African Indian Congress and influential South 
Africans.90 The team was particularly interested in meeting black students and Didcott 
accordingly confidentially advised NUSAS to make as much time available for this as 
possible when the national union was officially interviewed. Bishop Ambrose Reeves 
volunteered to assemble his group of influential liberals for the RIC to meet. However, 
things did not go entirely smoothly for NUSAS. Brinkman proved ‘difficult’ and 
‘domineering’ and was probably not won over despite Didcott’s warning that NUSAS 
would need to present a very strong case to him. Brinkman was the son of the 
Netherlands ambassador to South Africa and supported separate but equal apartheid. He 
moreover did not believe that NUSAS should have sole representation at the ISC but 
should form part of a national delegation.91 Brinkman made the observation to the Wits 
SRC that all races in South Africa were sincerely working towards a solution to the 
country’s problems and that news reports on South Africa overseas were biased, creating 
the impression, for example, that Africans were removed from Sophiatown at gunpoint.92    
On the other hand, Brinkman and Afrikaans student leaders appeared to strike up a good 
rapport, Brinkman returning later to study at Stellenbosch.93 When visas were granted, all 
SRCs at the Afrikaans-medium universities agreed to meet the RIC team94 as they were 
not ‘shy’ or ‘ashamed’ of discussing their political beliefs.95 They did however inform the 
commissioners that they regarded the investigation as unconstitutional and illegitimate 
and warned them that it was impossible to understand the complexity of South African 
society within a period of three weeks.96 The reason for the change of attitude of both the 
ASB and government could probably be attributed to the actions of the previous RIC 
team. Though denied visas to come to South Africa, its members nonetheless compiled a 
report based on liberal historical and sociological texts as well as statements made by 
NUSAS which were all seriously critical of apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism.97 Thus the 
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ASB and the government decided to allow the new RIC team in and win it over to the NP 
point of view.  
At Stellenbosch, in addition to meeting the rector and SRC, the RIC team interviewed 
members of the academic staff and SABRA.98 While in Pretoria, the commissioners held 
discussions with the ASB’s Langley and visited the Union Buildings, the Voortrekker 
Monument, the African township, Atteridgeville as well as some informal settlements.99 In 
addition they met apartheid ideologues,  Eiselen and De Wet Nel of the Native Affairs 
Department, as well as Van der Walt, the chairperson of the newly appointed 
Interdepartmental Commission on university apartheid100 (discussed in chapter three).  
The ASB was questioned about its views on the implementation of university apartheid as 
well as its relationship with NUSAS.101 The organisation used this opportunity to denigrate 
the national union, Salmon van Tonder of Pretoria alleging that two-thirds of the executive 
was communist. The avowedly liberal and anti-communist NUSAS leadership, which had 
recently voted against COD activist, Bob Hepple taking up the vacant vice-presidency, 
seriously considered suing Van Tonder for this dangerous slander. The moderate 
Stellenbosch-based ASB president, Jan Loubser, informed the RIC that NUSAS did not 
fulfil the ISC’s constitutional requirements for the status of a national union as it did not 
represent all the students in its country, in particular, Afrikaans-speakers.102 Loubser 
cautiously concluded that were the RIC team objective, something positive could come of 
its visit and on the basis of the evidence, the ISC might conclude that South Africa was a 
‘plural’ or ‘multi-group’ (‘meergroepige’) society,103 which presumably would justify the 
application of apartheid. The ASB had earlier reasoned that with greater and more wide-
spread knowledge of it and its stance, its support for apartheid would not preclude it from 
full participation in international student fora.104 Following the conclusion of the RIC 
investigation, this was presumably now the case. 
However, the RIC team did not uphold apartheid despite the pro-ASB slant of Brinkman. 
The report was compiled by the other commissioners after Brinkman had retired to bed 
and was then presented to him each morning for ratification.105 The report concluded that 
racially segregated higher education could never lead to equal education for all. It found 
that there were ‘no valid educational, economic or ethical reasons for any university in 
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South Africa to discriminate in its admissions policy’. It thus rejected the Natal system and 
the ASB’s adapted Natal system for coloured students at UCT, namely ‘to segregate once 
admitted’.106 Based on the recommendations of the RIC Report, the Ceylon ISC 
committed itself to large-scale aid to both the NUSAS academic freedom campaign and 
black education in South Africa.   
The Ceylon ISC was attended by NUSAS and the ASB. The latter prepared a statement 
to be read at the conference to the effect that it represented the cultural interests of white 
Afrikaans-speaking students107 and thus by implication could not claim to be a national 
union of students.108 This admission, coupled with the decision of the 1956 NUSAS 
assembly, in the absence of the radical left, to apply for full membership of COSEC,109 
paved the way for NUSAS achieving delegate status in the ISC. This was accomplished 
with ease, with only one student union disputing NUSAS’s claim to be a national union.110 
Evidently the NUSAS tactics of presenting as strong a public relations exercise as the 
ASB and not treating the Afrikaans organisation in an aggressive, ‘unseemly’ fashion,111 
paid off. The ASB was not so lucky, despite dispatching its intellectually and morally 
formidable vice-president, Van der Vyver, to the gathering instead of the original 
candidate who NUSAS had regarded as an easy opponent.112 Since the Birmingham 
Conference, NUSAS, aided by its British allies, had been considering having observer 
status at the ISC abolished.113 However, those student unions, particularly the Canadian, 
wishing to entice IUS members into the Western organisation, were opposed to this as it 
would deny the Eastern unions a voice. With the ‘odd bit of skulduggery’ on his part, 
Rubin and some of the COSEC leadership were instrumental in having observer status 
abolished114 without arousing the suspicion of either member unions or the ASB. The 
ASB for its part replied to the well-received NUSAS memorandum in terms which 
‘antagonised’ everyone and made the organisation appear ‘stupid’.115 Thus the Afrikaans 
organisation again failed in its application to acquire delegate status and, as at 
Birmingham, was designated ‘visitor’ with speaking rights.116 In the opinion of Coombe, 
the ASB’s decision to mount a very public campaign against the Soviet invasion of 
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Hungary in November 1956 and the suppression of academic freedom and students’ 
rights there was taken to boost the organisation’s international standing.117  
NUSAS-affiliated campuses and the desire for white co-operation, 1956-7  
While Coombe, NUSAS stalwart at Pietermaritzburg, was away from the campus 
attending the ISC and World University Services meetings, a motion that Pietermaritzburg 
disaffiliate from NUSAS was initiated without warning by SRC members, Alistair Verbeeck 
and Eelso Boonstra.118  Like others present at the 1956 NUSAS congress,119 Verbeeck 
had expressed concern over the lack of progress regarding co-operation with Afrikaans-
speaking students, but the NUSAS president had not interpreted this as antagonism 
towards the national union.120 Subsequently however, the UNP SRC accepted no 
mandates from the NUSAS congress other than those of a purely student benefit 
nature121 and like the SRCs of Wits and UCT which were reining in their left and right 
wings respectively, laid down strict voting guidelines for the SRC at future NUSAS 
gatherings.122 Moreover, UNP effectively abolished centre affiliation to NUSAS by 
requiring those interested in the national union to register their membership during the 
forthcoming SRC elections.123  
A well-attended, rowdy mass meeting was convened to decide the fate of NUSAS at 
Pietermaritzburg. The proposer of the disaffiliation motion, Boonstra, who usually 
abstained from voting on NUSAS issues at SRC meetings,124 argued that UNP should 
prioritise the primary function of a national student union, (co-operation amongst all 
university students) and sacrifice the secondary function (the specific principles for which 
NUSAS stood) in favour of reconciliation with Afrikaans-speakers.125 In further justification 
for secession, Boonstra contended that NUSAS was not a national organisation as it 
represented only white English-speakers and a few black students. Moreover, he averred, 
UNP could ‘make no progress’ in the NUSAS assembly as it abstained from voting 
because it either disagreed with or was not interested in the wide range of NUSAS 
activities.126 Few spoke in favour of the otherwise well-argued motion. This was in sharp 
contrast to the strong defence of the national union mounted by NUSAS activists. NUSAS 
loyalists asserted that membership of the national union could not be sacrificed for the 
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sake of white reconciliation and presumably with the aid of the ‘memorandum’, corrected 
inaccuracies regarding the organisation’s relationship with Afrikaans-speaking students. 
The meeting became a public relations exercise for NUSAS. The audience, largely 
ignorant of the national union, was bombarded with a litany of benefits accruing from 
NUSAS membership including that of overseas representation. Finally, a counter motion 
proposed by Jonathan Paton,127 the future political philosopher and son of the LP’s Alan 
Paton, that UNP expressed its full confidence in NUSAS, was carried nem con and the 
disaffiliation motion lost by one hundred and ten votes to forty one,128 most of the forty 
one allegedly being Afrikaans-speaking.129 During the following year Nux received many 
letters expressing their writers’ dissatisfaction with the political nature of NUSAS and 
urging white student co-operation. Boonstra was to call for a federation of SRCs130 along 
the lines envisaged by the reformers at Stellenbosch. 
At Stellenbosch a puzzling meeting took place in May 1956. In what was probably a 
carefully laid plan to test the potential opposition to the ASB and the receptiveness of 
Stellenbosch to the re-establishment of a NUSAS branch on the campus, a meeting of 
‘NUSAS’ was called, probably by students sympathetic to the national union.131 After 
discerning the anti-NUSAS sentiment of the audience, the organisers probably decided 
against speaking and turned the whole gathering into a joke,132 highlighting the benefits of 
cheap overseas tours and second-hand books accruing to members of the ‘Nasionale 
Unie van Stellenbosse Arm Studente’ (National Union of Poor Stellenbosch Students).133 
Contact with Afrikaans-speaking campuses remained important for NUSAS for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, NUSAS hoped to take advantage of the increasingly open conflicts 
and divisions manifesting themselves within Afrikaner nationalist organisations, including 
the ASB and individual student bodies, so as to enlist the support of the dissidents for 
university autonomy and the right of UCT and Wits to remain open. However, it could not 
permit these divisions to work against the national union by allowing the dissidents the 
advantage of forging a new apartheid-style student organisation outside the bounds of 
both the ASB and NUSAS. It could also not ignore a groundswell of support on its 
campuses for white co-operation which, following the implementation of university 
apartheid, could translate into the emergence of an apartheid-based national student 
body and consequently the demise of NUSAS.  
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Accordingly then, the 1957 NUSAS congress unanimously passed a resolution introduced 
in Afrikaans by C.I. Viljoen, an Afrikaans-speaking student at the Johannesburg College 
of Education (JCE) that Afrikaans-speakers return to NUSAS so that their voice could be 
heard in the national union.134 A similar plea had been made to the 1957 ASB congress 
by a Wits SRC member in his personal capacity.135 In liberal terms, Viljoen argued that as 
future leaders of South Africa, ASB and NUSAS members could not remain in ‘spiritual 
isolation’ from one another in a ‘geographically integrated society’ and that the ASB’s 
refusal to meet other groups fostered ‘prejudice’ and was a disservice to its 
membership.136 NUSAS congratulated the ASB for what it had done for Afrikaans-
speaking students,137 but reiterated its traditional policy that the ASB was a cultural 
organisation and not an alternative to NUSAS as claimed by the ASB.138 It also 
threatened the ASB with legal action if it continued to label NUSAS ‘communist’. So as to 
foster closer co-operation, NUSAS again urged its SRCs to make contact with their 
nearest Afrikaans-medium centre and attempt to undertake joint practical projects of 
mutual interest. Moreover, NUSAS executive visits would, for the first time, be extended 
to the Afrikaans-medium centres too.139  
What was the background to this accent on white co-operation which in the student and 
national press overshadowed the far more important decisions – the return of Fort Hare, 
the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defiance of the ‘church 
clause’ - taken by the 1957 congress?  
Divisions within the Nationalist alliance and, by extension the ASB, had a bearing on the 
greater emphasis NUSAS placed on white co-operation. The rejection by the government 
of the Tomlinson Commission led to a split within the NP and its think-tank, SABRA.140 
The 1956 ASB congress had already urged the government to implement the 
recommendations of the Tomlinson Commission141 before knowing of Verwoerd’s 
repudiation of the report.142 In spite of the government’s rejection, some within the ASB, 
particularly Van der Vyver and students at Stellenbosch, held on to the SABRA ‘visionary’ 
position,  thus exacerbating in the ASB, as in wider society, the increasingly bitter 
divisions within Afrikaner nationalism. N.J. Olivier, a SABRA visionary at Stellenbosch, 
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advised the Stellenbosch and UOFS ASB branches that a broad humanity should inform 
the manner in which good race relations were forged in South Africa. Further, he urged 
the ASB to make contact with black students so as to convince them of the advantages of 
separate universities, which Olivier believed the Afrikaans universities and students would 
actively have to help develop.143  
The ASB congress in April 1957 argued for the urgent necessity of ‘separate 
development’ in the interests of both the black population and the survival of white 
civilisation. Accordingly, it reiterated its call for separate black universities144 with the 
proviso that facilities for black students at Wits and UCT were not taken away until equal 
ones were available at the separate institutions. The ASB claimed that some of the black 
people with whom they had made contact understood the value and necessity of 
university apartheid but did not support separate universities because the facilities would 
not be equal.145 Moreover, the ASB remained committed to forging ties with other groups 
and races.146 From the observation made by C.I. Prinsloo from Wits that a sizeable 
number of English-speakers there did not approve of the liberal policy prevailing on the 
campus, the ASB could conclude that possibilities for white English-speaking co-
operation existed at Wits too. The ASB’s ten year anniversary commemoration 
publication, Gedenkblad was to be brought out in both English and Afrikaans, presumably 
for consumption by disaffected English-speakers in the ranks of NUSAS. It was also to be 
distributed overseas147 as the organisation still had ambitions of winning membership of 
the ISC and combating NUSAS’s propaganda there. The ASB also decided to strengthen 
its good relationship with SABRA and investigate the dangerous attitude of superiority 
displayed by Afrikaners towards black people and the offensive behaviour towards black 
people in which this attitude manifested itself.148 
Moral Re-armament and national student co-operation 
Treating people decently and honestly, the outward signs of a change of heart, were the 
foundations of the Moral Re-armament Movement (MRA) which was certainly responsible 
for furthering contact and co-operation between black and white, and English and 
Afrikaans-speaking whites in 1957. But not on the terms required by NUSAS. 
The MRA was an evangelical Christian undertaking established in 1938 in London which 
focussed on ‘personal transformation as the key to social transformation’. It adhered to 
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the ‘belief in the power of personal apology as a way of breaking down barriers between 
people and opening dialogue’.149 MRA has been credited with contributing to post-war 
Franco-German reconciliation as well as the settlement of nationalist-colonial conflict in 
Africa and Asia in the independence era. MRA was viewed with suspicion by the left150 
(and NUSAS151) as MRA preached Christianity as the answer to, and bulwark against, 
communism. It stressed negotiation in place of political and class conflict.152 The ANC 
was also opposed to MRA. After criticising the ANC at a conference held at the MRA’s 
headquarters in Caux, Switzerland in 1953, William Nkomo (founder of the Wits ANCYL 
and SRC and NUSAS representative in the 1940s and later associated with the Black 
Consciousness Movement) was summarily expelled from the ANC by Nelson Mandela.153 
MRA was well received by all race groups in South Africa, including the student bodies of 
Fort Hare,154 Stellenbosch and probably also the UOFS (see below). At a MRA meeting in 
the mixed Cape Town suburb of Woodstock, Loubser, former ASB president, announced 
that Stellenbosch students had undergone a change of heart. At the same time, Loubser 
and a contingent of Stellenbosch students apologised to the coloured audience ‘for their 
attitude of superiority and indifference towards men of other races’,155 in some ways 
addressing the concerns of SABRA and the recent ASB congress of white attitudes of 
superiority. 
Coombe reluctantly attended the MRA convention and converted. The prevailing 
atmosphere - which included Stellenbosch students singing ‘Nkosi sikelele’ and NP 
Jeugbonders apologising to black people for their past hatred towards them – became too 
overwhelming to resist. After asking Loubser for forgiveness for his attitude of bitterness 
towards the ASB, an organisation with which he still fundamentally disagreed, Coombe 
issued a widely publicised statement to this effect with Loubser,156 much to the 
embarrassment of other NUSAS leaders.157 Makiwane and Mutangbanengwe of the 
recently re-affiliated Fort Hare, feared that the MRA would sell out the liberation struggle 
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and were concerned that NUSAS might also support the MRA and its reactionary agenda. 
Moreover, in the otherwise disturbingly well received MRA delegation to Fort Hare, 
Loubser had not been particularly popular.158 MRA and the contact and co-operation that 
it fostered revealed clearly to NUSAS the dangers of contact and co-operation outside its 
own parameters. Namely, it risked the loss not only of conservative whites longing for 
white reconciliation but also its black and/or left wing. For the NP too, MRA represented a 
threat to orthodoxy. Following its 1953 investigation into the organisation, the 
Broederbond warned that the MRA fostered undesirable brotherhood, the disappearance 
of racial and national boundaries and the undermining of the true calling of the 
Afrikaner.159 Singing ‘Nkosi sikelele’, a hymn adopted as the anthem of African liberation, 
could imply the acceptance of a separate African nationalism, but was more likely an 
endorsement of a common South African fatherland. A ‘common fatherland’ was a 
dangerous idea to the NP and was championed by the former chief justice, Henry Fagan 
(author of the UP’s Fagan Commission on African urbanisation) in his Afrikaans poem, 
‘Nkosi sikelel’ iAfrika’.160 It was probably for these kinds of unorthodox ‘subversive’ views, 
as well as his MRA activities, that Loubser was expelled from the ASB.161 He would later 
publicly dissent from the NP.162  
Evidently MRA also found quite a following at the UOFS because in March 1958, its SRC 
stated that it had nothing to do with the MRA and forbade the propagation of the 
movement on the campus.163 The NUSAS leadership could never formalise its opposition 
to MRA, but probably warned Coombe to keep his conversion out of the public eye.164 No 
further references to Coombe and the MRA are to be found. 
 
 
Reaching out to the ASB-affiliated student bodies 
However, as the new NUSAS president, and believer in the efficacy of personal contact, 
Coombe embarked on a personal proselytisation of the ASB centres following the 
decision of the 1957 NUSAS congress that the executive visit non-NUSAS Afrikaans-
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medium centres. On arrival, uninvited at the UOFS, he was, to his surprise, met by local 
student leaders, including Koos Pretorius, an ASB executive member.165 This called into 
question the ASB’s professed policy of refusing to have any contact with NUSAS and its 
affiliated SRCs. Students at the UOFS had decided that they did want contact with some 
NUSAS-affiliated centres following a decision of the student body to disband the ASB166 
and a successful meeting with the Wits SRC in August 1957. However, the UOFS SRC 
was unwilling to put into effect the recommendation by Coombe that they invite Fort Hare 
and UNNE to their proposed informal inter-SRC conference because, as they explained 
lamely, their student body was not ready for such a thing and the black delegates might 
be subjected to inferior accommodation.167 As far as student contact was concerned, 
Coombe used this opportunity to shoot down as ‘a pipedream’ and ‘too late’168 the ASB’s 
plan for the creation of an apartheid-based federation of SRCs in the event of the 
implementation of university apartheid.169 In typical liberal fashion, Coombe argued that 
Fort Hare’s return to NUSAS signified that students wanted ‘free contact’ and ‘not the 
‘straightjacketed contact envisaged by the ASB’. Moreover he warned, Fort Hare would 
not agree to participate in a separate black organisation and sit down at federal executive 
level with those who had ‘inflict[ed]’ apartheid on them.170 
During his three day visit the NUSAS president met all types of Afrikaner nationalists, 
from eugenicists and Boer republicans who believed implicitly in the infallibility of 
apartheid and the government,171 to those who were open to new ideas and, like SABRA 
visionaries, reflected that the only solution to the iniquities of apartheid was total equitable 
territorial separation and the white sacrifices this entailed.172  Accordingly for the latter 
group, their support for separate black universities was dependent on the provision of 
equal facilities. However, Coombe discovered that they had neither checked the Separate 
University Education Bill nor taken note of the findings, sent to them, of the recent Inter-
SRC conference on university apartheid which quite clearly indicated that facilities would 
not be equal.173 Coombe concluded that Nationalists were sincere but extraordinarily 
ignorant of the realities of apartheid and ignorant of their ignorance. This, coupled with 
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the power they wielded, made them dangerous and in desperate need of contact which 
NUSAS had to foster.174 
The ASB and the Seventh ISC in Ibadan 
While Coombe was making contact at the UOFS, representatives of NUSAS and the ASB 
were attending the Pan African Student Seminar in Ghana and the Seventh ISC in 
Ibadan, Nigeria. The ASB still hoped to achieve one of the five categories of participation 
at the ISC, including the reinstated observer status.175 It believed that NUSAS was a 
sectional political organisation176 and thus did not qualify for delegate status.177 With the 
return of Fort Hare, the national union had transformed itself into what the ASB described 
as ‘a multi-racial conference’ which could no longer ignore human rights violations and 
remain aloof from politics.178 Moreover, by its defiance of the Native Laws Amendment 
Act NUSAS became, in the opinion of the ASB, overtly political.179 However, NUSAS’s 
claim to representativeness became more valid both in South Africa and abroad with the 
return of Fort Hare. Nonetheless, the ASB concluded that black students did not in reality 
support NUSAS but had been duped by NUSAS’s ‘underhand diplomacy’ to believe that 
the academic freedom campaign would be strengthened if conducted by a ‘multi-racial 
organisation’.180 Evidently in some concern though, the ASB-affiliated press noted that 
COSEC had made much of the fact that South Africa would be represented for the first 
time at the ISC by a ‘Negro’,181 NUSAS executive member, Mutangbanengwe.182  
At the Ibadan ISC, NUSAS was designated ‘delegate’ and the ASB ‘visitor’ ‘after some 
debate about the credentials of both organisations’.183 The ASB accused NUSAS of 
influencing this decision as Rubin had chaired the Credentials Committee. However, 
Rubin denied this, reminding the ASB that he had recused himself while South Africa was 
discussed and had seconded the motion that the ASB be given speaking rights.184 The 
ISC was a success for NUSAS on two fronts. Firstly, NUSAS again received 
overwhelming support for the academic freedom campaign and, to the indignation of the 
ASB, members of the ISC committed themselves to writing letters of protest to the South 
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African government.185 Secondly, the ASB admitted defeat and concluded that it had few 
friends overseas and that to secure membership of the ISC would require opening its 
organisation to all students and jettisoning its political principles.186 It did however agree 
to participate in a South African branch of the World University Service187 to be organised 
initially by NUSAS. It also did not give up on contact in Africa. To the amazement of the 
ASB representative, Van der Vyver, his ‘greatest friends’188 at the ISC and the seminar 
were black students. His experiences in Ghana and Nigeria on the eve of their 
independence reinforced his belief in apartheid and the necessity of granting political 
rights to black South Africans in their own states. These measures, Van der Vyver 
believed, were the only means of preserving white civilisation from creeping communism 
and preventing an imminent Russian-backed South African liberation war. Communism, 
he reasoned, appealed materially rather than ideologically to Africans.189 Accordingly 
then, the ASB investigated the possibility of a study tour to the rest of the continent and 
the distribution of a ‘propaganda publication’ in English, French and Spanish.190  
White co-operation and dissatisfaction with the ASB, 1957-8  
Within South Africa, contact and co-operation continued. Rhodes invited the Afrikaans-
medium student bodies to discussions regarding inter-university contact and co-
operation. The Potchefstroom SRC accepted this invitation in principle.191 This 
conference did not take place until 1958, but NUSAS was concerned enough about it to 
send ‘ammunition’192 to ensure that nothing endangering NUSAS came of it. A new 
National Union of Medical Students organised along racial lines, was mooted by the 
Pretoria Medical Students Council in 1957. Following an emotional visit to Pretoria,193 the 
hitherto radical Wits Medical Students Council agreed to affiliate.194 However, this 
‘betrayal of basic principles’ was overturned following the toppling of the Medical Council 
by older medical students195 with the active support of the NUSAS vice-president and 
Wits SRC president, Magnus Gunther.196 Eventually, a non-racial Association of Medical 
Students of South Africa came into existence which excluded Pretoria students, mainly 
because their rector would not permit their participation, but surprisingly included those 
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from the newly established Stellenbosch Medical School.197 Stellenbosch’s involvement 
was probably grounded on short-term tactical considerations because, as some of its 
leaders would later admit, with the legislation of university apartheid, open institutions 
would become a thing of the past. 
These positive developments were most probably responsible for a stream of criticism of 
the ASB as an obstacle to white co-operation.198 In a widely publicised letter which 
evoked both furious and apologetic responses from the ASB,199 and to which NUSAS, 
presumably for tactical reasons, requested its SRCs to respond,200 D. Potter of 
Stellenbosch harshly criticised the ASB. He accused it of being anti-English for refusing to 
meet NUSAS; supporting religious oppression because of its anti-Catholicism; being 
overtly political because of its support of the government; and provocatively, that 
nationalism was a dangerous ideology responsible for both world wars.201  
Support for Christian Nationalism and the ASB seemed to be waning on the university 
campuses, but not so at the training colleges.202 For many university students, Christian 
Nationalism had become redundant because it had served its purpose of forging a united 
Afrikaner nation and achieving Afrikaner political and economic power. The southern 
universities initially refused to vote for an increase in membership fees to the cash-
strapped ASB, presumably prolonging its financial dependence on the government and 
Afrikaner capitalist giants, Rembrandt,203 Sanlam and Volkskas.204 Stellenbosch students 
played no role in the 1958 Kruger Day celebrations205 and according to a SRC 
commission of inquiry, the ASB with its turgid ideological debates was as relevant to the 
average student as a ‘riot in the Middle East’.206 In the north, the ASB branch at 
Potchefstroom bemoaned the fact that so few students had participated in the ‘kerkhof 
skoffel’ (hoeing of the cemetery)207 while at Pretoria, the ASB restructured itself so as to 
elicit more student interest.208 At the UOFS the student body disagreed with the political 
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nature of the ASB,209 probably accounting for the appalling attendance at ASB meetings 
there.210 In 1957 a mass meeting voted to disband the ASB211 and replace it with a new 
national student body212 which would include the English-medium campuses.213 This 
echoed the earlier and continued call by Stellenbosch students (including the majority of 
aspirant SRC candidates) for the abolition of ipso facto membership of the ASB and the 
transformation of the organisation into a purely cultural body for those identifying with 
Christian National principles.214 It was this issue that was discussed at the 1958 ASB 
congress in Potchefstroom. 
Attending the 1958 ASB congress 
For the first time in its history, the ASB invited representatives of all the white NUSAS-
affiliated SRCs, together with the NUSAS president in his personal capacity, to attend its 
annual congress. NUSAS and the SRCs deliberated their responses. They mistakenly 
believed that a breakthrough had been made as the ASB invitation had made no 
reference to the race of the representatives from Wits and Cape Town. However, it later 
transpired that the ASB was labouring under the false impression that Coombe during his 
visit to the UOFS had said that the ‘open’ universities would compromise and send only 
white observers if invited to the ASB meeting.215 The president’s report on his visit is 
vague on this matter but this so-called gentlemen’s agreement became a bone of 
contention between the two sides.216 In the event, both the Wits and UCT SRCs issued 
statements that they would send whomever  they chose to future gatherings but purely 
incidentally, only white ones to the forthcoming ASB congress.217 NUSAS and the SRCs 
regretted that UNNE and Fort Hare had not been invited and that the NUSAS president 
only in his personal capacity. Moreover, they all made it clear that their presence at the 
ASB congress did not mean recognition of the ASB as a national union but only as a 
sectional organisation.218 Because the Wits team was composed of an ASB sympathiser 
in addition to the NUSAS vice-president, it had a strict mandate to reflect the views of the 
SRC only.219   
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For the observers from UCT, Wits and Pietermaritzburg came the realisation that the ASB 
and NUSAS spoke two different languages ‘literally’ and ‘figuratively’.220 The ASB’s 
insistence that God was at the centre of all aspects of life was alien to students from UCT 
and Wits221 where religious freedom and tolerance of all faiths was fiercely defended and 
any attempt to clothe the universities with a religious mantle was fiercely resisted (see 
chapter two).222 Moreover, whereas the ASB was stuck in theoretical and ideological 
abstractions completely oblivious of practical realities, the open universities were the 
testing grounds of successful race relations and integration,223 the latter believed by the 
ASB to be divinely proscribed. The UCT delegates questioned whether the integration of 
Dutch, German and French settlers into the Afrikaner nation also went against God’s 
wishes.224 These observations reinforced the long held view that co-operation with the 
ASB was impossible even though there was evidence of ‘a new spirit or outlook’ in the 
organisation.225 Only Durban and Rhodes226 were positive about future developments, 
believing that a new era had dawned. Moreover, Durban put forward the paternalistic UP 
view (long discredited by NUSAS) that the race problem could only be satisfactorily 
resolved once the two white groups had settled their differences.227   
The observers witnessed at first hand the divisions within Afrikaner nationalism as 
manifested in the ASB including critiques of the inconsistency of the apartheid policy 
itself. Stellenbosch’s attempt to transform the ASB – dismissed as a ‘puppet-show 
parliament’228 - into either a voluntary Christian-National undertaking or an inter-university 
body furthering white co-operation was met, as before, with resistance from Pretoria 
(represented by inter alia Daan Verwoerd, the son of Hendrik Verwoerd)229 and absolute 
intransigence by the normal colleges, in particular Heidelberg.230 Heidelberg temporarily 
disaffiliated when the ASB recommitted itself to contact with the black population. Those 
in favour of contact argued that for apartheid to work, its proponents would have to get to 
know the Bantu in ‘his very being’ as ‘a man and a person’ and accept the Christian 
                                                          
220 Nux, May 1958.  
221 Varsity vol. 16 no. 9, 24.4.1958. 
222 In 1958 the UCT SRC opposed a measure by the new UCT principal that students fill out a card at 
registration stating their religious affiliation so as to make it easier for chaplains to identify their flock. 
Eventually it was agreed that this would be voluntary. BC 586 O5.1, David (Clain) to Neville (Rubin), 
17.2.1958, p. 3. ‘Thought for the day’ in the student press came from a wide variety of sources including Kahil 
Gibran and Goethe. Varsity, 21.8.1958; 28.8.1958.   
223 Varsity vol. 16 no. 9, 24.4.1958. 
224 ibid. 
225 Witwatersrand Student vol. 10 no. 7, 29.5.1958. 
226 Rhodeo, 3.6.1958.  
227 BC 586 B1 Congress Minutes 1958, A. Tsipouras, ‘UN.D Assembly Report’, nd., p. 2. 
228 In Afrikaans; ‘popspel parlement’; Die Matie, 18.4.1958. 
229 Die Perdeby, 25.4.1958; Witwatersrand Student vol. 10 no. 7, 29.5.1958. 
230 ‘ASB – Tak staan plek vol’, Weerspieelinge – 1909-1959: Gedenkblad van die Heidelbergse 
Onderwyskollege, p. 97.  
164 
 
Bantu as his equal.231 The UCT SRC president questioned the rationality of the ASB’s 
policy of ‘civilising’ and Christianising the African population while still upholding 
traditional African culture, as it was not clear whether this included the acceptance of 
brideprice and polygamy. 
Through rigorous informal discussion, the NUSAS-affiliated delegates were able to 
‘seriously embarrass’ some ASB delegates into acknowledging the error of their 
decisions. But some, like the future South African president, F.W. de Klerk232 (who was 
also the son of Senator Jan de Klerk and nephew of J.G.Strijdom), whose most striking 
characteristic, according to the Afrikaans writer, André P.  Brink, his contemporary at 
Potchefstroom, was his extreme obsequiousness to his political superiors,233 refused to 
question the bona fides of the government. ASB members like De Klerk would not accept, 
for example, that the authoritarian regulations to be imposed on the new black colleges 
were wrong, or in the case of an established university like Fort Hare, wholly 
unnecessary.234 Later De Klerk would state that he and others at that time countered the 
charge that Bantu Education and the ‘controversial’ takeover of African schools were 
aimed at providing an inferior education by pointing to the large number of universities 
and training colleges built by the government for Africans.235 
The ASB delegates were divided on the issue of university apartheid. SABRA had already 
rejected key aspects of the Separate University Education Bill236 and a Stellenbosch 
academic had prophetically warned that violating university autonomy would set the 
precedent for a future government forcing Stellenbosch to admit black students. A 
‘progressive’ from Stellenbosch argued that the open universities should remain open. He 
justified this by reference to the ‘four freedoms of the university’ which stated that the 
function of the university was to seek the truth and not serve any ideology which could 
come about through arbitrary changes of government.237 Notwithstanding, the congress, 
with the exception of the Stellenbosch delegates, thanked the government for its progress 
made towards the implementation of university apartheid. The Wits and UCT observers 
warned those present that this vote of thanks could potentially jeopardise future inter-
university student relations and was moreover, inconsistent with the ASB’s 1957 
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resolution that the open universities ought not be closed until equal facilities were 
available at the new black colleges.238  
National student co-operation and a possible split within the ASB 
Despite criticism of ASB policy by the NUSAS affiliates and a decision by the ASB 
executive at its meeting in Heidelberg in June 1958 to revisit its controversial decision to 
seek contact with white English-speaking and black students,239 contact and co-operation 
continued throughout 1958. The Potchefstroom ASB branch under the chairmanship of 
F.W. de Klerk hosted a meeting with ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC. For 
the students present it was ‘a strange experience’ to ‘converse’ with a black person on 
the basis of equality while Luthuli’s espousal of a universal franchise in a unitary South 
Africa was utterly ‘alien’ and could not be squared with the survival of the Afrikaner 
nation.240 
Stellenbosch believed that with the expansion of facilities at the northern universities, it 
would become a more exclusively southern institution and accordingly more politically 
moderate too and so would be in a position to champion student unity in the south, 
furthering the already good relations existing between Stellenbosch and UCT. 
Furthermore, student leaders argued that a good Afrikaner was first a good South 
African.241 Accordingly, the SRC appointed a commission of inquiry into the aims, 
requirements and structure of a national student organisation. However, the commission’s 
recommendations that students come together on an apartheid basis as South Africans, 
thus avoiding all vital controversial issues, was rejected by both the UCT and Durban 
SRCs.242 However, a significant minority of students at UCT felt that their views regarding 
white student co-operation were being ignored by the NUSAS-dominated SRC. This view 
was reinforced by the surprise by-election defeat of a NUSAS-aligned candidate by a 
conservative anti-NUSAS student seeking white co-operation.243 A conservative group, 
allegedly linked to the UP, instigated a reform of the UCT electoral system aimed at 
breaking the power of NUSAS in student government.244 
Despite reservations about its commitment to white student co-operation, the UCT SRC 
invited its Stellenbosch counterpart to meet representatives of the UNNE SRC visiting 
UCT. Though the UNNE visitors denounced apartheid unconditionally during a student 
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mass meeting245 (see chapter five), it was the strong terms and no-holds-barred language 
employed by the black, NEUM-aligned UCT students to express their utter contempt for 
the ‘herrenvolk’ and any collaboration with it that evidently shocked the Stellenbosch SRC 
to the core. Stellenbosch thus concluded that integrated universities bred racial 
bitterness, hatred and intolerance as demonstrated by the bearing of black UCT students, 
whereas racially segregated institutions such as the ‘Bantu University of Natal’ [sic] bred 
a less hostile attitude – not the conclusion to which the UCT SRC and NUSAS wished 
Stellenbosch to arrive. 
Students from UNNE made up the bulk of the audience of those attending the Natal 
University Conference,246 addressed quite willingly by Van der Vyver247 in May 1958.248 
Similarly positive signs of an ASB thaw were not visible on the Witwatersrand. So as to 
make inroads into the English-medium campuses among students disaffected with 
NUSAS, the ASB had amended its rule to make provision for individual membership. 
Accordingly, Hendrick Smit, one of the Wits observers at the ASB congress, joined up.249 
Smit and Neville Cook applied to the SRC for permission to establish an ASB branch at 
Wits. This was acceded to with the proviso that it was open to all and that membership 
would not require resignation from NUSAS.250 The ASB supporters resigned from the 
SRC in protest, went to the Afrikaans press and charged the SRC with restricting campus 
freedom.251 A petition requesting the principal to overturn the SRC’s decision was 
circulated and signed by the one hundred and fifty students252 who had already resigned 
from NUSAS.253   
The matter - whether a closed ASB branch should be allowed to operate at Wits - went to 
a referendum. This was a risky course to follow at this particular time. The SRC could 
either have stalled its decision until the issue of university apartheid was settled, thereby 
avoiding hostile Nationalist publicity, or allowed the branch to function until someone was 
excluded from it.254 There was a fear that this was a ploy by the government to impose 
university apartheid via the backdoor by alleging that the rights of Afrikaans-speaking 
students were being suppressed at Wits255 (a similar tactic to that employed at Rhodes 
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shortly before this to thwart the Eastern Cape university’s expansion into Port Elizabeth - 
discussed in chapter three). Moreover, the Wits student press feared that ‘the engineers’ 
with their traditional antipathy to supposedly ‘commie agitators’ would be easy targets for 
ASB propaganda and would vote in favour of a closed ASB branch.256   
In the massive propaganda war which preceded the referendum, the ASB and the NP 
press accused the NUSAS-aligned SRCs of hypocrisy, inconsistency and dishonesty 
regarding liberal rights and academic freedom. The ASB questioned the Wits SRC’s 
commitment to freedom and democracy as these appeared to apply only to black 
students and not to Afrikaners.257 On the other hand, Wits students challenged the ASB 
on its interpretation of democracy. Hendrick Smit was forced to concede that at Pretoria 
and other ASB centres, ‘Jews and Catholics [were] not tolerated because they [were] a 
danger to the traditions of CNE’ and that the NP, the ASB’s parent body, had 
sympathised with Nazism and ‘was hostile to the Allied cause during the war’.258 In the 
event, Wits voted by a large majority against a closed ASB branch on the campus,259 the 
ASB accusing NUSAS of instigating its problems at Wits, a charge which NUSAS 
rejected.260 
Despite this setback - or perhaps victory - for the ASB, Stellenbosch and the UOFS, both 
centres dissatisfied with the ASB, sent observers to the 1958 NUSAS congress, the first 
time since the entry of Fort Hare in 1945. Though the congress was primarily concerned 
with university apartheid and the findings of the Select Commission, it did devote 
substantial time to furthering national student co-operation.261 For the SRCs of Rhodes 
and Durban however, the outstanding features of the gathering were the presence of the 
Afrikaans universities, the cordial atmosphere that prevailed262 and the (over-optimistic263) 
possibility of student co-operation and even unity. NUSAS had reiterated its policy of 
bilingualism264 while the Stellenbosch observers had singled out Rhodes and Natal for 
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their goodwill and conciliatory attitude265 and momentously called on the Afrikaans-
medium universities to return to NUSAS.266 
Shortly after the conclusion of the NUSAS congress, members of the Stellenbosch and 
UOFS SRCs descended on Rhodes again for the long awaited inter-SRC conference.267 
NUSAS was not invited and was kept in the dark both before and after the event.268 The 
participants trotted out the old UP mantra that before the race question could be tackled, 
the two white groups had to settle their differences. They believed that student co-
operation was essential, that NUSAS and the ASB were the basis for negotiation, and 
that the first step towards co-operation would be a conference of white SRCs.269  
The Stellenbosch and UOFS observers had spent much of the NUSAS congress with 
black delegates270 and thus agreed with alacrity to the suggestion of Rhodes and Fort 
Hare that, as future leaders, they should visit Fort Hare and Lovedale to hear the black 
view of apartheid.271 For the Stellenbosch students, this was the most ‘educative’ aspect 
of the conference,272 but evidently also the most disturbing, jolting them into the harsh 
realities of South Africa. At the insistence of Makiwane, the guests hesitantly addressed 
an informal gathering of Fort Hare students on Christian National Education but refused 
to relate the policy to apartheid and oppression. Government policy was justified by 
alleging that Afrikaners were ‘upright’ and ‘honest’ whereas the English were ‘deceptive’. 
The visitors subsequently rushed back to Grahamstown, neither staying overnight as 
planned, nor returning to address the mass meeting scheduled for the following day.273  
The Stellenbosch delegates learnt from this visit that Fort Hare students were politically 
conscious, had undeniable intellectual ability,274 rejected tribalism and were the future 
leaders of the black population. Most importantly, they discovered that little time remained 
for the proselytisation of apartheid among the black population.275 However, the new 
prime-minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, himself at loggerheads with SABRA visionaries 
regarding their proposed conference with black leaders,276 disapproved of the 
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independent course being pursued by Afrikaans student leaders. On his return from 
Grahamstown, Beyers Roelofse, three times president of the Stellenbosch SRC and later 
an army chaplain,277 was summoned to the prime minister’s office and made to promise 
never to meet black students again without the prior arrangement of the Department of 
Bantu Administration.278 Similar signs of a clampdown on dissent within Afrikanerdom 
were evident when ASB president, Van der Vyver was banned from speaking to a racially 
mixed audience at Wits shortly after co-executive member and prime minister’s son, 
Daan Verwoerd, had attended a meeting addressed by Albert Luthuli.279 
Little sign of NP dissent is evident in Beyers Roelofse’s impressions of the recent NUSAS 
congress penned for the Stellenbosch and UCT student newspapers shortly before the 
Rhodes Conference. Roelofse alleged that congress delegates held disparate views on 
religion and politics but once inside the student assembly acted as a united front. 
Moreover, the national union was anti-Afrikaans and un-South African as demonstrated 
by the damaging actions of the powerful vice-president of international relations, Rubin on 
his eight month overseas trip. Further, although NUSAS claimed to have no policy on 
biological integration, the organisation was dominated by Jews seeking to destroy their 
ancient Jewish identity in the pursuit of biological integration.280 
This opened a hornet’s nest and aroused suspicions that Roelofse’s observations were 
anti-Semitic. Through the Pietermaritzburg SRC, NUSAS denied that it was dominated by 
Jews.281 NUSAS leaders, whether Jewish or not, represented all NUSAS members and 
not Jews, explained the SRC.282 Moreover, NUSAS as a non-political organisation had no 
policy regarding biological integration.283 Bernard Meidnitz of the South African 
Federation of Jewish and Zionist Students claimed that his organisation rejected 
biological integration, assimilation and intermarriage between Jew and Gentile because of 
the loss of identity and tradition involved. Vindicating Roelofse, Meidnitz claimed that 
Jews in NUSAS were ‘wholly out of step with the rest of the Jewish student 
community’.284 Roelofse then urged Meidnitz to root out the ‘misguided’ anti-Afrikaans 
Jewish elements within the national union.285 Christoph Marx argues that during the 
1930s, Afrikaner nationalists held that Jews, like communists, championed and practised 
miscegenation. Moreover, as pointed out in chapter three, anti-semitism and anti-
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communism were interchangeable. The ‘unassimilable’, ‘cosmopolitan’ ‘Jew’, undoubtedly 
communist, was considered the greatest threat to Afrikaner nationalism and the Afrikaner 
nation.286 During this biological integration debate, NUSAS was accused by the ASB of 
being communist as it opposed the Suppression of Communism Act, only opposed 
communism when it infringed upon student rights, and did not bar communists from 
participation in its structures.     
At the 1958 NUSAS executive meeting, attended for the first time since the 1930s by 
observers from Stellenbosch and the UOFS, Roelofse, now Stellenbosch SRC president, 
refused to co-author with Meidnitz a retraction for the student press of the misleading 
statements that he and Meidnitz had made regarding Jews, NUSAS and biological 
integration.287 
Negotiating Stellenbosch’s return to NUSAS, 1958-9 
Surprisingly, in the light of his attacks on NUSAS, the new NUSAS president, Rubin 
welcomed the election of Roelofse to the Stellenbosch SRC presidency and believed that 
this augured well for NUSAS-Afrikaans student relations. In his election manifesto, 
Roelofse called for Stellenbosch to re-affiliate to NUSAS and ditch its membership of the 
ASB.288 He argued that NUSAS members would never leave their national union289 and 
that as the majority of students in South Africa were Afrikaans-speaking, they would be 
able to take control of NUSAS. From his observations at the 1958 NUSAS congress, 
Roelofse concluded that NUSAS was a powerful functioning ‘propaganda machine’290 
with a formidable status overseas and was thus capable of doing immense harm to South 
Africa. Moreover, in common with other Stellenbosch students, Roelofse believed that the 
NUSAS constitution was fundamentally sound and could thus form the basis of a new 
student organisation, and importantly, was the reason why NUSAS had overseas 
representation and the ASB did not.291 He contended that Afrikaans-speaking students 
could not sit back and play second fiddle to NUSAS and wait until more propitious 
circumstances prevailed, but should take the initiative and seize the opportunity 
immediately.292 Moreover, as Stellenbosch student leaders pointed out, university 
apartheid legislation would change the entire university landscape and make matters 
such as mixed representation redundant, thereby seriously weakening the liberal position. 
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In other words, Roelofse envisaged an NP takeover of NUSAS. However, probably 
because of his dressing down by Verwoerd, Roelofse initially played no role in the 
negotiations with NUSAS. This was left to the more genuinely enlightened Nationalists 
like expelled ASB president and MRA activist, Loubser.   
Discussions in Johannesburg between the Stellenbosch SRC and NUSAS were of a 
complicated, technical nature and revolved around the NUSAS constitution. Stellenbosch 
could not accept article 2.4, which spelt out NUSAS’s understanding of university 
autonomy and academic freedom viz the right of all to meet and study together. 
Stellenbosch wanted this rephrased to NUSAS upholding university autonomy so that 
Stellenbosch had the right not to study together. Its delegates were prepared to accept 
the compromise of Richard Goldstone (later a judge and international conflict resolution 
arbitrator) that article 2.4 be moved to the ‘schedule of entrenched clauses’ from which 
Stellenbosch could dissociate.293 Later Loubser was to suggest that article 2.4 was 
amended to ‘to uphold the principles of the autonomy of the universities and the 
academic freedom of students’.294 Rubin argued that article 2.4 was important to black 
students and that only the student assembly could scrap the clause. It was decided to 
invite Stellenbosch to affiliate to NUSAS and at the 1959 congress Stellenbosch could 
officially motivate its constitutional reservations and the steps to be taken to remove 
these.295 However, in March 1959, Roelofse and Ben Pieters informed NUSAS that 
Stellenbosch could not re-affiliate if NUSAS did not differentiate and discriminate against 
students on racial grounds.296 At the same time, presumably adhering to Verwoerd’s 
instructions of 1958,297 the Stellenbosch SRC revoked its invitation to its UCT counterpart 
for a joint meeting because of the presence of a coloured student on the UCT SRC, which 
earlier had not posed a problem.298 The Stellenbosch debating club followed suit, 
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although the appointment of Hector Qunta as UCT’s main speaker had posed no problem 
in 1958, even resulting in him being invited to address a Stellenbosch student society.299   
Nonetheless, Stellenbosch remained committed to white co-operation. The student body 
upheld the SRC’s resolution that Stellenbosch would resign from the ASB if the 
forthcoming ASB congress rejected its plans for the restructuring of the organisation and 
the creation of a new inter-university body which would bring together all South African 
students unable to reconcile with NUSAS.300 All NUSAS-affiliated SRCs were invited to 
observe the ASB congress, including the NUSAS president. UCT and Wits did not attend 
because of the stipulation of apartheid representation, but Rhodes and Durban did.301 
Possibly on the instructions of NUSAS, the Wits SRC president, John Shingler, 
recommended to Durban that it not accept the ASB’s invitation as he believed that the 
Durban observers were too inexperienced to attend such a gathering and could do 
immense harm to NUSAS.302  
Shingler’s fears were borne out. Probably because of the criticism of NUSAS by Rhodes 
and Durban and the developments at Rhodes towards the establishment of a new 
national student organisation303 (discussed later), which also had a bearing on 
Stellenbosch’s plans, the ASB congress very reluctantly agreed to Stellenbosch 
spearheading the establishment of a new non-ideological national federation of South 
African students outside the ASB.304 Overall, the ASB was a divided crisis filled 
organisation (the dissidents being labelled ‘sappe’) and though its adherents claimed that 
the 1959 congress had breached the conflict between the north and south,305 it was quite 
clear that the era of the SABRA visionaries and a more enlightened approach was over 
and that the ASB had returned to NP orthodoxy. Johan Strauss, founder member of the 
newly formed Ruiterwag, the youth wing of the Broederbond was elected to the ASB 
presidency.306 This boded ill for NUSAS-ASB relations because apart from the declaration 
of war against NUSAS and its anti-apartheid activities overseas,307 the Ruiterwag was 
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committed to ensuring that organisations such as NUSAS would have no place on the 
Afrikaans campuses.308  
What was the political background to these developments? African resistance to 
apartheid continued and with the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in April 
1959, became injected with a more radical dose of African nationalism. In early 1959, the 
ANC called for a boycott of Afrikaans manufactured products, evoking angry defensive 
reactions from whites countrywide. University students were no exception. At UCT 
NUSAS was accused of furthering the campaign, wrongly, although individual student 
leaders allied to NUSAS were sympathetic.309 The Extension of University Education Bill 
came before parliament in January 1959. It was opposed by the UP, NUSAS and its 
affiliated SRCs and, to the embarrassment of the government, received unprecedented 
condemnation and coverage overseas (discussed in chapter five).  
After the death of Strijdom, a leadership struggle within the NP ensued which was won by 
Verwoerd with the help of the Broederbond. The cracks within Afrikaner nationalism 
remained evident and it appeared as if Verwoerd and the Broederbond were attempting 
to impose NP orthodoxy on Nationalist institutions. In the wake of the decolonisation of 
Africa and the necessity of building a united white South Africa for the preservation of 
white Western civilisation, Verwoerd devoted his entire Union day speech to white co-
operation310 and introduced his Promotion of Bantu Self Government Bill which laid the 
foundation for separate ethnic states and removed indirect African representation in 
parliament. Japie Basson was expelled from the NP caucus for his criticism of the Bill311 
while SABRA was to find the Bill seriously wanting. SABRA had already shattered in late 
1958 when Verwoerd resigned from the body after clashes with the visionaries over the 
application of various aspects of apartheid, including contact and co-operation with the 
black population and university apartheid.312 When Afrikaner academics at Potchefstroom 
openly aired their reservations about government policy in the English press, they were 
swiftly silenced and brought back to NP orthodoxy by their University Council and, in the 
case of L.J. du Plessis, expelled from the NP.  
As elsewhere, a significant minority of Potchefstroom students opposed Verwoerdian 
policy and pressed for a moderate centrist party between the UP and NP. This eventually 
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materialised in the incarnation of the South African Bond in July 1959,313 but until then 
some Potchefstroom students joined the local branch of the UP,314 while a few even 
contemplated joining NUSAS.315 Youth branches of the UP and LP were established at 
the University of Pretoria, but although Ben Piek, the chairperson of the NP Jeugbond 
said their adherents would suffer no physical violence, they would not be tolerated as the 
NP was the only political party allowed at the university.316 As mentioned earlier, the ASB 
passed out of the hands of the enlightened SABRA visionaries (Loubser and Van der 
Vyver) to NP Verwoerdian orthodoxy with the election of Ruiter, Strauss, to the 
presidency.317  
White co-operation and the Verwoerdian counter-revolution at Stellenbosch 
In April 1959, the Extension of University Education Bill passed its Second Reading, 
accompanied by nonstop vigils in Cape Town and other parts of the country organised by 
NUSAS and its affiliated SRCs. Coinciding with these protests was a debate on university 
apartheid between Stellenbosch and UCT.318 Vernon February, a coloured student at 
UCT, brilliantly demolished university apartheid, while his Stellenbosch opponents, in the 
opinion of Rubin, evaded the issue and discussed culture and nationalism. Provocatively 
then, Rubin produced correspondence between himself and Pieters, ASB vice-president 
for international relations (later constitutional law expert and counsel in the registration of 
the Herstigte Nasionale Party)319 in which Pieters justified apartheid in terms reminiscent 
of Mein Kampf. The debate ended in uproar. Rubin instructed the NUSAS SRCs to 
publish the correspondence as well as a letter from Pieters to university principals abroad 
accusing NUSAS of committing high treason in calling for protests against the 
government’s Extension of University Education Bill. NUSAS subsequently threatened to 
sue Pieters for defamation and challenged him to publicise the replies he had received 
from the university principals.320 He would not, but NUSAS did through the campus 
newspapers of its affiliated SRCs.321 
In the meantime, a crisis already simmering at Stellenbosch boiled over the day after the 
inter-university debate. Firstly, much to the consternation of orthodox Nationalists, the 
press was awash with Stellenbosch’s unorthodoxy and ‘liberalism’ (which included a 
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report about a SABRA-facilitated meeting between the ANC and senior students and 
members of staff),322 its possible return to NUSAS and its rejection of the ASB. Secondly, 
the campus divided over the disruption of a speech delivered by Anglican archbishop, 
Joost de Blank, on race relations in March 1959323 and the conviction in the Stellenbosch 
magistrate’s court of two members of the SRC for assaulting a black university 
employee.324 Finally, seventy three students voted against university apartheid at a five 
hundred-strong mass meeting called after four members of the SRC failed to support 
such a motion at a recent SRC meeting.325 The four were subsequently asked by P.H. 
Kapp, later professor of History at Stellenbosch, to explain their actions to a mass 
meeting and resign from the SRC if these were found unacceptable to the student 
body.326  
The crisis escalated. Three students were assaulted for expressing their reservations 
about university apartheid,327 while seven members of the SRC resigned, including one of 
the original dissentients and those with criminal records, forcing the calling of a by-
election.328 Although denying it,329 Roelofse went to see Verwoerd and the MP for 
Stellenbosch for advice.330 This resulted in the dissolution of the SRC, the removal of the 
dissidents and the calling of fresh elections fought around the issue of university 
apartheid.331 In addition, the entire editorial board of Die Matie, the Stellenbosch student 
newspaper, resigned332 after their editor, the foremost proponent of white student co-
operation333 was suspended by the SRC for questioning Roelofse’s assertion that 
Stellenbosch was a sectional Afrikaner nationalist institution and not a white South 
African one.334 Consequently, there was neither coverage of the SRC election and 
university apartheid,335 nor the promised336 publication of the Pieters-Rubin 
correspondence. An NP Jeugbonder eventually took over the reins of Die Matie.337 The 
Jeugbond also concerned itself with the SRC elections, nominating twenty seven 
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candidates. However, to ensure that the ‘liberals’ did not win control of student 
government through a split vote, the NP persuaded ten candidates to step down.338  
Students at UCT favouring white co-operation optimistically predicted a more liberal SRC. 
They were disappointed. The NP Jeugbond ensured that liberalism, ‘the sprout of Satan’ 
and ‘vipers’ blood’ was ‘exterminated’ and that the ‘moulding, rotting influence of the 
dissentient voice’339 was silenced. Those believing in the ‘true-born volks tradition of 
unanimous democracy’340 triumphed and Roelofse again assumed the presidency.341 The 
new SRC assured its detractors that its victory did not mean the end of white student co-
operation or that English-speakers were not welcome at Stellenbosch.342 White co-
operation was a plank of Verwoerdian policy too. Evidently the alleged goal of a group of 
Stellenbosch students, namely to silence all independent thought in student government 
and prove to the northern universities and Verwoerd that Stellenbosch was fully in accord 
with Verwoerdian thinking343 was achieved, probably with the help of the Ruiterwag, too. 
Nico Smith alleges that from the 1960s, the Ruiterwag played an important behind-the-
scenes role in Afrikaans university SRC elections even going as far as committing 
electoral fraud to ensure that orthodox Nationalists controlled student government.344  
Rhodes too experienced a crisis with its SRC regarding university apartheid and white 
student co-operation, but returned to NUSAS orthodoxy with the intervention, ‘from afar’ 
of the national union. In March 1959 when the Extension of University Education Bill 
appeared before parliament, Dolf Gruber put before the Rhodes SRC a motion which 
stated that were Rhodes students not prepared to reject all segregation, which they were 
not, they should not also then uphold academic non-segregation.345 This was rejected 
through the efforts of the NUSAS supporters on the SRC. After the intervention of the 
Rhodes vice-chancellor, a ‘watered down’ statement of opposition to the Bill was 
adopted346 but which included a statement that the SRC ‘had no objection to the 
establishment of separate university facilities for Non-Europeans even if they be 
segregated institutions’.347 Relations between Gruber and the NUSAS Local Committee 
deteriorated further when Gruber would neither sanction an SRC protest march against 
the Extension of University Education Bill, nor help the Academic Freedom Committee 
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co-ordinate protest against the said Bill. Gruber only backed down when the staff 
threatened to organise a march.348  
These actions were probably linked to the upcoming inter-SRC conference, white at the 
insistence of Stellenbosch,349 to be hosted by Rhodes as a follow-up to its 1958 meeting 
with Stellenbosch and the UOFS. After two months of conflict on the SRC,350 an amended 
motion proposed by Gruber and John Benyon (a future historian), that a conference of 
student leaders from the English- and Afrikaans-medium universities be hosted at 
Rhodes to further white co-operation was finally put before a ‘fiery’ Rhodes mass meeting 
on 7 May 1959. It was rejected on the grounds that Rhodes would be sacrificing its 
principles. Moreover, it was ‘inopportune’ with the university apartheid Bill before 
parliament, was ‘a slap in the face’ to the English universities which had already 
expressed their disapproval of a restricted conference and would strain Rhodes’ 
harmonious relations with Fort Hare.351 Fort Hare threatened to sever all ties with Rhodes 
were the conference to go ahead.352 Consequently, Gruber and Benyon and seven of 
their supporters resigned from the SRC. A by-election was held but not before the 
‘moderates’ unsuccessfully attempted to force the resignation of the NUSAS ‘extremists’ 
as well.353 An SRC more ‘progressive’ and more favourably disposed towards NUSAS 
was voted into power354 in a ninety percent poll. Subsequently, the NUSAS assembly 
unanimously condemned the proposed conference355 which, it later transpired, was 
intended to set up a new student organisation in place of the ASB and NUSAS.356  
While the Rhodes and Stellenbosch SRC crises were progressing, an inter-SRC 
conference was held in Pietermaritzburg and was attended by representatives of UNNE, 
Durban and the UOFS. The UOFS representatives claimed to be in favour of meeting 
black students but not mixing with them socially as this was ‘contrary to their 
upbringing’.357 At this time, the UOFS student press was questioning various aspects of 
university apartheid, including the exclusion of conscience clauses from the new black 
colleges and the possibility that facilities were not equal to those at the established white 
universities.358 This was probably the reason for the startling admission by the UOFS 
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delegates that their SRC’s support for separate universities was based on the assumption 
that black students accepted these, but if in fact apartheid was being forced on them, 
SRC support would be withdrawn. This conference gave those in favour of co-operation 
at Durban much to rejoice about.359 Quite evidently, unlike Stellenbosch, the UOFS had 
not (yet) been brought back to NP orthodoxy.  
The return to orthodoxy had the effect of all the Afrikaans-medium universities, including 
the UOFS, refusing to attend the 1959 NUSAS congress. In this they followed the lead of 
the new ASB president who turned down the offer of the NUSAS president to extend the 
congress in order to accommodate the ASB.360 This was widely publicised for 
propaganda purposes by NUSAS to prove that it was the ASB rather than NUSAS which 
was responsible for the breakdown in student co-operation. Despite the absence of the 
Afrikaans centres, the NUSAS assembly discussed NUSAS-ASB-Afrikaans student 
relations. From a public reading of the correspondence between Rubin and Van der 
Vyver, it was quite clear to the assembly that there was significant contact in the top 
echelons of student government but not amongst the rank and file.361 Roelofse’s anti-
Semitic report of the 1958 NUSAS congress and Pieters’ overseas smear campaign of 
NUSAS and his correspondence with Rubin were greeted with shock, outrage and hilarity 
and comparisons drawn with Nazism.362 The assembly took exception to Roelofse’s and 
Pieters’ opinions, a resolution unanimously deploring them as ‘inaccurate’ and 
‘unwarranted’.363 
National contact after the passage of the Extension of University Education Act 
Although the NUSAS assembly devoted much attention to relations with Afrikaans-
speaking students, the main focus of the 1959 NUSAS congress concerned the recently 
enacted university apartheid, the subject of chapter five. However, of importance to 
national student co-operation was the decision of NUSAS to redefine its understanding of 
university autonomy. In effect, NUSAS stated that university autonomy was not an 
absolute right, in other words, segregated universities were not entitled to remain 
segregated.364 This significantly shifted the goal posts as far as Stellenbosch’s return to 
NUSAS was concerned. It removed the common ground that existed between NUSAS’s 
most conservative affiliate, Durban, which returned to NUSAS in 1949 on the basis of 
NUSAS’s continued defence of university autonomy and the right to segregate, more or 
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less the position from which Stellenbosch negotiated its proposed re-affiliation in January 
1959. The UP, the party of white South Africanism, was also in the process of losing its 
common ground. During its congress in August 1959, the liberals rejected the new 
segregatory measures put forward by the party leadership. This was to lead to the 
breakaway of the left wing and the creation of the Progressive Party. This is discussed in 
more detail in chapter five. According to the English press, probably inaccurately, many in 
the NP hoped that these developments would lead to a coalition with the UP, but if this 
was so, such a proposal was finally rejected by Verwoerd in August 1959.365   
While the UP congress was underway, Roelofse announced the Stellenbosch SRC’s 
intention of establishing a new national federation of students, the South African National 
Students’ Organisation  which, once it had ‘advanced’ sufficiently, would include black 
students too. Claiming that Stellenbosch had not departed from its apartheid principles, 
Roelofse informed the open universities that there would be no racial restrictions on their 
representation,366 thus eliminating one of the obstacles to inter-university co-operation. In 
justifying the federation, Roelofse argued that both the ASB and NUSAS constitutions 
were unacceptable to the other’s membership thus making both organisations unsuitable 
vehicles for national student co-operation. NUSAS and the ASB, he believed, would 
henceforward concentrate on cultural matters,367 presumably in the hope that NUSAS 
would be transformed into an English-speaking apartheid body. The most important 
motive however for this federation was providing a ‘patriotic’ student voice overseas to 
counteract the devastation wrought by NUSAS. Irawa, the UOFS student newspaper 
claimed that the federation would strive for the establishment of a new anti-communist, 
nationalist international student organisation committed to the preservation of Western 
civilisation.368 
Before NUSAS could respond to the Stellenbosch initiative, Eric Louw, the far-right wing 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and partisan of the late Strijdom,369 launched a blistering attack 
on NUSAS, accusing it (wrongly, only the ASB was present at that point of the 
conference) of instigating the economic boycott of South Africa called by the recent Pan 
African Students Conference in Tunisia. He also accused NUSAS of being a member of a 
non-existent communist international organisation. Moreover, Louw castigated 
Stellenbosch students for associating themselves with the new federation which he 
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erroneously implied was NUSAS’s creation.370 NUSAS, like the Wits student press, 
surmised that Louw’s outburst indicated that elements within the NP were threatened by 
the Stellenbosch initiative and aimed to sabotage it.371 Publicly NUSAS responded by 
refuting Louw’s allegations. It reaffirmed its belief in NUSAS, but nonetheless 
‘commended’ the Stellenbosch initiative and the ‘new spirit of co-operation’ which it 
signified and voiced its concern over the fact that Louw was dictating to Stellenbosch 
students.372 Student leaders at both Stellenbosch373 and UOFS reacted indignantly to the 
allegation that NUSAS was involved in the federation plans.374  
How did students at the NUSAS-aligned campuses respond to these developments? The 
UCT student newspaper, Varsity reacted overwhelmingly positively claiming erroneously 
that arrangements were far advanced for a new student organisation to replace both 
NUSAS and the ASB and that the UCT and Stellenbosch SRC were in the process of 
ironing out the last obstacles to unity.375 This was patently untrue. As the UCT SRC 
rejoined, it had had no contact with its Stellenbosch counterparts since the cancellation of 
the joint meeting earlier that year and moreover declared that NUSAS remained the best 
basis for national student co-operation.376 At a heated meeting, the UCT SRC refused to 
endorse a positive resolution welcoming the federation, expressed its reservations about 
the exclusion of the black universities and elected instead to request more information 
about the initiative.377  
The Wits student press viewed the Stellenbosch initiative with suspicion, arguing that it 
was based on the false assumptions that students were dissatisfied with NUSAS and that 
protest against university apartheid would disappear once university apartheid was finally 
implemented. Moreover, it believed that the federation was a means by which the NP 
could persuade the black middle class of the reasonableness of both university apartheid 
and the Bantustans and most importantly, win international student representation which 
had so far eluded the ASB. The Wits press suggested that Stellenbosch rejoin NUSAS 
were it sincere in its desire for student co-operation but return to the ASB if its initiative 
was aimed at domination of the NUSAS-affiliated centres.378 The Rhodes student press 
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recommended ‘that the English-speaking universities reconsider their attitude towards co-
operation with the Afrikaans universities’ in the light of the revelations about the newly 
established Ruiterwag and the leading role played by Ruiters in educational and student 
organisations. Prominent Ruiters in close proximity to Rhodes were named and Rhodeo 
speculated whether the ‘sinister’, ‘racialistic’ ideals of the Ruiterwag would ‘infiltrate’ the 
English universities.379 
In the end, the federation was a non-starter. In September 1959, the SRCs of the 
northern Afrikaans universities publicly rejected the Stellenbosch plan. The plan, they 
argued, implied making a choice between the ASB and the new federation and effectively 
replaced Christian Nationalism with elements of ‘humanism’ as the foundation of student 
organisation. It later transpired that shortly before this, despite the impassioned pleas of 
Roelofse and Pieters, the same universities, together with Strauss, rejected the scheme 
even though it flowed from the 1959 ASB congress resolution to establish a new national 
student body.380  
Conclusion 
The end of the decade marked, for the time being, the end of white contact and co-
operation. With the legislation of the Extension of University Education and Fort Hare 
Transfer Acts, it was quite clear that contact and co-operation between different races at 
the ‘open’ universities and Fort Hare would very soon be something of the past. 
Moreover, NUSAS was soon openly to defy university apartheid thus making positive 
relationships with government-supporting students and student bodies even more difficult 
and unlikely.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Social segregation, university autonomy and the passage of the Extension of 
University Education and Fort Hare Transfer Acts, 1959 
 
Introduction 
The signing into law of the erroneously named Extension of University Education Act in June 
1959 marked the culmination of the NP’s fourteen year assault on the admissions policies and 
racial composition of the Universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand as well as the 
attempts by the apartheid ideologues in the Native Affairs Department to create separate ethnic 
institutions for black university students. Together with the Fort Hare Transfer Act, which 
expropriated Fort Hare to the state, the Extension of University Education Act facilitated the 
incorporation of African higher education into the structures of Bantu Education as well as the 
harnessing of the new colleges to the development of the ethnic polities envisaged by the 
Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act of 1959.  
NUSAS’s fourteen year, increasingly sophisticated and organised opposition to university 
apartheid (particularly at the international level) climaxed in 1959. Its decision to oppose 
government measures on the tactically inclusive grounds of university autonomy became 
redundant as university apartheid loomed large but more importantly, became morally 
indefensible particularly in the eyes of NUSAS’s expanding black membership. Thus, a serious 
re-evaluation of the universities’ right to discriminate on racial grounds became imperative, as 
did the associated contradiction of upholding academic non-segregation while simultaneously 
practising campus social discrimination.  
This chapter will examine the progress of the academic freedom campaign during 1958-9, the 
divisions within the NUSAS-affiliated student bodies regarding its proselysation and attempts by 
NUSAS to establish an alternative to university apartheid in the form of the South African 
Committee for Higher Education (SACHED). The parliamentary debates on the two university 
bills will also be discussed. These shed light on the different interpretations of educational 
apartheid held by members of the NP. This would have a bearing on the orientation and 
functioning of the new ethnic colleges during the 1960s and ultimately on student politics of the 
future. As in the case of NUSAS’s academic freedom campaign, the divided UP’s performance in 
parliament demonstrated the immense difficulties of mounting principled, logical and strong 
opposition to university apartheid based solely on the defence of university autonomy.    
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Social segregation at Wits and UCT, 1940-1959 
Since the 1940s, the SRCs of Wits and UCT, in accordance with their commitment to academic 
freedom, held that all campus societies should be open to all. However, this policy was not 
applicable to sports clubs and at Wits, to the Choral Society and University Players, all of which 
were subject to outside jurisdiction.1 Dances were a separate and thorny issue. Racially mixed 
dances were expressly forbidden at Wits by the university authorities.2 At UCT however, the 
University Council ruled in 1944 that no hard and fast rulings would be made regarding social 
segregation. In 1954, T.B. Davie, the principal of UCT, went further when he pronounced that 
ultimately in policy and practice there should be complete academic and social equality at the 
university3 and that the inevitable racial integration of the campus would proceed in a natural, 
incremental and evolutionary fashion.4 In 1953, the UCT SRC effectively abolished the social 
colour bar following hostile public reaction to the Modern World Society’s racially mixed ball. It 
ruled that all students had equal social rights but in an unstated attempt to dissuade black 
students from attending dances and attracting unwanted public and government attention, left the 
exercise of these rights to the discretion of the individual.5 The result of SRC and official 
university policy, or lack thereof, was that by 1960 at UCT, an SRC-appointed commission of 
inquiry (never made public because of its explosive findings) found that campus social activities 
and even sports clubs were integrated to a surprising degree.6  
A similar situation could have pertained at Wits had the university authorities there not introduced 
new forms of social segregation in the early 1950s to ward off university apartheid. A diverse 
group of liberals and radicals mobilised to roll back all segregation at Wits in 19537 but with the 
spectre of apartheid looming over the universities, the divisive issue of social segregation was 
shelved so as to build a united front in defence of university autonomy.8 For tactical reasons too, 
black students did not actively demonstrate against this dual policy of which they did not 
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approve.9 However, following the return of Fort Hare and the unequivocal rejection of racism 
signified by the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the radical left re-
introduced the campaign to desegregate Wits in 1957. The liberal SRC president, Magnus 
Gunther, who had a history of fighting a rear-guard battle against the ‘minority red ticket’ was 
deeply concerned that this issue be correctly handled10 - presumably by liberals and not by the 
radical left.11 Reopening the social segregation question, particularly at the behest of Stanley 
Trapido, a future Marxist historian and a member then of the despised and feared COD, risked 
fracturing the broad campus front constructed against university apartheid. The following year 
Rose-Innes Phahle, a NEUM-aligned member of the SRC, argued that it was dishonest to defend 
the concept of academic non-segregation,12 presumably because of the practice of social 
segregation. Subsequently, the SRC appointed a commission of inquiry into campus 
segregation.13 When this found in 1959 that the overwhelming majority of faculty councils 
opposed social discrimination against black students, the Wits SRC and student body reaffirmed 
their belief that all student functions should be open to all students14 and accordingly requested 
the principal to lift his prohibition on mixed functions. However, with the university under attack 
from the government, new segregatory measures were introduced in early 1959, which barred 
black students from entering the cafeteria and exam hall while a social function was in progress. 
Through sustained protest action these new restrictions were eventually lifted.15 Much of the 
momentum for this desegregation campaign came from the Students’ Fellowship Society, a non-
partisan left grouping established for the specific purpose of opposing social segregation at Wits 
by Frank Adler (associated with the NEUM) and Lionel Morrison (a Treason Trialist, member of 
the Congress-aligned South African Coloured Peoples’ Organisation and later first black 
president of the British National Union of Journalists). Its inaugural meeting was addressed by 
Baruch Hirson, a Wits Physics lecturer associated with the NEUM but then also a member of 
COD.16  
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The death of T.B. Davie and the assumption to the UCT principalship of Dr John P. Duminy, 
formerly of the Pretoria Technical College, who it was feared viewed the SRC as little more than 
a prefect body under his authority,17 marked the end of UCT’s fluid laissez faire social 
segregation policy. A ball in UCT’s Jameson Hall in August 1958, at which a racially mixed group 
danced ostentatiously with each other, provoked an outraged public reaction, as well as the 
interest of the security police.18 The NP press predictably raised the lurid spectre of 
miscegenation, but in a new disingenuous line of attack, argued that black students were 
discriminated against at Wits and UCT because of their lack of social rights, an injustice which 
would be removed with the enactment of university apartheid.19 Reacting to this NP criticism and 
believing that it could perhaps still halt the passage of the university apartheid legislation or at 
least salvage a degree of autonomy, the UCT Council issued a statement expressing its wish 
that non academic social functions (specifically dances and university accommodation) should 
accord with the social customs and conventions of the community.20 Duminy interpreted this 
conservatively to mean that no racially mixed dances could be held on the campus. At a stroke, 
the tactical decision to shelve the issue of social segregation so as to build a broad alliance 
against university apartheid fell away. Arguing that the University Council had merely voiced an 
opinion and not a directive about social practice,21 the SRC refused to police social activities and 
host segregated functions as instructed to do by Duminy.22 Being cognisant of the fact that the 
majority of UCT students did not support racially open dances,23 the SRC retained its 
commitment to evolutionary integration and the ideal of open social functions. It also reiterated 
the stance of its predecessors that attendance at social functions would remain at the discretion 
of the individual.24 This did not go far enough for the radical left which uncompromisingly 
rejected all social segregation.25 
In August 1959, against the background of the ANC’ s recently concluded potato boycott against 
the ill-treatment and exploitation of farm workers in Bethal, the radical left embarked on a boycott 
of the newly segregated UCT bus service operated by the state owned enterprise, City 
Tramways.26 After having exhausted other avenues to resolve the issue, the SRC under future 
                                                          
17 BC 586 O5.1, Neville (Rubin) to David Clain, 14.2.1958, p. 2. 
18 Die Burger, 13.8.1958; 16.8.1958; 26.2.1959; Cape Times, 13.8.1959; Honi Soit to Argus, 21.8.1958; Union of 
South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, column 3290, 9.4.1959. 
19 Die Burger, 14.8.1958.  
20 Cape Times, 13.8.1958. 
21 BC 586 O5.1, D. Clain to ‘Mr Benfield (Registrar)’. 
22 BC 586 O5.1, J.P. Duminy to ‘Mr Jowell’, 9.12.1958; ‘UCT SRC: Minutes of an Extraordinary meeting of the above 
Council held on Thursday, 11th June (?1959), at 7.45 p.m. in the T.B Davie Room, Students’ Union’, pp. 2-3. 
23 Argus, 14.8.1958; Honi Soit to Argus, 21.8.1958.  
24 Argus, 5.12.1959; Cape Times, 7.12.1959; Varsity, 30.3.1960. 
25 BC 586 O5.1, ‘UCT SRC: Minutes of a meeting of the above Council held on Monday, 3rd March, 1959 at 8.0 p.m. 
in the T.B Davie Room, Students’ Union’, p. 5; New Age, 21.8.1958; 10.12.1959; Varsity vol. 17 no. 17, 18.6.1959. 
The radical left included SRC members Hillel Ticktin, Dawn Levy, future doctor, Rajkisour and Miss Winokur (perhaps 
Shula Marks, the radical historian).    
26 BC 586 O5.1, UCT SRC Minutes, nd., c. August 1959;  New Age, 3.9.1959;  Argus, 28.8.1959;  9.9.1959. 
186 
 
NUSAS president, Adrian Leftwich, narrowly endorsed the bus boycott and helped co-ordinate 
the alternative transport.27 This ‘[un]gentlemanly’, ‘[un]civilised’ behaviour divided UCT students 
along potentially violent race and class lines28 – the wealthy white elite physically broke through 
the picket line and stormed into the bus to avert the withdrawal of the bus service in the face of 
the very successful boycott29– and pushed the SRC into unconstitutional struggle along the lines 
of the Congresses. 
The Pietermaritzburg student body was also thrown into turmoil regarding segregation when 
Anglican and Catholic SRC members persuaded the student government to endorse the 
controversial recommendation of Joost de Blank, that the Anglican Church open its schools to all 
races.30 Like most enraged and scandalised white South Africans, including the UP,31 the 
student body rejected this overwhelmingly, claiming that Africans were too irresponsible to be 
integrated in the classroom and that white school integration was a greater priority.32 The SRC 
contemplated resigning because of this explicit vote of no confidence in its policy.33  
NUSAS supported these campus desegregation campaigns for both moral and tactical reasons 
and was particularly anxious to dispel the impression of the black universities and the 
Congresses that the Wits and UCT SRCs condoned their universities’ social segregation 
policies.34 NUSAS was attempting to woo the uncompromisingly anti-racist UNNE back into its 
ranks while the Pius the Twelfth Catholic University College voiced its dissatisfaction with the 
universities’ social colour bar and threatened to establish its own national union of students.35  
University autonomy 
Linked to the inconsistency and hypocrisy of upholding both academic non-segregation and 
social segregation was the whole issue of university autonomy and the right to determine 
admissions on a racial basis. University autonomy was drawn sharply into focus by members of 
the UNNE SRC invited by their UCT counterparts to visit the campus in the hope of ensuring the 
black university’s continued participation in the university apartheid campaign and ultimately its 
re-affiliation to NUSAS. Raymond Mokoena and Pat Samuels stated that defending university 
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autonomy implied a defence of the entirely unsatisfactory and inferior facilities imposed on black 
students by the Natal University authorities. Thus their opposition to university apartheid - an 
inferior education system imposed on black students - was based on opposition to apartheid in 
toto.36 These views accorded with those of most black UCT students, the majority of whom 
would not participate in the university apartheid campaign because of its limited scope.37 At the 
1958 NUSAS congress, Fort Hare similarly questioned NUSAS’s support for racially segregated 
universities, which its defence of university autonomy implied.38 Accordingly, NUSAS decided to 
revisit its stance on this concept.39 Defending university autonomy was by then a tactical rather 
than a principled stand. Earlier in 1958, representatives of NUSAS and the Wits and UCT SRCs 
had indicated to the Commission on Separate University Education (discussed next) that in their 
official capacities they upheld the right of Stellenbosch to remain segregated but in their private 
capacities they did not. Moreover, Professor Denis Cowan, a UCT Council member concurred 
with this view, stating that Stellenbosch’s rightful decision to remain segregated was ‘most 
inadvisable’.40 
Commission on Separate University Education, 1958  
The majority report of the Commission on Separate University Education of 1958, which 
interrogated the manner in which the apartheid colleges were to be organised, was founded on 
political delusion and an outright lie. The eight NP signatories argued that the black community 
was allegedly too backward and lacking in responsibility to take the initiative in establishing and 
financing its own ethnic universities and thus the state would have to do so itself from its own 
resources.41 Apart from the fact that the majority of the black population was totally opposed to 
separate educational institutions, the ethnic colleges would in fact be directly financed by African 
taxation through drawing on the Bantu Revenue Account.  
As pointed out by Beale, the hand of the Native Affairs Department is clearly discernible in the 
majority report. The new university colleges would play a key role in the development of the 
Bantu reserves.42 Because graduates of the open universities acquired an ‘alien and 
contemptuous attitude towards their own culture’43 and, it was argued, were thus not prepared to 
serve their own communities,44 the new ethnic colleges would be required to produce skilled 
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personnel grounded in their ethnic communities to develop the reserves.45 Control of the new 
colleges would be vested in white state-appointed councils, which it was envisaged would 
eventually be replaced by black ‘advisory councils’ composed of state appointees closely linked 
to Bantu Authorities. Similarly, black ‘advisory senates’, on which the white state-appointed 
rectors also served, would replace the initial white senates when the former had completed their 
‘apprenticeships’ and were ready to take over the reins of academic governance.46  
Political and ideological control was paramount to the state. Because Fort Hare alumni were so 
opposed to the state takeover of their alma mater (an admission that Africans did not support 
government educational policy), no convocations would be permitted at the new colleges.47 Most 
academic and administrative staff members would be white. Unlike at any other South African 
university, some would be appointed directly by the Native Affairs Department and all would be 
subject to public service regulations. Conscience clauses were to be omitted. Religious freedom 
would be vested in the Minister of Native Affairs. Accordingly, the colleges would be founded on 
a ‘positive’ (Christian) religious basis so as to ‘live up to our (white Afrikaner) religious national 
character’ and ‘to render the highest service to the non-Europeans’.48 Apart from the violation of 
religious and academic freedom which this entailed, critics pointed out that Christianity was at 
odds with nurturing and promoting traditional African culture.   
Representatives of the open universities, the SAIRR, SABRA, NUSAS and its SRCs,49 objected 
to the removal of black students from the open universities, African financing of the colleges, the 
level of state control envisaged in the colleges’ apartheid governing structures and the absence 
of conscience clauses, though SABRA not the first or the last. The critics argued that the level of 
state control and the absence of academic freedom and university autonomy that state control 
implied would deter high quality academic staff from teaching at these institutions. The colleges 
were thus doomed to eternally inferior academic status.50 The minority report authored by the 
three UP members of the Commission and Margaret Ballinger of the LP, endorsed the objections 
of the critics.  
The NUSAS president, Coombe, and representatives of the Wits, UCT and Pietermaritzburg 
SRCs appeared before the Commission in January 1958 to answer questions based on their 
earlier written submissions.51 NUSAS called into question the bona fides of the government in 
stating that separate black universities were being constructed to advance the interests of the 
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black population and that they would not be inferior in any way.52 Quoting extensively from NP 
utterances, Coombe argued that black students were to be removed from the open universities 
for blatantly racist and political reasons. The Minister of Justice, C.R. Swart, for example, had 
stated that separate universities were being built because no white in Winburg would tolerate 
their children attending classes with black students, while Verwoerd had intimated that the 
Separate Universities Bill was before parliament because the open universities were 
transforming the ‘Bantu’ into ‘black Englishmen’ to ‘be used against the Afrikaner’.53 This 
information was received in absolute silence by the Commission and did not elicit further 
questions.54 In what the UCT SRC representatives believed was an attempt to trap them into 
contradicting themselves, questions were asked in a ‘shrewd’ and ‘circuitous’ fashion.55  David 
Clain and Norman Bromberger refused to accept the NP argument that the social disadvantages 
suffered by black students at the open universities justified their removal to their own separate 
institutions. Moreover, they declared that their SRC was not embarrassed by the limited social 
colour bar operative at UCT because this was a consequence of outside regulations and the 
social attitudes of white students and not SRC policy. To the shock and consternation of the 
Commissioners, the UCT SRC and NUSAS stated that they were working towards a common 
society and entirely integrated education and that their rejection of university apartheid ultimately 
meant the rejection of the whole ideology of apartheid.56 
So as to ensure that university apartheid remained in the public eye, NUSAS and its affiliated 
student bodies picketed the Commission in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Pretoria.57 The 
radical left (‘The Party’ or ‘Johnny and his cohorts’) objected to the UCT SRC placards bearing 
the words ‘Western universities are traditionally free and open’ and thus produced their own, 
unsanctioned by the angry SRC, which read ‘we students are all against apartheid’.58 Thus, as in 
the past, the dominant liberal left policed their radical counterparts and divided over Cold War 
ideology as well as the extent to which apartheid should be challenged.  
The 1958 general election and the resumption of the academic freedom campaign  
The Commission and university apartheid were overshadowed by the general election of April 
1958. As in 1953, the UP hoped to trump the NP (still holding a minority of votes) at the polls, 
though its chances of doing so were slimmer than before. Coloured voters in the Cape, 
traditionally UP supporters, had finally been removed from the common voters’ roll in 1956. 
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Meanwhile, the enfranchisement of eighteen year olds gave the NP an electoral advantage given 
both the demographic preponderance of Afrikaans-speakers amongst the white population and 
the Christian-National indoctrination the newly enfranchised had been exposed to at school. The 
ANC too favoured a united front against apartheid and adopted the slogan ‘the Nats must go’. 
However, the NP further entrenched its power at the expense of the opposition – the UP 
haemorrhaged more seats to the NP, the Labour Party entirely lost its parliamentary 
representation (and its place on the Separate Universities Commission) and the LP candidates 
forfeited their deposits. Thus the spectre of university apartheid loomed large for the first sitting 
of the new parliament in August 1958.  
Immediately after the election, NUSAS and its SRCs again began to put in place the structures 
required for their even more ambitious campaign to stop university apartheid. Academic freedom 
committees were again called into existence and negotiations with the university authorities 
commenced for the piece de resistance, a one day closure of the universities to mark the 
passage of the Bill and thus the racial closure of the ‘open’ universities’ and the ethnification of 
Fort Hare.59 Importantly, the Wits SRC printed sufficient copies of its evidence to the Separate 
Universities Commission to distribute to all opposition MPs. The new Extension of University 
Education Bill (renamed in more ‘neutral’ terms stressing ‘university provision’ rather than 
‘separat[ion]’ following the recommendation of PUCHE60), which included all the Separate 
University Education Commission’s majority report changes to the earlier 1957 Bill, was 
introduced in parliament on 14 August 1958. Attesting perhaps to the effectiveness of NUSAS’s 
lobbying of the UP, De Villiers Graaff refused the Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences leave 
to introduce the Bill until the UP was satisfied that the serious inroads into university autonomy 
intended by the Bill had been removed and that MPs were allowed sufficient time in which to 
study the Report of the Commission on University Education,61 which the government had 
cunningly released only two days before.  
Shortly after this, J.G. Strijdom died and the premiership passed to Hendrik Verwoerd, the 
Minister of Native Affairs who O’ Meara avers ‘was already far and away the most hated figure in 
South Africa - and not just amongst the black majority’.62 The hand of the apartheid ideologues 
was strengthened. The Department of Native Affairs was divided into two new separate 
ministries, the Departments of Bantu Administration and Development and Bantu Education, 
headed by Department of Native Affairs  ideologues M.D.C. de Wet Nel and W.A. Maree 
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respectively,63 the latter an extraordinary racist who forbade white Bantu Education officials from 
shaking hands with black people. Shortly before these developments, the Extension of University 
Education Bill was again delayed,64 but not for long it could be surmised. Verwoerd and his new 
cabinet underlings had a particular interest in imposing direct state control over African higher 
education and incorporating it into the ideological structures of Bantu Education and would brook 
no opposition to this plan. Evidence for this can be discerned in Verwoerd’s unprecedentedly 
vicious attack on SABRA members, N.J. Olivier and L.J. du Plessis, for daring to question his 
former ministry’s provisions for the ethnic colleges.65 
In January 1959, the speech from the throne announced the re-introduction of the Bill during the 
forthcoming parliamentary session. Rubin, the new NUSAS president, reminded NUSAS 
executive members that university apartheid had been delayed by a decade because of the 
national union’s sustained opposition to it. He exhorted everyone to ‘pull out all the stops during 
this most difficult time’ in the hope that the Bill would again be shelved. He warned that a 
defeatist attitude would be rewarded with deserved defeat. Already the Durban Academic 
Freedom Committee had used the argument that students should protest against the apartheid 
Bill, not because they could stop its passage, but because failing to do so would signify consent 
and endorsement of government actions.66 The Wits SRC president, John Shingler, offered a 
more sophisticated interpretation of government tactics and how students ought to respond to 
these. The government employed totalitarian techniques he argued. It attacked again and again 
by introducing the university apartheid bills and when opposition to these measures was at its 
most intense, suddenly withdrew them causing the dissipation of all protest. Thus Shingler urged 
Wits students to maintain the pressure on government,67 presumably so that it would not get 
away with lulling students into a false sense of complacency. 
What was particularly significant about the 1959 campaign was its international dimension. In his 
capacity as international vice-president and representative of the World University Service 
(WUS), an international student relief body based in Geneva, Rubin spent a good six months 
abroad in 1957/868 and early 1959. In his WUS capacity, he was able to raise the vast sums of 
money required by UCT’s ‘Open University Appeal Fund’ and Wits’ African Medical Scholarships 
Trust Fund (twenty five thousand dollars from the USA alone by April 1959)69 to enrol as many 
black students as possible at the open universities before the implementation of university 
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apartheid.70 During the course of his travels, Rubin participated in the ISC and addressed 
student unions all over the world about university apartheid, winning their support for NUSAS’s 
campaign. Through his influence, the United States National Student Association debated 
whether American universities should be lobbied to withhold recognition of degrees conferred by 
the ethnic colleges and those South African institutions debased by apartheid legislation.71 This 
was in fact the first salvo in the campaign to make the new colleges unworkable. Rubin also met 
important public figures such as African nationalist luminary, Kwame Nkrumah, president of 
newly independent Ghana, Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of New Deal US president, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and patron of the youth, and Adlai Stevenson,72 all of whom added their voices to the 
international protests.  
During early 1959, almost three hundred letters and cables from universities in more than fifty 
countries were sent to Verwoerd deploring the government’s actions and requesting that the Bill 
be withdrawn. Verwoerd famously responded by stating that all the protests went the way of all 
bad things, namely, straight into his wastepaper basket where they belonged.73 At a later stage, 
NP politicians tried to play down the scale, significance and spontaneity of this international 
condemnation by dismissing it as merely the viewpoint and work of one person, Neville Rubin, 
president of NUSAS74 and son of Leslie Rubin, LP member and Senate Native Representative. 
This provoked the UP’s facetious dig that if Rubin was such a commanding and influential figure, 
the government should consider appointing him to head its five hundred million pounds per 
annum Information Service which hitherto had been singularly unsuccessful in selling South 
Africa’s apartheid policy overseas.75 Nonetheless, despite its bravado, the NP was rattled by the 
level of international opposition to its plans. The Minister of Education expressed his ‘strongest 
opposition’ to those ‘student organisations’ inside South Africa who organised abroad and 
facilitated the collection of money intended to thwart the implementation of government policy.76 
Right winger, H. Rust, reiterated these views but argued that internal and external ‘agitation’ was 
aimed at setting the black population against the new universities and instilling hatred against 
the NP, the government and the white man in South Africa.77      
The university apartheid bills in parliament, February - June 1959 
On 26 February 1959, the Extension of University Education Bill ‘to provide for the 
establishment, maintenance, management and control of university colleges for non-White 
                                                          
70 ibid.; BC 586 O5.1, UCT SRC Minutes, 3.6.1959, p. 2; Cape Times, 10.3.1959; Contact, 22.3.1958; Varsity vol. 18 
no. 17, 6.8.1959. 
71 BC 586 B3 Executive Minutes 1957, p. 11; B4.1, Neville Rubin to the Executive, 3.9.1958. 
72 BC 586 O5.1, Neville Rubin to Daphne van Rooyen, 19.2.1958. 
73 Union of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, columns 3194, 8.4.1959; 3231, 3297, 9.4.1959. 
74 ibid., 3240-3241, 8.4.1959. 
75 ibid., 3288, 9.4.1959. 
76 ibid., 3172-3173, 8.4.1959. 
77 ibid., 3218-3219, 8.4.1959. 
193 
 
persons’ and ‘the limitation of the admission of non-White students to certain universities’ was 
introduced by John Vorster, Deputy Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences.78 De Villiers Graaff 
again refused the government permission to introduce its Bill because it was ‘incompatible with 
the pattern of academic freedom and university autonomy obtaining in the Western world’.79 In 
the opinion of Varsity this was a ‘highly unusual step’80 presumably because this radical and 
decisive action was out of character for the normally timid, vacillating and divided UP, which, 
terrified of alienating its white electoral support base generally supported the principle of 
government policy but not its details. The UP stand was endorsed by the Native 
Representatives, Ballinger and Walter Stanford, as well as by the independent Coloured 
Assembly Representative, M.W. Holland. The UP continued its resolute opposition to university 
apartheid, because there was ‘nothing whatsoever …good’ in it. On 22 April 1959, the UP called 
for the withdrawal of the Fort Hare Transfer Bill,81 intended ‘to assign the maintenance, 
management and control of the University College of Fort Hare to the government’ and ‘transfer’ 
to the government ‘certain assets, rights, liabilities and obligations’.82   
During February, April and June 1959, the NP led by Verwoerd and the Ministers and Deputy 
Minister of Education, Arts and Science, Bantu Education and Bantu Development (T.T. 
Serfontein, B.J. Vorster, W.A. Maree and M.D.C. de Wet Nel, respectively) justified the removal 
of black students from the open universities, the establishment of the new ethnic universities and 
the expropriation of Fort Hare in the positive developmentalist but primordially tribal terms 
already outlined in the majority report of the Commission into Separate Education. There was no 
consistency however in whether the new ethnic colleges, rooted in their respective ethnic 
communities, were to be the agents of cultural and political development or whether they were to 
be the instruments of their communities.83 The more implicitly baasskap-orientated favoured the 
former for the foreseeable future. The ethnic colleges would be controlled by the white ‘trustees’ 
in the racially separate senates and councils who would thus be in a position to direct cultural, 
political and community development along lines compatible with apartheid and government 
policy.84 Much emphasis was placed on the nurturing of traditional ‘Bantu’ and, in the context of 
Fort Hare, ‘Xhosa’ culture. Drawing on the recently concluded All African Peoples’ Conference in 
Accra (discussed later), where the delegates demanded the recognition and development of 
African as opposed to Western imperial culture and history,85 the NP, specifically the Minister of 
Bantu Administration and Development, argued that that was precisely what the government 
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was facilitating by constructing ethnic colleges and insisting that black students leave the open 
(jingoist) universities at which they were ‘bywoners’ (squatters).86 Townley Williams of the UP 
pointed out the illogicality and sudden about turn of government policy considering that it had 
consistently refused over many years to either recognise or subsidise Fort Hare’s African 
languages and Bantu Studies Departments.87 While requiring that each ethnic group in South 
Africa would be accommodated in their own separate ethnic institutions, the NP refused to spell 
out firstly, what was meant by a ‘volksgroep’, secondly, whether the white English- and 
Afrikaans-speaking volksgroepe would also be forced into linguistically separate universities and, 
thirdly, whether all volksgroepe formed part of a ‘common fatherland’.88 The latter was 
particularly pertinent considering that shortly before the passage of the Fort Hare Transfer Bill, 
the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Bill was introduced which once passed would become 
the enabling legislation for the creation of separate ethnic, tribal, self-governing states 
presumably with separate ethnic citizenships.  
The UP was particularly incensed at the racial closure of Wits and UCT and the removal of 
coloured, Indian and non-Xhosa speakers from Fort Hare. The NP justified the former by quoting 
(selectively and out of context in the opinion of the UP) from the speeches and utterances of 
Louis Botha, Jan Smuts and J.H. Hofmeyr. By arguing that none of the three former SAP/UP 
leaders had ever intended that either UCT or Wits should be racially mixed and had always 
advocated racially separate universities, the NP attempted to demonstrate the illogicality and 
inconsistency of the UP’s opposition to government policy when it in fact accorded with its own 
earlier policy.89  
The UP was on the horns of a dilemma. The right wing of the divided party (conspicuously silent 
during these debates) was committed to white supremacy while its left wing cautiously favoured 
a common (middle-class) society founded on Western civilisation. Thus the UP’s official rejection 
of the Extension of University Education Bill, based on the defence of university autonomy was a 
compromise. Nonetheless, there was a definite feeling among most UP members who spoke 
during the debates that mixed universities in themselves were a good thing. They facilitated 
contact and understanding among people to the benefit of race relations, they instilled Western 
civilisation and common values which were a bulwark against communism, while separate 
universities were dangerous for the survival of the white race.90 Turning the NP’s traditional 
rationale of rejecting racial intermingling on its head, namely, that it nurtured the development of 
political agitators, race hatred and ultimately a situation akin to the ultimate white fear, the Mau 
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Mau in Kenya, Philip Moore argued that it was racially separate educational institutions, like 
those established for Kenya’s Kikuyu-speaking children which were the incubators of agitation 
and events such as the Mau Mau.91 Similarly, the liberal wing of the UP (E.G. Malan of Orange 
Grove, Zac de Beer of Maitland, Helen Suzman of Houghton, Colin Eglin of Pinelands and 
Douglas Smit of East London City), put a case for a common society which they believed was 
already in the making at Wits and UCT and at Fort Hare too.  
The NP played divide and rule by exploiting the differences and divisions within the UP. 
Somewhat overstating the case, Verwoerd alleged (correctly) that the conservatives did not want 
mixed universities while the liberal wing favoured integration a la the LP, but because the UP 
was so desperate to maintain party unity so as to resume power again, the conservatives were 
prepared not to block the liberals.92 However, as Van Niekerk stated, the UP knew that the white 
electorate did not want integration and thus the UP employed university autonomy as a 
smokescreen for its real supposedly integrationist intentions.93 
The NP continuously goaded UP members about their attitude towards the principle of the 
Extension of University Education Bill, namely, separate universities or integration.94 L. 
Steenkamp, a centrist, though judging from his alarmed reactions to NUSAS’s and its SRCs’ oral 
evidence during the Separate Universities Commission, no integrationist,95 steadfastly refused to 
elaborate on this. He retorted to his NP taunters, including the Deputy Minister of Bantu 
Education,96 that the principle of separate universities had already been laid down by the 
government and accepted by parliament and moreover, was expressly excluded from discussion 
by the terms of the 1957-8 parliamentary Commission. Similarly, Suzman evaded a direct 
answer to NP probing as to whether she would accept the appointment of a black rector and 
staff at the open universities and retorted that only the government could be ‘absurd’ and 
‘arrogant’ enough to lay down law for an eventuality perhaps fifty to a hundred years into the 
future. For the present she advised the NP to leave the matter of staffing to the university 
authorities whose hands were in any case tied by the mores of white parents who would not 
hesitate to voice their dissatisfaction and remove their children if race relations at the universities 
did not meet their satisfaction.97 
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By upholding the right of the universities to decide their own admission policies, the UP was 
accused of furthering the transformation of UCT and Wits into truly black institutions.98 The NP 
alleged that the university authorities99 and definitely the current student leaders at the open 
universities and Pietermaritzburg – a representative at the latter informing the Separate 
University Commission that he would have no qualms should his daughter wish to ‘marry a 
native’100 - stated quite unambiguously that they favoured an open society and were working 
towards the abolition of race as a factor in society. This, Verwoerd argued, would lead to the 
demand for integrated schools and then the ultimate horror, the forcible integration of all 
educational institutions as was happening in the USA101 following the implementation of the 1954 
Brown versus the Board of Education Supreme Court ruling.  Graaff dismissed outright the idea 
of ultimately black universities and open schools (no ‘black Bishops’ and ‘de Blank will not get 
his way’102) but predicted prophetically that were social mores to change and such a situation 
was to arise, it was irrelevant to both the UP and NP as neither party would be in power as 
neither would ever allow this to happen.103 However, the UP was unable to deny the logic of NP 
arguments, namely that if the UP wanted to retain the white character of UCT and Wits, it would 
have to abrogate these institutions’ autonomy to do so and moreover, the university authorities 
would themselves have to racially discriminate in their admission practices.104 
The UP continued to oppose the removal of black students from the open universities, but did 
accept the construction of separate black universities if there was a justified need for them, if the 
black population desired them and if they were ‘good’ universities. It employed divide and rule 
tactics similar to those of the NP to prove that the ethnic colleges envisaged by the Bill did not 
fulfil any of these requirements and conditions. Firstly, the UP argued that there was no need for 
new black universities as so few Africans matriculated105 and that the government’s own experts 
believed so too. Accordingly, it challenged the government to release the report of the 1955-6 
Van der Walt Commission to allay the suspicion that it was being suppressed because its 
findings failed to endorse the goals and direction of the Department of Native Affairs’s favoured 
university policy.106 This, the furious government did not appear to have done. Secondly, the UP 
stated that men of the stature of Dr A.B. Xuma, former ANC president, and Professor Z.K. 
Matthews, sometime acting principal of Fort Hare, opposed the government’s new university 
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policy107 and thus the NP was challenged to name any legitimate black leader who was in favour 
of ethnic universities.108 The only person the NP could come up with was Botha Sigcau, 
chairperson of the discredited Transkeian Authority, but the Opposition suspected that there had 
been an element of compulsion in his endorsement of government plans for Fort Hare.109 
Allegedly thousands of traditional leaders in the Northern Transvaal were in favour of an African 
university in their territories,110 but in reply as to why they had not given evidence to this effect to 
the Separate Universities Commission, the NP lamely submitted that the traditional leaders were 
not au fait with the terms of reference of the Commission, namely, the operationalisation and 
administration of universities.111 Thirdly, the UP cited the concerns of leading academics at the 
Afrikaans universities, Professors N.J. Olivier, L.J. du Plessis and J.C. Coetzee (the latter two 
embroiled in serious trouble with Potchefstroom University for their purportedly anti-government 
stance112) to prove that the proposed new ethnic colleges were neither ‘good’ institutions 
because of their incipient authoritarianism and abrogation of academic freedom and university 
autonomy nor would they ever be the intellectual equals of the older white institutions.113 
The UP and the Coloured and Native Representatives rejected the racially separate university 
governance structures and the civil servant status of the staff at the new colleges, many of whom 
would be direct state appointees, and the implications of these measures for academic freedom 
and attracting high quality staff. The Opposition speculated on the probable dire fate which 
awaited the Fort Hare personnel who indicated on a form sent to them by the Department of 
Bantu Education that they objected to the transfer of Fort Hare to the government.114 Both the 
expropriation of Fort Hare and the indoctrination envisaged at the new colleges were likened to 
the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, Stanford making an analogy to the 
Nazi takeover of the University of Heidelberg and the introduction of courses like Aryan Science 
and Folk History into which the government’s courses in Native Administration and History could 
presumably quite easily morph.115 The Minister of Lands alarmingly alleged that no university 
had autonomy – all universities derived their powers from the state to which they were ultimately 
answerable116 - while Fort Hare was even less independent, being subject to Rhodes in terms of 
both governance and curriculum. Importantly for the future of academic freedom, it was clear 
that the state intended to make further inroads into university autonomy (as predicted by Graaff) 
                                                          
107 ibid., 3200, 8.4.1959. 
108 ibid., 1566, 26.2.1959. 
109 ibid., 8958, 24.6.1959.  
110 ibid., 3293, 9.4.1959. 
111 ibid., 1559-1560, 26.2.1959; 3293, 9.4.1959; 3692, 10/11.4.1959.  
112 BC 586 B1 Presidential Report 1959, p. 29.  
113 House of Assembly Debates, 3188-3190, 3194-3199, 3234, 8.4.1959; 8898-8899, 24.6.1959. 
114 ibid., 8960-8962, 8967, 24.6.1959; D. Williams, A history of the University College of Fort Hare, South Africa – the 
1950s: the waiting years, Edward Mellen Press, Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter, 2001, pp. 356-357. 
115 House of Assembly Debates, 3255, 8.4.1959. 
116 ibid., 3431-3433, 10.4.1959. 
198 
 
by also removing the right of the university to determine what it would teach.117 The Minister of 
Justice warned that no university would be permitted to become a breeding ground of 
communism, sedition and anti-whiteism or propagate atheism or ‘the cult of nakedness’. It 
accordingly singled out Robert Sobukwe, a lecturer/language assistant at Wits, who had recently 
assumed the leadership of the newly established militant PAC118 whose members had broken 
away from the ANC in 1958 because of the latter’s multi-racialism and alleged communist and 
non-African domination. 
The Opposition reiterated its misgivings earlier expressed at the Commission into Separate 
Universities regarding the funding of the university colleges. Firstly, they regarded it as grossly 
unfair that Africans, already poor and overtaxed, should pay for the construction of the new 
colleges and their education from their own revenue, and, in the case of Fort Hare, should also 
lose their subsidy from the Department of Education, Arts and Sciences. They argued that the 
amounts earmarked by the Department of Native Affairs for the construction and annual running 
costs of the ethnic colleges were entirely inadequate and would result in inferior institutions.119 
Given that these were a fraction of those required to build and maintain the newly opened 
University of Ghana (slightly over seventy one thousand pounds per annum for a tribal college 
after ten years of its existence as opposed to over six hundred and seventy thousand pounds for 
Ghana),120 this was a valid point which received much publicity in the student press both before 
and after the parliamentary debate. J.A.F. Nel claimed that Fort Hare was already inferior 
because it had failed to expand its limited academic offerings over the years while the number of 
graduates it had produced was pathetically small.121 The government intended remedying this 
supposedly dire situation, he claimed, by giving the ‘Bantu’ and specifically the Xhosa their own 
superior institutions. Ballinger disputed the claim that Xhosa-speakers were being given anything 
at all; in fact Fort Hare was being given to the Department of Native Affairs and African 
taxpayers were being forced to shoulder the bill for the ‘fancies of the hon. prime minister’.122 In 
the opinion of  Moore, the takeover of Fort Hare amounted to the ‘rape’ of the college123 and was 
moreover, Ballinger argued, expropriation without due compensation for Fort Hare’s estimated 
one million pounds worth of assets. These accusations hit home to the outraged NP who firstly 
disputed the accusation that there would be no compensation – the churches would receive an 
amount decided on by the state for their hostel buildings – and rejected out of hand that Fort 
Hare’s assets amounted to anything close to a million pounds. They effectively called Professor 
                                                          
117 ibid., 3395, 3406; 10.4.1959. 
118 ibid., 3396-7, 10.4.1959.  
119 ibid., 3624, 3628-3629, 10/11.4.1959. 
120 Witwatersrand Student vol. 11 no. 5, 15.4.1959. 
121 House of Assembly Debates, 4482-4483, 22.4.1959. 
122 ibid., 8923, 24.6.1959. 
123 ibid., 4460, 22.4.1959. 
199 
 
Burrows, principal of the college, a liar for claiming so.124 Thomas Bowker (Albany) pointed out 
that in fact, African taxpayers would compensate the churches, and for this reason, speculated 
that the churches would probably take pity on these hapless victims and would accept less for 
their assets than their actual worth.125  
The UP and Ballinger questioned the government’s logic in seeking to Christianise the Bantu 
while simultaneously expelling the churches from Fort Hare. Ballinger claimed that this was a 
‘perversion’ and an attack on both Christianity and the English churches.126 Moore asked what 
kind of outcry would be provoked were the Afrikaans churches treated in such a similarly cavalier 
fashion.127 The NP was in an uproar.128 They believed that God was on their side129 and as such 
they were the ‘righteous’ and not the ‘unrighteousness’ as implied by the Opposition. Rust 
denounced Ballinger’s words as the ‘most terrible things ever said in the House’.130 Reiterating 
the earlier words of the Minister of Bantu Education, that dual control of the university and 
hostels invited rebellion,131 he justified government intentions by citing the recommendations of 
the ill-fated 1955 Fort Hare Commission that the churches be relieved of their residence 
responsibilities.132 However, these justifications were insincere; the NP could not get away from 
the truth of the Opposition’s attacks. Earlier, Rust had stated quite unambiguously that ‘liberal 
agitators’ and their ‘clergymen’ had always been a ‘plague’ to the Afrikaner people and had 
always ‘obstructed’ it and that accordingly he wished they would just ‘leave the country’.133 The 
Jewish community too was singled out by De Wet Nel regarding their publicly voiced concerns, 
along with other faiths, about the dropping of the conscience clause at the proposed new ethnic 
colleges.134 This omission, Bowker argued, was ‘wicked’ and took South Africa ‘back to the 
Middle Ages’ and to the days of the early English universities when ‘Catholics, Quakers and 
Jews’ were prohibited from holding academic office.135  
Townley Williams argued that if the government intended to Christianise the African population 
and provide it with universities (neither of which were part of traditional African culture), it was 
logically embarking on a process of westernisation. He thus asked why the government did not 
just leave Fort Hare as it was because the government and the current Fort Hare authorities 
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were moving in the same direction.136 E.G. Malan and Zac de Beer argued that Western 
civilisation and truth were one and indivisible. There was no such thing as an ethnic or racial 
truth they asserted.137 For De Beer, Western civilisation was neither exclusively white nor 
exclusively Christian.138 Malan reminded the House that Western civilisation had its origins 
amongst ‘non-whites’ in Egypt and Mesopotamia and, perhaps even more galling for race 
conscious Nationalists, the first book written in Afrikaans was a Malay prayer book authored by a 
coloured imam for the Afrikaans-speaking coloured community.139 Malan and De Beer pleaded 
with the government to retain the racially open character of UCT and Wits140 and following 
NUSAS’s responses at the Separate Universities Commission, to allow white students into the 
ethnic colleges.141 They, like Suzman, believed that in the light of the rapid changes occurring 
elsewhere on the African continent, it was essential that the traditional South African master-
servant/black-white relationship were modified and that white students should meet their black 
intellectual equals, or even intellectual superiors, on a level of equality142 – effectively an 
endorsement of the creation of a multi-racial middle class society rooted in Western values. 
The NP had no such intentions and its determination to close the open universities and 
expropriate Fort Hare was, it on occasions admitted, to ensure that black students had no choice 
but to go to the new ethnic colleges. This was an admission that no black student desired 
separate universities and that these new institutions would be inferior to the open universities 
and the old Fort Hare. That the children of black diplomats would be exempted from the 
provisions of university apartheid was also such an admission of inferiority. For many in the NP, 
keeping the universities white was the main thrust of their arguments justifying university 
apartheid. For the developmentalists like Verwoerd, De Wet Nel and Maree, virulent racism was 
just below the surface. If Wits and UCT were allowed to remain open and Fort Hare permitted to 
remain racially undifferentiated as far as its student body, staff accommodation and university 
governance were concerned, Verwoerd and Maree reasoned that race consciousness would be 
blunted, especially amongst the younger generation, and that people would believe that at a 
certain level of society and education apartheid was not applicable and integration was 
permitted.143 In typically eugenicist terms, Verwoerd declared that racial integration was immoral 
and would lead to the downfall of white civilisation. Carel de Wet too ‘hated racial intermingling’. 
Moreover, ‘racial purity’ was also of great concern to him. Justifying the transformation of Fort 
Hare into an exclusively Xhosa institution, De Wet alleged that the Jewish community had kept 
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itself racially pure because its members had not married out and this racial purity had allowed it 
to create the independent national Jewish state of Israel. So too then ought the white group help 
the Xhosa group to preserve its racial purity, presumably so that it too could acquire a racially 
pure Xhosa national state.144  
Joost Heystek, MP for Waterberg, went further along the racial hygiene/Nazi path than any other 
member of his party. Quoting from the early twentieth century American eugenicist, George 
Fergusson145 (the US eugenics movement directly influenced the holocaust146) and 
contemporary US educational race purists, Heystek argued that the more white a person was 
the more intelligent they were and that hence African-Americans of pure black descent had only 
sixty nine percent of the intellectual capacity of pure blood white Americans.147 It was for this 
reason Heystek claimed, that US school integration had allegedly failed. African-Americans, 
dismissed as ‘retarded’148 and lacking in ‘creative’ thinking abilities,149 supposedly held back their 
white American class-mates. Thus, each race should be given separate educational institutions 
which accorded with their ‘nature, talents, origin and potential’150 thus implicitly justifying the 
provision of inferior facilities to the black population.     
Despite some long speeches, the Opposition noted that NP MPs were on the whole reluctant to 
engage in debate. This was particularly true when Verwoerd, the main architect of the university 
bills, was absent from the Assembly,151 revealing that the NP had few moral, logical or financial 
grounds for defending what were effectively racist and authoritarian measures. 
While the NP argued for different, inferior black tribal educational university colleges and the 
racial purification of the hitherto predominantly white universities, and while the official 
Opposition rejected these plans on the basis of the erosion of what was effectively privileged 
white university autonomy and academic freedom, it was Douglas Smit, former Secretary of 
Native Affairs in the last Smuts government, who in the terms of Cape liberalism put university 
apartheid in the wider context of the increasing harshness and inhumanity of white, particularly 
Nationalist, oppression of and injustice towards the black population. Commenting on the 
expropriation of Fort Hare: ‘And this is being done under the cloak of Christian National 
Education, without any consultation with the people whose interests are at stake. No government 
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would last for one day if it dared to do any such thing to any European institution in this country. 
This is only possible in the case of people like the Bantu who have no voice in the Government 
of their country. If any protest is made by them they are condemned as agitators and sent out 
into the wilderness where their voices cannot be heard. What future is there for these people? Or 
what future is there for us Europeans while we mete out such treatment to the mass of the 
people…?’152 
The academic freedom campaign during the parliamentary debates, January - June 1959 
From the moment the bills were introduced, students from UCT staged day and night vigils 
outside parliament, often with the assistance of the Black Sash.153 Numbers swelled to such an 
extent that at one stage the protest chain extended a full mile.154 NP parliamentarians generally 
ignored the pickets, but Eric Louw, who was particularly vexed at NUSAS’s overseas campaign, 
tauntingly but inaccurately remarked ‘No Coloureds? Well well well!’155 The previous year he had 
addressed a similar question to a group of female picketers: ‘Waiting for their coloured 
boyfriends to ask them to dance?’ From February onwards, similar demonstrations and pickets 
were staged at Rhodes,156 Durban,157 and Pietermaritzburg, students at the latter holding 
banners stating ‘universities not civil service departments’ and ‘education not indoctrination’.158 A 
thousand-strong protest at Wits saw a three hundred foot chain symbolising the bondage of 
academic freedom being strung along Jan Smuts Avenue.159 SRCs and Academic Freedom 
Committees sent telegrams to Verwoerd and De Wet Nel asking them to withdraw the apartheid 
bills160 while all students were encouraged to buy postcards to be sent to the government 
conveying a similar request.161 Academic Freedom Committees organised symposia and 
lectures on university apartheid,162 convened meetings addressed by educationists and 
members of opposition parties and mounted newspaper exhibitions highlighting the historical 
development of the Extension of University Education and Fort Hare Transfer Bills and facilitated 
the publication of ‘special editions’ of the campus newspaper.163 A ten foot long banner, probably 
the largest Wits had ever produced, was strung up above the Great Hall almost obscuring its 
entrance with its pledge to fight for the restitution of academic freedom.164 Both the Wits and 
UCT SRCs invited the Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences, J.J. Serfontein to address their 
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respective student bodies and explain the bills.165 Both invitations were declined and received 
much publicity in the student and national press courtesy of NUSAS.  
NUSAS remained in close contact with the media, which played its part in the campaign. The 
introduction of a guillotine limiting the Third Reading and Committee stage of the Extension of 
University Education Bill to four and five-and-a-half hours respectively and those of the Fort Hare 
Transfer Bill to an equally restricted time frame, evoked much comment in the public press.166 
The piqued NP angrily blamed the Opposition’s obstructionism in opposing the Bill and the 
agitation from outside for the necessity of these undemocratic measures. While the NP declared 
that the black population favoured separate universities, the Cape Times ran a feature based on 
interviews with black students at UCT to prove otherwise. Contrary to what the NP was arguing 
both in and out of parliament, namely, that black students were deprived of a full university life 
because of social and sporting segregation,167 black students at UCT told the newspaper that 
the minor social disabilities which they experienced were far outweighed by the superior 
education they received at UCT which they would not exchange for a full social and sporting life 
at one of the government’s future tribal colleges.168 
NUSAS and its SRCs timed their campaigns to peak during the Second Reading of the 
Extension of University Education Bill in April. For this marathon all-night, thirty nine hour debate, 
the NUSAS president remained on hand to provide the Opposition with important information 
with which to bolster their arguments.169 As in 1957, simultaneous nationwide mass meetings 
and university assemblies presided over and attended by the chancellors, principals, councils, 
senates, convocations and SRCs of the various NUSAS-affiliated universities preceded the 
formal marches into the city centres of Cape Town, Johannesburg,170 Durban,171 
Pietermaritzburg,172 Grahamstown173 and Alice. With the passing of the Second Reading, Wits 
closed for the day after a university assembly pledged itself to the continuing defence of the 
open universities.174 Although a nationwide shutdown had been NUSAS’s intention, no other 
student body was able successfully to negotiate this.  
During the Second Reading, Rubin presided over an inter-SRC conference in Cape Town 
attended by representatives of all the NUSAS-affiliated SRCs as well as UNNE. This conference 
charted the campaign further, confidentially thrashed out plans for defying university apartheid 
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when it was implemented and tasked NUSAS with devising a logo depicting the destruction of 
academic freedom.175 A jackboot stamping on a shattered Greek column next to the words 
‘academic freedom’ was eventually displayed on all official NUSAS and some SRC stationery.176 
A public statement, which again rejected government plans to violate academic freedom and 
university autonomy and construct inferior institutions the degrees of which, it warned would not 
be accepted abroad, was issued with a plea to government to heed the protests from both within 
and without South Africa and withdraw the bills. Following this, an SRC deputation led by Rubin 
attempted to procure an interview with J.J. Serfontein, but was as unsuccessful in doing so as 
the UCT Senate and Council deputation a few weeks before.177 
The campaign overseas heated up too. At the ISC attended by Rubin in Lima, Peru, in early 
1959, a motion deprecating government plans for the open universities and Fort Hare was 
carried,178 Eric Louw dismissing this as an ‘impertinent intrusion’.179 In what prefigured the great 
demonstrations of the future Anti-Apartheid Movement, one thousand banner-waving students 
rallied outside South Africa House in London in March 1959180 while their leaders attempted 
unsuccessfully to secure an interview with South Africa’s High Commissioner. Sometime later, 
five thousand students from all parts of Britain marched through London’s West End to Hyde 
Park Corner, there to be addressed by the president of NUS.181 Dome, the Durban student 
newspaper, mentioned a ten thousand-strong London march, allegedly the largest British 
student protest since the Second World War.182 Rubin maintained close contact with many 
academic organisations and their representatives overseas. Dr W. Cook, vice-chancellor of the 
University of Exeter, was provided with up to date information on university apartheid which he 
presented to a meeting of the Association of the Universities of the British Commonwealth in 
Montreal in August 1958.183 The Committee on Science and Freedom sent Professor J.H. 
Bavinck, a Calvinist theologian from the Free University of Amsterdam, to South Africa in 1959. 
He rejected government measures out of hand, finding the degree of ‘pressure, force and 
compulsion’ inherent in the bills their most repugnant feature.184 The NP was furious at being 
shamed and betrayed by a European kinsman of their own faith but played down the significance 
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of Bavinck’s visit, De Wet Nel dismissing it as merely another NUSAS scheme, which it secretly 
was.185  
The ASB, in limbo as far as overseas recognition and affiliations were concerned (discussed in 
the previous chapter), was enraged at the scale and success of NUSAS’s international 
campaign. Following NUSAS’s distribution of a thee page letter on education, apartheid and the 
proposed university bills to student unions, universities and political and religious leaders 
overseas, the ASB’s international vice-president, Ben Pieters, accused NUSAS of committing 
high treason by dragging South Africa’s name through the mud. In a replying letter to overseas 
university principals, Pieters alleged that contrary to the testimony of NUSAS and other 
‘liberalists and leftists’, government policy was ‘humanitarian’ in the ‘long term’. However, he 
revealed his true eugenicist, crypto-Nazi baasskap colours by stating that apartheid sought ‘the 
best biological solution’ to South Africa’s problems and despite the attempts by apartheid’s 
enemies to ‘mongrelise’ the world, the ASB was convinced that the ‘white race [would] survive’ 
and would ‘refuse to be destroyed by those who believe[d] that race mixing [was] an act of the 
highest moral value’.186 These utterances received much copy in the student press,187 again 
courtesy of NUSAS. NUSAS wished to conscientise its constituency to the particularly 
dangerous and abhorrent beliefs of some in the NP camp, presumably to both thwart the 
burgeoning white co-operation movement and propel even greater numbers of students into 
denouncing university apartheid. At UCT, for example, a ‘distinct group of students’ (probably 
white – the majority of black UCT students continued to remain aloof to the campaign) who 
claimed to uphold academic non-segregation refused to march, picket and demonstrate 
ostensibly because it was ‘childish’ and would achieve nothing. However, the more likely reason 
for their passivity was so as not to alienate students at the Afrikaans-medium universities. 
Campus-based academic freedom campaigns 
With the passing of the Second Reading in April 1959, many student leaders had begun to 
concede that university apartheid would finally become a reality. Nonetheless, a united front and 
the continuing momentum of the campaign had to be maintained. Various arguments were 
employed to ensure this.  
The Wits SRC pointed out that eleven years of student protest had kept university apartheid in 
abeyance and because of that eleven more waves of black students had been able to receive a 
quality education at Wits. Saul Bastomsky (then an LP activist who was banned in 1964 for his 
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later COD activities),188 chairperson of the Academic Freedom Committee, reiterated the bravely 
optimistic words of Tobias, the initiator of the campaign in 1949 and still one of its most important 
champions, that university apartheid was a temporary setback and Wits should thus prepare for 
the day when academic freedom was restored. Bastomsky urged students to continue their 
protests even though the government paid little heed to them because Wits could not remain 
silent like the German universities which shamefully succumbed without a word to Nazi battery. 
Moreover, Bastomsky believed that Wits had a liberal tradition which should be defended and 
nurtured at all costs. To the frequently asked question, why should white students concern 
themselves with the problems of a few black students when the latter would ‘swamp them if they 
got the chance’, he answered that freedom was one and indivisible: a diminution of black rights 
meant the diminution of white rights. In a more radical vein and certainly at odds with the UP line 
in parliament, Bastomsky denounced white ‘racist’ cries of ‘swamping’ and declared that should 
Wits become a ninety percent black institution, academic merit alone would remain the sole 
determinant for admissions to the university.189  
Wits students evidently took heed of these arguments and continued to patronise protests, 
meetings and demonstrations in their numbers. But it was the unmasking of Priscilla Lefson, 
Wits’s ‘blonde police spy’, in late February 1959 that injected an additional dose of anti-
government fervour into the student body. The largest demonstration in Wits’s history at which 
students carried placards bearing the words ‘Keep Wits open, but not to spies’ followed a packed 
to overflowing meeting on academic freedom and spying addressed by Tobias.190 Lefson, a BA 
student of British colonial background, had taken over from a police spy on the statutory Wits 
SRC of 1955 (see chapter two) and was tasked with attending meetings of both NUSAS 
(including the 1958 congress) and the radical defunct Students Liberal Association, mixing with 
SRC members and university ‘communists’ and attending social functions in Johannesburg’s 
wealthy northern suburbs frequented by left-wingers and ‘ducktails’.  
Wits SRC members,  Shingler and Goldstone, together with honorary NUSAS vice-president, 
Ernie Wentzel, debriefed Lefson in a Johannesburg flat and for propaganda purposes supplied 
the Sunday Times with a recording of her confession. The furious security police raided the 
homes of the ‘interrogators’, the Wits SRC office and the NUSAS head office in Cape Town for 
the incriminating debriefing tape, but in vain.191 The tape, apparently ‘mislaid’ in the NUSAS 
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office, was only handed over192 once Shingler and Wentzel were subpoenaed under the Official 
Secrets Act. This ‘heavy handed’ action by the government,193 its aggressive refusal to admit to 
other cases of paid campus spies alleged by NUSAS and its SRCs,194 and the presence of 
security policemen at student mass meetings since as early as 1949,195 reveals the already high 
level of state surveillance and intimidation of the English-medium universities, the government’s 
paranoia of left wing campus political activity and presumably its unease too at the continued 
united front against university apartheid.   
During the run-up to university apartheid, copies of the right wing SA Observer appeared on the 
Rhodes campus carrying articles claiming, for example, that the ‘Wits spy’ was a persecuted 
heroine and that university autonomy was a subversive doctrine.196 This action was probably an 
attempt by the state and its allies to further the cause of the burgeoning white co-operation 
movement which had threatened to entirely demobilise the academic freedom campaign at 
Rhodes during the first half of 1959 (already discussed in chapter four). However, all was not lost 
for the campaign, directed in the absence of the SRC, by the Academic Freedom Committee and 
NUSAS Local Committee (one and the same thing). Anti-Nationalist, anti-Afrikaans feelings were 
running high on the campus at the time and probably fuelled support for the academic freedom 
campaign and the university-wide demonstration in March 1959, though for English supremacist 
reasons rather than principled opposition to apartheid. After a ‘busy’ night in November 1958 by 
‘Our Heritage Must Be Saved’ freedom group – probably an anti-republican grouping akin to the 
Horticulturalists and Freedom Radio in Natal - the police swooped on Jan Smuts Hall and 
confiscated ‘freedom flags’ and other paraphernalia.197   
A struggle for control of the academic freedom campaign at Durban flared up between the SRC 
and the Academic Freedom Committee, the latter headed by Local NUSAS Committee chair, 
Brian Sharpe, a militant anti-republican, who was, a couple of years later, to contemplate and 
perhaps embark on sabotage (discussed in chapters six and nine). With the support of the 
UNNE SRC, the Academic Freedom Committee decided to stage some kind of militant protest. 
In August 1958 the inherently cautious university authorities warned that a token strike or any 
other radical action which did not meet its approval would result in disciplinary action being taken 
against the organisers.198 Presumably this was because the university’s stunning victory over the 
government in retaining ownership and control of the Natal Medical School could so easily be 
reversed by untoward student action. For example, the Dean of the Medical School had already 
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sought to distance his institution from NUSAS and the overseas African Medical Students’ Trust 
Fund (AMSTF) fund-raising campaign199 and feared that a separate bill for the expropriation of 
the Medical School (like that for Fort Hare) could easily materialise in the future.200 Thus, the 
SRC shot down the recommendations of the Academic Freedom Committee, reconstituted it by 
excluding its ‘untrustworthy’ members201 including Sharpe, and pondered protest action which 
would win the support of all sections of the university.202 Informed of this decision by Sharpe and 
another member of the NUSAS Local Committee, the UNNE SRC passed a motion of censure 
on its Durban counterpart.203 This led to an open breach between the Durban SRC president, 
Anthony Tsipouras - whose contacts with the ANC and NIC NUSAS hoped to utilise - and the 
UNNE SRC and NUSAS Local Committee. Tsipouras warned that Durban might leave NUSAS 
because of the actions of the Local Committee and he himself threatened to resign his position 
on the NUSAS national executive.204  
Further dividing Natal University in the lead up to the passage of the university bills was the 
decision of UNNE and the Medical School to boycott graduation because seating would, as in 
the past, remain segregated. A furious principal, E.G. Malherbe, warned the medical students 
that their action had alienated many people hitherto sympathetic towards them and implied that 
they were playing into the government’s hands. Moreover, he accused them of ‘inflict[ing] a 
gratuitous insult’ on their greatest champion, Professor Ian Gordon, 205 who was largely 
responsible for the Natal Medical School being exempted from university apartheid provisions 
after its staff threatened to resign if they were required to work under any institution other than 
the University of Natal.206  
Despite this conflict and division, a joint march of the Durban and UNNE student bodies did take 
place. This was largely as a result of the efforts of Tsipouras, who unusually for Durban, led the 
academic freedom campaign at Natal University207 and remarkably, managed to rouse the 
Durban student body from its traditional apathy, if not conservative hostility towards ‘political’ 
activity. In ‘Stormy weather ahead’ published in Dome, an extraordinarily prescient future-cast 
aimed at goading students into action and warning them of the consequences of their silence 
and inaction in the face of government university policy, the writer predicted that by 1966 South 
Africa would be a republican police state, the tribal colleges would be closed and state 
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indoctrination textbooks would be in use at the other universities. Natal students would be tried 
for treason in 1964. By 1970, an externally assisted underground movement would be in 
operation within an environment of economic depression and mass impatience. In 1977, the first 
uprising would be crushed leading to bitter fighting by 1980. Alarmingly for Natal students, Britain 
would refuse all requests for assistance.208   
The Extension of University Education Bill was adopted by the House of Assembly on 30 April 
1959 by sixty nine votes to forty seven and then went to the Senate where, to the outrage of the 
Opposition, it was also subjected to a guillotine. The last tactic employed by NUSAS and its 
SRCs was to petition the Governor-General to withhold his signature of the Bill.209 This he 
obviously would not do, being a ceremonial government appointee, and the Extension of 
University Education Bill was signed into law on 12 June 1959. Attention was diverted to the Fort 
Hare Transfer Bill. 
Since the resignation of Clifford Dent following the closure of Fort Hare in 1955, the college was 
administered by a series of acting principals leading to somewhat directionless ad hoc decision-
making. In 1958, Professor H. Burrows, an economist from the University of Natal, took over the 
reins of Fort Hare and immediately took it in hand. The administration was streamlined and 
strengthened and new degrees in agriculture and accounting were introduced, the state refusing 
to approve the same in pharmacy and music. More students were offered places at the college 
in 1959 and, to accommodate them, a building programme was embarked on, paid for out of the 
institution’s meagre resources because the state refused any financial assistance.  
An attempt was made to enrich the cultural and social life of the student body and very 
importantly regularise the often fractious, conflictual relationship between it and the university 
authorities – the former involved in a bitter and very public nurses strike at Lovedale Hospital.210 
For this purpose, Burrows invited Coombe to Fort Hare to discuss inter alia, effective channels of 
communication between the student government and the authorities.211 Testament to the esteem 
in which Burrows held the NUSAS president and presumably believed Fort Hare students did 
too, the newly created position of Dean of Students was offered to Coombe, but because of his 
prior bursary commitments to the Natal Education Department, he was unable to take it up.  
Though not the primary aim of Burrows’ endeavours, it was hoped that these wide-ranging 
reforms and innovations would instil and project a sense of purpose, discipline and orderliness at 
Fort Hare which, along with a united front of student, staff and administration, would win Fort 
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Hare much public sympathy and deter the government from tampering with it. Given the 
accession to power of Verwoerd and the unrelenting implementation of apartheid on all aspects 
of black life, this seemed like a naively optimistic hope by late 1958. Adding to the sense of fear 
and foreboding hanging over the college was the resumption of the Treason Trial in August 1958 
in which Z.K. Matthews was a defendant212 and the requirement that all women as well as all 
hitherto undocumented males over sixteen register for reference books in nearby Port Elizabeth 
following the long delayed and long resisted implementation of the Abolition of Passes and 
Documents Act of 1952.213  
At the same time, the Fort Hare SRC was building up to an all-embracing university apartheid 
campaign in conjunction with NUSAS – Rubin having visited the campus in late July 1958214 - 
and accordingly invited the Fort Hare Council, Senate, convocation and staff to join it in a series 
of demonstrations.215 With the almost simultaneous release of the Report of the Separate 
Universities Commission and the introduction in parliament of the Extension of University 
Education Bill, the SRC under Makiwane, released a denunciation of government plans to the 
press without the required permission of the college authorities.216 The report of the Commission 
of Inquiry and the Bill which flowed from it were dismissed as ‘a grandiloquent improvement of 
the diabolical aims …of apartheid’ and by placing the new tribal colleges under the Native Affairs 
Department, would lead to a ‘more rapid development towards degradation, mental 
regimentation and slavery’. The statement concluded by warning the ‘architects of university 
apartheid’ that while they ‘cherish[ed] the illusion that this corruption will obtain at non-white 
universities, the same corruption will eventually strangle the throats of the entire population of 
South Africa’.217 An even stronger rejection by the NEUM-aligned Anti-CAD that university 
apartheid was ‘a process of wringing the necks of Non-Europeans who had any ideas in their 
head’ and that the new universities would be staffed by ‘intellectual gaolbirds since live enquiring 
minds would not submit themselves to fascism’218 indicated the degree of anger generated in the 
black community regarding government plans for the universities.  
Burrows and the ‘Senate Publications Committee’ objected to the SRC statement arguing that it 
was ‘vicious’, ‘libellous’ and ‘illiterate’ and accordingly would not allow its publication.219 They did 
however offer to help the SRC formulate a more acceptable statement but the SRC stood firm, 
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it’s stand supported by a student mass meeting.220 Mutambanengwe, an SRC member and 
leading NUSAS figure on the campus speculated (correctly) that the authorities who intended 
taking the lead in the academic freedom campaign could not countenance ‘forthright protest’ and 
thus expected the student body to simply fit in with their conservative plans.221 The following 
year another SRC denunciation of the apartheid bills was blocked by the authorities.  
Despite this disagreement, the SRC-initiated protest procession through Alice in March 1959 
won the support of Burrows and many members of the Senate. Even some of the conservative 
staff members, who in 1957 had dismissed all protest action as the agitation of their foreign-born 
LP colleagues (discussed in chapter three), participated because it ‘exhibited little of the political 
connotations’ of its predecessor.222 Moreover, the Fort Hare Lecturers Association mounted a 
very strong protest in March 1959.223 Further evidence of united university action is found in the 
inclusion of SRC president, I. Majola in the Fort Hare Council, Senate, hostel wardens’ and 
churches’ legal defence delegation to Cape Town which appeared before the parliamentary 
Select Committee of the Fort Hare Transfer Bill in May 1959.224 Basing his evidence on the 
ultimately fateful 1955 Duminy Commission Report, P.A.W. Cook of the former Native Affairs 
Department, railed (inaccurately in the opinion of Majola), that Fort Hare no longer served the 
purpose for which it was established, namely furthering the education of Xhosa-speakers, 
because the bulk of its students were coloured and Indian.225   
At the beginning of the 1959 academic year, Majola had exhorted the student body to close 
ranks as all eyes would be on it as parliament debated university apartheid. He appealed to 
students to prove that Africans, coloureds and Indians could live and work harmoniously 
together. He called on everyone to bury their political differences.226 Even the newly formed, 
exclusively Africanist PAC branch threw its support behind the academic freedom campaign227 
led by the dominant faction on the SRC, the Fort Hare ANCYL, which uniquely for an ANC 
branch at that time, had a multi-racial membership.228 Students were urged to jettison their 
prejudices and maintain contacts with other universities.229 When Rubin visited the college 
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during the Second Reading of the Extension of University Education Bill, a student mass 
meeting declared that Fort Hare stood ‘four square’ behind the national union despite some 
reservations about its limited political programme and Western foreign policy bias.230 Despite this 
student-university united front, the efforts of the parliamentary Opposition and the national and 
international campaign, the Fort Hare Transfer Bill was finally passed in August 1959. The last 
act of the student body – not likely to endear it to its soon to be new masters - was a college-
sponsored tour of the Union undertaken in July 1959 by a group of African, coloured and Indian 
students to promote inter-racial understanding and inform South Africans of Fort Hare’s 
achievements and the coming of university apartheid.231 
University autonomy and desegregation 
With university apartheid on the statute books, the Wits SRC called on its university authorities 
to abolish all campus social segregation232 and, like its UCT counterpart, formulated a new 
radical understanding of university autonomy.233 These resolutions formed the foundation of the 
new NUSAS correlated resolution on university autonomy in its South African context adopted at 
the 1959 NUSAS congress.234 The NUSAS resolution235 declared that university apartheid 
legislation was an infringement of university autonomy and the four freedoms of the university 
and that a state-aided university, claiming the right of university autonomy to deny rights to any 
community on grounds other than academic merit, would be in violation of university autonomy. 
Indicating a radicalisation of its policy regarding opposition to apartheid by not limiting this 
opposition to education alone, NUSAS committed itself to opposing not only the breach of 
autonomy implicit in university apartheid but all policy denying people their rights.236 Presumably 
to appease Rhodes and Durban, this resolution implied a rejection of the right of the closed 
universities to remain closed but unlike the more radical UCT resolution, did not explicitly say 
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so.237 The UCT SRC resolution stated that ‘autonomy was not an end in itself but a means of 
upholding…academic freedom’ and was thus ‘not an absolute concept’. Even more 
controversially, but entirely consistent with state enforced desegregation in US schools, it argued 
that ‘interference in the universities may be legitimate… if the university uses the dogma of 
autonomy to deny internal freedom or abuses its freedom by the application of non-academic 
criteria’. Only in the mid-1960s would NUSAS adopt a policy accepting state interference in 
state-funded higher educational institutions.    
Whether the SRCs and student bodies at the closed universities of Natal and Rhodes would 
adopt the NUSAS autonomy motion was uncertain. The Rhodes student body did not endorse it 
because it was unable to assemble a mass meeting quorum to do so.238 Durban however, would 
not revoke its support for university autonomy until the next decade. However, the authorities at 
the University of Natal were under increased pressure from many fronts to desegregate the 
university. In 1959, for example, the Faculty of Arts at Durban undertook an investigation into the 
racial integration of full and part-time classes on the black and white campuses. A member of the 
Durban NUSAS Local Committee intended putting a motion of support for this to the student 
body,239 but whether this happened or not, is unclear.   
South African Committee for Higher Education (SACHED) 
NUSAS began to put in place its plan to circumvent university apartheid. The South African 
Committee for Higher Education (SACHED) was secretly (it was referred to in code in NUSAS 
correspondence) set up. This distance education/tutorial college, with branches in 
Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town would provide the funding and facilities necessary for 
black matriculants to obtain the London General Certificate of Education (A-levels) enabling the 
successful to enrol for an undergraduate degree (mainly BA and BSc Economics) through the 
external arm of the University of London. Britzius Tutorial College, a private correspondence 
institution in Johannesburg was contracted to provide study material and undertake one-on-one 
tutorials, group classes requiring that SACHED be registered with the state.240 A room was 
acquired from the Anglican Church in Johannesburg which served as the SACHED common 
room and library.241  
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Presumably so that the government did not associate SACHED with NUSAS and its anti-
university apartheid political activity and thus shut the former down, NUSAS ensured that it was 
one step removed from its new creation. Together with representatives from academia, Britzius 
College and civil society bodies like the SAIRR, NUSAS served on the SACHED Committee, 
chaired by the national union’s tireless, long-time ally, Bishop Ambrose Reeves. Anne Welsh, 
Wits Economics lecturer was the administrator of SACHED and responsible for all academic and 
financial matters. Rubin through the WUS in Geneva and various student unions abroad secretly 
facilitated funding.242 Rev. John Collins, Canon of St Paul’s Cathedral and founder of Christian 
Action243 and the Treason Trial Defence Fund,244 even more clandestinely procured other 
sources of income in the UK. When the government decreed in late 1959 that no black student 
not already at the open universities in 1959 could register for the following year, NUSAS’s 
intention of flooding the universities with new black students became inoperable (only four 
Africans in 1960 received the required ministerial permission and none for medicine and 
engineering)245 and the funds accrued for this purpose (including AMSTF) were eventually 
transferred to SACHED. SACHED too was almost aborted when the state intimated in 
September 1959 that it would stoop to new levels of depravity in thwarting black educational 
advancement by banning Africans from pursuing correspondence studies. This forced NUSAS to 
blow its secrecy cover and seek permission from the Department of Bantu Education to launch 
its programme. This was ultimately granted.246  
One of SACHED’s first recruits was Thabo Mbeki, the future South African president, who was 
referred to the institution by ANC stalwart, Walter Sisulu. Mbeki’s biographer, Mark Gevisser 
claimed, presumably on the basis of Mbeki’s then understanding of the scheme, that SACHED 
‘had just been formed to train young Africans, handpicked by the ANC for future leadership’.247 
Though this statement is not entirely accurate and moreover implies that the ANC played a role 
in SACHED’s formation, Chief Albert Luthuli, banned president of the ANC, was successfully 
approached to serve alongside Reeves and the LP’s Alan Paton on the SACHED Board of 
Trustees.248 Though NUSAS was in any case seeking closer co-operation with the African and 
Indian Congresses, it presumably realised that for SACHED to succeed it had to be seen as 
legitimate amongst its potential black participants and thus Congress endorsement was 
essential. SACHED certainly did attract ANC activists, some of them expelled from the ethnic 
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universities for their political activities. SACHED thus became a kind of fall-back option for 
student activists. Moreover, the heavily politicised SACHED NUSAS branch in Johannesburg 
would push the national union much further to the left during the 1960s. 
Conclusion 
The passage of the Extension of University Education and Fort Hare Transfer Acts marked the 
closing of one era and the opening of a new one for both the NP government and NUSAS and its 
affiliates. The removal of black students from the open universities, one component of the 
Extension of University Education Act, symbolised the first phase of NP rule which was 
concerned mainly with racially separating all areas of social and political interaction.249 Because 
the NP was divided over the meaning of apartheid, was insecure in office with limited control 
over many areas of political and economic governance, and was faced with intensifying black 
resistance to its rule, apartheid laws were not always immediately implemented and enforced,250 
or, as in the case of the universities, enacted.  
The eleven year history of the Extension of University Education Act is marked by initial 
government reluctance to intervene in the universities and a preference firstly, for utilising 
administrative measures to remove black students from the open universities and secondly, 
shaping public opinion to press the university authorities to racially segregate their campuses. 
The Holloway Commission plumped for simply congregating African students at the existing 
black universities and leaving coloured students where they were. The increasing power of the 
Department of Native Affairs (a government within a government) ensured that its proposals for 
five black ethnic university colleges, rejected by the Holloway Commission as impractical and too 
expensive, were the terms of reference of the 1955-6 Interdepartmental (Van der Walt) 
Commission and together with the removal of black students from the open universities, the key 
features of the Separate Universities Bill introduced in 1957. The tremendous civil society 
opposition to this Bill and reservations within the NP camp about inter alia, its authoritarian 
measures resulted in its being relegated to a parliamentary Select Committee where out of the 
public eye its potential for scuppering the government’s 1958 electoral ambitions was minimised 
and where it would acquire a measure of legitimacy through the employment of democratic 
public participation procedures.  
The final enactment of the Extension of University Education and Fort Hare Transfer Bills 
marked the shift to grand apartheid and the adoption of ‘multi-nationalism’ premised on the 
fallacy that South Africa was not one nation but a geographical unit composed of multiple 
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separate primordial ethnic groups and nations-in-the-making. This shift is marked by the 
assumption of power of Verwoerd and his Department of Native Affairs ideologues and the 
enactment of the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act of 1959. These policy shifts were 
responses to the triple challenges faced by the NP state namely, the anti-colonial African 
independence movement, the continued failure of the government to stamp out resistance and 
impose control over the black majority and lastly, international condemnation of apartheid.251 The 
new ethnic universities under the authoritarian control of their separate white and apprenticeship 
black governing structures would play a developmental role in the eventually self-governing 
ethnic territories in which they were situated. Moreover, the establishment of state universities 
and the expropriation of Fort Hare, marked an extension of Bantu Education into higher 
education, the elimination of missionary education and the liberal, Western, middle class values 
it propounded and the assumption of direct control and indoctrination. 
The transition to a new era is discernible too in the changing party political landscape. With 
increasingly repressive security measures and its leadership crippled by the ongoing Treason 
Trial, the ANC began to deliberate its future tactics and direction. The consumer boycott weapon 
which directly targeted white political and economic interests was utilised to considerable effect 
during the Nationalist produce and potato boycotts.  
Under the influence of its majority black membership and its increasingly radicalised younger 
white members, many of the latter recent university graduates with ties to NUSAS, the LP 
radicalised too. It sought closer co-operation with the ANC and NIC after 1956 and began to toy 
with new, extra-parliamentary methods of struggle. Like the ANC and its Congress Alliance 
affiliates, the LP attended the historic All-African Peoples Conference in Accra in December 
1958252 where participants, representatives of anti-colonial organisations, mapped out the 
course for ridding Africa of colonialism and imperialism and committed themselves both to Pan-
African unity and assisting one another to freedom and independence. Particular attention was 
paid to the problems faced by those confronting the white minority regimes of Southern Africa.253  
Despite its radicalisation, the LP’s anti-communism remained unchanged. Largely for this 
reason, many LP members sided with the stridently anti-communist, racially exclusive African 
nationalist PAC which emerged shortly after the Accra conference, rather than the racially 
inclusive ANC and Congress Alliance whose multi-racialism was unique on the African 
continent254 but viewed with suspicion by some Africanist participants at Accra. Nevertheless, 
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the LP endorsed the overseas economic boycott of South African goods initiated by the ANC 
and Patrick van Rensburg, a member of the LP, in 1959. This precipitated the exit of much of the 
more conservative, often older LP membership,255 a process already begun in 1958 when the 
party’s African members rejected the protection of minority group rights in the constitution of the 
ostensibly non-racial LP.256  
Some of these former LP members found a new political home in the Progressive Party (PP),257 
founded by liberal, former UP members whose exit from the party was precipitated by the right 
wing’s racist denunciation of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act and its refusal to 
countenance any further alienation of white land required to consolidate the reserves and the 
future ethnic states. The PP endorsed a common society, a bill of rights and a qualified 
franchise258 and thus its policy differed little from that of the LP at its inception in 1953. With the 
advantage of representation in parliament, the PP appeared to be a more viable vehicle for 
political change than the LP and came to be the party to which a significant number of white 
students at the NUSAS-affiliated campuses identified, making it a new political force in student 
politics in the 1960s. The ever-radicalising LP, shorn of its more conservative wing, was the 
party of choice for radical student activists in the new era unfolding after the legislation of 
university apartheid.  
With the tribal universities set apart in remote, isolated parts of South Africa and under the direct 
control of apparatchiks hostile to multi-racial contact, the likelihood of these students 
participating in NUSAS forums was slim. Already, the Department of Native Affairs-appointed 
principal of the Bantu Normal College in Pretoria (to be incorporated into the new Transvaal 
ethnic college) had proscribed NUSAS at the college. Thus, NUSAS’s function as a non-racial 
forum was in danger of becoming redundant. For Tobias, the closing of the open universities and 
the curtailment of the ‘beautific experience’ of ‘living...a non-segregated existence’ led to 
thoughts of suicide.259 For the current student leaders of the academic freedom campaign, their 
failure to prevent university apartheid precipitated their further radicalisation. All pretence of 
upholding university autonomy and the right to segregate was dropped and a determined effort 
made to desegregate what remained of the open universities. Moreover, government plans for 
the open universities and tribal colleges would be sabotaged by flooding the former with black 
students and making the latter unworkable and even ungovernable (discussed in chapter seven). 
Ultimately, some of this student leadership would come to the conclusion that the only way to 
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bring about fundamental political change in South Africa would be by illegal underground activity 
and the adoption of violence and sabotage (discussed in chapter nine). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Sharpeville and the radicalisation of NUSAS policy, 1960-1962 
Introduction 
Sharpeville was a watershed in South African history and also for NUSAS. Coming so soon after the 
climax and ultimate failure of the campaign against university apartheid, Sharpeville was the catalyst 
for the increasing radicalisation of NUSAS’s policy and leadership. It was also the catalyst for 
NUSAS’s attempts to carve a meaningful activist role for itself in the struggle to rid South Africa of 
apartheid, an apartheid, moreover, which in the wake of Sharpeville was bolstered by a security 
state displaying alarming tendencies towards totalitarianism. South Africans across the political 
spectrum, including some within the NP, realised that a new racially inclusive political dispensation 
was a necessity. NUSAS, like many other organisations and individuals, called for the summoning of 
a new national convention more inclusive than that of 1908 which had brought the Union of South 
Africa into existence, an event celebrated during the Union festival of April-May1960. Though a 
national convention or ‘consultation’ was endorsed by the student bodies which made up NUSAS, 
the understanding of what constituted a new political dispensation was interpreted by much of 
NUSAS’s large white membership to mean white unity on the basis of a ‘just’ policy towards the 
black majority. Sharpeville thus spawned a significant white student co-operation movement driven 
by leading figures at both the NUSAS- and ASB-affiliated universities. This posed a threat to 
NUSAS’s hegemony. The white co-operation movement together with the growing conservatism of 
many white English-speakers in the aftermath of Sharpeville, reflected in the electoral gains of the 
NP during the 1961 general election, widened the gap between NUSAS’s radicalising leadership and 
its mass student membership. Shortly before Sharpeville, NUSAS took a short, sharp, temporary turn 
to the right as it desperately attempted to extricate itself from the UK-based economic boycott of 
South African goods.  
Economic Boycott of South African goods 
One of the most controversial issues to face NUSAS in the immediate aftermath of the passage of 
the Extension of University Education and Fort Hare Transfer Acts was the economic boycott of 
South Africa. In May 1959, the ANC had called for a boycott of certain goods in South Africa (already 
discussed), which many student leaders in their personal capacities had endorsed as one of the few 
remaining avenues open for peaceful protest. A similar campaign was launched in Britain in June 
1959 by the UK-based Anglophone student organisation, the Committee of African Organisations 
(CAO), to which the radical SACP-aligned and largely anti-NUSAS South African Students 
Association (SASA) (transformed in 1958 into the South African Freedom Association) was 
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affiliated.1 However, responsibility for the launch of the second UK boycott was undertaken by former 
Fort Hare SRC president and ANC stalwart, Tennyson Makiwane and without the unanimous 
backing of the party in South Africa, Patrick van Rensburg of the South African Liberal Party.2 
This campaign rapidly gathered momentum in Britain winning the support of the British Labour Party, 
individual members of the Liberal and Conservative Parties, the trade unions and the student 
movement.3 To the horror and mystification of NUSAS office bearers who were wholly ignorant of 
these developments, reports began appearing in the South African press in late November 1959 
alleging that NUSAS had initiated the boycott as a protest against university apartheid. Accordingly 
NUS had voted to mount a boycott of all South African products appearing on a ‘list’ compiled by 
NUSAS for this purpose.4 From the beginning NUSAS suspected that SASA or other ‘Reds’ were 
behind the NUS decision,5 presumably because these groups wished to harness the highly effective 
academic freedom campaign machinery to the sanctions campaign. Without any facts at its disposal, 
NUSAS nonetheless denied any knowledge of or involvement in the boycott movement and stated 
that while opposed to apartheid, ‘partisan’ political issues were outside its sphere of activities.6 To 
make matters worse, this statement was distorted by the South African press, NUSAS being 
reported as expressing its opposition to the boycott.7 This placed NUSAS in the conservative anti-
sanctions, pro-government camp and thus at risk of alienating its current, and hoped for future, 
radical black membership. A statement issued overseas could be similarly misconstrued.8 Moreover, 
NUSAS felt that it could not easily dissociate itself from the overseas boycott as it had become such 
a powerful force abroad, but at the same time could not possibly risk endorsing it either.9 In addition, 
only the student assembly, which presumably would be difficult to summon during the long 
December university vacation, could take such a decision. NUSAS thus decided to remain silent until 
it had more information at its disposal10 or preferably, until the issue had died down making further 
statements unnecessary.11  
The issue did not go away.12 The NUS boycott provided the government and its press an excellent 
stick with which to beat NUSAS, which they did to great effect.13 Eric Louw again entered the fray. 
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With the probable assistance of the ASB,14 Louw reiterated his accusation made after the Pan 
African Students Conference (see chapter four) that the communist and unpatriotic NUSAS had 
instigated the overseas economic boycott just as it had the anti-university apartheid campaign. 
Presumably because of the close link between the boycott movement and the Congresses and the 
highly effective international arm of the university apartheid campaign, this barb hit home and placed 
NUSAS on the defensive. NUSAS considered suing Louw for defamation in accordance with recent 
NUSAS policy regarding ‘communist’ allegations,15 but even though its case was strong,16 decided 
that this was too politically risky as ‘too many skeletons could be dragged out of the cupboard’ in the 
process.17 It also considered inserting a clause in the NUSAS constitution rejecting all totalitarianism 
in education, whether fascist or communist.18 This was an extraordinarily defensive and capitulary 
reaction which would have shifted NUSAS distinctly to the right and redefined it as an ‘anti-
communist’ rather than a ‘non-communist’ organisation.  
In the event, the constitution was not amended as not everyone was in favour of doing so.19 
Moreover, some believed that the issue of communism was separate to that of the boycott.20 With 
time running out and with potentially dangerous consequences for NUSAS, John Shingler, the new 
NUSAS president, decided to act decisively and respond to Louw.21 Shingler realised that early in 
the new year student cafeterias around Britain would commence the implementation of the NUS 
boycott according to the so-called NUSAS list, severely denting NUSAS’s public image in South 
Africa in the process. Failure to extricate itself from the boycott would result in NUSAS forfeiting the 
support of its more conservative students which it desperately needed to retain, were it to host its 
proposed multi-racial youth conference and, more controversially, embark on an academic freedom 
campaign at the newly opened black ethnic colleges. Moreover, the government and UP could use 
the boycott issue to great effect against NUSAS when parliament re-opened in January.22 Further, 
the original damage control plan was considered unfeasible.23 This entailed contacting individually all 
one hundred and eighty three NUS affiliates and confidentially informing them that it was too 
dangerous for NUSAS to endorse something as politically explosive as a boycott, either locally or 
abroad, without jeopardising its other anti-apartheid work in South Africa.24 Ultimately NUSAS went 
on the offensive in its ‘open letter’ response to Louw. It denied initiating the boycott, stated its 
unapologetic opposition to apartheid and in a long catalogue of human rights violations perpetrated 
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by the government in pursuit of educational apartheid, created the impression that the government 
had only itself to blame for the invidious international position in which South Africa found itself.25 
After this letter had been dispatched, NUSAS discovered the source of its problems. In November 
1959, NUS had overwhelmingly adopted a resolution endorsing the boycott and assuming that, on 
the basis of its anti-university apartheid campaign, NUSAS would not oppose such a stance, added 
‘a vague reference to NUSAS and university apartheid’.26 However, a communist student at London 
University seeking to embarrass and compromise both NUSAS and NUS had inserted into the 
boycott resolution a clause that it should be prosecuted according to the ‘NUSAS list’, an entirely 
fictitious artefact.27   
At its annual congress in July 1960, NUSAS had again to reiterate to students at Rhodes, already 
critical of NUSAS and intent on pursuing white co-operation outside NUSAS, that it had neither 
compiled a boycott list nor disseminated such a list.28 In addition, the Durban delegation proposed a 
resolution ratifying Shingler’s ‘open letter’ to Louw in which he had stated that NUSAS was anti-
communist. This was ultimately withdrawn in favour of another which made no reference to anti-
communism and threatened legal action against anyone defaming the national union.29 There were 
other consequences of the ‘boycott affair’. Dr J.P. Duminy, principal of UCT, declined a vice-
presidency of NUSAS - an honorary position customarily accorded to and accepted by all the 
principals of NUSAS-affiliated centres - ostensibly because of the national union’s role in the 
university apartheid campaign,30 but also the Afrikaans press averred, because of the sanctions 
campaign. NUSAS remained fearful of identifying itself with the boycott and feared too that radical 
black students might in the future persuade NUSAS to do so. This, it realised, it would be morally 
obliged to do but as a consequence, NUSAS would fissure,31 a situation already discernible in the 
LP, the political home of the NUSAS leadership.    
Ernie Wentzel, a leading LP member, argued that his party’s endorsement of the sanctions 
campaign marked its turning point. The LP, hitherto a moderate party committed to constitutional 
change, shifted in the aftermath of the sanctions debate to one ‘groping towards participation in 
mainstream black power politics’.32 For NUSAS, the boycott movement could not be considered a 
turning point and certainly not a progressive one. NUSAS had been involuntarily drawn into the 
boycott, had refused to take any stand, and considered an anti-communist constitutional 
amendment. The boycott issue served to expose the vulnerability and impotence of the national 
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union in the face of challenges outside its limited educational and non-party political framework. In 
terms of tactics, NUSAS had already partially abandoned constitutionalism by adopting the weapons 
of struggle associated with the radical liberation movements and was also hesitantly co-operating 
with the Congress youth leagues in the hosting of a multi-racial youth conference as a prelude to 
establishing a national youth organisation affiliated to the World Assembly of Youth.33 However, it 
was the events and consequences of Sharpeville that marked the turning point in NUSAS. The 
national union realised that its limited political programme was no longer sustainable or justifiable 
and thus despite its conservative white student base, it finally jettisoned its ‘students-as-such’ 
position allowing it the freedom to dip its feet into what remained of mainstream black politics.  
Sharpeville 
Shortly after the official launch of the boycott movement in the UK, Harold MacMillan, the British 
Conservative Party prime minister, arrived in South Africa on the last leg of his tour of Britain’s 
current and former African colonial possessions. In a speech to the South African parliament in Cape 
Town in February 1960, MacMillan signaled his government’s assent to African nationalism and the 
rapid decolonisation taking place on the continent by stating that a ‘wind of change’ was blowing 
over Africa. As importantly, he politely warned that Britain would withdraw its support for South Africa 
(though he rejected the economic boycott) because it found aspects of the country’s policies 
repugnant and blowing against the spirit of the times.34 Further, he hoped that South Africa would 
grant individual rights to its black population and ‘share power in society on the basis of individual 
merit alone’.35 Six weeks later there occurred the events which came to be known as Sharpeville. 
For a short time it appeared that South Africa would follow the rest of Africa and embark on 
fundamental change. As with the boycott movement, NUSAS was drawn into it, but in this instance, 
was fundamentally changed by it. 
During 1959, both the ANC and PAC laid the foundations for their separate campaigns to rid South 
Africa of the hated pass laws. The ANC’s was to assume on 31 March 1960 and culminate on 31 
May 1960, the latter coinciding with the government’s Union Festival commemorating fifty years of 
South African independence. Through the employment of the militant tactics of the ANCYL’s 
Programme of Action and the Defiance Campaign, the PAC aimed to effect the abolition of the pass 
laws and the implementation of a minimum wage as a prelude to securing the final liberation of 
South Africa by 1963. Thus Africans were urged by the PAC to court arrest by peacefully presenting 
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themselves passless at government offices and police stations on 21 March 1960.36 Areas with large 
concentrations of migrant workers and where the pass laws were even more zealously applied than 
elsewhere, like in Vereeniging on the Witwatersrand (the scene of the recent Colebrook colliery 
accident), and in the Cape Town townships of Langa and Nyanga (where the Coloured Labour 
Preference policy was in effect), responded to the PAC’s call.37 A peaceful crowd of seven thousand 
pass protesters gathered outside the Sharpeville (Vereeniging) police station was shot at by the 
police, killing sixty nine people. This cold blooded massacre was repeated later that night on a 
smaller scale at a six thousand-strong rally in Langa.38 Against the background of general police 
harassment, the people of Vereeniging mourned their dead with a week-long general strike while the 
Cape Town townships moved to a position of near insurrection.  
Students were drawn into these events, mostly involuntarily, many of them being exposed for the 
first time to the demands of the black majority and the methods by which these demands would be 
attained. On 24 March 1960, meetings were banned for three months.39 Rhodes students 
demonstrated against this, walking three abreast to the cathedral to avoid constituting a march40 
while six hundred Natal students registered their opposition to this in a pre-dawn march through the 
streets of Pietermaritzburg.41 NUSAS obliquely supported these protests, stating publicly that ‘the 
actions of the students flowed directly from the actions of the government’.42 On 25 March, Philip 
Kgosana, a UCT student and the Cape Town leader of the PAC, led a demonstration outside the 
Caledon Square police station, and with LP intervention, was instrumental in having the pass laws in 
the Cape suspended. This suspension was extended to the rest of the country the following day. 
Albert Luthuli publicly burned his pass and called on others to do the same. In an attempt to win 
back the ground lost to the PAC, Luthuli called for a stay-away on 28 March to mourn those killed the 
previous week. Hundreds of thousands heeded his call, presaging a protracted strike and the biggest 
work-stoppage in South Africa’s history, seriously inconveniencing and frightening whites.43 Some 
UCT students responded by scabbing at the dairies, docks and fish factories44 which had come to a 
standstill. A few of their progressive counterparts joined the LP and the COD in transporting food to 
the townships.45 Four UCT students, including the independent Marxist, Hillel Ticktin, were arrested 
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for distributing stay-away handbills in the townships.46 A two hundred-strong mass meeting at UCT, 
convened by NUSAS and LP stalwarts, Neville Rubin, Adrian Leftwich and Kenney Parker discussed 
the arrests. Students were warned that they ‘could no longer consider themselves to be aloof from 
the struggle’ in that they would ‘have to choose sides’ and ‘those who are not with us are against 
us’.47 Following the LP, the UCT student body decided to contribute to a fund to help families whose 
relatives had been shot at Sharpeville and Langa.48  
By this time there was a sense that the government had lost its bearings and self-confidence, that 
the initiative had moved to the black majority and that white supremacy could come to an end.49 On 
30 March, Kgosana led a march of ten thousand people from Langa to the centre of Cape Town,50 
cutting through the UCT campus on the way. Lectures were cancelled by the university authorities 
and students urged to take precautions.51 By the end of the day a draconian state of emergency had 
been declared over most of the country which restricted meetings and the press, imposed a curfew 
and suspended habeas corpus. Thousands of activists from the PAC, the Congresses and the LP 
were detained,52 including Wentzel. Pietermaritzburg students protested against the detention of 
their academic staff while the Wits authorities banned all meetings of a political nature including one 
to be addressed by Shingler.53 The Rhodes Senate censored the student newspaper, Rhodeo, in 
compliance with the press restrictions54 but in one case, the Rhodeo editor blacked out all the 
offending text rather than remove it altogether in protest against the state of emergency.55 These 
events marked the end of student protest for at least a month. From April a steel cordon of the army, 
navy and police surrounded the Cape Town townships56 and like other whites around the country, 
UCT students were called up for emergency army duty by the Active Citizen Force. The UCT SRC 
obtained concessions for those affected,57 presumably because the SRC disapproved of this 
conscription.58 On 7 April 1960, the pass laws were re-imposed and on 8 April 1960, parliament 
passed legislation outlawing the ANC and PAC, the only opposition to this second measure coming 
from the PP. The following day, a near fatal assassination attempt was made on Verwoerd while he 
was opening the Rand Easter Show in Johannesburg. The events of Sharpeville shook white South 
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Africa to its core. Capital flowed out of the country59 and many English-speaking whites made 
preparatory plans to emigrate.60          
Student leaders acted cautiously, if at all, during the initial stages of the state of emergency. This 
was because the emergency regulations were so all-encompassing that any action could be deemed 
illegal. In addition, the university authorities imposed their own clampdowns. There was also a dearth 
of information as only LP publications dared defy the media restrictions while the Congress press 
(New Age) ceased publication, its staff in detention. Thus the government’s propaganda that 
communist agitation was behind the events of Sharpeville, a view enthusiastically endorsed by the 
UP, held sway.61 Tom Lodge argued that by the end of the 1950s radical whites were ‘infected… 
with a sense of crisis and of imminent change’.62 This was certainly true of many students63 but in 
the case of the NUSAS leadership, this sense of crisis became a sense of paralysis immediately 
after the imposition of the state of emergency. Shingler admitted that he did not fight the Wits 
principal’s proscription of meetings on campus because of the general crisis of the times, but in 
retrospect believed that this was not the right approach.64 Communications with the outside world 
also broke down during the state of emergency. This resulted in COSEC issuing a statement on the 
situation in South Africa, assuming, as in the NUS-economic boycott issue, that this would meet 
NUSAS’s approval. It did not, because of the emergency restrictions. Overseas student 
organisations were puzzled by NUSAS’s reticence and caution regarding such an important event 
that had reverberated around the world.65 It was only in June 1960, following the actions of some of 
its SRCs and the softening of some of the emergency restrictions, that NUSAS called for the lifting of 
the state of emergency as it abrogated fundamental human rights and the ideals of a university and 
had a negative effect on education.66 Nonetheless, the NUSAS president was concerned that this 
statement was ‘too far ahead of the conservative SRCs’67 which did nonetheless unanimously ratify it 
at the July congress.    
Passing a resolution on the state of emergency led to further conflict within already divided student 
bodies and SRCs. Some student leaders wished to take a stand while others urged caution. Dawn 
Levy, the radical chairperson of the NUSAS Local Committee, together with Hillel Ticktin, walked out 
of a UCT SRC meeting when that body would pass only a watered down version of their much 
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stronger motion deploring the disappearance of students detained without trial.68 However, some 
weeks later the SRC, far from unanimously, did pass a Ticktin-Levy motion calling on the 
government to end the state of emergency and release or charge detainees.69 This was probably to 
pre-empt the adoption of a far more radical resolution on the emergency to be put before a student 
mass meeting by a progressive united front formed for this purpose, which included a call on the 
government to accede to the demands of the people of South Africa for freedom.70 
At Wits the SRC seemed both paralysed by personal conflict between its members and afraid of 
taking a stand.71 Leadership and decisive action thus passed to a loosely united group of left wing 
and, the NUSAS president suspected, ‘non-communist’72 factions, working under a cloak of secrecy 
and suspicious of the SRC.73 This appeared to be an embryonic united front of radical liberals, 
independent Marxists, the NEUM and the COD. Such a multi-ideological front - in the form of 
electoral ‘tickets’74 and the Students’ Fellowship Society75- had already taken shape in 1959 to fight 
campus social segregation. This ‘front’ then was responsible for a four hundred-strong illegal march 
to the Johannesburg Fort in May 1960 to demand the charge or release of those students and staff 
incarcerated there. The event was punctuated by ugly confrontations with state authorities and those 
disapproving of the protest76 while the follow-up meeting was disrupted by ‘rowdies’, probably 
augmented by outsiders who hurled racial insults at the protest organisers.77 Two weeks later, the 
illegal march to the Fort was repeated, resulting in the arrest of six participants. An anti-arrest sit-
down strike on the Wits campus came to an abrupt end when the participants were physically 
attacked by tomato-throwing counter-demonstrators.78  
In the meantime, the detainees embarked on a hunger strike. This became the vehicle for an 
embryonic united front, like at Wits, emerging at UCT. Following an address by the LP’s Patrick 
Duncan - a prominent role player in the Cape anti-pass campaign and confidante of Philip Kgosana - 
the radical Students Fellowship Society and surprisingly, the non-political YMCA embarked on a 
hunger strike in sympathy with the detainees. They were joined by two hundred students, including 
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the president of NUSAS.79 Liberals, among others, were very keen to foster such student unity, but a 
UCT united front failed to consolidate before the lifting of the emergency. NUSAS, however, saw the 
need for a progressive pressure group on the campus which would further the NUSAS (and LP) 
agenda and thus, from behind the scenes, was instrumental in the establishment of the UCT Radical 
Society.80 NUSAS and campus Liberal opinion coincided with that of the national LP. In an effort to 
fill the political vacuum left by the banning of the liberation movements, the LP considered 
establishing a new political organisation, but Luthuli was not interested.81  
Sharpeville and the state of emergency led to a deterioration in relations between students and 
university authorities. One reason for this was that the English-medium universities were put under 
increased pressure from the government to eliminate the supposedly fertile political environment 
which allegedly nurtured Sharpeville. NUSAS feared then that prospective staff and students might 
in the future be subjected to state-imposed ideological screening.82 In May 1960, Albert Hertzog, the 
far-right wing Minister of Posts and Telecommunications accused the English-medium universities of 
‘sharpening the spears’ which would ‘stab’ ‘white South Africa in the back’,83 presumably a reference 
to Philip Kgosana at UCT and Robert Sobukwe at Wits. Though the principal of UCT angrily 
denounced Hertzog’s accusations,84 the UCT authorities, like those at Wits, co-operated to a degree 
with the government.85 Thus, the ban on meetings at Wits was retained86 even after the state had 
eased its restrictions on gatherings, while the authorities at UCT were allegedly responsible for the 
presence of the security police at the mass meeting called to protest the state of emergency.87 At 
Pietermaritzburg, E.G. Malherbe forbade the SRC and Academic Freedom Committee to picket the 
university’s ‘Open Day’ alleging that the police had threatened to arrest all protesters and that 
demonstrations would jeopardise his negotiations with the government regarding the release of the 
University of Natal detainees.88 
Other incidents at Wits and Pietermaritzburg suggest a conservative backlash, aided and abetted by 
government supporters and/or agents of the state pursuing their own agendas. The Broederbond 
was actively championing the creation of Afrikaans-medium/Nationalist institutions in various parts of 
the country. The first steps towards the establishment of an Afrikaans university on the Rand came 
with the announcement in 1960 that the Goudstad Teachers Training College would open its doors 
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in Johannesburg in 1961.89 The Broederbond continued its campaign begun in 1957 to keep Rhodes 
out of Port Elizabeth, while in Natal it later came to light that from a base in the Agriculture Faculty, 
the Broederbond intended transforming Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Training Colleges into 
Nationalist institutions. In order to justify expensive new universities, the impression had to be 
created - with the assistance of agents provocateurs - that the English universities discriminated 
against Afrikaners (as witnessed at Wits and Rhodes in 1957) and with their radicalism and 
lawlessness were hostile to Afrikaner values. Thus, the night before the proposed ‘Open Day’ picket 
was to have taken place at Pietermaritzburg, the SRC’s offices were burgled, presumably to 
sabotage the picket. At Wits it was believed that government supporters, unable to muster sufficient 
support on the campus for their cause, infiltrated the ‘rowdies’ or the ‘engineers’ leading to 
increasing violence at student mass meetings. The ‘engineers’ were traditionally anti-authority and 
known for their disruption of meetings, but they were considered UP-orientated and anti-NP.90 
How did NUSAS view its future in the light of the state of emergency, the banning of the liberation 
movements, the mass detentions and Hertzog’s attack on the ‘open’ universities? In early May, 
NUSAS feared that if the emergency persisted, the national union would be banned. Thus the 
leadership began putting in place contingency plans with regard to its files, avenues of outside 
communication and new campus-based structures.91 However, in the event of NUSAS avoiding 
proscription and the state of emergency being lifted, it was felt that in light of the changed political 
environment, NUSAS needed to widen its sphere of activities and move in a more radical direction. A 
number of options were deliberated. Firstly, it considered drawing up an open letter to Verwoerd 
stating in ‘unequivocal terms’ NUSAS’s belief in a non-racial society and the role of the youth in 
preparing for such an entity.92 Secondly, NUSAS could adopt a resolution based on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights calling for a ‘national convention of all races and groups in South Africa 
to consider a way out of the present impasse’. This could ‘capitalise on the vacuum caused by the 
lifting of the state of emergency and…serve as a means of broadening NUSAS’s sphere of activity’. 
Thirdly, it could make new attempts at convening a multi-racial youth conference which would bring 
NUSAS into contact with groups on the left and the right.93 By the middle of May, Shingler had 
decided that although NUSAS remained high on the government’s shortlist, it represented no threat 
to it and thus would remain untouched.94 Thus NUSAS went ahead with its three plans. 
The multi-racial youth conference already planned for May 1960 had to be abandoned due to the 
proscription of the ANC and the detention of many of its organisers, including Wentzel.95 This 
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mooted conference was controversial firstly, because it moved NUSAS into uncharted territory in 
hosting the event with the ANCYL and the SAIYC and secondly, because it was scheduled for 31 
May 1960, the climax of the NP-inspired festival celebrating fifty years of the Union of South Africa. 
The Congresses boycotted this festival,96 a series of events aimed primarily at forging white unity, 
while NUSAS and its SRCs, being non-political, took no stand on the matter.97 Staging the multi-
racial conference on Union Day then, also the date of a government-sponsored youth festival in 
Bloemfontein, would thus be construed as a deliberately defiant protest gesture and an endorsement 
of the boycott. NUSAS thus made it clear to the Youth Congresses that its reluctant agreement to 
this was based on the understanding that the date of the conference was ‘coincidental’ and so 
devoid of any political significance.98  
NUSAS did not however, remain aloof from protests against apartheid mounted on Union Day. At a 
conference hosted by De Blank in November 1959, representatives from a variety of organisations, 
including the ANC, LP, the Civil Rights League and NUSAS concluded that after fifty years of Union, 
South Africa was still plagued by poverty and injustice.99 Accordingly, a ‘Continuation Committee’ on 
which NUSAS served, made arrangements for a march followed by a ‘dedication ceremony’ pledging 
participants to work for the improvement of wages, the extension of human and civil rights to all and, 
significantly for NUSAS, undertake to convene a new representative national convention.100 On 31 
May 1960 Van der Sandt Centilivres together with various dignitaries, connected to the LP and ANC 
led the ‘dedication march’ through the streets of Cape Town, eliciting much student support.101 Thus 
the ground had already been prepared for the calling of a national convention, but NUSAS realised 
that it faced serious obstacles from the student assembly in adopting such a policy.102  
White fears precipitated by Sharpeville drove not only a white conservative campus backlash but 
also a renewed white co-operation movement. This was spearheaded by the SRCs of 
Pietermaritzburg and Rhodes103 as well as Hennie van der Walt, the president of both the 
Potchefstroom SRC and the ASB (jailed for embezzlement in 1988 after serving as Deputy Minister 
of Co-operation and Development104). Van der Walt was so desperate to secure national student co-
operation that he had accepted the customary invitation extended to the ASB-affiliated SRCs to 
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attend the annual NUSAS congress,105 much to the NUSAS president’s private regret. He feared that 
the presence of Van der Walt – a likeable character - would fuel the white co-operation movement, 
pushing the student assembly to the right and thus less amenable to endorsing the radical proposals 
to be put before it.106 Ultimately a setback in the white co-operation movement resulted in Van der 
Walt changing his mind about attending the NUSAS congress (discussed later) and, moreover, the 
national convention issue was shelved until more propitious circumstances prevailed. 
The 1960 NUSAS Congress and conflict between the liberal and radical left 
The 1960 congress, which took place despite the state of emergency restrictions, was well-attended 
(though a training college delegate declined her invitation to be present because of the supposed 
danger entailed107) and did not shirk from discussing political issues. It concerned itself with a 
proactive policy towards the new ethnic colleges, in particular at Fort Hare (discussed in chapter 
seven) and in the context of both the national and international student co-operation movement, 
became embroiled in long and divisive ideological conflict over contact with East European student 
organisations108 and the ASB. Because of its hostile and unco-operative attitude towards NUSAS 
and its active championing of university apartheid, the majority of Wits delegates (led by Justin Joffe) 
unsuccessfully proposed that NUSAS cease any further attempts at contact or co-operation with the 
ASB.109 Moreover, they refused to ratify an earlier decision of the NUSAS executive declining an 
invitation to participate in a Metallurgy and Geology seminar hosted by the Polish national student 
union.110  
These conflicts resumed on the Wits campus after congress. In an article that a NUSAS executive 
member considered ‘vitriolic’ and anti-NUSAS,111 Joffe, in an evaluation of the recent NUSAS 
congress in Wits Student, concluded that Wits was out of sync with NUSAS policy and predicted its 
further loss of power and influence in the national union.112 With the active involvement of the 
NUSAS executive members on the Wits SRC,113 who had earlier expressed concern at the potential 
damage Joffe could cause at the NUSAS congress,114 Joffe was relieved of his position on the 
editorial board of Wits Student.  Five SRC members who endorsed Joffe’s views of the NUSAS 
congress115 (some of whom were members of the COD116) resigned in protest at the authoritarian 
                                                          
105 Die Wapad, 11.5.1960. 
106 BC 586 A2.1, John Shingler to Laurie Geffen, 24.5.1960. 
107 ibid., 20.5.1960, p. 4. 
108 BC 586 B1 Congress Minutes, ‘Report of the International Relations Commission’, ‘Appendix 5’, pp. 93-94.  
109 BC 586 B1 Congress Minutes 1960, pp. 16-17; Dome, August 1960; Rhodeo vol. 14 no. 4, 26.8.1960; 
Witwatersrand Student vol. 12 no. 11, 2.8.1960.  
110 BC 586 B1 Congress Minutes 1960, p. 51; Witwatersrand Student vol. 12 no. 11, 2.8.1960. 
111 BC 586 A2.1, Hugh Lewin to Ros (Traub), 7.8.1960. 
112 Witwatersrand Student vol. 12 no. 11, 2.8.1960.  
113 BC 586 A2.2, Laurie Geffen to Ros (Traub) nd. (‘9pm Friday Just out of Nairobi’).  
114 BC 586 A2.1, John Shingler to Laurie Geffen, 22.6.1960, p. 2.   
115 Witwatersrand Student vol. 12 no. 12, 9.8.1960; no. 14, 24.8.1960; B. Blecher, S. Bastomsky, M. Wade, H Barolsky to 
Varsity vol. 19 no. 27, 28.9.1960.  
232 
 
actions of the SRC, as did the entire staff of both the Wits Student117 and the NUSAS Local 
Committee. Harking back to the Wits SRC crisis of 1955, when the Wits left was routed, a ‘Wits-
Student-In-Exile’ (like the 1955 Wits-SRC-in-exile) was published off-campus. With Wits awash with 
anonymous pamphlets implying that Joffe and his supporters were ‘communistic’, a rowdy mass 
meeting failed to pass a motion of no-confidence in the SRC. In the bye-election which followed, 
Joffe was returned to the SRC118 indicating that the Wits student body, in contrast to those at other 
NUSAS centres, had not lurched to the right and embraced white co-operation.   
This incident also demonstrates the growing re-engagement of the radical left in campus and 
NUSAS politics and the seriousness with which it took the Congresses’ commitment to a united front. 
At UCT too, the radical left played a pivotal role in the 1959/60 desegregation campaign and one of 
their number, Dawn Levy, had taken up the position of NUSAS regional secretary. However, 
believing that NUSAS should assume a direct political role and should not waste time attempting to 
change white students’ attitudes, which included ‘courting’ the ASB, she resigned from NUSAS at 
the 1960 congress.119 Shortly thereafter the radical left exited UCT politics altogether even to the 
extent of boycotting the SRC elections.120 Ironically, this was probably to the advantage of the 
liberals and the disadvantage of the right as radical candidates tended to split the vote allowing for 
the success of those of conservative persuasion. With the LP moving into extra-parliamentary 
politics and thus building a closer relationship with the ANC and the Indian Congresses in campaigns 
against the removal of ‘Black Spots’ and the Group Areas Act and women’s passes,121 it inevitably 
had to work with the COD too, despite lingering reservations in certain sections of the LP about the 
COD’s communist connections and entryism. NUSAS would not work with the COD except in 
exceptional circumstances as, for example, in making contact with the new ethnic colleges.122 
Prior to its 1960 congress, the NUSAS leadership had already ensured that Joffe would not be 
elected to the executive123 and according to the radical left would brook no internal constructive 
criticism of policy.124 In its arrangements for the multi-racial youth conference, NUSAS negotiated 
with the ANCYL and the Indian Youth Congresses and intended to invite the UP Youth too. 
However, nowhere in the correspondence is there any mention of the COD Youth being either a 
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party to the arrangements or even being invited to the conference125 even though a non-racial COD 
branch operated at Wits.126 This indicates not only NUSAS’s desperate attempts to distance itself 
from any association with ‘communists’ in the face of NP smears, but also the personal ideological 
prejudices of key NUSAS individuals at the time. Wentzel, one of the organisers of the multi-racial 
conference, was generally suspicious of COD infiltration. He had, while being in NUSAS, played a 
prominent role in ousting the radical left in 1955, and as Transvaal head of the student section of the 
LP, resisted the COD plan to amalgamate its reading groups with the LP.127 The announcement, 
shortly after Sharpeville, by the South African Communist Party (SACP) of its existence – it was 
reconstituted in 1953128 - almost certainly increased the suspicion of LP members that the COD was 
a communist front, a suspicion enunciated the following year by the 1961 NUSAS president, Adrian 
Leftwich. Regarding the radical Wits position on the ASB, NUSAS office bearers probably supported 
it, but publicly had to distance themselves from it. Firstly, it was propagated by the COD and 
secondly and more importantly, as the NUSAS president was to argue privately the following year, 
calls to sever ties with the ASB only served to fuel the white co-operation movement which NUSAS 
was desperately attempting to stymy.129 
Sharpeville and white co-operation 
Calls for white student unity stemmed directly from white fears following both Sharpeville and 
MacMillan’s ‘Wind of change’ speech. Whites looked north of the border and watched in horrified 
foreboding the escalating civil war in the Belgian Congo and the fate of the white minority fleeing on 
the eve of independence. Moreover, a further ten African colonies were due to gain their 
independence in 1960 at a time when Pan-Africanism was becoming more assertive and its leading 
champion, Kwame Nkrumah, openly backing South Africa’s liberation movements and the economic 
boycott. In addition, the United Nations Security Council, including the United States, condemned 
apartheid and the government’s response to Sharpeville, making white South Africans feel even 
more isolated.         
Speakers at the SABRA conference in April 1960 argued that an indigenous white Afrikaner nation 
had the right to exist on the African continent, but in the face of a black revolution faced its most 
dangerous hour yet and, were it not rapidly to make the tremendous sacrifices necessary to make 
the Bantustans work, white Western civilisation faced extinction in South Africa.130 Talks needed to 
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be initiated with ‘responsible Bantu’ and whites were urged to stand together and not fight one 
another.131 Similar sentiments were voiced in the Afrikaans student press and within the ASB.132  
Dissent within the NP regarding Verwoerd’s application of apartheid escalated after Sharpeville and 
played itself out in the Afrikaans student arena, colouring the white co-operation student movement. 
Taking advantage of Verwoerd’s absence from government while he recovered from his 
assassination attempt, Paul Sauer, with the backing of much of the Cape NP as well as many NP 
intellectuals, called for a review of apartheid policies, particularly those relating to the pass laws, 
urban Africans and African wages.133 L.J. du Plessis, the Potchefstroom-based dissident expelled 
from the NP in 1959, raised similar concerns to those of Sauer, and in addition pleaded for the 
‘intensive modernisation’ and ‘planned democratisation’ of the reserves.134 Moreover, serious 
concerns were raised about apartheid and the coloured population. Many within the Cape NP and 
SABRA believed that coloured people were intrinsically part of the white Afrikaans population and 
should thus be accorded political and social rights. 
The Afrikaans churches too were uneasy about the morality of certain aspects of apartheid and were 
concerned at the impending international isolation of their churches. Leading from this, the Dutch 
Reformed and Hervormde Churches participated in the World Council of Churches’ Cottesloe 
Consultation in December 1960 and were signatories to a statement which could be interpreted as 
condemning as unchristian various aspects of apartheid such as migrant labour and the Mixed 
Marriages Act.135  
NP circles were awash with dissident literature. Delayed Action written by Albert Geyser and Beyers 
Naudé, signatories to the Cottesloe Consultation, appeared in late 1960.136 Although he remained 
silent about Sharpeville,137 N.P. van Wyk Louw’s earlier ideas on ‘liberal nationalism’,138‘survival in 
justice’139 and ‘loyal resistance’ were revisited and offered as serious critiques of Verwoerdism. An 
anonymous publication, Pro Libertate140 appeared on the Stellenbosch campus which mentioned 
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Louw’s Lojale Verset and raised many of the concerns of NP dissidents.141 This infuriated the 
insipiently authoritarian Stellenbosch SRC,142 which like Verwoerd, the Broederbond and the 1961 
ASB congress, was intent on stamping out what it termed ‘liberalism’ and the type of white co-
operation that it linked to this liberalism. White co-operation was on the mind of many white South 
Africans after Sharpeville. Many within the NP and the UP called for a coalition government.143 
In 1960, a new political movement, the National Union (NU) was established by Japie Basson, 
expelled from the NP in 1959 for his rejection of the Bantu Self Government Act.  Basson shared 
many of the concerns of the SABRA visionaries, such as N.J. Olivier (recently replaced as 
chairperson of SABRA by Verwoerd loyalists), who helped draft National Union policy. Thus Basson 
advocated direct coloured group representation in parliament and the economic development and 
geographical consolidation of the reserves and their incorporation as autonomous entities into a 
South African federation. He believed further that South Africa should strive towards an ‘open 
society’ rather than one based on either forced separation or forced integration.144 These views 
echoed those of retired chief justice and former Fusion Minister of Native Affairs, Henry Fagan, who 
in his recently published book, Our responsibility pleaded for a sense of community between black 
and white and inter-racial contact regulated by (conservative) social convention rather than 
legislation.145 Fagan subsequently accepted the leadership of the NU. With the movement’s 
moderate race policy (perhaps to the left of 1959 UP policy) and its accent on white unity (Basson 
proposed to replace an Afrikaner-dominated government with one composed of both white language 
groups), the NU hoped to attract the support of English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites in both the 
UP and NP.146 The NU generated much nationwide excitement. It won the support of NP dissidents 
such as theologian Albert Geyser and young Afrikaans-speakers in the ‘Pretoria Study Group’, 
former UP supporters and even the defection of large sections of current UP branches, as well as 
unilingual English-speakers like Brian Bamford, later a PP MP.147  
The white student co-operation movement occurred against the background of the Sharpeville 
aftermath and the rise of the NU. In May 1960, the chairperson of the Pietermaritzburg SRC, John 
Chettle (later to work for the conservative South African Foundation in New York) invited the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the 1930s. It ‘challenged some of the less sacred but nevertheless stultifying aspects of Afrikaner culture and politics 
manifest on the campus’.  B. Burnell, ‘The life of Beyers Naude: a psychobiographical study’, PhD thesis, University of the 
Free State, 2013. According to an editorial in Die Matie, the authors of the new publication were deliberately using the title, 
Pro Libertate to legitimate their new ideas and create the impression that these were a natural progression from the ideas 
of the 1930s.   
141 A.A. Visser to Die Matie, 23.6.1961. 
142 Die Matie, 11.8.1961. 
143 Rand Daily Mail, 7.4.1960. 
144 J. Basson, Steeds op die parlementere kolfblad: met insigte oor die Afrikaner en Afrikaans, Politika, Cape Town, 2008, 
pp. 4-6, 11.    
145 ‘3. Critical Afrikaner intellectuals and apartheid 1948-1958’, www.newhistory.co.za/3-critical-afrikaner-intellectuals-and-
apartheid-1948-1958/ accessed 2.2.2012. 
146 J. Basson, op. cit., pp. 5-6, 18-19; J.C. Gordon Brown, ‘South Africa: rustle on the veld’ Time, 29.2.1960, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,873235,00.html accessed 28.9.2011. 
147 J. Basson, op. cit., pp. 5, 12-13, 16-17, 20-24. 
236 
 
presidents and vice-presidents of all South African university SRCs to a conference to discuss firstly, 
NUSAS-ASB relations, secondly, the position of the new university colleges and thirdly, future 
contact between the various student groups.148 Pietermaritzburg was motivated by ‘deep concern’ 
‘over the riots’ and the ‘general state of affairs pertaining in South Africa149 and the urgent necessity 
for ‘mutual understanding’.150 The bilingual conference would be held in camera under the 
chairmanship of Henry Fagan.151 Simultaneously, the Potchefstroom SRC called a white inter-SRC 
conference along the lines of the non-political Committee of University Principals to discuss practical 
student interests.152 After Sharpeville, speaker after speaker on the Potchefstroom campus and 
within the ASB stressed the dire situation in which Afrikaners found themselves and, pleading the 
cause of white co-operation, argued that what was the fate of Afrikaans-speaking whites was also 
the fate of English-speakers.153 Indicating the level of fear felt by some Potchefstroom student 
leaders during the Sharpeville crisis was the remarkable appeal for the ‘two great giants of the 
student world’, the ASB and NUSAS to ‘take hands’ as time was running out: ‘…the time for 
quibbling and fanatical heresy was over’.154 Potchefstroom believed that despite serious differences 
between the two organisations, enough areas of common interest existed for the two to work 
together.155 Perhaps this was not the view of everyone at Potchefstroom but certainly there existed a 
desire for some kind of change. A significant number of Potchefstroom students followed L.J. du 
Plessis into the NU.156 
However, the main drive for white co-operation came from the ASB president, Hennie van der Walt, 
based at Potchefstroom. So as to broaden its membership at non-ASB-affiliated centres and 
establish itself at the English-medium universities, the ASB amended its constitution to allow student 
groupings such as the Wits Afrikaanse Studenteklub and similar organisations it intended to set-up 
at Pietermaritzburg and Natal Training College, to join the ASB.157 Moreover, some elements within 
the ASB called for a united white front and pleaded with those who had few reasons to disagree with 
the ASB to throw in their lot with an organisation they claimed was both truly national and patriotic.158 
Moreover, the ASB believed, like NUSAS, that university apartheid would seriously dilute the non-
racial principles of the former open universities, making English-speaking students more accepting of 
apartheid and so weakening NUSAS. With few black students in the national union, the ASB hoped 
that students at the new ethnic colleges would realise that NUSAS was culturally alienating to them 
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and would thus be amenable to an apartheid confederation.159 The Potchefstroom SRC believed that 
the ‘Bantu’ had a great belief in the justice of the Afrikaner and apartheid.160 Nonetheless, it did not 
invite the ethnic colleges to its inter-SRC conference apparently because there was no suitable 
accommodation for black delegates in Potchefstroom.161  
In the end Potchefstroom withdrew its invitation in favour of Pietermaritzburg’s more inclusive one.162 
The Natal invitation drew a storm of protest from the UCT SRC because it effectively restricted the 
open universities to sending white delegates only and to avoid all social mixing, it proposed that 
meals be served at the conference table.163 The radicals such as Ticktin believed that the gathering 
would serve no useful purpose and recommended that the invitation be ignored. However, the views 
of those desiring white co-operation prevailed and thus UCT replied that it welcomed the initiative but 
not on Pietermaritzburg’s terms. The Wits SRC narrowly voted to attend the conference as they were 
informed that the NUSAS president supported the idea and so assumed that UCT did too. This 
decision was overturned through the efforts of the NUSAS vice-president164 and ultimately both Wits 
and UCT indicated that they were not prepared to attend an event where the restrictions on 
representation were aimed at circumventing their stated policies.165 
Pietermaritzburg postponed its conference to a later date, much to the relief of Shingler. Shortly after 
Sharpeville, Shingler had privately indicated his support for the initiative to the conference 
organisers, but subsequently came to the same conclusion as other executive members that it was 
wrong and potentially dangerous, particularly after the rector of the University of the North had 
shown so much enthusiasm. Subsequently, Shingler publicly made it known that while NUSAS 
welcomed any attempts at co-operation, these were really the concerns of SRCs rather than 
NUSAS. The NUSAS executive thus hoped that the Pietermaritzburg gathering would be postponed 
until after the NUSAS July congress at which SRCs would be subtly turned against it.166 
Van der Walt and the Potchefstroom SRC were furious at the cancellation of the conference.167 The 
open universities were accused of destroying student co-operation because even when the 
Afrikaans-medium universities conceded, in their opinion, ninety percent of their principles, Wits and 
UCT still refused to co-operate.168 Because of this, the SRC decided that in future the Afrikaans 
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universities would not initiate co-operation in this type of forum and in protest, decided to rescind its 
earlier decision to attend the NUSAS congress.169  
The Pietermaritzburg conference or the ‘National Convention of SRC’s’ finally met shortly after the 
conclusion of the NUSAS congress. It was hailed very inaccurately by the excited Natal press as the 
first meeting of English- and Afrikaans-speaking students since 1933.170 It was attended by 
representatives of all of NUSAS’s white affiliates as well as those of UNNE and Fort Hare.171 The 
presence of the traditionally ultra-rigid Pretoria SRC and the Verwoerdian Ruiterwag-controlled 
Stellenbosch SRC is indicative of the fearful climate of the times and/or the ulterior motives of the 
ASB – the latter contemplating a ‘three bond confederation policy’ based on separate ethnic and 
linguistic representation for black and white students. The convention took place behind closed 
doors and while a final press statement was released, the minutes were available only to those who 
attended and not to NUSAS. The participants agreed that a similar annual meeting should be 
inaugurated without restrictions on representation, that attacks by the ASB and NUSAS on each 
other should be minimised and, importantly for the ASB and the Afrikaans-medium centres, no 
‘irresponsible’ attacks on South Africa would be made abroad by either the ASB or NUSAS. With 
evident relief, Shingler reasoned the conference had not been too damaging to NUSAS in that firstly, 
no secretariat had emerged, desired by the ASB for its apartheid confederation and secondly, 
NUSAS had not been attacked directly but only implicitly.172 A follow-up conference was called for 
August 1961 by enthusiastic co-operationists at Rhodes, some of whom were opposed to NUSAS. 
NUSAS resolved to ensure that there would be no restrictions on representation, perhaps in an effort 
to stymy it. In early 1961, Rhodes and Pietermaritzburg were joined by Durban in the pursuit of 
national student co-operation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
In late 1960, the conservative backlash following Sharpeville manifested itself in the return of more 
conservative SRCs at most of the NUSAS centres.173 At Pietermaritzburg NUSAS watched with an 
element of foreboding as Agriculture student, Ivor Dreosti,174 a keen supporter of the NU175 and filled 
with an almost messianic vision to achieve national co-operation (including between white and 
black), assumed the presidency of the SRC. He had the backing of a large cohort of rowdy, heavy 
drinking, racially paternalistic,176 ‘anti-political’ (meaning anti-left wing), though generally anti-NP 
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agricultural students (‘agrics’) newly organised into an Agricultural Students Council.177 Hugh Lewin, 
the NUSAS vice-president based at Pietermaritzburg was tasked with building up a liberal clique to 
countenance the agrics,178 isolate Dreosti from his conservative student base and educate him on 
the implicit dangers of sacrificing principles, which inevitably occurred with white co-operation.179  
Already in September 1960, student circles were awash with rumours regarding Durban’s possible 
disaffiliation from NUSAS.180 Moreover, the brief interlude of a group of progressive, if not radical, 
pro-NUSAS student leaders at Durban came to an end in late 1960. Topping the SRC polls from a 
field of candidates which the Sunday Times alleged included fervent government supporters181 were 
the conservative, Pieter Janisch, trying to distance himself from his SACP uncle, Bram Fischer,182 
Dudley Goodhead, a Natal separatist183 and David Gordon.184 The charismatic Gordon, the son of 
Professor Ian Gordon of the Natal Medical School, was the ostensibly loyal chairperson of the 
Durban Local NUSAS Committee but was earlier described as ‘an engineer of the engineers’ 
(meaning that he was politically conservative) and leader of the anti-progressive, anti-NUSAS 
opposition at Durban.185 Gordon won SRC office on the basis of his intention of establishing a 
separate Natal Students’ Association,186 a plan he was evidently able to further during the campaign 
preceding the republican referendum called by Verwoerd for October 1960.  
Because the majority of South Africans were excluded from participating in the referendum, a 
republic was rejected by the liberation movements, the LP, PP and the UP. This referendum aroused 
strong emotions in English-speaking Natal, not least amongst Natal students who feared that 
severing the umbilical cord with Britain would make them even more hostage to the vagaries of 
Afrikaner nationalism. During the course of the referendum campaign, the NP Jeugbond trampled 
and spat on the Union Jack while declaring Durban’s South Beach an independent republic, fueling 
much anti-republican feeling.187 A number of Durban students, including Brian Sharpe, a NUSAS 
executive member, established an Anti-Republican Youth Front, which at its huge outdoor rallies, 
called for ‘an independent Natal under the Queen of South Africa.’188 Gordon and Goodhead 
attempted to organise an anti-republican march in October 1960,189 Gordon justifying this by 
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denouncing the government for trampling on academic freedom, slandering NUSAS as communistic 
and importantly for future developments, dividing university students by language.190 
The white South African (and South West African) electorate narrowly endorsed a republic, though 
not in Natal where this was overwhelmingly rejected. The Durban SRC consequently called for 
provincial self-government for Natal.191 This echoed the demand of the UP-controlled Natal 
Provincial Council,192 the openly secessionist UFP and the Anti-Republican Youth Front and Douglas 
Mitchell, the Natal UP leader who vaguely but insistently asserted that the province would follow its 
own path should the republicans triumph.193 With the collapse of this ‘Natal Stand’, precipitated by 
Mitchell reneging on his undertaking to lead it, Gordon appeared to abandon his separatist 
tendencies and became a champion, like the UP and the NU, of white national co-operation instead. 
The UP’s campaign against a republic had originally been founded on a defence of white unity. It 
believed that in the face of the anti-whiteism displayed at Sharpeville and in the Congo, white unity 
was essential and thus calls for a republic were divisive and reckless.194 Shortly after the 
inauguration of the Republic in May 1961, Verwoerd called a general election for October 1961 partly 
in an attempt to annihilate all opposition to his policy both from within and without the NP.195 The NU 
and the UP constructed an electoral alliance, the former eventually merging with the latter.196 All of 
this had repercussions for NUSAS. 
During a student body meeting at Durban in April 1961, addressed by the new NUSAS president, 
Adrian Leftwich, Gordon alleged that the national union’s approach to national problems was 
negative. He demanded that ‘an all-out attempt be made to compromise with the Afrikaans-medium 
universities’ outside the confines of both the ASB and NUSAS.197 Moreover, Durban rejected much 
of NUSAS’s foreign policy, which by 1961 had moved further to the left than that of NUS and was 
aligned with the Afro-Asian bloc in the non-communist ISC.198 Thus the Durban SRC dissociated 
itself from any denunciations of European and American imperialism in Africa, Asia and South 
America199 and labeled itself ‘anti-communist’ in contra-distinction to the ‘non-communist’ NUSAS.200 
Moreover, while retaining as policy Durban’s opposition to university apartheid, the SRC abolished 
its Academic Freedom Committee.201 
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At the Natal Regional Conference in May 1961, attended also by the UOFS,202 it was quite clear that 
NUSAS was out of favour and that Gordon, in alliance with Dreosti of Pietermaritzburg, planned to 
launch a confederation above NUSAS and the ASB203 which would, it appeared, be aligned to the 
NU.204 Shortly after the Republican celebrations, Gordon unveiled the framework for his Federal 
Secretariat (FEDSEC). To resolve the perennial problem of representation, separate black delegates 
would represent black students at Wits and UCT.205 This mirrored both the NU’s proposal for 
coloured parliamentary participation as well as Van der Walt’s solution to the ‘open’ universities’ 
representation in the ASB’s future confederation,206 the latter similarity not missed by the Wits 
student press.207 The NUSAS president regarded the FEDSEC proposal as a ‘blasphemy’208 and the 
most dangerous ever put forward. He feared that it could win the support of many of the NUSAS and 
ASB universities and isolate Wits, UCT and the newly re-affiliated UNNE within NUSAS.209 NUSAS 
believed that plans had already been laid to engineer Pietermaritzburg’s disaffiliation from NUSAS or 
failing this, ensuring the election of an anti-NUSAS SRC for 1961-2.210  
At its annual congress NUSAS planned to sabotage FEDSEC by subtly convincing white co-
operation centres such as Rhodes to attack the recently launched organisation.211 This would 
hopefully have the effect of isolating Gordon, putting Dreosti uncomfortably out on a limb and in so 
doing, drawing Pietermaritzburg back into the NUSAS fold.212 In addition, NUSAS planned to rely on 
the newly (re)affiliated black centres of UNNE, Johannesburg Institution of Indian Teacher Training 
(JIITT) and SACHED to continue to push NUSAS policy in a progressive direction which in turn 
would also isolate the conservative centres.213 However, isolating the conservative centres and 
stymying the white co-operation movement could seriously backfire were the radical black centres 
successfully to move that congress break off all ties with the ASB,214 which in the event UNNE 
attempted. Moreover, NUSAS wondered how long it could continue to support publicly the white co-
operation movement while at the same time working behind the scenes to sabotage it.215    
At the NUSAS congress in July 1961, Durban played a confused role. Perhaps caught up in the 
emotional response to Alan Paton’s opening speech, Gordon praised NUSAS to the skies as the last 
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bastion of racial tolerance.216 He claimed that Durban would not leave the national union, but on the 
other hand he jubilantly relished his centre’s break with NUSAS policy217 which he believed would 
destroy the organisation’s ‘united front’. Durban refused to discuss FEDSEC218 and walked out when 
the congress demanded that segregation at the University of Natal be discussed.219 This served to 
drive a wedge between Durban and Pietermaritzburg, the latter siding with UNNE in accusing 
Durban of racism and supporting segregation.220 In the event, the congress worked its magic on the 
Durban delegation who all, with the exception of Gordon, underwent a conversion to NUSAS values. 
Consequently Gordon became isolated and a laughing stock on the SRC,221 presumably as he had 
lost all credibility because of his numerous changes of policy.222 In August 1961, both the Durban 
SRC and student body reaffirmed their affiliation to and complete confidence in NUSAS. As 
importantly they declared their opposition to apartheid by adopting the updated post-Sharpeville 
NUSAS resolution based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights223 which they had earlier 
rejected as being outside the sphere of education.224 
For the time-being, the essentially white reconciliation movement was over except at the 
Johannesburg College of Education (JCE). At JCE a few students, including SRC members, 
resigned from NUSAS to pursue English-Afrikaans co-operation.225 They believed that were the 
English- and Afrikaans-medium training colleges to resign en masse from NUSAS and the ASB 
respectively, they could all come together in the Transvaalse Onderwyskolleges Studenteunie 
(TOKSU) which they aimed to transform from a largely administrative body into a fully-fledged 
student union. This was repudiated by TOKSU and most of the JCE SRC, but the SRC remained 
critical of Wits’ stance regarding national inter-SRC conferences. It regarded Wits’ refusal to 
compromise with the ASB centres as unrealistic and placing unnecessary obstacles in the path to 
reconciliation. There had been no black students on the Wits SRC since 1959, and, JCE reasoned, it 
was unlikely that there would be any in the future either.226 The fears of the NUSAS president that 
university apartheid would dilute non-racial principles were being realised.  
While working towards destroying the white co-operation movement, NUSAS began implementing 
the plans it had mapped out after Sharpeville, namely, of radicalising the national union. It thus fell in 
with the national convention movement. 
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A national convention and the anti-Republican stay-away 
Shortly after the white republican referendum, a national consultation of African bodies took place in 
Orlando. Flowing from this was the ANC-dominated All-In African Convention held in 
Pietermaritzburg in March 1961. The gathering called on Verwoerd to convene a representative 
convention to draw up a new constitution for South Africa, failing which a three day stay-away 
coinciding with the declaration of the Republic would be called.227 Although in principle NUSAS 
supported the call for a national convention, it probably did not support the All-In venture because, 
like the LP which did reluctantly have Liberal African participants, it appeared to be a Congress 
Alliance and specifically COD front despite, confusingly, displaying the trappings of Africanism.228 
However, the newly re-affiliated UNNE SRC sent observers to the meeting, a move which NUSAS 
supported because it felt that it was important to keep in close co-operation with all political 
movements.229  
More to NUSAS’s liking was the widely representative Natal Convention spawned by the Natal anti-
Republican movement and the Natal LP which met at UNP in April 1961.230 It was attended by 
representatives and observers from both the UNP231 and UND SRCs but because it was not a ‘Natal 
Stand of the old type’ in that it called for the abolition of segregation and the introduction of a non-
racial franchise,232 it did not find favour with Gordon and his Durban SRC observers.233 Not finding 
favour with the radical NUSAS leadership, though probably viewed with approval by much of 
NUSAS’s student base because it posed no real threat to white interests, was the gradualist PP-UP-
NU-orientated ‘National Consultation’ which coalesced on the Rand in June 1961.234 It was endorsed 
by capitalists and pillars of society such as Justices Fagan and Centilivres and Dr Duminy of UCT.235 
In the Western Cape a Coloured Convention Movement closely aligned to the Congresses, but 
inclusive of other ideological strands, also emerged.236 
Thus a national convention meant different things to different people and had wide appeal on which 
NUSAS could capitalise. The NUSAS leadership believed that by successfully coupling the demand 
for a national convention to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the national union would 
create the space required for more overt political action and co-operation with the democratic 
movement. However, the convention motion would have to be carefully phrased so as to win the 
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support of the more conservative centres like Rhodes, Pietermaritzburg and particularly Durban and 
would have to emerge initially from the affiliated campuses.237 This proved easier than NUSAS had 
anticipated. As already discussed with regard to Durban, in the run-up to the declaration of the 
Republic and South Africa’s exit from the Commonwealth, emotions were running high among many 
English-speaking whites. In the opinion of the NUSAS president, the student population reversed out 
of its post-Sharpeville conservatism in the wake of the anti-Republican and national convention 
movement.238 Moreover, in the aftermath of Sharpeville and with the exception of Durban, NUSAS 
had been instrumental in establishing pressure groups (such as the Radical Society at UCT and the 
Human Rights Society at Wits) on all its campuses to press issues important to NUSAS such as 
human rights and the national convention.239   
The NUSAS postal motion on the national convention emerged from those passed by its affiliated 
SRCs and student bodies, in particular UCT. The NUSAS president, based in Cape Town secretly 
drafted much of the UCT resolution and did a great deal of work behind the scenes to assure its 
successful passage.240 This resolution, proposed jointly by members of the Radical Society and the 
Congress Alliance (the latter proposer dubbed ‘commie’ by the NUSAS president)241 was passed 
overwhelmingly. It stated that a democratic education could not exist in an undemocratic society, that 
a democratic government and education system should be based on both the recognition of human 
rights and the consent of the governed and thus called for a national convention to discuss the 
formation of a democratic South African government.242  
Wits adopted an approach of multi-inclusivity in the run-up to its adoption of the UCT/NUSAS 
national convention resolution, which presumably to incorporate as many people as possible, it 
referred to as ‘multi-racial consultations’.243 During lunch hour meetings, multi-racial consultations 
were discussed and endorsed by faculty councils, including the conservative engineers, religious 
societies (Catholic, Jewish and Islamic), as well as political and discussion groups.244 However, 
probably because of the government clampdown and military call-up just prior to the declaration of 
the Republic on 31 May, the Wits authorities banned meetings of the LP and PP while the chief 
magistrate proscribed the mass meeting scheduled to adopt the UCT/NUSAS convention motion.245 
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Consequently, the Wits student body overwhelmingly endorsed the national convention in a SRC-
sponsored referendum.246 
The Rhodes student body adopted the national convention motion nem con247 and against the 
expectations of the NUSAS leadership, so did Durban, though in a somewhat qualified fashion.248 
The UNNE student body, on which NUSAS pinned its hopes for driving the national union’s policy in 
a progressive direction, had already adopted the All-In Conference’s call for a national convention 
despite the opposition of the still vocally powerful NEUM and reservations from some that the All-In 
Conference was itself racist, being restricted to Africans.249 With UNNE back within the NUSAS fold, 
NEUM had intensified its verbal and ideological war against NUSAS250 and thus put up strong 
opposition251 to UNNE’s adoption of NUSAS’s tactically moderate national convention motion.252   
Attesting perhaps to the overtly political nature of the motion and the restrictions imposed on training 
colleges regarding party politics, seventeen representatives abstained from taking a stand on the 
national convention against forty seven who endorsed it. NUSAS thus issued a statement to the 
press locating its demand for a sovereign national convention firmly within the contemporary issues 
(for NUSAS and South Africa) of the anti-colonial movement on the African continent and South 
Africa’s increasing international isolation. The statement read: that noting ‘the impasse towards 
which this country is moving and the refusal of the government to consider the grievances of the 
majority of people of South Africa, NUSAS pledges its support to those calling for a national 
convention’. The statement claimed further that NUSAS would ‘do all in its power to assist in the 
realisation of this goal’ which is vital for the establishment of a democratic South Africa and for South 
Africa to take its place in the community of nations and ‘come to terms with the developments in the 
continent of Africa.’253 A couple of months later, the NUSAS congress instructed the president to 
make contact with all bodies working towards the summoning of a national convention,254 but to 
ensure that NUSAS was not to become ensnared in a ‘Prog-UP consultation’ added the descriptor 
‘truly representative’.255 Durban attempted to limit NUSAS’s support for the convention to educational 
matters only256 and pressed for the amendment of the resolution to NUSAS rejecting a universal 
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franchise in a democratic South Africa, a measure which was implied by linking the convention 
motion to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.257 
The convention resolutions gave NUSAS a degree of leeway to engage in overtly political activities 
and make contact with what remained of the Congress Alliance. In the aftermath of Sharpeville and 
coupled to the (re-)affiliation of UNNE and the radical Johannesburg SACHED branch, this was both 
necessary and inevitable. In the opinion of the COD-aligned Counter Attack, NUSAS was becoming 
a more truly non-racial body with the foundations of genuine friendships and political contacts being 
laid at the 1961 congress,258 but nonetheless its relationship with the Congresses left much to be 
desired.259 This was amply illustrated by the speed with which a message from Nelson Mandela of 
the All-In Conference lauding the stand of students in the anti-Republican stay-away260 was whisked 
away and received no mention in the NUSAS assembly minutes.  
NUSAS did not endorse the All-In Conference’s call for a national stay-away, presumably because 
this was party political, and NUSAS had no policy on the Republic. This was a matter of concern to 
black students, the 1959 vice-president, Billy Modise questioning NUSAS’s failure to take a stand. 
Nonetheless, the NUSAS office remained open on Republic Day. The NUSAS front at UCT, the 
Radical Society, joined the call of the Congress-aligned ‘Student Action Group’ for a stay-away.261 It 
commended the convention and stay-away organisers for their continuing ‘dedication’ to non-violent 
change but warned students that time was running out.262 Die Burger made much political capital 
from this leading to the UCT principal threatening disciplinary action against anyone ‘undermining’ 
the university.263 Nonetheless, some UCT students did boycott classes on 29 and 30 May.264 
The reaction of the Wits authorities to similar calls was harsher and more interventionist and 
indirectly affected NUSAS. To the consternation of the Wits authorities who confiscated some of 
them, a variety of leaflets and posters appeared on the campus, including one signed by Nelson 
Mandela urging students to stay at home.265 Voicing similar sentiments to those of the UCT Radical 
Students’ Society, the editor of the Wits student newspaper argued in a contentious editorial that 
‘non-whites’ were justified in turning to violence against a ‘minority dictatorship’ and thus called on 
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students to support the strike as a non-violent means of struggle.266 The newspaper in question was 
withdrawn and the editor disciplined by both the Wits authorities and the SRC for encouraging a 
stay-away. He resigned his position in acrimonious circumstances267 and was thrown off the Wits 
delegation to the forthcoming NUSAS congress.268 Nonetheless, students at Wits did support a stay-
away, leading to the cancellation of some lectures in the Arts Faculty.269   
UNNE students boycotted classes270 as did those at the University College of the Western Cape 
(UCWC) and Fort Hare. However, strikers at the new ethnic colleges were met with intimidation from 
their authoritarian college authorities and/or the state. In an attempt to pre-empt the success of the 
stay-away compulsory tests were scheduled at UCWC on the days leading up to Republic Day and 
all one hundred and forty boycotters were threatened with expulsion.271 Against the backdrop of a 
militarised campus, the entire Fort Hare student body embarked on a three day stay-away, at the 
conclusion of which the university was closed and students sent home until further notice.272 
NUSAS publicly defended Fort Hare’s anti-Republican stance in terms of the students’ rejection of 
the authoritarian system of university apartheid and Bantu Education.273 A sympathy stay-away, in 
protest at the closure of Fort Hare, was embarked on by a majority of Rhodes students274 although 
the student body as a whole remained deeply divided over the issue.275 This surprisingly militant 
action can be partly explained by the intensity of anti-Republicanism and anti-Nationalism. For 
example, Rhodes students erected an ‘anti-Republican wall’ in one of their residences.276 English-
speakers in Natal, and to a lesser extent, the Eastern Cape, could always be relied on to protest 
against the loss of their rights, as happened during the ‘constitutional crisis’ of 1951-2, but most were 
not prepared to extend their protest to the loss of black rights. The organisers of a mass meeting at 
Rhodes on the 31 May made it clear that this was not intended to be an anti-Republican gathering 
but rather a forum to make known the student body attitude towards events in the country ‘in 
accordance with human rights’.277  
At Pietermaritzburg, as at Wits,278 the COD embarked on an intensive propaganda campaign,279 
which, coupled to the Natal Stand and the fear of call-up, resulted in the student body voting for a sit-
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down strike in favour of the national convention. This was opposed by the conservatives who did not 
wish to be associated with the simultaneous All-In strike.280 Despite being proscribed by the chief 
magistrate, the protest went ahead and was broken up by troops and armed police.281 This was the 
first occasion on which the military and police invaded a white campus.282 The action revealed the 
paranoid, authoritarian political climate of the time, which resembled that of the state of emergency 
of 1960. It also perhaps indicates the state’s intention to crush any liberal opposition at 
Pietermaritzburg in preparation for the transformation of the campus, along with that of the Natal 
Training College, into a Nationalist enclave. 
The General Law Amendment Act, 1962 
Following the inauguration of the Republic, the convention movement limped along a little longer. In 
October 1961, NUSAS co-sponsored a ‘Cape Convention’ with a variety of organisations which 
included the Black Sash and former members of the banned ANC.283 However the convention 
movement had effectively died by the end of 1961. The ANC adopted new tactics of sabotage and 
exploded its first installation on 16 December 1961, the ‘Day of the Vow’, a historically symbolic day 
for Afrikaner nationalism. With the announcement of an early general election scheduled for October 
1961, the white opposition parties directed their attention to defeating the NP at the polls.284 This 
was not to be. For the first time since 1948, the NP received a majority of white votes, including a 
substantial number of English-speaking ones. The UP’s representation in parliament shrunk further 
despite its electoral alliance with the NU. The NU and PP were almost decimated, both parties 
retaining just one seat each - that of Basson in Bezuidenhout and Suzman in the wealthy Houghton 
constituency, respectively. Faring worse than the electorally more viable PP was the LP, 285  whose 
candidates had stood solely to put across radical Liberal ideas, the party having recognised earlier 
the irrelevance of white electoral politics as a vehicle for change.286 Afrikaner dissent was silenced 
for the time being.287 Thus, with the backing of a white population traumatised by the events of 
Sharpeville and African nationalism, the government set about eliminating all remaining dissent 
through the construction of a police state along the lines of that already experienced during the state 
of emergency and the declaration of the Republic.  
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In May 1962, the General Law Amendment Bill (or ‘Sabotage Bill’) appeared before parliament. It 
abrogated the rule of law by allowing detention without trial and placed the onus on the defendant to 
prove his/her innocence and allowed for the banning of individuals, organisations and publications. 
Moreover, as with the definition of ‘communism’ in the Suppression of Communism Act, ‘sabotage’ 
was defined so broadly that any call for change could be construed as sabotage, making the caller 
liable to the death penalty.288  
NUSAS itself could fall foul of these measures. Along with the LP, the Black Sash and the churches, 
the national union protested vehemently against the Bill as being an abrogation of academic 
freedom, the rule of law and human rights. Together with the Standing Committee of SRC 
Presidents, NUSAS mounted a campus-wide campaign against this new draconian measure.289 This 
campaign was as inclusive as possible so as to attract maximum student participation. Many 
students were disillusioned with the efficacy of protest, while others were either apathetic, or like the 
UP, supported the Bill. Adopting Wits’ strategy utilised during the national convention campaign, 
endorsement by as many campus societies as possible was sought.290 A wide range of political 
parties, organisations and individuals were invited to address the various student bodies. These 
included representatives of the PP,291 the Transvaal Indian Congress292 and Albert Geyser,293 newly 
appointed professor of Divinity at Wits. (Geyser had recently been found guilty of trumped up 
charges of heresy by the Nederduits Hervormde Church and dismissed from the University of 
Pretoria for his opposition to apartheid.294)    
The emphasis of the campaign differed on each campus. At this time, Pietermaritzburg and the Natal 
Midlands were seething with underground anti-Republican activity,295 the lineage of which could be 
traced back to the Torch Commando’s 1951-2 ‘Malanazi’ campaign (discussed in chapter two). Thus 
Pietermaritzburg students stressed the Nazi nature of the General Law Amendment Bill, designing 
the front page of their student magazine in the shape of a swastika in which were embedded scenes 
from the Warsaw Ghetto flanked by the faces of Verwoerd and Hitler.296 The NP press and NP 
student leaders297 responded furiously to this allegedly slanderous Nazi jibe.298 However, E.G. 
Malherbe, principal of Natal University and head of military intelligence during the Second World 
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War, defended the student editors by pointing out that Vorster, the Minister of Justice, responsible 
for the Bill and interned during the War, had had a great war-time admiration for the swastika.299 
All the NUSAS-affiliated universities held campus mass meetings300 as well as demonstrations off- 
campus, some as at Wits, Durban and Rhodes301 in conjunction with other civil society 
organisations.302 Marches by Wits,303 Durban304 and UCT305 students were banned but a few 
nonetheless went ahead and were met with police and/or vigilante interference or violence.306 For 
liberals and radicals, this indicated that even prior to the enactment of the Sabotage Bill, South Africa 
had become a police state. The campaign culminated in a solemn mass meeting on academic 
freedom and human rights at UCT in June 1962 attended by all the SRC presidents and addressed 
by  Leftwich and Albert Geyser.307 A torchlight procession to parliament to present a petition signed 
by four thousand students opposed to the Bill was banned by the Cape Town Municipality on 
instructions from the police. Nonetheless, the procession went ahead in a manner which legally 
circumvented its proscription. Despite the believed legality, a number of students were arrested and 
the rest locked in a garden.308 
Despite the extra-parliamentary opposition, the General Law Amendment Act was passed in 1962, 
effectively dismantling the rule of law. The radical left was virtually silenced on campus following the 
banning of the COD in September 1962309 and New Age ceased publication in terms of the 
Sabotage Act. Ironically, campus co-operation between members of the COD and the LP had 
improved significantly since 1961 with the UCT Radical Society and the Congress-aligned Modern 
World Society holding joint protest demonstrations.310 The Indian Congresses escaped proscription 
and despite the NUSAS leadership’s reservations about their East-bloc-aligned foreign policy, made 
a decision to actively work with them.311 Thus representatives of the Transvaal Indian Youth 
Congress (TIYC) attended the 1962 NUSAS congress as observers. However, the student assembly 
attempted to veto further co-operation with them unless NUSAS also co-operated with the PP Youth. 
NUSAS required political credibility from the Congresses and the presence of the TIYC served this 
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purpose.312 It was perhaps for this reason that the student assembly accepted the argument of the 
radical NUSAS leadership that the Indian Youth Congresses were primarily cultural entities.313 This 
assertion is difficult to sustain because though they were not attached to political parties contesting 
elections (as the PP Youth was), the TIYC, for example, was a deeply political body ‘quite ready for 
action’ whose newsletter was entitled Combat.314 
The 1962 congress and the further radicalisation of NUSAS policy  
In addition to the TIYC, the presence of the radical black affiliates of UNNE, SACHED and the 
Johannesburg Institute for Indian Teacher Training (JIIT) ensured that NUSAS did not take a 
rightward turn towards the PP. Instead, the assembly moved to the left with some fundamental 
changes in policy. Though NUSAS had already theoretically done so in 1957 with the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it finally abandoned the ‘students-as-such’ position in 1962 
and declared its intention to oppose apartheid in toto. There were many reasons for this. It was 
becoming increasingly difficult to separate educational and political issues, as, for example, in the 
case of the national convention. NUSAS leaders were also becoming increasingly frustrated about 
their inability to participate in political activities in their personal capacities because their actions 
would inevitably be associated with NUSAS. If NUSAS had no policy on these political issues the 
leadership’s personal political activities would antagonise NUSAS’s mass membership.315 Moreover, 
even after Africanising its delegation,316 NUSAS, like the COD, discovered that multi-racialism, non-
racialism and white participation in African liberation movements, were viewed with suspicion by 
participants in Pan-African conferences. This left NUSAS delegates no choice but to sign all-
embracing anti-apartheid statements as they had done in Accra in 1960.317 The radical SACHED 
branch challenged NUSAS to submerge itself in the anti-apartheid movement, and fulfill the 
requirements of the Freedom Charter.318  
NUSAS faced other challenges to its hegemony in the student union arena. Following the support 
given by students to the national convention and anti-Republican stay-away, the Congresses 
decided that an African Students Association be established. The SACHED branch under Thabo 
Mbeki played a pivotal role in ensuring its launch in December 1961.319 (This is discussed in chapter 
seven.) In addition, a new non-racial and politically committed student body, the Progressive 
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National Students Organisation (PNSO), made an appearance in 1961-2320 (discussed in chapter 
seven) and there were serious rumblings of disaffection at Fort Hare. The ISC – composed of large 
numbers of student unions from the developing world - abandoned its ‘students-as-such’ 
orientation.321 This allowed it to pass overtly political resolutions against imperialism and colonialism 
which NUSAS, as a loyal and active participant was also obliged to do both in the ISC forums abroad 
and, at the request of SACHED, at home during the 1961 NUSAS congress.322 The NUSAS 
president felt that NUSAS was also located in the developing world where ‘political, social and 
economic security were not assured’ and should thus accept its responsibility of ‘bring[ing] about a 
change of heart in South Africa’.323  
In his opening address at the 1962 congress, Leftwich reminded those present that the national 
union had in fact abandoned the ‘students-as-such’ position in 1957, but had not yet fully 
implemented it. It was his belief that the enactment of the ‘totalitarian’ Sabotage Bill marked a 
‘turning point’ in South Africa’s history which meant that NUSAS now had to ‘deliver the goods’324 
and work for a democratic dispensation. Present at the 1962 NUSAS congress was a representative 
of the West German students’ union. He argued in favour of NUSAS putting into practice the 
‘student-in-society’ position by explaining that West German students had had no choice but to adopt 
a political line when the newly constructed Berlin Wall cut off East Berlin students from their 
university in West Berlin.325 Thus with the support of most of the assembly, NUSAS declared that 
‘the problems in… education can only … be resolved once…apartheid and totalitarianism… [have] 
been removed’326 and resolved that students as citizens ‘had no choice but to take an active stand’ 
against any law which directly or indirectly violated human rights.327 The revised policy did however 
specifically rule out NUSAS aligning itself with any political party.328 Nonetheless, Ex-Chief Albert 
Luthuli, Nobel Peace Prize winner and the banned president of the banned ANC, was elected 
honorary president of NUSAS.329 Following Luthuli’s acceptance, the NUSAS president stated that 
Luthuli’s association with the national union would be ‘an incentive to students to work harder’ ‘for 
the New South Africa that must come’.330   
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A new South Africa different to the one hoped for and envisaged by NUSAS and Luthuli was coming 
into being with the substantial increase in the defense budget and the extension of military service 
for all white males to almost a year. NUSAS viewed these developments with alarm, particularly as 
the government - other than alleging that South Africa was threatened from without - was very 
evasive about the role to be played by these future conscripts. With the hindsight of Sharpeville and 
Langa, NUSAS feared, prophetically, that troops would be deployed in the townships to defend 
apartheid and oppress their fellow South Africans.331 Thus the student assembly mandated the 
executive to lobby for the recognition of the moral right to refuse to undergo racially exclusive military 
training which could be used to further apartheid. One of the methods envisaged of achieving this 
was through canvassing eminent individuals to support the right to conscientious objection.332 At this 
time French students faced similar moral dilemmas regarding their conscription into the French army 
tasked with fighting Algerian independence. NUSAS unequivocally supported the cause of Algerian 
liberation333 and expressed its solidarity with the French student union facing harassment from its 
government regarding its endorsement of Algerian self-determination.334 Thus, it could be argued 
that the NUSAS conscription resolution, with its ‘eminent persons tactic’ had similarities, as New Age 
noted, to the ‘Manifesto of Insubmission’335 or ‘Manifesto of the 121’ signed in 1961 by leading 
French citizens such as Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir which upheld the right of French 
soldiers not to serve in Algeria.336 
Another controversial issue resolved at the 1962 congress was NUSAS’s relationship with the ASB. 
The NUSAS leadership had concluded that it was more principled and important to cater for its 
expanding radical black membership than to continue pandering to the white co-operationists in its 
increasingly conservative white ranks. Moreover, it was realised that many within this constituency 
could leave NUSAS in the near future. This was particularly true for the teacher training colleges and 
technikons where in the face of both growing conservatism and government-inspired restrictions on 
student activities, NUSAS faced an uncertain future. Moreover, many student leaders believed that 
continuing attempts to engage with an organisation like the ASB was deeply insulting and humiliating 
to black students.337 Thus in the run-up to the 1962 NUSAS congress, NUSAS carefully prepared the 
ground for breaking off ties with the ASB. Histories of NUSAS’s relations with the ASB were 
strategically placed in the student press which proved conclusively that the ASB was the cause of 
non-co-operation and not NUSAS.338 Moreover, a forty-strong NUSAS branch339 was established by 
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André Michau (later an Anglican priest in Namibia) at Stellenbosch in early 1962. It was 
predominantly English-speaking, ‘but not exclusively so’ and politically liberal, some of its members 
having been associated with the post-Sharpeville, Pro Libertate publication340 mentioned earlier. The 
branch decided to test the sincerity of the NP by applying to the NP-controlled SRC for official 
recognition based on the Die Transvaler’s unlikely assertion that ‘Afrikaans universities’ unlike Wits, 
for example, ‘were the real models of liberty’ and thus NUSAS was free to operate on any Afrikaans-
medium campus.341 The thoroughly alarmed SRC immediately banned the branch,342 claiming that 
NUSAS’s opposition to Christian Nationalism could not be tolerated and moreover, it was impossible 
for two student organisations to operate simultaneously on the campus.343 Tertius Delport, president 
of the SRC and a member of the ASB executive (later a leading NP parliamentarian before joining 
the Democratic Alliance) threatened to expel from the ‘Students’ Union’ any individual who joined 
NUSAS.344 Nevertheless, he encouraged English-speakers to affiliate to the ASB through an English 
Bond of their own creation.345 The events at Stellenbosch played into the hands of those in NUSAS 
wishing to effect a final break with the ASB. The debate at congress was long and heated but 
eventually against the wishes of JCE and some at Pietermaritzburg, NUSAS did sever all ties with 
the ASB, with the clarification that the resolution did not apply to individual student bodies and SRCs 
affiliated to the cultural body.346  
Far more controversial than the ASB decision was the SACHED-initiated resolution on the status of 
South African degrees. SACHED had originally threatened to propose that NUSAS support an 
academic boycott of South Africa347 but was evidently persuaded to put forward something less 
drastic and divisive which had a chance of being accepted by the student assembly. Thus the motion 
expressed NUSAS’s misgivings about the currency of South African degrees in the light of firstly, 
large-scale academic immigration following the introduction of university apartheid and the events of 
Sharpeville and secondly, the increasing international isolation in which South African universities 
found themselves. Thus overseas institutions were requested to express an opinion on the matter. 
There was much opposition to this from those who believed the motion amounted to a vote of no-
confidence in South Africa’s educational system and/or that it was presumptuous of NUSAS to take it 
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upon itself to evaluate South African degrees.348 Ultimately, against the wishes of forty percent of the 
assembly,349 ‘those who felt that the national union was obligated to publicise the disastrous 
consequences of racial discrimination won the day’350 and the resolution was passed. 
The ‘degree motion’ would be the plank on which those disaffected with NUSAS at Rhodes, 
Pietermaritzburg and JCE would build their case for disaffiliation from the now unquestionably radical 
NUSAS. In this they would become the unwitting pawns of the South African government 
endeavouring to sever NUSAS’s conservative student base from its radical leadership. In August 
1962, a student mass meeting at Rhodes voted overwhelmingly to dissociate itself from the degree 
resolution. More seriously, a disaffiliation motion was tabled too but was amended substituting 
automatic affiliation to NUSAS with individual voluntary membership.351 Leftwich, who attended the 
meeting352 to avert disaffiliation, was extremely worried about the ‘snowballing’ consequences that 
Rhodes’s changed status could have on other centres353 and so put a positive public spin on it by 
letting it be known that Rhodes had simply changed its method of enrolment.354 Moreover, NUSAS 
realised that the situation was not as bad as it could have been as the right wing had failed to take 
control of the Rhodes SRC’s mandate to NUSAS congresses. Henceforward, voting at NUSAS 
congresses would be determined by NUSAS members alone, who, it was assumed, would be further 
to the left than the more conservative SRCs predicted for the future.355  
As with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights apartheid motion in 1957 (see 
chapter three) the disaffiliation saga occurred in the midst of the battle between Rhodes and the NP 
for control of the Rhodes University branch in Port Elizabeth. As part of the NP campaign, Die 
Oosterlig carried a series of articles claiming, as Die Transvaler was doing with regard to Wits and 
the campaign for an Afrikaans university on the Rand, that Rhodes discriminated against Afrikaans 
students, which Rhodes Afrikaans-speakers denied.356 Both the Rhodes authorities and the SRC 
stated their strong opposition to the proposed closure of the Port Elizabeth campus and its 
replacement with a new bilingual ‘independent’ institution outside Rhodes’ jurisdiction.357  
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Since 1959, as noted earlier, agricultural students at Pietermaritzburg had organised themselves into 
a powerful conservative and disruptive bloc on the SRC358 but in 1962 they failed to put up any 
candidates for the election to the SRC. This provided grist to the rumour mill of an electoral boycott 
followed by a vote of no-confidence in the newly elected SRC. This would force a bye-election 
leading to agricultural control of student government.359 Ultimately there was neither a vote of no-
confidence nor a bye-election. However, a motion requesting Pietermaritzburg’s disaffiliation from 
NUSAS was only lost through the casting vote of the new SRC chairperson.360 Although investigative 
reporters could find no direct evidence to support this, suspicions existed that the electoral boycott 
was linked to a wider NP agenda.361 During 1962, rumours emanating from authoritative sources in 
the City Council and on the university staff about an ongoing plan, hatched some years before, of a 
NP takeover of Pietermaritzburg surfaced in the latter half of 1962. The takeover would be achieved 
in phases. Firstly, the committee aimed to work for an independent Pietermaritzburg university and 
thereafter win control of its Senate through the civil servant status of the staff of the Agriculture 
Faculty.362 It is interesting to note that the regional head of the Broederbond at that time was 
Professor S. Hulme of the Faculty of Agriculture.363  
The 1962 NUSAS congress marked a new departure in not only policy but also the presidency. For 
the first time in NUSAS’s history, a theologian and minister of religion was elected to head the 
national union. Basil Moore, president-elect of NUSAS was an ordained minister of the Methodist 
Church and president of the Rhodes SRC, which for a number of years had been under the 
hegemony of theology students. It was expected that Moore would be ‘more acceptable’ to NUSAS’s 
mass student base but ultimately he was refused permission by the Methodist Church to take up the 
NUSAS office.364 Thus during the latter half of 1962, NUSAS was faced with succession crises both 
for the presidency as well as on the SRCs at its affiliated campuses.  
Succession crises were not new. In most years NUSAS was concerned that there was an insufficient 
number of charismatic and, ever more importantly, progressive and sufficiently politically committed 
student leaders to take NUSAS and its campuses forward in the right political direction. However, by 
the end of 1962, the succession crisis was more acute than before. NUSAS had definitely moved to 
the left, and arguably could be considered one of the most radical organisations still operating legally 
in South Africa. However, it had not taken all its campus leadership and certainly not its seventeen 
thousand-strong student base with it. There were many reasons for this. Adrian Leftwich singled out 
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generational turnover. The new upcoming leaders had not been politicised and radicalised by the 
academic freedom campaign of the 1950s. They also had very little experience of a racially open 
university and had thus come to accept as normal the status quo of almost completely white 
campuses. At Rhodes, not only was a generation of radical theologians graduating365 but contact 
between Fort Hare and Rhodes, which had kept Rhodes on the right path, had also declined.366 
Another factor, not specifically mentioned in NUSAS correspondence, was the rise of the PP as a 
force in student politics. It is very clear from a reading of the minutes and correspondence of 1962 
that many student leaders, even at the traditionally radical Wits, had found a home for themselves 
within the new party. PP adherents were opposed to the boycott tactic and heralding a divisive 
debate of the 1970s and 80s, attempted to introduce a motion at the 1962 NUSAS congress that 
while they rejected Bantu Education in its entirety, they also regretted the boycott of school by 
African school children.367 Some PP adherents opposed the conscription resolution while others felt 
that the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could lead to a universal franchise 
which they opposed.368 As noted earlier in the debate about the attendance of the PP Youth at 
NUSAS congresses, the Progressives were not opposed to NUSAS playing a direct political role but 
rather were concerned at the form this would take and in alliance with whom. 
How did NUSAS intend to address these challenges? In the past it had tended to rely on SRCs and 
Local Committees to further the NUSAS agenda, but evidently these could not be guaranteed. The 
president of the 1961/2 Wits SRC had supported the radical direction in policy at the 1962 congress, 
but the NUSAS leadership believed this was not out of conviction, but rather because of the 
historically radical tradition and mandate of Wits. His natural successor, Hugh Kowarsky, was of the 
post-‘open university’ generation,369 and like the president of the JCE SRC and the natural 
successor at Durban, was a Progressive (he fought the SRC election as a PP activist), and had 
opposed many of the new aspects of 1962 NUSAS policy. Thus NUSAS continued its policy begun 
after Sharpeville of creating campus pressure groups which would push the NUSAS agenda. One 
such at Wits which produced good results was the controversial Human Rights Society established 
in 1962. The Local Committees (barely functioning at for example Wits), would be shored up by 
political education and leadership programmes (already begun)370 for second and third year 
students. These would take the form of weekend regional seminars (similar to those introduced by 
the LP) which would be (secretly) funded by the United States National Student Association 
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(NSA).371 The campus Academic Freedom Committees would be responsible for general student 
political education on university apartheid, academic freedom and non-racialism. In order to retain 
general campus support, NUSAS stressed as always that attention had to be paid to advertising and 
providing practical student benefits. NUSAS’s commitment to practical benefits and education were 
extended off-campus to non-students with the introduction of a literacy programme in the Transkei 
(discussed in chapter nine) to be funded again from the USA. NUSAS was also playing a role in the 
establishment of a leadership training programme in Bechuanaland. These all added to NUSAS’s 
workload and thus the vice-presidency also became a paid full-time position funded again by the 
NSA.372 
It is quite clear that by the end of this period, NUSAS was becoming financially dependent on the 
fairly conservative United States NSA, though in terms of political orientation it was more aligned 
with African-American student civil rights organisations. There is also evidence of NUSAS cutting the 
colonial umbilical cord with Britain in the face of both the global trend towards Americanisation and 
alignment with students in the developing world. A move towards continental Europe and the 
emerging New Left is also discernible in, for example, the conscription resolution.  
Conclusion 
The events of Sharpeville, the endorsement of the national convention and active opposition to the 
Sabotage Bill transformed NUSAS into a radical organisation in terms of its leadership and policy, 
poised on pursuing a far more activist role in the eradication of apartheid. However, this activist role 
was seriously jeopardised by firstly, NUSAS’s failure to take much of its student membership with it 
(much of it had become more conservative than before) and secondly, the terms of the Sabotage Act 
which made most political action illegal and even threatened the proscription of NUSAS. NUSAS 
was fully aware of the latter and had prepared its activist base for the risks of illegal action, by, for 
example, hosting a symposium on the ethics of illegal action at the 1962 congress. However, even 
before the enactment of the Sabotage Act, the NUSAS president and international vice-president,  
Leftwich and Lewin respectively, as well as former NUSAS president Rubin had concluded, like the 
Congresses, that legal protest was futile and that something like sabotage was the only tactic 
capable of bringing about an end to apartheid. The consequences of this will be discussed in chapter 
nine.     
Nineteen sixty two marked the end of a dynasty of remarkable NUSAS leaders. It was due to these 
leaders (Wentzel, Coombe, Rubin, Shingler and Leftwich) that NUSAS in the face of ever greater 
apartheid encroachments into education had managed to weld together an organisation committed 
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to the creation of a democratic South Africa which included a political spectrum ranging from the 
Baptist students on the right to the revolutionary SACHED on the left. It would require a strong, 
experienced and battle-hardened leadership, like the one retiring from student politics, to retain this 
broad church in the face of direct state attacks on NUSAS in the forthcoming years.       
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NUSAS and the ethnic university colleges, 1960-1965 
Introduction 
Following the enactment of the Extension of University Education Act in 1959, NUSAS embarked 
on a multi-pronged programme of action aimed at, in some instances, bypassing university 
apartheid altogether, in others, mitigating its effects, or finally, making it unworkable. Firstly, the 
South African Council for Higher Education (SACHED) was established to enable black students 
to study through the University of London rather than attend the ethnic institutions. Secondly, in a 
rather symbolic gesture, the open universities and Natal would be entirely desegregated while 
simultaneously becoming exclusively white. Thirdly, NUSAS hoped that through its assistance, 
the student bodies at the new ethnic universities would make their institutions unworkable by 
provoking and staging much publicised crises. Fourthly, NUSAS would ensure that it would 
remain an open organisation and as representative of as many student bodies as possible. 
This chapter will evaluate how successful NUSAS was in firstly, retaining the support of Fort Hare 
students and gaining the affiliation of those at the new University Colleges of Zululand (Ngoye), 
Durban-Westville (Salisbury Island) and the North (Turfloop) and secondly, making these 
institutions unworkable. This chapter will demonstrate how authoritarian government control 
ensured that traditionally free student life, including affiliation to NUSAS, became impossible at all 
the ethnic colleges with the result that NUSAS activity, if any, moved underground like that of the 
banned ANC and PAC and still quasi-legal Indian Congresses. At Fort Hare and UNNE (the latter 
a springboard onto Salisbury Island), NUSAS activists were first and foremost ANC and Natal 
Indian Congress activists. This had the effect of pushing NUSAS into closer contact with the 
liberation movements, consequently radicalising the national union. Following the security 
crackdown of 1963, NUSAS increasingly filled the void left by the decimated liberation 
movements, ensuring that values like human rights and academic freedom remained in currency 
at some institutions. This chapter will also show that a combination of repression, ignorance and 
generational change ensured that a significant number of students at the ethnic universities were 
pragmatically resigned and even relatively accepting of tribal college life and were accordingly 
hostile to NUSAS values and the national union’s attempt to destabilise their institutions. This, 
combined with an assertive Africanism discernible particularly at Turfloop, influenced the 
emergence of the Black Consciousness ideology of the late 1960s. 
The desire for a separate African student organisation led to the establishment of the ANC-
aligned African Students’ Association (ASA) and the PAC-aligned African Students’ Union of 
South Africa (ASUSA). Both organisations posed a threat to NUSAS as firstly, their existence 
could lead to the haemorrhaging of NUSAS’s African members, transforming the national union 
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into a de facto white body and secondly, played into the government’s hand and its desire for 
apartheid structures. 
The expropriation of Fort Hare and retaining its affiliation 
Through its close contact with Fort Hare since its re-affiliation in 1957, and strengthened by the 
presence of committed NUSAS executive members at Rhodes like Hugh Lewin, NUSAS was 
able to keep a finger on the pulse of activities at the new Xhosa college, something it could not 
do at the other new ethnic institutions.1 
The events at Fort Hare during the early 1960s need to be understood within the context of 
African reaction and resistance to government policy and the state’s attempts to stamp out this 
resistance. Following the legislation of the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act in 1959 
which would lead to Transkeian self-government in 1963, the state accelerated its controversial 
1951 Land Betterment Scheme, abolished the fairly legitimate elected Transkeian and Ciskeian 
General Councils and began the consolidation and re-tribalisation of Eastern Cape districts into 
Bantu Authorities under compliant African chiefs.2 These measures sparked a rural revolt in the 
Transkei and Ciskei between 1960 and 1963, which pitted peasants, urban migrants, and to a 
lesser degree, adherents of the All African Convention, the ANC and even elements within the LP 
as well as a number of Fort Hare students against the government and collaborating Bantu 
Authorities chiefs.3 During the same period, African schools were wracked by serious turmoil as 
scholars resisted the manifestations of Bantu Education. Perennial issues such as subsistence 
and discipline became even more politicised than in the past in the face of increasing 
authoritarianism and deteriorating food. Fort Hare students had only superficial links to the 
Pondoland and Thembuland Uprisings (e.g. Anderson Ganyile, expelled from Fort Hare in 1960 
for his ANC activities led the Pondoland ‘Mountain Committee4) but very definite ties to Bantu 
Education schools. Fort Hare student leaders, Chris Hani,5 Barney Pityana,6 and Anderson 
Ganyile,7 had all been leading members of the banned ANCYL while at Lovedale during the late 
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1950s and early 1960s. Moreover, the ANC Eastern Cape Command instructed its Fort Hare 
members to conscientise children at the surrounding schools.8   
Despite the government takeover of Fort Hare in 1960 and the national proscription of the ANC 
shortly thereafter, the Fort Hare Youth League, unusual in that it was multi-racial,9 remained a 
formidable but increasingly underground presence on the campus.10 Govan Mbeki, of the ANC’s 
Eastern Cape Command, maintained close ties with Fort Hare students and ensured that the 
campus participated in national ANC campaigns.11 During the late 1950s, a group within the Fort 
Hare Youth League debated the efficacy of non-violence and began ‘to prepare for the eventuality 
of an armed struggle taking place’.12 With the establishment of a branch of the PAC at Fort Hare 
in 1959, there existed the possibility of the further radicalisation of the student body. However, 
unlike the militant national organisation, the Fort Hare PAC branch did not play an active role in 
campus politics but concerned itself largely with discussion groups on Pan-Africanism.13 It could 
nevertheless be relied on to support the non-collaborationist Society of Young Africa (SOYA) in its 
attacks on white liberals, collaborators and multi-racialism. However, the PAC remained part of 
the Fort Hare united front opposing university apartheid.14 
It is thus not surprising that an independent Fort Hare, built on missionary liberalism and exporting 
alien and subversive ideas to the surrounding countryside, needed to be destroyed and brought 
into line with Christian National Bantustan policy. Even before the official government 
expropriation of Fort Hare in January 1960, preparations for liberal-missionary cleansing were set 
in motion. Twenty four students, including most of the 1959 SRC, were refused re-admission to 
Fort Hare in 196015 by the Bantu Education Department which took over the application and 
admission processes.16 The students in question were apparently ‘uncooperative’ and were 
allegedly the organisers of a demonstration against the new college authorities who visited Fort 
Hare in late 195917 (discussed later). NUSAS ensured that these effective expulsions were widely 
                                                          
8 J. Smith and B. Tramp, op. cit., p. 36. 
9 ‘Stanley Mabizela April 19, 1999 Cape Town: Interview by Danny Massey’, 
www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/webpages/DC/oral19990419  accessed 22.11.2012, p. 5.   
10 D. Massey, op. cit., pp. 185, 187. 
11 T. Karis and G. Carter, From protest to challenge volume 4,  Profiles of African politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, 
Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1977, p. 84. 
12 A. Masondo, ‘Sawing electric pylons’, Dawn Souvenir Issue, 1996, pp. 21-23 cited in S. Ellis, ‘The genesis of the 
ANC’s armed struggle in South Africa 1948-1961’, Journal of Southern African Studies vol. 37 no. 4, December 2011, 
pp. 664-665. 
13 ‘Stanley Mabizela April 19, 1999 Cape Town: Interview by Danny Massey’, 
www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/webpages/DC/oral19990419  accessed 22.11.2012, p. 5; D. Massey, op. cit, p. 143. 
14 D. Massey, op. cit., p. 141. 
15 BC 586 M1, H.J. du Preez to S. Makana, s/222-11.2.1960; B1 Presidential Report 1960, p. 12, Eastern Province 
Herald, 23.2.1960; Anderson Ganyile to New Age, 25.2.1960; Witwatersrand Student, 9.8.1960.     
16 D. Williams, A history of the University College of Fort Hare, South Africa – the 1950s: the waiting years, Edward 
Mellen Press, Lewiston, Queenston and Lampeter, 2001, p. 522. 
17 BC 586 M1, ‘Summary of Press Report Appearing in the “Evening Post”, 20th Feb. 1960’. 
263 
 
publicised and was instrumental in securing places for the students concerned at either UNNE18 
or in the newly launched SACHED programme.  
After being required to complete questionnaires distributed by the Bantu Education Department 
regarding their attitudes to apartheid, etc., eight senior members of staff (all white and English-
speaking) were dismissed, as well as the wardens of the church-owned and controlled student 
residences. With the exception of the conservative Donovan Williams, professor of the 
ideologically sensitive discipline of History,19 all the victims were believed to have had close ties to 
the student body and anti-government20 LP sympathies. The elderly Z.K. Matthews was forced to 
resign from the college, forfeiting his entire pension when he refused to accept the government’s 
deliberately draconian conditions for the continuation of his tenure.21 The government in turn 
blatantly lied to the public by claiming that Matthews had resigned from the ANC to retain his Fort 
Hare position.22 Other staff members, both black and white, also resigned when they were 
presented with their new conditions of service. Black staff members and any new appointees 
were classified civil servants thus depriving them of their academic freedom and freedom of 
association.23 The contract of Burrows, the caretaker principal, was not renewed because of his 
unequivocal opposition to the expropriation of Fort Hare.24 His place was taken by a ‘rector’ with 
vastly augmented powers in the person of John Jurgens Ross, a committed member of SABRA, a 
Law lecturer at the UOFS, a former Bantu Education school inspector,25 and member of the Board 
of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church.26  
Twenty three vacant academic posts had to be filled – seventy five percent of the staff 
complement.27 To ensure ideological conformity, many of these positions were not publicly 
advertised but were filled internally by the Department of Bantu Education.28 Most of the new 
appointees were graduates of either the Afrikaans-medium universities or UNISA29 and were most 
likely government supporters. Although touted as an African university, very few black academics 
were appointed to any positions after the government takeover, leading to a decline in black staff 
numbers from thirty five percent in 1960, to nineteen percent in 1969.30 In terms of the Fort Hare 
Transfer Act (discussed in chapter five), the management of the new ethnic university was vested 
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in a newly constituted totally white Council.31 A parallel black Advisory Council,32 composed 
primarily of collaborating Bantu Authorities traditional leaders and conservative Moral 
Rearmament adherents33 was a sop to the idea of African control. Likewise, a white Senate and a 
black Advisory Senate replaced the non-racial body. These staffing and governing measures 
fundamentally altered the ideological character of Fort Hare and were instrumental in transforming 
the college into a Bantu Education institution and in the opinion of Gwala, an extension of the NP-
orientated Afrikaans-medium universities.34 
So too did the new rules and regulations that new and returning students were forced to accept as 
condition for their registration in 1960.35 In the opinion of the NUSAS president, these were more 
suited to a penal institution than a university36 and by restricting students’ freedom of movement 
and association were designed to stamp out all opposition to government policy.37 Students were 
forbidden to leave the grounds, receive visitors, be associated with any organisation, call 
meetings or issue press statements without the rector’s permission. Contravention could result in 
expulsion. Once the new regime was in place, students discovered that the library holdings were 
censored,38 church services became indoctrination events,39 collaborating wardens sat in on all 
meals,40 paid primarii or students enticed with allowances and bursaries spied on their peers or 
were threatened with the withdrawal of their scholarships if they did not.41 More disturbingly, the 
security police became an almost permanent feature of campus life.42 With the support of its 
affiliated SRCs, NUSAS publicised and protested against these conditions, both before and after 
the government takeover.43   
The NUSAS president, Rubin, visited Fort Hare during the latter part of 1959.44  It is probably for 
this reason that the NP press held NUSAS responsible for the tightly and anonymously organised 
demonstration that greeted the new administrators when they visited Fort Hare for a pre-takeover 
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inspection in October 1959.45 On arrival at a campus bedecked with inaccessible banners and 
posters and a pirate flag fluttering on the greased flagpole,46 Ross, Professor S. Pauw of UNISA 
(UNISA would replace Rhodes as the Fort Hare examining body47) and H.J. du Preez, the 
registrar-elect, were greeted by mourning, black armband-clad students who, during the course of 
the day, pelted them with eggs and tomatoes and deflated the tyres of their cars. Some of the 
staff milled around the students, enjoying the pageant.48 The government could but have no doubt 
of the opposition of Fort Hare students and some of the staff to the imminent change of status of 
their institution and so sought to nip it in the bud. The tomato and flag demonstration was the 
reason given for the refusal to readmit members of the 1959 SRC to the college in 1960.49 
Although not intended as a gesture of defiance against the forthcoming ethnicisation of the 
college, the decision of the Fort Hare Senate to enroll a record number of new students in 1959 
and, in doing so, waiving its traditional quota on coloured and Indian students, effectively meant 
that Fort Hare retained its multi-ethnic and multi-racial student body well into the 1960s. Student 
numbers swelled to almost five hundred in 1959 but shrank to three hundred and sixty the 
following year50 with only fifty new students, almost all of whom were Xhosa-speaking, admitted in 
1960.51 Many of these students were non-matriculants pursuing diploma and certificate courses.52 
As warned by all those who opposed the Fort Hare Transfer Act, student numbers were projected 
to fall even more sharply in the future (and did to two hundred in 196253) because of the ethnic 
nature of admissions54 and the abysmally small pool of African matriculants. Desperate to make 
their ethnic engineering experiment succeed, the Fort Hare authorities pursued a policy of divide 
and rule. Preferential treatment was meted out to the new first year Xhosa-speakers at the 
expense of the multi-racial and multi-ethnic majority of returning students, the latter being made to 
feel they were unwelcome and barely tolerated.55 
All eyes, both hostile and anxiously hopeful, were on Fort Hare when it opened in February 1960. 
In a bizarre - and in the light of the Separate Amenities Act and a new government directive that 
black and white were forbidden to shake hands - illegal attempt to win the support of its 
detractors, the opening function of the new ethnic Fort Hare took place at a non-racial freshers’ 
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ball hosted by the SRC. The function was opened by a processional march of new white 
‘Nationalist’ male academic staff members partnered by the (black) wives of their black 
colleagues. The SRC was to comment that this was the first, last and only non-racial social event 
ever held at the new apartheid university.56 
Elections to the SRC were traditionally held at the beginning of the academic year. Ross had 
initially decided against retaining this tradition, but because this would be grist to the anti-
government mill, was persuaded, presumably by higher authorities, to permit some form of 
student government.57 With the expulsion of most of the 1959 SRC weighing heavily upon them, 
the student body deliberated whether they should set their leadership up for victimisation but 
eventually decided that to retain the character of a ‘real’ university they should hold elections.58 
Ross informed the new SRC, chaired by Seretse Choabi, ANC and NUSAS activist (sentenced to 
Robben Island in 1964 and later ANC Secretary for Education in Zambia),59 that its task was to 
implement government policy.60 A fight ensued between the SRC and Ross about the proposed 
new SRC constitution, which the SRC could not accept.61 Again, so as to maintain a semblance of 
university life, students held their annual Fort Hare rag.62 This was met with interference by the 
Fort Hare authorities who, intent on destroying the liberal, philanthropic ethos of the old 
missionary university, confiscated the rag money meant for charity and insisted that it be used to 
provide student bursaries.63 In addition, presumably to conform to the requirements of Bantu 
Education, it was decreed that future rag magazines would appear in Xhosa, instead of English, 
with a few Afrikaans articles thrown in too.64   
The docile Xhosa tribal college hoped for and envisaged by the Fort Hare authorities would 
definitely have no place for NUSAS, viewed by the government and its supporters as an agitator 
body intent on stirring up disorder and conflict among essentially satisfied students. Among the 
students expelled in 1959, were also some NUSAS activists. Thus, early in the new year of 1960, 
NUSAS embarked on a campaign based on its anticipated proscription at Fort Hare. This would 
have the effect of drawing negative attention to the college65 and affecting its workability. 
However, the Fort Hare rector did not take the bait and publicly ban NUSAS, resulting in NUSAS 
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having to abandon its large-scale press and campus-wide protest action.66 Following 
correspondence between NUSAS and Ross, NUSAS was informed that the Fort Hare SRC was 
no longer affiliated to the national union67 because, as Ross alleged to the SRC, NUSAS was 
composed of agitators wishing to disturb the calm and order of Fort Hare. A solid united front 
coalesced around the affiliation issue with a student mass meeting calling for the reversal of 
Ross’s decision, but to no avail.68  
During a visit to the Eastern Cape shortly after Sharpeville, the NUSAS executive was able to 
meet Fort Hare student leaders in secret where it was quite clear that even those previously 
opposed to the national union were united in their opposition to Ross’s dictatorship.69 Although 
threatened with immediate arrest were he to enter the Fort Hare campus, Shingler was able to 
inform Ross, whom he caught sitting on the verandah of his home in Alice, that NUSAS regarded 
Fort Hare as an affiliated member until the student body (to whom the rector referred as ‘his 
children’) alone, and not the rector, decided otherwise.70 Security police interference and the 
searching of the NUSAS executive’s car marred the two-day trip to Alice.71 Shortly thereafter, 
Ross reiterated his earlier threat to have any Fort Hare student caught furthering the aims of 
NUSAS expelled.72 This put at risk some NUSAS (and ANC) activists like Thami Mhlambiso (later 
ANC representative in New York, an extraordinary individual cast in the mould of Mandela73 who 
together with Thabo Mbeki was Oliver Tambo’s ‘blue-eyed boy’74), and Stanley Mabizela (later of 
the ANC’s international affairs department and ambassador to Namibia in 1994).75   
Fort Hare students were forbidden to attend the 1960 NUSAS congress but were secretly present 
at the ‘select committee’ convened after the event which discussed, inter alia, further action to be 
taken against NUSAS’s banning at Fort Hare.76 This select committee transformed itself into the 
Standing Committee on Academic Freedom composed of the presidents and vice-presidents of 
NUSAS-affiliated SRCs. It would function like an American cabinet and discuss the abrogation of 
all aspects of student rights and would focus particularly on the ethnic colleges.77 This structure 
had the advantage of bringing on board NUSAS campaigns all SRCs, thus broadening and 
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legitimising NUSAS activities. However, the Standing Committee’s weakness lay in the 
conservatism of some of its members, particularly at Rhodes, Pietermaritzburg and Durban. 
These SRCs were afraid of embarking on possibly illegal activity during and shortly after the state 
of emergency78 and were in any case more concerned with white co-operation than events at Fort 
Hare and the ethnic colleges. For this reason they were kept in the dark about some of NUSAS’s 
plans.79 The further action (conspiratorially codenamed ‘tea-party’) planned by the Standing 
Committee entailed the five SRC presidents and the NUSAS executive delivering speeches in 
support of academic freedom outside the gates of Fort Hare,80 and presenting themselves at the 
rector’s office to reinstate Fort Hare’s official affiliation to NUSAS.81 The ‘tea-party’ did not go 
according to plan. With the Chettle conference on white co-operation looming on the nearby 
horizon (discussed in chapter six), the SRCs of Rhodes, Durban and Pietermaritzburg pulled out, 
as did, at the last minute, those of UCT and Wits. This left only the NUSAS executive (Shingler, 
Leftwich and Lewin) with the task of defying the ban on entering the Fort Hare campus and in so 
doing, effectively provoking a confrontation with the authorities regarding Fort Hare’s affiliation to 
the national union.82   
The ‘tea-party’ of 7 September 1960 occurred against a backdrop of escalating resistance and 
counter-resistance in the Eastern Cape. In June 1960 the ‘Mountain Committee’ at Nqusa Hill, a 
nascent state, was bloodily suppressed after rejecting Bantu Authorities. By the end of 1960, the 
Eastern Cape revolts had demanded the introduction of a universal franchise in place of tribal 
political organisation and the end of Bantu Education. Successful boycotts of white trading stores 
and non-payment of taxes followed in pursuit of these goals. At the same time, hut burning of 
traditional leaders aligned to Kaiser Matanzima, controversially claiming for himself the so-called 
paramountcy of Emigrant Thembuland, accelerated.83 Members of the LP embarked on a 
campaign to link up rural resistance with the ‘national picture’ and accordingly undertook the 
organisation of a march to Umtata, enlisting the assistance of Fort Hare students whom they met 
secretly in a forest in September 1960.84 Also coinciding with NUSAS’s September visit was the 
announcement by the ANC of its intended anti-pass campaign during the October republican 
referendum.85 In November 1960, Proclamation 400 was gazetted, imposing a state of emergency 
over the whole of the Transkei. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development explained 
that this measure would empower the chiefs to arrest ‘white communist agitators’ and ‘Patrick 
                                                          
78 BC 586 A2.1, Hugh Lewin to Ros (Traub), 9.8.1960.  
79 BC 586 A2.1, Adrian Leftwich to Hugh Lewin, 6.1.1961. 
80 BC 586 A2.1, Hugh Lewin to Adrian Leftwich nd., c. August 1960, p. 2.  
81 BC 586 M1, ‘Fort Hare Report August 1960–July 1961’, p. 1. 
82 BC 586 A2.1, John Shingler to Hugh Lewin, 21.9.1960. 
83 G. Mbeki, op. cit., pp. 116-122, 129.   
84 R. Vigne, Liberals against apartheid, op. cit., pp. 166-167. 
85 M. Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations 1959-1960, p. 73. 
269 
 
Duncan and his kindred spirits’ operating in Thembuland.86 This racist perception that Africans 
were incapable of initiating and sustaining independent political action without white involvement 
was already held by the Fort Hare authorities and the government regarding student protest and 
the role of NUSAS therein. Presumably this would have a bearing on the authority’s reaction to 
the ‘NUSAS tea-party’ too. 
Once the NUSAS executive had arrived on campus, Ross reluctantly allowed the Fort Hare SRC 
to meet the visitors in his office but during this very heated meeting refused the request of both 
the SRC, and later the student body, that the NUSAS leaders address a student mass meeting. 
NUSAS was accused of inciting the student body and was alleged to have been responsible for 
the tomatoes thrown at the visiting delegation the previous year.87 The executive was 
subsequently ordered off the campus but later that day did manage to address the student body 
outside the university despite security police presence. NUSAS pledged its continued support to 
Fort Hare students and re-iterated its opposition to university apartheid. Likewise, the mass 
meeting confirmed its loyalty to NUSAS and discussed general conditions on the campus.88 
However, the student body was reluctant, fearful and too disgruntled with NUSAS to take any 
militant action after the Standing Committee had reneged on its undertaking to come to Fort Hare. 
However, Mhlambiso, the newly elected NUSAS vice-president, managed to persuade them 
otherwise.89 
After NUSAS’s departure the campus was in uproar. A further mass meeting was held at which 
the student body successfully forced the reluctant and frightened rector, who brought his Senate 
Executive Committee with him for protection, to attend and answer their grievances. These 
included the banning of NUSAS, the flouting by the authorities of the SRC constitution, the 
transformation of the SRC into little more than a puppet body, the expulsion of the 1959 student 
leadership, the authoritarianism and lack of freedom on the campus, and the rector’s public 
condonement of police action at Sharpeville and Langa enunciated at the recent SABRA 
conference. Moreover, Ross was censured for withdrawing the SRC’s financial autonomy, his 
failure to rectify students’ grievances regarding the library and more importantly, his insistence 
that wardens sit in on meals and spy on students in the dining room.90 Ross was called on to 
resign, but he refused. The SRC, no longer prepared to be a puppet, dissolved itself. Ross 
pleaded with them to reconsider this decision and promised to draw up a new constitution, but to 
no avail. The student body voted to suspend lectures and embarked on a boycott of the dining 
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hall.91 Chaos erupted and, after a hated dining room warden was wounded by flying cutlery, the 
rector suspended classes too. The authorities attempted unsuccessfully to deflect attention away 
from the loss of student rights and autonomy of the SRC by publicly projecting the crisis as one 
stemming from ill-discipline in the dining halls.92 Ross went to Pretoria for advice and in the 
meantime, all students were given twenty four hours in which to sign a declaration of conduct, 
failing which they would be expelled. A mass meeting voted to ignore the declaration but this was 
subsequently rescinded when armed riot police arrived in Alice. Eventually the whole cowed and 
fearful student body93 ‘capitulated’ in the words of the disappointed NUSAS president, the last 
person to sign being an overwrought Mhlambiso.94  
The SABC announced that the students’ demand for a new constitution would be met.95 This and 
the arrival of the police on campus demonstrate how important the state considered the success 
and functioning of the new ethnic colleges to be. The Afrikaans student press expressed its 
concern at the suspension of classes worrying that this indicated the failure of the ethnic 
colleges.96 At the opposite end of the political spectrum, progressive student observers hopefully, 
but in the end wrongfully, believed that the crisis at Fort Hare coupled with the fewer than 
expected registrations had made the whole system of tribal colleges unworkable and unviable.97 
As the NUSAS executive had hoped, the student bodies at the NUSAS-affiliated campuses 
voiced their sympathy and support for the plight of their Fort Hare counterparts and denounced 
the actions of the college’s authorities. SRCs passed strong resolutions decrying the abrogation 
of Fort Hare student rights which flowed from university apartheid and significantly, some moved 
beyond the narrow limits of apartheid education and demanded the implementation of democratic 
government in South Africa.98 In addition, UCT students held both a mass meeting and a sit-in 
protest.99 The Fort Hare and Rhodes authorities accused the conservative and intimidated 
Rhodes SRC, which was becoming progressively more opposed to NUSAS, of fermenting the 
Fort Hare crisis. This followed the interception by the security police of telephone calls made to 
Fort Hare from the SRC offices by Lewin, the NUSAS vice-president at Rhodes.100 
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For Fort Hare, the result of the ‘September crisis’ was a tightening of restrictions and further 
limitations on freedom of speech and movement.101 Twenty five students were threatened with 
expulsion.102 Then, following orders from Pretoria, Mhlambiso, NUSAS vice-president and ANC 
activist, was expelled from the college for insubordination in early 1961 despite the intervention of 
the Fort Hare Senate103 and an attempted but ineffectual weak demonstration mounted by 
frightened and intimidated students.104    
For NUSAS, the ‘tea-party’ campaign was a qualified success. In the opinion of Shingler, it lacked 
some legitimacy because of the absence of the SRC presidents, was not sufficiently organised, its 
goals were not properly spelt out and there was insufficient clarity on what would actually be done 
on the campus. Shingler believed that the campaign had raised NUSAS’s profile with the Fort 
Hare student body and amongst black students generally.105 This view is shared by Winston 
Nagan, a Fort Hare student during this period who argued that with the banning of the liberation 
movements, Fort Hare students and particularly those who were members of the ‘Fort Hare 
resistance’ (not spelt out by Nagan, though Masondo refers to ‘the Group of Seven’) valued the 
association with NUSAS as it ‘allowed them to reconnect with forces committed to the broader 
struggle against apartheid’.106 Working with the Fort Hare resistance pushed NUSAS into closer 
contact with the liberation movements. This was inevitable in any case because NUSAS activists 
at Fort Hare were almost always, and then first and foremost, ANCYL activists. While overseas, 
Shingler was to report on events at Fort Hare to the newly exiled Oliver Tambo whom he met at a 
conference. At the other end of the spectrum, Shingler believed that the Fort Hare ‘tea-party’ had 
probably further alienated conservative whites as well as the security police and the cabinet, 
confirming their suspicions that NUSAS was an agitator organisation of ‘fellow travelers’.107 Both 
the NP-supporting Die Burger and Die Oosterlig held NUSAS responsible for events at Fort 
Hare.108 
On the basis of the qualified success of the ‘tea-party’ and the anticipated national security 
crackdown in the new-year, Shingler decided that NUSAS would hold no demonstrations or 
confrontations at Fort Hare in 1961. This was evidently not the view of Leftwich, the incoming 
1961 president who planned to keep Fort Hare on the boil and confront university apartheid 
directly. With the state of emergency operating in the Transkei, and Fort Hare resembling a mini-
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police state with informers,109 search-lights110 and constant police surveillance, together with the 
suspected tampering of NUSAS mail, this had to be done clandestinely. NUSAS correspondence 
used code names for people and activities and safe addresses to avoid security branch detection. 
Meetings between Rhodes NUSAS activists and their Fort Hare counterparts were under the 
guise of Toc H111(a Christian men’s movement established in the UK in the 1920s) while NUSAS 
operatives secretly met Fort Hare student leaders outside the campus or lay low on the rugby field 
until detected by the police floodlights. 
The 1961 campaign was dubbed ‘the jazz concert’ with various operatives assigned different 
musical instruments to drown out ‘the classics’, the state.112 From what can be gauged from the 
correspondence, the overture to the ‘grand closing concert’ would be a reception on the Fort Hare 
campus for Z.K. Matthews, newly elected NUSAS honorary vice-president.113 This would be 
jointly hosted by NUSAS and the Fort Hare Alumni Association114 during March/April 1961,115 the 
date also of the anticipated Sharpeville commemoration. This reception would presumably be the 
catalyst needed to ignite the intimidated and apathetic student body to radical action. However, 
this plan was hobbled in a number of ways and was thus abandoned. Firstly, Matthews was 
reluctant to be used in such a potentially provocative fashion116 and moreover believed that it 
would impact negatively on NUSAS.117 Secondly, the whole reception was turned into a damp 
squib when the Fort Hare student leadership made the tactical error of requesting Ross’s 
permission to collect money for Matthews and then being allowed to present it to him at his home 
and not on the campus as originally intended.118  
During a secret meeting in the Fort Hare countryside which entailed giving the security police the 
slip, NUSAS and Fort Hare activists hatched a second plan.119 Leading ‘jazzmen’ would make 
themselves available for election to an SRC based on Ross’s flawed and rejected new 
constitution. Once elected, they would engineer a crisis based on the loss of student rights. This 
crisis, it was hoped, would activate the intimidated student body into taking militant action, which 
would then link up with the All-In Conference’s anti-Republican and national convention stay-away 
at the end of May 1961.120 Fort Hare students had earlier refused to elect an SRC based on the 
new constitution because this implied acceptance of tribal college status and could lead to the 
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victimisation of SRC members.121 However, the dangerous possibility that the group of students 
arranging social functions on the campus might be persuaded by Ross to form an SRC called for 
a revision of the earlier principled non-collaboration stand. NUSAS would not give advice on the 
merits of the ‘SRC-election-crisis-engineering’ plan because of the dangers involved to those 
participating but did pledge its support for any action that the students might take. It also offered 
to help procure alternative university placements in the event of the plan being implemented and 
the leadership being expelled. Before any final decision was taken, the organisers were expected 
to consult the ANCYL as well as ‘certain people in PE’,122 presumably Govan Mbeki. In the event, 
this SRC plan was overtaken by the crisis ensuing from the meeting on the campus of Fort Hare’s 
new Advisory Council on 13 April 1961.  
Following a complaint by Kaiser Matanzima, a member of the Advisory Council and head of the 
Transkei Bantu Authorities, that Stanley Mabizela had called him a ‘polecat’, Ross summarily 
expelled Mabizela. Mabizela denied this accusation but informed Ross that he had had a heated 
argument with Saul Mabude,123 about his collaboration with Bantu Authorities and his refusal to 
explain to a student mass meeting his membership of the Advisory Council. In the process 
Mabizela had called Mabude a ‘sellout’. Ross alleged that any criticism of government policy was 
insubordination and thus warranted expulsion. Following an illegal mass meeting convened by  
Choabi and Martin (Chris) Hani, the student body stormed en masse into Ross’s office demanding 
the immediate non-negotiable reversal of the expulsion order as it was an abrogation of 
fundamental human rights. Ross refused to consider this and the students embarked on an all-
encompassing strike, calling even on the workers to down tools.124 The black academic staff 
pleaded with Ross to rescind the order and he eventually agreed on condition that Mabizela send 
a letter of apology to Matanzima. The NUSAS president, among others, suggested he do this as it 
would be ‘suicidal’ to be expelled and would probably lead to the expulsion of other activists 
(Mhlambiso) too.125 The real ‘culprit’ was in fact Griffiths Mxenge, then considered an ANC 
‘lightweight’126(later a leader of the NUSAS branch and brutally murdered by the apartheid 
regime127) for whom, Mabizela surmised, the student body was unlikely to rally. By taking the 
blame, Mabizela was able to provoke the student body to the desired radical action. It was 
believed that Mabizela’s expulsion had been engineered by the Fort Hare authorities and their 
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humiliating failure in achieving this, provoked them into taking harsh action against the anti-
Republic stay-away which occurred a few weeks later.128 
Amidst a massive security police clampdown nationally and on the campus in the run-up to the 
declaration of the Republic, the Fort Hare student body again prevailed on the college workers to 
down tools while they themselves embarked on a hundred percent three day boycott of classes. 
The police swooped onto the campus, the college was closed and all the students sent home.129 
(See chapter six.) For those working towards the failure of the ethnic colleges, this was a moral 
victory, and for the government, which was trying to mitigate this by broadcasting propaganda on 
the SABC, a monumental failure.130 For NUSAS, this was the militant action that it had sought to 
provoke. The extreme response of the Fort Hare authorities to the boycott was used by NUSAS to 
drum up further publicity against the inadequacies of university apartheid. All NUSAS-affiliated 
SRCs and academic freedom committees were requested to take a stand on the Fort Hare 
issue.131 As discussed in chapter six, Rhodes responded magnificently with its own sympathy 
stay-away,132 but as also noted, much of this militancy was stimulated by anti-Republicanism 
rather than a rejection of apartheid. The UCT SRC issued a statement ‘deploring the closing of 
the college’ which it argued, ‘was glaring evidence of the failure of the government’s policy of 
university apartheid’.133 UNNE’s denounced the suppression of the rights of students to 
participate in the affairs of the country.134 In weighing up the success of the response to the 
closure, Adrian Leftwich concluded that a victory had not been won as the SRCs had not come up 
as strongly as anticipated.135 Because of the security situation pertaining during the inauguration 
of the Republic, protest meetings about Fort Hare were banned too.136 There was, in addition, a 
tremendous fear that the extraordinarily brave actions of the Fort Hare student leadership would 
lead to reprisal and mass expulsions. 
When Fort Hare re-opened in July 1961, everyone was allowed to return, much to NUSAS’s 
surprise. Moreover, the authorities adopted a surprisingly conciliatory attitude towards the student 
body, evidently in a desperate attempt to stabilise and normalise the situation. However, three 
students were interrogated by the police regarding their role in the anti-Republican strike at 
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Lovedale and eventually the entire Fort Hare student body (to its aghast and aggrieved 
indignation) was held responsible for the events which had led to the closure of the high school on 
two occasions.137   
Bantu Education was a key component of government policy and one of its aims was to impose 
control over the youth. By 1961 Bantu Education was in turmoil, particularly in the Transkei where 
Govan Mbeki believed it was failing. Teachers were reluctant to impose discipline and traditional 
leaders refused the government’s plea that they step in to restore order.138 Moreover, school 
children responded enthusiastically to the All-In Conference’s call for the anti-Republican stay-
away139 while the Pondoland revolt rejected not only Bantu Authorities but Bantu Education too. It 
is thus not surprising that the state acted harshly against any Fort Hare students who actively 
opposed and fanned opposition to these measures as, for example, in the separate cases of  
Mabizela and Bantu Authorities and Lovedale’s closure. 
Provoking opposition to university apartheid and NUSAS’s banning on the campus was still 
NUSAS’s aim after Fort Hare re-opened in July 1961. The Z.K. Matthews reception was 
reinstated as its vehicle even though Matthews was still reluctant to be part of something which 
could impact negatively on NUSAS.140 The party, at Lovedale Theological College, was attended 
by most of the NUSAS executive, NUSAS activists at Rhodes, part of the Fort Hare student body, 
alumni and old staff, as well as the security police, the latter uninvited and peering in through the 
windows.141 The mass meeting, the main purpose of the reception,142 passed a resolution of no-
confidence in the tribal college rectors and called on them to resign, but this was subsequently 
withdrawn by the fearful and intimidated student body.143 
Despite this apparent fear and apathy on the part of the student body, Fort Hare insiders 
optimistically believed that ‘the walls’ of apartheid education were ‘cracking’ and in a desperate 
attempt to retain the viability of the numerically shrinking Xhosa college, the rector was granting 
many concessions.144 On the basis of this information, NUSAS decided that 1962 should be the 
year of defying Ross’s banning of NUSAS and that a ‘solid front of opposition must be shown’ by 
all the affiliated centres. No particular plan of action was finalised but it was tentatively suggested 
that NUSAS invade the campus and create an issue at a mass meeting. This would then be taken 
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to Ross. Some NUSAS leaders were sensitive to the accusations which came from both the 
government and some sections of the Fort Hare student body that it was an agitator organisation 
which just came to the campus to export revolution and thus insisted that the initiative should be 
taken by the Fort Hare students themselves.145   
Apart from the fact that NUSAS was banned at Fort Hare, it faced a number of obstacles in 
implementing its plan. Firstly, the student body was deeply divided and wracked with conflict.146 
Generational change and government policy had substantially altered the nature of the student 
body by 1962. Many new students were reasonably happy with college life, were depoliticised and 
ignorant of both NUSAS and other organisations and thus unwilling to embark on militant action. 
In other words, they were set to become the docile student body dreamed of by the university 
authorities.147 In the absence of an SRC, some of these new students had, to Ross’s delight, 
taken it upon themselves the task of organising campus social activities.148 A significant number 
of mainly pre-1960 students remained implacably opposed to anything approaching 
collaboration149 and thus, with the strong support of NUSAS, decided to disrupt the collaborating 
student committee and its cosy relationship with the rector.150 In addition, throughout 1961 and 
1962, the college authorities experienced passive resistance aimed at making the system 
unworkable.151 Students coughed rudely when Ross spoke, boycotted church services, which had 
become indoctrination sessions,152 and even threw stones at the cinema. Some of the non-
collaborators still favoured the revival of the SRC under Ross’s flawed constitution so as to 
provide leadership to the bickering and intimidated student body and also to preserve the 
character of the pre-1960 Fort Hare.153 Nothing however came of this and instead militant student 
leaders turned to the banned liberation movements for direction.154  
During the second half of 1961, when the ANC was preparing itself for sabotage, a parallel 
development occurred at Fort Hare. A radical anti-collaboration body came into existence at the 
college with the aim of ‘prevent[ing] Fort Hare being turned into a tribal college in spirit’ and 
‘restor[ing]…the solidarity that [had] existed in the past’.155 This organisation, the Force Publique 
was presumably named after the Congolese colonial army which had mutinied against its white 
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officers at the time of independence. This naming perhaps signified the inspirational nature of the 
Congolese struggle for national liberation for Fort Hare students as well as the parallels students 
discerned between their own situation with the Fort Hare authorities and those of the oppressed 
but fighting Congolese. At the same time as the establishment of the Force Publique, the 
underground cell system, the M-Plan, initiated by Mandela in the early 1950’s in anticipation of the 
ANC’s banning, was adopted at Fort Hare too.156 It was allegedly through the Force Publique that 
the M-Plan was introduced.157 This impacted on NUSAS too. As radical student politics moved 
underground, there was no longer any open discussion or any organised body to provide 
leadership to the mass of Fort Hare students158 and so implement NUSAS’s plan of action for 
1962. Moreover, by 1962 many of the older generation of students were so disillusioned with tribal 
college life that they were aiming at graduating and getting out of Fort Hare as soon as 
possible,159 while some ANC activists were preparing to go into exile. All of these factors 
exacerbated the ANC and NUSAS leadership vacuum developing at Fort Hare. On the other 
hand, the fact that Fort Hare NUSAS activists were primarily ANC activists who channeled their 
energies into underground ANC work160 could only have had a radicalising effect on NUSAS 
policy. It was NUSAS’s experience at Fort Hare, and also the University of the North (discussed 
later), that influenced the decision of the 1962 congress to put into practice the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and adopt a more militant activist policy. 
NUSAS’s militant action planned for Fort Hare in 1962 hit other obstacles too. From late 1961, 
Fort Hare students displayed ‘antagonistic apathy’ towards NUSAS.161 Some were disillusioned 
because despite militant action, university apartheid remained in place.162 Others were too 
frightened and intimidated to be associated with an organisation proscribed on the campus which 
many believed did nothing other than ‘import revolutions’ to the campus.163 Very few students 
attended the NUSAS meeting convened after the Fort Hare graduation in Grahamstown while  
Mhlambiso, the NUSAS vice-president then based at UNNE, was advised of the futility of visiting 
the Fort Hare campus as NUSAS was dead there and all its structures had collapsed.164 On the 
basis of this and other information procured from those in the know at the college, Mhlambiso 
concluded that were Fort Hare students ‘still prepared to put up a fight’, it would not be for 
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NUSAS.165 Mhlambiso observed too that much opposition and apathy was displayed towards 
organisations other than NUSAS too,166 including the ANC and its newly established student 
organisation, the African Students’ Association (discussed later in this chapter) the latter which 
visited Fort Hare in May 1962.167 NUSAS decided that it would still maintain contact with Fort 
Hare and champion its struggles even though it had lost the support of the student body.168 
Early in July 1962, NUSAS officials visited Fort Hare and managed to revitalise the national union 
on the campus.169 However, the level of this support was soon tested with the second visit to the 
campus of the Unity Movement’s Cape Peninsula Students’ Union (CPSU)170 propagating its new 
radical student organisation, the Progressive National Students’ Organisation (PNSO). Probably 
having a bearing on the creation of PSNO, was the formation of the African Peoples’ Democratic 
Union of South Africa (APDUSA) in 1961. This was a semi-clandestine, though mass-based 
revolutionary socialist liberation movement affiliated to the NEUM, which had flowed out of a post-
Sharpeville initiative of the Western Cape branch of SOYA. APDUSA won a significant following 
in Eastern Mpondoland and in Sekhukhuneland as well as the support of the Durban Student 
Union.171 It can be assumed then that PSNO was associated with APDUSA too.  
Adherents of PSNO attacked NUSAS bitterly in both 1961 and 1962, claiming that it was funded 
by the Chamber of Mines and was the student wing of an unnamed political party,172 probably the 
LP. NUSAS was deeply concerned about this turn of events and left no stone unturned in its fight 
to retain Fort Hare’s affiliation. Shortly after the conclusion of the landmark 1962 NUSAS 
congress, Leftwich and Basil Moore, president and president-elect respectively, returned to Fort 
Hare and laid out NUSAS’s newly adopted radical activist policy. Despite a very long and heated 
meeting during which Fort Hare students told NUSAS officials that they did not trust them and that 
as a white organisation NUSAS could not really understand African concerns,173 Leftwich 
concluded (surprisingly) that NUSAS was held in very high esteem at the college. However, to 
retain this status, it would have to implement its new activist policy otherwise it would quite 
justifiably be guilty of making empty pious statements.174 Fort Hare adherents of PSNO accused 
                                                          
165 BC 586 A2.2, Thami Mhlambiso to Adrian Leftwich, 18.4.1962. 
166 ibid., 5.6.1962. 
167 ibid., BC 586 A2.2, Adrian Leftwich to Thami Mhlambiso, 26.6.1962. 
168 BC 586 A2.2, Adrian Leftwich to Thami Mhlambiso, 8.5.1962. 
169 BC 586 B1 Presidential Report 1963, ‘Fort Hare Report July-December 1962’, p. 1. 
170 One of the visitors was Archie Mafeje, a Master’s student in Anthropology at UCT. BC 586 B1 Presidential Report 
1963, ‘Fort Hare Report July-December 1962’, p. 1. NUSAS would later protest vehemently against the decision of the 
UCT authorities to bow to government pressure and revoke the appointment of Mafeje to a senior lectureship in 
Anthropology at the university. This will be discussed in chapter ten. 
171 R. Kayser and M. Adhikari, op. cit., pp. 321, 324-325, 328, 333-334.   
172 BC 586 B1 Vice-President’s Report 1962, pp. 1-2; Presidential Report 1963, ‘Fort Hare Report July-December 
1962’, p. 1; B3 Executive Minutes 1961, Annexure 1, ‘Strictly Confidential’, p. 7; B4.1, Adrian Leftwich to the Executive, 
13.9.1961; 4.10.1961, p. 4. 
173 Rhodeo vol. 16 no. 9, 15.8.1962. 
174 BC 586 A2.1, Adrian Leftwich to Derek Bostock, 15.8.1962, p. 4. 
279 
 
NUSAS of stealing PSNO’s policy175 and subsequently engineered the student body’s 
disaffiliation from NUSAS in August 1962.176 A follow-up mass meeting to overturn this decision 
had to be abandoned following its disruption by PSNO supporters and the possibility of violence 
breaking out. Ultimately a petition reaffirmed Fort Hare’s affiliation to NUSAS,177 much to the 
national union’s relief. NUSAS had feared that Fort Hare’s alignment with the racially exclusive, 
anti-NUSAS and anti-collaborationist PSNO would play directly into the government’s hands. 
Moreover, NEUM members were traditionally armchair politicians who eschewed all political 
activity (though APDUSA broke this mould) and thus a majority of PSNO adherents at Fort Hare 
would ensure that the student body became the politically docile entity so longed for by the 
college’s apartheid authorities.178 It was quite possible given the level of security police activity 
and spying at Fort Hare that became evident after the arrests of 1963-4179 (discussed later) that 
the authorities had infiltrated PSNO too, so as to sow dissension on the campus and thereby 
weaken all political forces. 
Rooting out all radical political opposition was the aim of the South African government when it 
embarked on a massive nation-wide security crackdown from June 1963. This was in the wake of 
the PAC’s campaign to liberate South Africa in 1963, the ANC’s sabotage campaign, as well as 
potential resistance to and disruption of Transkei’s imminent self-government. Armed with the 
Suppression of Communism, Unlawful Organisations and General Law Amendment Acts, as well 
as a phalanx of newly recruited informers,180 thousands of people were detained for up to one 
hundred and eighty days often enduring interrogation under torture. Many were released without 
facing any charges, but were often subsequently banned under the Suppression of Communism 
Act. Others were charged with and usually convicted of a number of offences, the most common 
being membership of and pursuing the goals of a banned political organisation181 and, as in the 
case of the Rivonia trial of Umkhonto we Sizwe’s high command, sabotage.  
Between 1962 and 1965, fifteen Fort Hare students were convicted of sabotage and of being 
members of either the ANC or the PAC, while many more (eighteen in 1964 alone)182 were 
detained for varying lengths of time and for varying reasons, including being members of NUSAS. 
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The first casualty was Rex Lupondwana, a first year student, who with the permission of the 
leader of the ANC’s Victoria East Sabotage Unit, Andrew Masondo, a Mathematics lecturer at 
Fort Hare, was found guilty of petrol bombing the house of his police informer and Lovedale 
teacher. His accomplice and Fort Hare room-mate, Viwe Rhelu, was not arrested at the time183 
but was refused readmission to Fort Hare in 1963. Fort Hare students were permitted by Ross to 
provide food for Lupondwana in prison, but Ross warned the students that he was aware of 
NUSAS activity on campus, which the students defiantly confirmed. It would seem that NUSAS 
paid for Lupondwana’s legal defense.184 The 1963 NUSAS congress initiated a ‘Political Freedom 
Fund’ under the auspices of its ‘Academic Freedom Committee’, which would provide legal and 
material assistance to detainees and their dependents.185 
In March 1963, Andrew Masondo and three Fort Hare student members of his Sabotage Unit 
were arrested for sawing down an electricity node and plunging the surrounding area, including 
Fort Hare, into darkness.186 Police, ‘armed to the teeth’ swooped onto the campus to arrest the 
three students, much to the distress of the traumatised student body who cancelled their freshers’ 
ball in sympathy with their colleagues undergoing ‘third degree’.187 Angry that the authorities had 
not protected the students, the student body marched on the rector’s office to demand the 
rectification of their grievances. The authorities continued to collaborate with the police. Shortly 
after this, two students were arrested on the campus by the police and the assistant registrar and 
were charged with being members of a banned organisation.188 Ross became difficult too and 
refused to allow the student body to raise funds for Masondo’s wife and their five children. 
Ultimately Masondo was sentenced to twelve years hard labour on Robben Island while his 
student accomplices received eight and nine years respectively.189  
It was long prison sentences like these imposed on students, which led to the establishment of 
NUSAS’s ‘Prison Education Scheme’. This initiative flowed out of SACHED and enabled students 
to continue their studies while in prison, NUSAS sourcing the funding for fees and books from 
overseas student unions. Bizarrely, given the brutal and sadistic manner in which political 
prisoners were often treated, the prison authorities permitted the operation of this scheme but 
insisted that all letters would be censored. In the midst of the Rivonia Trial, Bram Fischer, the 
counsel for the accused and by then the most senior SACP/MK operative still at large, expecting 
that his clients like Nelson Mandela would receive life sentences (if they escaped the death 
penalty) approached Maeder Osler, NUSAS vice-president, about extending NUSAS’s Prison 
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Education Scheme to non-students. To this NUSAS agreed and enlisted the services of Imperial 
Correspondence School and the University of London to effect this.190 Over the following twenty 
six years, as attested to by Nelson Mandela, the scheme assisted many scores of political 
prisoners and later ordinary ones too in furthering their education.191 One of its first beneficiaries 
was Rivonia trialist, Andrew Mlangeni, confined on Robben Island192 with Andrew Masondo.  
Masondo was arrested one month prior to his planned assassination of the hated Kaiser 
Matanzima, Pretoria’s Bantu Authorities henchman. Matanzima, together with M. De Wet Nel, 
Minister of Bantu Education, was to be the guest of honour at apartheid Fort Hare’s first 
graduation ceremony under the auspices of its new examining body, UNISA, in April 1963.193 This 
graduation occurred against the background not only of a national security crackdown, but also 
the changing status of the Transkei, which potentially had a bearing on Fort Hare’s future too. In 
January 1963, the Transkei Constitution Bill, which was the enabling legislation for Transkeian 
self-government, was, after a long delay, introduced in the South African parliament. The delay 
was caused first of all by opposition to self-government within the NP,194 as well as, to the dismay 
of the government, to the surprising rejection of the Pretoria-drafted apartheid constitution by the 
majority of traditional leaders in the Transkei and Ciskei Territorial Authority who favoured a non-
racial dispensation. Pretoria left it to Kaiser Matanzima to railroad the unpopular draft constitution 
through the various tribal bodies.195 As far as Fort Hare was concerned, rumours had been in 
circulation since 1959 that the college, which was deemed to be situated in a white group area, 
was to be relocated to the Transkei. In addition, its imposing infrastructure would be transformed 
into the headquarters of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development from where 
the apartheid authorities could keep a watchful eye over the self-governing Transkei and the 
African territories of the Eastern Cape.196 However, evidently afraid of the consequences of 
transferring the as yet not fully subdued Fort Hare student body to the uncertain and untested 
control of the Transkei, the South African government abandoned this plan in May 1963.197 
In April 1963, coinciding with the Fort Hare graduation, Verwoerd announced that elections to the 
Transkeian parliament would take place that year too. It was not surprising then that Fort Hare 
students voted to boycott the 1963 graduation because their attendance at the event would have 
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lent an air of legitimacy to university apartheid and tribalism. In an effort to prevent what was 
threatening to become a public relations embarrassment to the ethnic university, Ross compelled 
students to apply for tickets to the occasion. However, this attempt at intimidation and threat of 
victimisation of those who did not attend was not successful as the student boycott was total.198 
Graduation boycotts would become a recurring event in Fort Hare’s subsequent history and at 
other tribal colleges too. The 1964 Fort Hare graduation boycott199 was largely the handiwork of 
NUSAS activists and generated much anger against the student body and NUSAS by the 
humiliated Fort Hare staff. NUSAS activists were subsequently placed under close observation.200 
From late 1963 onwards, NUSAS at Fort Hare and black students in NUSAS generally, became 
the target of government reprisals.201 In the context of the general security crackdown aimed at 
paralyzing the liberation movements, the government evidently suspected that NUSAS activists 
were in fact ANC activists. This suspicion was borne out in many cases as a number of ANC 
cadres, including the 1963 NUSAS Local Committee chairperson, Nagan, were able to use their 
NUSAS positions as a cover for their illegal ANC activities.202 However, targeting black NUSAS 
members also coincided with a clampdown on Eastern Cape LP activists (like the banning of 
Rhodes Philosophy lecturer, Terrence Beard, who was dismissed from Fort Hare in 1959), who 
were campaigning with the Democratic Party of Victor Poto for a non-racial Transkei during the 
Transkeian elections of November 1963.203 In two separate incidents at the end of 1963, two Fort 
Hare students – one returning from a NUSAS regional seminar - were detained by the security 
police and interrogated under torture on a variety of subjects including the activities and 
membership of NUSAS.204 In August 1964, four Fort Hare NUSAS leaders were detained 
following their public denunciation of detention without trial, including that of NUSAS president, 
Jonty Driver205 (discussed in chapter nine). The four ‘moderates’206 included Choabi, a ‘brilliant’ 
master’s student and former SRC president, Sam Nolutshungu, the chairperson of the Local 
NUSAS Committee and leading NCFS member, later appointed vice-chancellor of Wits and 
Stephen Gawe vice-president of the Anglican Students Federation and son of the ANC’s 
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chaplain-general.207 Though they were eventually convicted of furthering the aims of the ANC208 - 
Andrew Masondo was brought back from Robben Island to stand trial with them and others like 
Mabizela209 - in the students’ eyes, this was proof that being part of NUSAS was too dangerous to 
risk.210 This perception was probably further reinforced following another two incidents. The Local 
Committee chairperson was arrested for ‘obstructing the ends of justice’211 while Mhlambiso was 
banned under the Suppression of Communism Act, largely for his NUSAS activities according to 
NUSAS president, Driver.212     
By mid-1964, NUSAS was still popular and operational at Fort Hare but was in a state of slow 
terminal decline. Many students were too afraid to associate themselves with the organisation213 
or were successfully indoctrinated by Bantu Education and thus bowed to the authority’s hostility 
to the national union.214 Moreover, much of NUSAS’s leadership215 (and that of the ANC’s too) 
had left the university, mostly because they had graduated, but some because they were in prison 
or had secretly left the country to join the underground organisations in exile.216 With the massive 
infiltration of informers at a national level and at Fort Hare too from 1963 onwards,217 NUSAS 
moved underground and adopted what was effectively the ANC’s M-Plan. Students were recruited 
individually to cells of between six and seven members and would meet secretly to discuss typical 
NUSAS concerns such as human rights and academic freedom.218  
Fort Hare students were active consumers of NUSAS benefits such as the Loan Fund and the 
discount booklets and, of course, the newly established Political Freedom Fund, renamed the 
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more innocuous ‘Defense and Aid’. For those wishing to enroll at an overseas university, or 
needing to flee the country in a hurry, overseas scholarships, administered in South Africa by 
NUSAS, were available too.219 NUSAS had procured these largely through its contacts within the 
international student movement and at universities abroad. Although NUSAS operated 
underground, these student benefits were publicly advertised in the student residences with no 
untoward consequences.220 This was possibly because Ross had informed NUSAS in 1960 that 
although Fort Hare students could not be affiliated to the national union, they could utilise its 
benefits. This situation was tactically unacceptable to NUSAS but nonetheless all of its services 
remained secretly accessible to Fort Hare students.221 Not surprisingly then, a large proportion of 
the student body did become individual members of NUSAS although for security purposes no 
membership lists were compiled during 1963 and 1964.222  
Resorting to individual enrolment changed the whole nature of Fort Hare’s association with 
NUSAS. This effectively meant that the student body, through its SRC, which did not exist, was 
no longer affiliated to the national union as in the past. Traditionally NUSAS had pursued strong 
centre-SRC affiliation but the merits of the weak individual membership system were becoming 
increasingly discernible to NUSAS in the changed political and security situation. Individual 
enrolment made for more committed cadres and would put to an end the intermittent, bruising and 
destabilising bids for disaffiliation of the past. During a secret mass meeting in 1964 attended by 
the NUSAS president, Jonty Driver, those present affirmed their affiliation to the national union. 
NUSAS’s detractors questioned the legitimacy of this but were informed that this affirmation 
conveyed the views of NUSAS members only and was not binding on the rest of the student 
body223 nor for that matter, the non-existent SRC. On various occasions after 1962 and again in 
March 1964, Fort Hare students had considered reinstating the SRC but in each instance had 
concluded that such a body would be a puppet collaborative institution224 (an argument which the 
NUSAS executive dismissed) and more importantly, would result in the victimisation of its officers. 
Thus the underground NUSAS committee elected by NUSAS members became the de facto 
SRC.225 In this environment of clandestine activity, no mass meetings under the auspices of 
NUSAS could be held on the campus226 but occasionally NUSAS members did meet in the forest 
outside university property. In March 1964, the NUSAS executive was unable to meet any 
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students during a visit to Alice227 while in 1965, it was advised not to come at all.228 Contact 
between Rhodes NUSAS activists and their Fort Hare counterparts also collapsed.229 In 1964, 
Rhodes NUSAS activists ceased visiting Alice because they were afraid that they were being 
watched and could thus endanger the Fort Hare students seen in their company.230 Even 
meetings in Grahamstown came to an abrupt end when the 1963 and 1964 NUSAS Directors for 
the Eastern Cape, Lorna Symington and Gillian Gane, fell victim to the African Resistance 
Movement crackdown in July 1964231 (discussed in chapter nine). On three separate occasions in 
1963, Templeton Mdalana, a former Fort Hare student and ANC activist employed by NUSAS to 
pilot its Transkei literacy project, was unable to even set foot in Alice before he was recognised by 
state security personnel, let alone enter the campus where the security police were almost 
permanently camped out. Alternative arrangements for retaining contact with Fort Hare were set 
in motion in 1964 when NUSAS attempted to establish a branch at the seminary adjacent to the 
university. 
In 1963, the Federal Theological Seminary of Southern Africa (Fedsem), was opened in Alice by 
the Anglican, Methodist, Congregational and Presbyterian Churches for the training of black 
ministers.232 Both the Anglican and Methodist Churches had had their respective seminaries in 
Johannesburg and Natal closed by the government under the Group Areas Act, and moreover, 
along with the Presbyterian Church, had lost control of their residences at Fort Hare after the 
government takeover in 1960. The government and Fort Hare authorities were ambivalent about 
granting permission for the establishment of this new independent black college. However, 
because Fedsem would solve the legal problem of Fort Hare being situated in a white group area 
and secondly, because the government hoped that the new college would extensively utilise the 
new Divinity offerings introduced at Fort Hare, Fedsem was allowed to come into existence. 
However, both the Anglican and Congregational Churches would have nothing to do with Fort 
Hare whereas the Methodists and Presbyterians planned to cultivate a close relationship with the 
apartheid institution.233 This difference laid the foundation for potential conflict at Fedsem.  
The first principal of Fedsem was Aelred Stubbs from the decidedly anti-government Anglican 
monastic order, the Community of the Resurrection. Although Stubbs was a sympathetic 
champion of human rights and negotiated with the Fort Hare and state authorities on behalf of the 
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arrested Fort Hare students and the NUSAS Political Freedom Fund,234 his actions were 
circumscribed. Firstly, Fedsem did not share a single political vision and secondly, it existed under 
sufferance of the authorities and had to operate within the harsh environment of Bantu Education 
and university apartheid. This made any approach by NUSAS to Fedsem regarding Fort Hare 
students problematic. After a protracted period of delicate negotiations between the Fedsem 
authorities and NUSAS,235 undertaken in particular by Charles van Onselen at Rhodes, a NUSAS 
branch was established at the seminary in 1965 on the condition that it would not be used as a 
‘launching pad’ for Fort Hare.236 Nonetheless, the existence of a fairly active NUSAS branch at 
Fedsem237 and a sympathetic environment in which to operate greatly facilitated NUSAS’s difficult 
relationship with the Fort Hare student body.  
By mid-1966, Fort Hare’s NUSAS branch had shrunk to only thirty five members. This was due 
more to fear and apathy stemming from continuing intimidation rather than antagonism to 
NUSAS’s ideas.238 NUSAS thus established its own new society, presumably along similar lines 
to the NUSAS fronts set-up at Wits, UCT and Rhodes in the aftermath of Sharpeville, and injected 
its liberal ideas into existing non-political campus groupings.239 Not only NUSAS activism, but Fort 
Hare political activism in general, was, of necessity, diverted to non-political student societies, 
particularly the religious denominational ones.240 These included the NCFS, the Anglican 
Students’ Association and later the University Christian Movement (UCM). Many of the Fort Hare 
students arrested in the 1960s were leading members of the Catholic and Anglican student 
movements.241 As mentioned earlier, NUSAS retained fairly close ties with the NCFS and through 
annual congresses held simultaneously at the same venues, was able to meet students from the 
ethnic colleges. Fort Hare’s religious societies had extensive ties with Fedsem which provided 
them ‘with a forum to assert themselves politically’ and whose staff, like, for example, Desmond 
Tutu (later Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town) acted as their chaplains.242 The multi-racial and 
free Fedsem, much like the old Fort Hare before its takeover, was to become a refuge for Fort 
Hare students, many of them fleeing there during confrontations with the police in 1973.243  
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Fedsem would also become the home of radical theology and once its avowedly non-racial staff 
and student body had overcome its objections to and confusion regarding it, Black Theology 
too.244 Radical theology and Black Theology, imported from South America and the USA 
respectively, would play a formative role in the thinking of both the UCM and the Black 
Consciousness movement. Black Theology ‘condemns in the name of Christ, those who oppress’ 
the black majority struggling for liberation. ‘This was an attack at a very vulnerable point’ against a 
government which claimed to be Christian.245 Thus the threat posed to the state by Black 
Theology’s confrontation with apartheid, coupled to the belief that Fedsem was a subversive 
political influence in that it harboured NUSAS and instigated and fanned student resistance at Fort 
Hare (often allegedly NUSAS-induced), led to the expropriation of the seminary by the state in 
1974.246  
The University College of Durban-Westville (Salisbury Island)  
Like Fedsem, UNNE was not a government-controlled institution and thus provided an avenue 
through which NUSAS could establish contact with the new Indian university in Durban. The 
enrolment at UNNE of many of those expelled from Fort Hare after 1959 improved NUSAS’s 
prospects for securing the re-affiliation of black Natal students to NUSAS. The Medical School 
had long been sympathetic towards re-affiliation. (Because of their heavy workload, medical 
students were regarded as being less politically active than their Sastri counterparts247 and 
probably less radical too). NUSAS thus assiduously courted medical students either directly or 
through the Wits and UCT Medical Students’ Councils or the Association of Medical Students of 
South Africa, the latter of which the Natal Medical Students Council was a member. NUSAS 
considered securing the separate affiliation of the Medical School, particularly considering that the 
rest of the black section of Natal University would eventually disappear following the 
establishment of the ethnic universities, but realised that such a divisive action could create 
tension and stand in the way of full re-affiliation.248 When the Separate Universities Education Bill 
was before parliament in April 1957 and NUSAS had made clear its intention of adopting the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a very real possibility existed that the whole of UNNE (led 
by SRC president M.J. Naidoo) might re-affiliate. However, NUSAS’s Western Cold War 
alignment, in addition to a still powerful NEUM minority at UNNE, continued to be stumbling 
blocks.249 A student mass meeting voted to collaborate with NUSAS against university apartheid. 
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Suspecting that a re-affiliation was in the offing – and such a tentative suggestion did emanate 
from the floor - Mac Maharaj and a large number of NEUM supporters, brought in especially for 
the occasion, attempted unsuccessfully to amend the motion by adding that UNNE would not 
return to NUSAS.250 Nonetheless, NUSAS believed that this was quite a significant achievement. 
The announcement by the government in the latter half of 1960 of its intention of opening a new 
Indian university in Durban the following year, under its newly created Department of Indian 
Affairs, precipitated UNNE’s re-affiliation to NUSAS in September 1960.251 NUSAS hailed the 
return of UNNE as an ‘auspicious and historic’ event which would facilitate the creation of a 
student united front against apartheid.252 Due to some constitutional wrangling by the NEUM and 
its sympathisers desperate to keep NUSAS off the campus, the notice to re-affiliate was 
withdrawn253 and only re-instated in February 1961.254 In spite of this hiccup, NUSAS believed 
that UNNE would shape and direct NUSAS policies ‘in the very tricky years to come’255 and 
tasked its Local Committee with establishing contact with students at the new Indian ethnic 
college.256  
The imminent establishment of the new university and the closing of UNNE to Indian students 
wishing to register for Arts, Commerce and Science degrees257 goaded the hitherto divided Indian 
community into action. A meeting (to which NUSAS was invited but was unable to attend)258 
convened by the South African Indian Congress and the conservative South African Indian 
Organisation, voted not to co-operate with the government and to setup an alternative non-
apartheid correspondence higher education institution through which students could follow 
degrees offered by the University of London.259 This threatened to duplicate the services of 
SACHED and, more seriously, the wide publicity given to the defiant Indian response jeopardised 
the very existence of such anti-apartheid correspondence initiatives like SACHED. NUSAS 
nevertheless welcomed the ‘Indian alternative’ because it effectively amounted to a boycott of the 
new tribal college and was interpreted as such by the Indian community.260 After a slow start261 
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(between one hundred and fifty and two hundred students applied unsuccessfully to enroll at 
UNNE),262 and the collapse of the ‘Indian alternative’,263 approximately one hundred and twenty 
students registered at the new college. Most of these failed to meet the minimum academic 
admission requirements. Following the release of the matric supplementary exam results, eighty 
students were deregistered from their degree courses. Though initially having promised to do so, 
the university authorities refused to refund the registration fees of the affected students, forcibly 
persuading them to remain at the college to follow diploma courses. In this way, the authorities 
hoped to deceive the public into believing that the college was well patronised and accepted by 
the Indian community. UNNE planned to publicise the conflict while NUSAS intended to undertake 
action via its SRCs.264 There were subsequently ‘rumblings’ at the college,265 though these could 
also have been linked to the republican stay-at-home. 
The new Indian University College, eventually named the University College of Durban Westville, 
was initially situated in a disused (discarded) naval barracks on Salisbury Island in Durban Bay,266 
its siting a forcible reminder to students that they too were ‘discarded’.267 This ‘Alcatraz’268 as it 
became known, could be reached by ferry from Durban harbour (free to whites)269 or via a long 
desolate pedestrian causeway. In keeping with the provisions of the Extension of University 
Education Act, an Indian Advisory Council was established, which the Indian community 
announced it would boycott, and special courses in Tamil, Hindi, Gujerati and Sanskrit were on 
offer.270 The new rector was Professor S.P. Olivier from UCT and, like all the other ethnic college 
heads, a member of the Broederbond.271 He was fanatically committed to overseeing the success 
of the new college and staged elaborate public relations exercises to create a positive image of 
the institution and attract more students to it. He and his Indian staff members toured Indian 
schools in Natal in order to persuade them to enroll at Salisbury Island. Shortly before ‘parents’ 
day’, new furniture, curtains and a bus appeared on the campus, only to disappear again 
immediately after the event.272 Though this was probably also a dishonest public relations 
exercise (Leftwich held Olivier to be a ‘weak’ and ‘uncertain man’),273 Olivier stated that racially 
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separate universities had nothing to do with apartheid but were simply a method of extending 
education.274     
Leftwich wrote to Olivier requesting permission to investigate the affiliation of the Indian College 
students to NUSAS, but without success. A number of Salisbury Island students attended the 
1961 NUSAS congress held conveniently in Durban. Evidently inspired by the event’s 
proceedings, some of these observers volunteered to undertake NUSAS activities at Salisbury 
Island and establish a NUSAS branch there. Though the UNNE SRC president had called for a 
boycott of the new college,275 and UNNE students generally tended to be rather ‘stand offish’ 
towards their tribal college compatriots, viewing them to some extent as sellouts to apartheid,276 
Mhlambiso and members of the UNNE Local Committee agreed to further the cause of NUSAS 
activities on Salisbury Island. To do so they sought the help of the Natal Indian Youth Congress 
which had contacts there. Leftwich felt that the establishment of a Salisbury Island NUSAS branch 
and then the branch’s request to the college authorities for official recognition would be a more 
effective tactic than an approach by NUSAS. The authorities would refuse the students’ request, 
Leftwich surmised, opening the way for NUSAS to blow the issue sky high and again prove how 
far the ethnic colleges deviated from the nature of ‘true’ universities.277 By the end of 1961, 
nothing concrete had materialised. A group of Island students who Leftwich met in Durban were 
wary of NUSAS, fearful of committing themselves, and very afraid of informers definitely present 
in their student body.278 
The 1962 academic year opened with a call by an ‘Action Committee’ (an organisation unknown 
to Mhlambiso but linked to a newspaper, the Indian Graphic which had openly called for a boycott 
of the college in 1961)279 for the boycott of classes in protest against conditions at the college. 
This measure was wholeheartedly endorsed by the NIYC. The rector got wind of this and issued a 
threatening warning to students not to stay away, with the result that the boycott was called off.280 
Leftwich’s earlier expressed fear was realised: namely, that the politically and tactically 
unconscious student body (the first years were particularly jittery)281 would be cowed and 
outmanoeuvred by Olivier.282  
In the meantime, plans were laid for the establishment of a NUSAS branch. A former UNNE 
student and NUSAS Local Committee member, Durag Behari, who planned to enroll at Salisbury 
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Island, was to work from the inside.283 While members of the Natal NUSAS executive and UNNE 
Local Committee were distributing flyers advertising a proposed NUSAS meeting to students 
disembarking from the ferry, an altercation with an angry Olivier occurred regarding the flyers and 
‘his children’s’ affiliation to NUSAS.284 It was believed that the paternalistic rector favoured an 
association with the ASB.285 Nonetheless, shortly after this, an underground NUSAS branch, the 
‘Island Students’ Association’ came into existence, similar in structure to the underground ‘Imps 
Society’ at Durban Training College, a strongly NP and ASB-inclined institution where NUSAS 
was also banned from operating.286 Contact with the Indian College students increased 
significantly, meetings taking place off-campus and often on the beach.287 The Island Students’ 
Association ran the gauntlet of hostility not only from the college authorities but also from the 
NEUM-aligned Durban Students’ Union (DSU). In an effort to extend the activities of the newly 
formed PSNO in Natal, the DSU actively and persistently worked towards destroying NUSAS’s 
presence at both Salisbury Island and UNNE,288 almost effecting the disaffiliation of the latter in 
August 1962.289 
In addition to keeping NUSAS off the campus, the Salisbury Island authorities attempted to 
ensure the isolation of the student body. Some observers suspected that one of the reasons 
prompting the sudden and hasty establishment of a separate Indian university was the increasing 
contact between students at Durban and UNNE. Maeder Osler, president of the Pietermaritzburg 
SRC in 1962-3, recalled that there was much contact and socialising between Pietermaritzburg 
NUSAS members and their counterparts at UNNE. Black and white working together was not an 
unusual phenomenon and at some levels social mixing occurred too.290 These were evidently 
phenomena that the Salisbury Island authorities had no wish to replicate, as demonstrated by a 
number of incidents. When white Durban students arrived at the college ‘open day’, they were 
warned that they were being monitored while they visited students in their rooms.291 Of equal 
concern to Olivier was the presence of Dutch sailors at a college dance and soccer match. 
Henceforward, visitors were barred from the campus.292 To the fury of Olivier, a photograph of a 
‘private property’ ‘no entry’ signpost erected at the college was published in Wits Student with the 
caption ‘a university?’. NUSAS ensured the distribution of this photograph to other student 
newspapers.293 In September 1962, Leftwich visited Salisbury Island but was informed that no 
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NUSAS representative would be permitted to meet the student body until such time as the 
national union recanted its opposition to university apartheid.294 In a strongly worded and defiant 
press release publicising this incident, NUSAS stated that it would never relinquish its principles. 
In addition, it asserted that it was forced to operate underground at the college and would 
continue to do so ‘as part of [its] struggle for full university freedom in South Africa’. Moreover, 
Olivier was challenged to hold a referendum to determine whether or not Salisbury Island 
students voluntarily attended the apartheid college.295  
In 1962, an SRC came into existence. However, like the post-university apartheid Fort Hare SRC, 
it was a short-lived ‘rector’s representative council’. Olivier assumed the right to veto all SRC 
decisions and insisted that a member of staff sit in on all meetings and all minutes were sent to 
the rectorate. Worse was expected of the residence house committee members, who resigned 
after refusing to ‘ferret’ out information about the activities of their fellow students and report on 
these to the authorities.296 Subsequently, the student body drew up a new SRC constitution 
conferring on student government the same freedoms enjoyed by those at other NUSAS-affiliated 
universities.297 NUSAS committed itself to fight for the rights of students at Salisbury Island,298 
probably in line with its Fort Hare policy of forcing a student rights issue and provoking a 
confrontation. Whether this materialised or not, hostility towards NUSAS and the Island Students’ 
Association intensified, the rector threatening to take action against any student associated with 
the national union.299 A student was forbidden to observe the 1962 NUSAS executive meeting 
though this measure was also motivated by the fear that he planned to attend the preparatory 
meeting of the new non-racial sports body300 (the South African Non-racial Olympic Committee - 
SANROC) aimed at isolating South African sport internationally. Salisbury Island was absent from 
the 1963 NUSAS congress too301 and by the end of that year, the Island Students’ Association 
was dormant.302  
Indian College students were probably not spared the consequences of the massive security 
clampdown of 1963-4, which engulfed Fort Hare and to a lesser extent, UNNE. At the latter, 
leading members of the NIYC, ANC and NEUM were detained without trial and/or slapped with 
banning orders.303 The security police raided the Salisbury Island student residences in 1963.304 
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Demonstrating the authoritarian climate of the times, Ashwin Shah and three other students were 
detained under the General Law Amendment Act in 1964 merely for advertising the decision of 
the ‘Student Organisation’305 to boycott the ‘tribal college’ graduation. The NIYC was fully 
supportive of this action and NIYC students at Springfield Teacher Training College (which 
NUSAS had long attempted to affiliate without success306) designed and printed the leaflets and 
posters for this.307 
The University College of Zululand (Ngoye)  
Salisbury Island was not the only new ethnic college in Natal. The new government college for 
Zulu and Swazi speakers308 was situated approximately one hundred miles from Durban at 
Ngoye, an African reserve, near Mtzumzini in Northern Natal. Of the forty one students who 
enrolled in 1960 for courses in the Arts, Social Sciences, Commerce and Education, only seven 
were registered for degrees. Tuition and accommodation fees were substantially lower than those 
at the predominantly white universities and state loans, coupled to employment by the 
Departments of Bantu Education and Administration and Development or the Bantu Authorities, 
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were available for a large proportion of the amount.309 As at all the ethnic colleges, staff salary 
scales and benefits were racially differentiated and social segregation strictly enforced. Black and 
white employees were housed separately and toilets and even cooking utensils were racially 
segregated.310 White staff members received a twelve shilling mosquito allowance whereas their 
black colleagues were entitled to a mere four pence.311 The rector of Ngoye was Dr P.A.W. Cook, 
a senior employee in the old Native Affairs Department, who had supplied a substantial amount of 
evidence to the 1958 Commission of Inquiry into the Separate Universities. 
At the beginning of the 1960 academic year, the NUSAS executive laid plans for visiting the new 
ethnic college. It was agreed that permission would be sought to visit the rector at the campus 
and if this materialised, request his permission to address the student body regarding its affiliation 
to the national union. Were the visit refused, NUSAS would still proceed to the college provided 
that it had secured the necessary permit from the Bantu Authorities to enter a tribal area.312 If this 
too was unsuccessful, NUSAS would not defy the law – it had no mandate from the student 
assembly to do so – but would release to the press all the correspondence regarding the visit so 
as to highlight the reality of university apartheid.313 Ultimately, the events of Sharpeville overtook 
the Ngoye arrangements. 
The 1960 NUSAS congress undertook to break the isolation of the ethnic college students by 
encouraging all affiliates to make contact with them. Putting this resolution into effect did not 
seem promising. At the ‘Natal education conference’ in Durban, Cook accused NUSAS of 
‘irresponsible incitement and agitation’.314 He did however allow members of the Durban SRC, 
including David Gordon, then the chairperson of the Durban Local NUSAS Committee, to visit the 
college and even meet, in his presence, a selected group of Ngoye students. Cook would not 
countenance any further inter-university contact though. Debates with the Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg debating unions were ruled out because, Cook explained, the Ngoye students 
were too inexperienced. The real reason for this however was probably Cook’s fear of a 
politicised student body. To avoid this, all topics for discussion by the college debating society 
were decided by the authorities and political discussion in general was banned on the campus.315 
No students were permitted to attend the 1961 NUSAS congress316 though some expressed a 
desire to do so.317 
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In October/November 1961, Leftwich and Mhlambiso were permitted to meet the Ngoye student 
body off-campus. Meetings in the future would always take place thus, not because of ‘any cloak 
and dagger stuff’ but because the students were uncomfortable with the presence of NUSAS 
officials within the college precincts.318 The NUSAS visitors of 1961 believed Cook to be a clever 
and astute rector. Through his careful handling of the student body he ensured that it had no 
grounds for complaint and dissatisfaction.319 As noted earlier, at black educational institutions, 
subsistence and discipline issues could escalate into explosive, overtly political protests, having 
become infused with more general and explicit political discontent. The newly appointed SRC, 
which superseded a partially appointed ‘student council’320 asserted that it enjoyed ‘full powers’ 
even being able to invite whosoever it pleased to address the student body. Moreover students 
felt that facilities at Ngoye were good and much better than those at Natal where, because of 
segregation, students were offered a limited academic education and little or no access to social 
and sporting facilities. 
Students believed that Cook was a ‘reasonable man’.321 His successful management of the 
student body could quite probably be attributed to a full phalanx of informers he had at his 
disposal. The visit of NUSAS as well as those of invited outside lecturers were probably approved 
because they would be fully monitored by Cook’s eyes and ears. Shortly after the NUSAS visit, a 
member of the Ngoye SRC, who seemed to have the confidence of the rector, indicated his 
intention of attending the 1961 NUSAS executive meeting in Cape Town. He made it clear though 
that this information should be kept absolutely secret, particularly from other members of his SRC 
who he suggested were informers. This posed a dilemma for the NUSAS leadership because 
while desperately keen to include Ngoye, they were afraid that this particular student was in fact 
an informer sent by the rector to spy on the national union. It was decided that he would be told 
not to come322 and he evidently did not, his name being absent from the meeting’s minutes. 
For NUSAS it became apparent that students at Ngoye were the ‘most conservative’ and 
‘confused’ of all those enrolled at the ethnic colleges.323 In 1962 it was discovered that some even 
supported the PP.324 Through lack of exposure, Ngoye students were ignorant of what 
traditionally constituted a university and thus also of concepts like academic freedom and student 
rights.325 They were however opposed to the principle of racially separate universities. Because 
students were generally satisfied with the college and thus prepared to defend it, they were not 
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willing to initiate protest over a loss of student rights.326 Presumably then too, they would also not 
be amenable to provoking a crisis like that of the ‘tea-party’ at Fort Hare in September 1960 and 
making the university ungovernable. Nonetheless, Leftwich concluded that the student body at 
Ngoye was very important to NUSAS as it was composed of the ‘sort of men we need in this 
country’.327 These ‘men’ included Sibusiso Bengu (a one time member of the Inkatha Freedom 
Party and later Minister of Education in the Mandela government),328 and Sam Mhlongo (a 
supporter of the PAC from Soweto,329 who would later serve as a medical specialist on Thabo 
Mbeki’s HIV/AIDS panel).330 Somewhat patronisingly then, Leftwich contended that Ngoye ‘men’ 
needed to ‘become more aware and take up some courage’. This could be achieved, he 
reasoned, through lots of contact and discussion.331  
Maintaining contact and facilitating discussion with Ngoye during 1962 and 63 was undertaken by 
the NUSAS-affiliated student bodies in Natal and the NUSAS executive,332 particularly in the 
latter, Mhlambiso. Evidently the restrictions on the Ngoye debating society were lifted as its 
members were hosted by their Pietermaritzburg counterparts in 1962.333 UNNE sports teams 
travelled to Ngoye but these occasions were marred by some unpleasant incidents (not spelt 
out)334 presumably relating to segregation and Cook’s stipulation that the visiting teams should be 
composed only of Zulu-speaking Africans. Ngoye students, including Mhlongo, attended both the 
1962 NUSAS congress and executive meeting as observers.335 NUSAS placed a premium on 
ethnic college participation in its forums and to this end had procured financial assistance from 
the United States NSA.336  
Concerted efforts were made to establish a NUSAS branch at Ngoye and by late 1963/early 1964, 
unconfirmed reports seemed to suggest that one had indeed come into existence.337 This was 
probably true as Osler recalls that there were small NUSAS branches at all the Natal ethnic 
colleges at this time.338 Though it was most unlikely that the Ngoye branch would ever enjoy 
official campus recognition, Cook astutely indicated that the question of affiliation to NUSAS 
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would be held over for his successor, Professor J.A. Maree of the University of Pretoria, to 
decide.339  
Even before the arrival of the new rector in 1964, the era of Cook’s carefully cultivated politically 
docile student body was coming to an end.  Mhlongo, NUSAS’s most important contact and, 
despite his PAC preferences, NUSAS’s strongest promoter, believed that the student body would 
react to ‘an incident’.340 Twenty Ngoye students (others were too afraid to add their names) sent 
an open letter to NUSAS complaining about the poor conditions pertaining at the college. These 
included the assault by a Commerce lecturer of a student unable to answer a question during a 
class, the encouragement of students to study in Afrikaans because of the poor English language 
skills of the staff, the censorship of the student newsletter, the quality of the food and the rigid 
social segregation enforced on the campus. NUSAS was instrumental in having this open letter 
published in the press.341 Mhlongo was refused readmission to Ngoye in 1963,342 presumably 
because he was held to be one of the protest’s ringleaders. NUSAS arranged a medical 
scholarship for him at the University of Dublin, from where he was able to represent NUSAS at 
overseas student gatherings.343 Mhlongo’s effective expulsion presaged the national security 
clampdown of 1963-4. 
The assumption of Maree to the rectorship in 1964 inaugurated a period of increasing 
authoritarianism at Ngoye. A student was expelled for arguing with a member of staff, but the 
evidently cowed SRC was too afraid to take up the matter, to the ire of the disgruntled student 
body.344 This SRC was overtly Africanist. During a NUSAS visit to the college in 1964, it  rudely 
refused to contemplate an association with the national union and accused Mhlambiso and UNNE 
SRC member, Darkie Sepobedi of being ‘stooges’. Henceforward, NUSAS resolved to work with 
more sympathetic students opposed to the SRC’s stance.345   
The University College of the North (Turfloop) 
Establishing contact with students at the newly established University College of the North 
(UCON) in order to secure affiliation proved very difficult for NUSAS. Although Bantu Normal 
College had been affiliated to NUSAS before its closure and incorporation into the UCON, none of 
its students transferred to the new institution. Thus NUSAS, somewhat opportunistically given its 
attitude towards the radical left, relied on Wits COD members, like Saul Bastomsky to headhunt 
Turfloop students. Shingler believed that the white left was viewed with somewhat less suspicion 
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by the black community than were white liberals346 and, moreover, had far greater involvement 
with the black community than NUSAS ever had. Later on SACHED would provide the avenue of 
communication between NUSAS and the UCON.347 
As with Ngoye, contact with the new Transvaal university college was made more difficult 
because of the sheer isolation and remoteness of the campus. It was situated thirty kilometres 
from Pietersburg in an African reserve entirely devoid of human habitation348 to which moreover, 
like at Ngoye, a permit was required to enter.349 Four hundred thousand pounds (a fraction of that 
required for the new University of Ghana) were expended on constructing a fairly impressive 
residential university which, with its Arts, Science and Education faculties, as well as courses in 
Native Administration and trading350 aimed to churn out the personnel required to manage the 
hazily envisaged Bantustans of the future. In conformity with the government’s policy of 
ethnicisation, the architecture incorporated ethnic patterns and designs purportedly those of the 
Sepedi, Xitsonga and Setswana language groups for which the university catered.351 Outdoor and 
indoor lapas or lekgotlas with kraal manure floors, which were never used,352 replaced the more 
usual common rooms in the student residences.  
Professor E.F. Potgieter, the first rector of Turfloop, was conversant in the local vernacular and 
importantly, like one of the architects of Bantu Education, Eiselen, was an anthropologist from the 
University of Pretoria. Twenty eight years after the establishment of the ethnic college, Potgieter 
claimed that he had aimed at the gradual creation of ‘First World individuals’353 ‘freed from 
traditional emotionalism’, in contradistinction to Verwoerd whom he claimed envisaged ‘guiding’ 
Africans to the ‘Third World’.354 In 1960 he stated vaguely that the task of the university was ‘to 
build a tradition of our own and function as one organism’.355 The University Staff Association was 
particularly concerned at moulding an apartheid-orientated ‘Bantu’ from its ‘intellectually different’ 
student body through a synthesis of the ‘best’ of black and Western culture. Thus particular 
attention was paid to fostering African culture on the campus in the form of art, pottery and dance 
and presumably to counter the influence of American jazz with which the Staff Association 
(disapprovingly?) believed Africans had a rhythmic affinity, the development of African music 
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through the use of simple traditional orchestral instruments.356 By 1962, a pottery and art studio 
was in existence on the campus.357 
In conformity with Bantu Education, it was officially stated that the media of instruction would be 
both official languages358 even though some within the NP, like members of the Potchefstroom 
SRC who visited the campus in 1961, believed that instruction would eventually be in the 
vernacular.359 In practice, however, most lectures were delivered in Afrikaans,360 a language that 
many students did not follow. Turfloop students believed this was a sinister plot to promote 
Afrikaans and sideline English,361 rather than perhaps merely a lack of English proficiency 
amongst the staff. Perhaps reinforcing the suspicion of Turfloop students, in 1963 a Nationalist 
academic stated that both the growth and power of Afrikaans depended on the African majority 
speaking the language. 
The new rector, Potgieter, like his other ethnic college counterparts, was fanatically committed to 
see the new apartheid university succeed.362 Like the Eastern Cape, Sekhukhuneland was a 
hotbed of resistance to Bantu Authorities, Betterment and Bantu Education363 and in 1958 the 
ANC was banned in Sekhukhuneland and parts of the Soutpansberg.364 Just thirty kilometres to 
the west of the campus, the GaMatlala community, with some input from the ANC, continued their 
decade-long struggle against rural restructuring365 while thirty kilometres to the university’s east, 
opposition by the Wolkberg community to their forced removal had been violently countered by 
the state.366 Thus it can be presumed that Potgieter had to ensure that the UCON did not become 
like Fort Hare, a site of struggle against government policies. Thus, like at Fort Hare, freedom of 
movement was seriously restricted as was freedom of thought and association, while fear and 
intimidation became a means of control over the student population.   
The small student body (eighty eight in 1960367 and nearly one hundred and thirty in 1961368) 
could be divided along political and geographical lines. Those from the Witwatersrand were 
politicised, radical and keenly aware of their lack of student rights, whereas those from the 
Northern Transvaal and the rural areas were ignorant of the nature of other universities, wanted to 
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make the university work and were prepared to accept the rector’s diktats.369 Despite the 
presence of the former group, the events at Sharpeville in March-April 1960 provoked no student 
reaction at the newly opened college.370  
Students were not entirely docile during 1960-1 despite the severe restrictions imposed on them. 
They refused to build the playing fields,371 embarked on a three day boycott of the dining hall 
because of their dislike of a warden,372 would not elect secundi, junior to the paid primarii who 
were the eyes and ears of the rector,373 and declined to be interviewed for an SABC 
documentary, forcing the staff to dress up as students.374 Resistance to both lectures and 
inaugural lectures being delivered in Afrikaans, as well as segregated seating at university 
functions, occurred on a continuous basis.375 On the occasion of a student boycott of an inaugural 
lecture, the police were summoned to the campus to aid the black staff in guarding the hall where 
the function was taking place.376  
At the beginning of 1961, two students, Bennet Marengwa and Job Molepo, were refused 
readmission to the college without any reasons being proffered.377 Neither student was 
particularly visible either as an activist or leader, though both had participated in the dining room 
boycott378 and Molepo moreover, was accused by the college authorities of slandering the 
institution to a British visitor.379 In addition, Molepo’s father, a former president of the Transvaal 
Teachers’ Association, had successfully sued a Bantu Education inspector, Aggenbag, leading to 
what many believed was Aggenbag’s premature death.380 The college authorities knew this.381 
The Turfloop student body, as well as the Wits SRC, which complained to the Department of 
Bantu Education, regarded these expulsions as pure intimidation, the authorities making an 
example of Marengwa and Molepo to demonstrate what happened to those who did not support 
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apartheid in toto and stepped out of line.382 This instilled tremendous fear in the student body 
leading to a state of its near paralysis.383 
This affected the functioning of the newly formed SRC, elected early in 1961. The coming into 
being of this body had been long delayed.384 The reasons for this were that the student body 
feared that its members would be victimised and secondly, the rector delayed his approval of 
changes to the constitution, recommended by the Wits SRC, which included inter alia depriving 
seats to the primarii and secundi.385 Within a few months of the SRC’s existence however, some 
students were arguing, like at Fort Hare, for its abandonment because the rector was exploiting in 
divide and rule fashion the ideological and tactical differences of its members and turning it into a 
powerless tribal college structure.386 By June 1961, a number of members of the SRC, including 
the president Ezekiel Makhene, had resigned due to being reprimanded by the rector for visiting 
Wits without his permission and speaking to the press after a negative expose of campus 
conditions had appeared in the Sunday Times.387 Both of these activities flowed from NUSAS 
which used inter-campus visits as a means of building up contact and winning support for 
affiliation and used press exposes to champion its opposition to university apartheid.388 In addition 
to these transgressions, the SRC was accused of working towards a ‘crisis’,389 presumably 
connected to the inauguration of the Republic. The ANC-aligned within the student body called for 
a three day stay-away from classes on 29-31 May 1961 in response to the call of the All-In 
Conference as well as the mysterious ‘Lumumba’ (again evidence of the importance of the 
Congolese independence struggle – newly independent Congo’s prime minister, Patrice 
Lumumba had just been assassinated by Western government agents). However, ‘timid 
Southerners’ on the SRC vetoed this as they refused to be used as a ‘political platform’ in an 
action that would be deplored by the rector.390 
It is not clear who ‘Lumumba’ was. He could have been Thami Mhlambiso, ANC and NUSAS 
activist expelled from Fort Hare in 1961. During March/April 1961, Mhlambiso had responded 
enthusiastically to the suggestion by the NUSAS executive that he visit Turfloop ‘sub rosa’ (as he 
would later at Fort Hare) and ‘inject some sort of fire’ there.391 Whether Mhlambiso was 
‘Lumumba’ and/or did visit Turfloop and play a hand in the proposed anti-Republic boycott, his 
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inclusion as NUSAS vice-president in the delegation selected for the first officially sanctioned 
NUSAS visit to Turfloop in March 1962, was probably the reason for its sudden last minute 
cancellation by the Turfloop authorities.392 Ultimately, an all-white NUSAS delegation arrived on 
the campus on 30 April 1962,393 sparing the college authorities any headaches regarding either 
segregation at dinner or the negative influence on the student body of a political hothead expelled 
for insubordination from a sister tribal college.     
This visit had had a long gestation394 before it came to fruition. Through an exchange of 
correspondence initiated by Shingler in 1960, Potgieter had made it clear that no organisation 
other than the churches would be welcome on the campus until such time as a student ‘esprit de 
corps’ had taken root. Moreover, NUSAS was warned that as one of the most vociferous critics of 
the new universities, it could not expect to ‘organise our students for us’.395 Nonetheless, in 
October 1961, the new NUSAS president, Leftwich, arrived uninvited at Turfloop but was refused 
permission to either tour the campus or meet the SRC.396 So in the light of the previous fruitless 
mission, Leftwich and Denis Hunt were pleasantly surprised at the cordial reception they received 
from the rector and his academic staff during their April 1962 visit.397 However, all was not as it 
seemed.398 On their return journey to Pietersburg, Leftwich and Hunt were tricked into stopping 
their car by white Afrikaans-speaking youth who in a ‘sinister’ fashion ‘reminiscent of the 
organised and officially approved thuggery of Nazi Germany’,399 proceeded to shave their heads 
with sheep shears, pushed their car off the road, deflated its tyres and hid their keys, thus forcing 
them to walk the three miles into town.400 Many Turfloop students were outraged and 
embarrassed by the incident and believed that the authorities had had a hand in it but were too 
afraid to point fingers.401 
The NUSAS delegation received a warm welcome from the Turfloop SRC and student body. 
Nonetheless it was subjected to an uncompromising interrogation of its policies and what it had to 
offer African students as well as outright criticism and rejection.402 This experience, along with a 
follow-up visit by the entire Wits SRC to participate in a Turfloop symposium on ‘the role of 
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university students in a changing society’, had a profound influence on NUSAS which, as 
discussed earlier, was in the midst of much soul-searching in regard to putting into practice its 
activist ‘student-in-society’ position. 
Discussion ranged around issues of identity, the relevance of NUSAS to black students in the 
struggle generally and at the ethnic universities in particular, as well as the trustworthiness and 
honesty of NUSAS. In what would soon become a painful debate for the predominantly white 
NUSAS, the student body accepted that whites were ‘Africans’ too, but evidently the 
understanding of ‘African’ remained primarily ‘black African’. Turfloop students were concerned 
that the small number of (black) African students in NUSAS muted the (black) African voice in the 
organisation and suggested that NUSAS juggle with representation and restructure itself by 
creating an upper house which would include representatives of all universities.403 NUSAS’s 
response to this recommendation is not recorded but historically and in the future it had and did 
reject any type of representation that was not based on studentship alone.404 The dreaded 
ethnically based FEDSEC proposals against which NUSAS had fought a secret rearguard battle 
the year before came up again and again. Surprisingly, it found favour with Gessler Nkondo, 
president of the SRC, as a pragmatic solution to student unity in the face of NUSAS’s proscription 
at the ethnic universities and hostility to NUSAS amongst Afrikaans-speaking students.405 NUSAS 
was asked how it expected to incorporate black students when it failed even to achieve white 
student unity, while a suggestion was made that NUSAS focus its attention on the Afrikaans 
universities with a view to infiltrating them and converting their student bodies.406 NUSAS’s own 
student base was considered politically unreliable too as it was composed of students of differing 
political opinions whose parents moreover had a vested interest in the status quo. NUSAS 
conceded the difficulties of having a radical policy and a conservative membership when, for 
example, it was pointed out by a Turfloop student that the national union’s proposed defense 
(conscription) policy could lead to divided families and a situation in which a son might even 
‘spear’ his father.407 
A large number of criticisms were leveled against NUSAS. Nkondo stated that white English-
speakers had historically proved themselves hypocritical.408 NUSAS was accused of supporting 
social segregation at the open universities. The Wits SRC’s unwilling complicity in this was 
reinforced some weeks later when it was unable to respond to a suggestion from the Turfloop 
SRC that the college send an invitation sport team to the Wits campus.409 Moreover, it was 
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alleged (incorrectly according to an indignant NUSAS) that NUSAS at the ISC had blackballed the 
newly formed National Union of Basutoland Students,410 an organisation comprising the student 
body of the Pius the Twelfth Catholic University College which, to NUSAS’s chagrin, had 
disaffiliated from NUSAS in 1959 for nationalist reasons and then refused to co-operate with 
NUSAS on a confederal basis. Other students informed NUSAS that it was an ineffectual 
organisation which could offer nothing to Turfloop students in that it opposed bills which were 
nonetheless still enacted. Others objected to NUSAS being held responsible for apartheid and 
argued that Africans had done very little themselves to oppose these measures and that 
apartheid applied to Africans and that Africans should therefore get up and fight it themselves 
using a philosophy devised by Africans.411 
The leading role of African students in the struggle against apartheid came across very clearly 
during a joint symposium on ‘the role of university students in a changing society’ held some 
weeks later between the Turfloop student body and the full Wits SRC.412 This symposium was 
presumably used as a sounding board for African views in the run-up to the 1962 congress which 
would move NUSAS in a far more radical activist direction. The Wits SRC argued that as 
intellectuals, students should observe society and criticise. If this was insufficient, students could 
take a temporary leading role in changing things. The Turfloop student body, on the other hand, 
argued variously that students as an intellectual elite should either lead or play an active role in 
the struggle for liberation which for some students could take the form of a violent revolution.413 
The leading role of students in the liberation movement was entirely consistent with the thinking of 
national liberation movements on the rest of the African continent and, with the substitution of 
‘African’ for the broader more inclusive ‘black’, would form the basis of Black Consciousness 
ideology which would come to dominate the ethnic universities in the future.  
In a perceptive weighing up of NUSAS’s chances of securing the affiliation of Turfloop to the 
national union, Denis Hunt, NUSAS international vice-president, noted the growing racial 
separatism on the campus. Turfloop students realised that they were perceived as sellouts in 
attending the new ethnic university, but at the same time the college offered the students a 
degree of shelter from the harshness of apartheid (e.g. the pass laws), adequate subsistence and 
the possibility of future social mobility. They thus had far more than the majority of their peers. 
Although politically conscientised students realised the serious deficiencies of the college, it was 
‘their’ college, it appealed to their sense of Africanness and they were intensely proud of it.414 ‘The 
call of the African to the struggle for his own self-realisation as an individual with dignity is a 
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strong one and he [sic] must do it himself.’415 As this accorded in many respects with apartheid 
ideology, ‘it suit[ed] the college authorities too’.416 Hunt thus questioned whether Turfloop 
students would risk everything they had to affiliate with a proscribed organisation (which some 
regarded as hypocritical) which could offer them very little in return.417 It was concluded that most 
of the student body and largely ‘liberally minded’ SRC were sympathetic to NUSAS418 but this was 
masked by the rhetorical dominance of the chairperson, Nkondo, and some vociferous Africanists 
looking without much success for a following. Hunt thus concluded that NUSAS could secure an 
affiliation (and there was talk on the SRC of forming a branch) but to retain it and keep Turfloop 
students happy would require a full-time NUSAS officer at Wits.419  
Ultimately Turfloop delayed its decision regarding affiliation because, as NUSAS bravely spun it, it 
was weighing up all its options.420 However, the SRC did attempt to participate in NUSAS’s 
campaign against the Sabotage Bill. A mass meeting was called to discuss the Bill and a decision 
taken to hold a protest march. However, a group of students became fearful of the consequences 
and ultimately the march was cancelled much to the crowing delight of Potgieter who had wormed 
this information out of a cowed SRC after discovering anti-Sabotage Bill graffiti on the college 
walls.421  
With the knowledge of Potgieter,422 members of the SRC did attend the 1962 NUSAS congress 
and executive meeting in their personal capacities.423 The SRC subsequently endorsed the 
congress decision to sever all ties with the ASB. This was not an entirely unanimous decision. 
Nkondo, the fan of FEDSEC, was equivocal while the adherents of the PAC such as Noel 
Manganyi (later vice-chancellor of Turfloop), felt that the NUSAS resolution did not go far enough 
as NUSAS SRCs were still free to meet their ASB-affiliated counterparts.424 The ASB, whose 
Pretoria and Potchefstroom affiliates had been sending out feelers to the Turfloop student 
body,425 was informed that the SRC would not meet its representatives because of the Afrikaans 
organisation’s support for university apartheid.426 Neither would the SRC host NUSAS during the 
next two years as each date suggested by the national union for its visit clashed with proposed 
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visits by the PAC-aligned African Students Union of South Africa (ASUSA)427 (discussed later). 
Despite this apparent brushoff and the apparent leaning towards ASUSA, as well as an attack on 
NUSAS by Nkondo at the 1962 ASA conference428 (to be discussed later), Nkondo informed 
NUSAS that the Turfloop SRC was committed to maintaining contact and friendly relations with all 
student organisations429 and that it moreover was opposed to separatist student structures.430 
Despite this reassurance, the student body voted to affiliate to ASUSA in 1963.431 Interestingly, by 
1963, the Turfloop authorities believed that they were finally winning control over their charges as 
those responsible for sowing dissension in the ranks and opposing ethnic universities were 
becoming an increasingly small minority in a largely docile apartheid-accepting student body.432 
Despite its successful subordination of the student body and the fact that ASUSA was presented 
to it not as the student branch of the PAC but as an organisation promoting African educational 
and cultural advancement,433 the university authorities, after a long period of deliberation, refused 
to sanction the official affiliation of Turfloop to ASUSA.  
Turfloop’s affiliation to ASUSA marked the end of official NUSAS–Turfloop relations for the next 
few years as well as any hope (largely abandoned as hopeless in 1961) of making the campus 
unworkable.434 However, informal contact and even campus visits, were maintained by the Wits 
SRC.435 In addition, a lively exchange of political views was conducted between individual 
Turfloop ASUSA members such as Max Tlakula, and members of the Wits SRC in the hope that 
some common ideological ground could be found for retaining student co-operation in areas such 
as NUSAS’s Literacy Project (discussed in chapter nine).436 Despite the Turfloop student body’s 
decision to remain officially aloof from NUSAS, Themba Sono argues that Turfloop students (as 
well as other ethnic college students) were wholly won over to NUSAS and for most of the 1960s, 
were the national union’s black liberal champions of multi-racialism, integration and academic 
freedom.437 According to Sono, to Turfloop students, no greater proof of NUSAS’s integrity and 
commitment to black students’ welfare and racial integration could be found than in the selfless 
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courage of Adrian Leftwich who, on visits to the Turfloop campus438 (deliberately) ate, slept and 
socialised (danced with as many Turfloop women as possible) and unequivocally and scornfully 
rejected all aspects of apartheid. Moreover, the fact that NUSAS was banned on the campus and 
viewed with opprobrium by the college authorities, made it more alluring and desirable.439 
However, despite this alleged ‘zeal and zest’ for NUSAS,440 the Turfloop student body and SRC 
only applied to affiliate to NUSAS in 1968,441 on the eve of the establishment of a new national, 
racially exclusive student organisation, the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO) 
(discussed in chapter ten).  
The African Students Association (ASA) and the African Students Union of South Africa 
(ASUSA) 
Eight years before the launch of SASO, two new exclusively African student organisations, the 
ANC-aligned African Students Association (ASA) and the PAC-aligned African Students’ Union of 
South Africa (ASUSA), came into existence. It was stated publicly that ASA originated from a 
decision taken by Nelson Mandela, that because of the strong support given to the anti-
Republican stay-away of May 1961 by African scholars and students, they should be organised 
into a new African students’ movement.442  
In actual fact, Walter Sisulu was responsible for ASA’s genesis. Sisulu believed that an 
association of studying youth could be an ‘organisational cover’ for the banned ANCYL and could 
provide generational continuity and new recruits to sustain the ANC’s new underground 
existence. So as to ‘staunch’ the ‘haemorrhage’[ing] of young African intellectuals from the 
Congress tradition to Pan-Africanism, ASA would be, like the ANCYL, open to Africans only. 
Sisulu entrusted the task of building this new structure to Thabo Mbeki, then a student at 
SACHED, Johannesburg.443 Shortly before the launch of ASA at UNNE in December 1961, the 
PAC-aligned students pulled out and inaugurated their own organisation, the African Students’ 
Union of South Africa (ASUSA) in Johannesburg.444 ASA’s launch on the Day of the Covenant 
was deliberately scheduled to coincide with the launch of the ANC’s sabotage programme 
although Mbeki insisted that the date was coincidental. He did however accept that the launch of 
ASA and Umkhonto We Sizwe represented ‘parallel manifestations of the same impulse’.445 South 
Africa had entered a new phase of struggle, students as an intellectual elite should play a leading 
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role in the struggle and one of the tasks of ASA was to find recruits for a liberation army. This 
could not be done from within the confines of the non-violent NUSAS and thus the establishment 
of ASA was presented as a breakaway from NUSAS.446 
NUSAS was not to know any of this, but nonetheless found these new developments within the 
African student world alarming. It feared that a new (initially one) racially separate African 
organisation could result firstly, in the exodus of African students from NUSAS, effectively turning 
the national union into a white body and secondly, as a racially exclusive organisation, ASA could 
fall into government hands. Despite ASA being a separate African body, Leftwich, following 
current liberal opinion, believed that ASA, like the All-In conference was a creation of both the 
SACP, which was operating quite openly in Lesotho, and NUSAS’s old enemy, COD. One of 
ASA’s aims, Leftwich believed, was to embarrass and weaken the militant, anti-colonial but non-
communist NUSAS by drawing off its black members and painting it moderate and white. His 
suspicions were inferred from the fact that COD was playing a very proactive role in organising 
the youth, that New Age was aggressively championing ASA, that the call for ASA came from 
Nelson Mandela, believed to represent the extreme left wing of the ANC, that the organising 
secretary, Thabo Mbeki, was ideologically close to his SACP stalwart father, Govan, and that the 
first public announcement of the existence of ASA had been made at the 1961 NUSAS 
congress.447 
Despite these reservations NUSAS recognised the need for an organisation which could cater for 
high school children not eligible for NUSAS membership. NUSAS hoped to win dual membership 
of NUSAS and ASA and at the same time debated amending its constitution to allow student 
bodies like ASA, the SCA and NCFS to become associate members of the national union.448 
During a number of meetings with the ASA Preparatory Committee and through correspondence 
with Thabo Mbeki before the launch, Leftwich and the executive discussed the future basis of co-
operation between NUSAS and ASA. Mbeki and most of the Preparatory Committee members 
were very accommodating and in fact ‘wanted NUSAS at the official level’449 but were not 
prepared to commit to anything which could drive the Africanists from the organisation.450  
Shortly before the ASA launch, NUSAS’s invitation to attend was withdrawn and not in so many 
words informed by Mbeki that, were NUSAS members to participate, they should be African and 
should avoid courting controversy.451 NUSAS was not happy with this situation but nonetheless 
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sent Mhlambiso, its vice-president, to the inaugural Durban congress.452 Once there, Mhlambiso 
ended up chairing a number of sittings453 and was then nominated for the ASA presidency too. 
This position he declined, the presidency going to Ernest Galo, expelled from Fort Hare in 1960 
for his activities on the 1959 SRC454 and subsequently vice-president of the UNNE SRC and a 
champion there of UNNE’s re-affiliation to NUSAS in 1960/1.455  
The ASA inaugural conference passed an ‘apartheid and education’ resolution similar to that of 
NUSAS’s, congratulated Albert Luthuli on being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, saluted African 
students for their ‘courageous’ role during the inauguration of the Republic, hailed the 
independence of Tanzania and a possible peaceful settlement in Algeria, and offered its support 
to all ‘African struggles against all forms of foreign domination’.456 In other words, policies not 
dissimilar to, nor more overtly political nor radical than those of NUSAS. What did distinguish ASA 
from NUSAS was the message from the ANC underground notifying the conference that it was 
responsible for the sabotage attacks the night before.457  
Of particular importance to NUSAS was the long and unresolved debate regarding membership of 
ASA.458 It was reported that some students at the multi-racial UNNE and Fort Hare (the latter 
where the ANCYL was multi-racial)459 believed ASA was racist in restricting its membership to 
effectively black ‘Africans’460 and that the colour of ASA membership was immaterial if it abided 
by the aims of the organisation. Moreover, some delegates expressed the opinion that there were 
students of races other than black who could be regarded as ‘African’. Those who stated they 
could not accept domination by other races rejected this view. Ultimately the constitution made no 
reference to either race or African origins as criteria for membership of ASA with the 
understanding that most delegates wanted ASA to be an ‘African’ organisation and that the new 
executive formulate its understanding of ‘African’.461 Despite these propitious events, no policy 
regarding ASA’s relationship with NUSAS was adopted at the conference because ASA wanted to 
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effect a rapprochement with the Africanists.462 Although this was not specifically discussed at the 
ASA launch, but was later, ASA had a stake in co-operating with NUSAS as NUSAS was 
regarded as South Africa’s national union and as such was a member of a number of international 
student organisations, a status ASA could probably not achieve by itself.463  
At the end of 1961, NUSAS sent some SACHED recruitment pamphlets to ASA to distribute to 
matriculants considering entering the ethnic universities. Although Mbeki believed that their 
denunciation of university apartheid was excellent, he refused to have them distributed as this 
would create the impression (presumably to the Africanists and ASUSA) that ASA was the 
‘mouthpiece’ of NUSAS.464 ASUSA had decided at its launch that no co-operation with the non-
‘indigenous’ NUSAS would be tolerated and further, that dual membership of the two 
organisations would result in expulsion from ASUSA.465 
On the other hand, ASA accepted an invitation to attend NUSAS’s annual congress in July 1962 
but due to a communication failure, no official observers arrived.466 So in the absence of ASA, the 
NUSAS assembly passed a resolution proposed by a SACHED student, Abel Zwane. This 
welcomed both the formation of ASA and its non-racial policy, but regretted that circumstances 
necessitated it being racially exclusive and as such accepted that ASA did not regard itself as a 
national union of students.467 This last section infuriated ASA, which at its annual congress held in 
December 1962, passed a motion of censure on NUSAS condemning it for ‘try[ing] to accord a 
status of inferiority upon ASA'.468 Many delegates expressed the opinion that dual membership of 
ASA and NUSAS should be prohibited but ultimately no decision was taken thereon.469 Nor was 
any taken about the definition of ‘African’. Many delegates felt that an exclusively racial definition 
would exclude Africans north of the Sahara. Both of these issues had a bearing on the main topic 
of debate, namely, the failure to achieve African student unity in the face of the still unresolved rift 
with ASUSA.470  
To patch up its relations with ASA, NUSAS amended the offending clauses of its 1962 congress 
resolution. It explained that it considered ASA to be neither inferior, subsidiary, nor an alternative 
to NUSAS, that the two organisations were independent and autonomous, and were neither 
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complementary nor in opposition to one another.471 NUSAS still attempted to build a close 
relationship with ASA both at an organisational level as well as through joint participation in 
specific projects.472 At a personal level, ASA leaders expressed their sympathy with the NUSAS 
leadership, which because of the national union’s conservative membership, was unable to 
advance its radical policies. Relations between NUSAS and Mbeki were friendly too. At a meeting 
at Fort Hare, the visiting Mbeki took to the floor and quickly made short change out of some 
students attacking NUSAS.473 The ANC, to which ASA was aligned, was also critically 
sympathetic. This was demonstrated in the case of the decision of Mhlambiso to resign from 
NUSAS after being called a ‘Matamzima’ by anti-NUSAS Africanist students in Basutoland and 
his feeling that NUSAS posed an obstacle to African student unity. The ANC prevailed on him not 
to leave the national union as it did ‘not want to create a political vacuum by blotting NUSAS out 
of existence’,474 presumably because it believed that ASA could not achieve very much. Most of 
ASA’s energy was expended fruitlessly on patching up its relationship with ASUSA. Mbeki did 
embark on a countrywide ASA tour in 1962, and during a secret meeting at Fort Hare informed 
students from both Fort Hare and Lovedale that the liberation movement was offering a limited 
number of scholarships for overseas study, but that it was the wish of the movement that the 
majority remained at school and university to finish their courses. However, Barney Pityana, then 
at Lovedale, believed that Mbeki was in fact putting out feelers for potential recruits to Umkhonto 
We Sizwe.475 
By late-1963, ASA was facing an organisational crisis. Starved of funds, unable to make headway 
at the ASUSA strongholds of Turfloop476 or Ngoye,477 its annual conference hindered by the 
police, its leadership depleted (many were in prison,478 including founding member Mike Ngubeni 
for sabotage479 and Ernest Galo had fled South Africa480 and subsequently died) – ASA effectively 
abandoned the universities and considered amalgamating with NUSAS.481 At Galo’s funeral, 
attended by Driver and Osler of the NUSAS executive, Driver was invited to deliver a speech.482 
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In 1965, ASA rallied.483 Attempts were made by the Turfloop SRC to revive the moribund ASUSA 
too,484 but this was abandoned when only a few students turned up at a conference for this 
purpose staged in Johannesburg in December 1965.485 Three years later the Turfloop student 
body shelved its bid to secure official approval for its affiliation to ASUSA and applied for 
membership of NUSAS (discussed in chapter ten). ASA continued to attract a secret following at 
Fort Hare until the end of the 1960s. ASA adherents at Fort Hare were largely middle-class 
‘southerners’ still steeped in the liberal missionary educational tradition. Their northern working 
class counterparts were, by contrast, adherents of black assertiveness.486 ASA remained 
committed to the non-racialism of the ANC and thus students aligned to ASA at Fort Hare and 
other campuses would initially have no truck with the emerging Black Consciousness 
movement.487 Some ASA adherents were eventually won over to the new ideology by the partially 
inclusive and non-racial definition of ‘black’ which included not only Africans, but also coloureds 
and Indians too,488 and/or were instrumental in its formulation. However, this was in the future. 
In the early 1960s NUSAS was required to respond to the ideological and organisational 
challenge posed to it by ASA as well as meet the needs and interests of black students in an 
effort to win and maintain their loyalty. Thus NUSAS afforded an increasingly leading role to its 
black membership in setting the pace and direction of NUSAS policy. This led to serious reflection 
within the national union regarding its role within the increasingly oppressive, polarised and 
hopeless environment of post-Sharpeville South Africa. And, accordingly, a review of NUSAS’s 
policy, structure and level of activism, was undertaken. In 1962, as discussed in chapter six, 
NUSAS finally for all practical purposes jettisoned its ‘student-as-such’ orientation. Accordingly, it 
committed itself to putting into practice the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and pursuing 
an activist policy aimed at opposing apartheid in all its spheres. In so doing it moved beyond the 
mere rhetoric and pious resolutions for which radical critics had condemned NUSAS in the past.   
NUSAS thus focused on more practical projects. The Transkei literacy project, funded by the 
United States NSA (and thus the CIA) and co-ordinated by Templeton Mdalana, Fort Hare 
graduate and ANC activist, was launched in 1963.489 This took NUSAS away from its traditional 
terrain of mainly white university campuses and into the rural areas of black South Africans. (This 
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is discussed in more detail in chapter nine.) It was hoped that the literacy project would be the 
avenue through which contact and co-operation with ASA and ASUSA could be pursued.490   
Although aimed at identifying and grooming a new generation of radical NUSAS cadres, the 
NUSAS regional and national seminars, inaugurated in 1963, again with US NSA funding,491 
provided an opportunity for black students, particularly those at the ethnic universities and 
associated with ASA and ASUSA, to participate in NUSAS structures and lead the process of new 
policy formulation.492 Once policy so arrived at was accepted by NUSAS cadres, a period of 
intense political education of the student bodies of the NUSAS-affiliated centres would follow. 
Thereafter, the proposed new policy would be introduced in the student assembly to be discussed 
and adopted by the SRC representatives there, who, in many instances, were neither radical nor 
NUSAS activists. In other words, policy-making would and did become even less of the preserve 
of the student assembly, the SRCs and student bodies it represented. Black students, many not 
formally affiliated to NUSAS and perhaps not even particularly sympathetic to the organisation, 
came to play a significant role in the formulation of NUSAS policy.  
Linked to the important policy-making role of black students, was the issue of Africanisation. 
Africanisation of NUSAS was a necessity if the national union was to meet the challenge posed to 
it by competing African student organisations as well as the concerns of the Turfloop student body 
that the black voice in NUSAS was muted. Moreover, in the context of decolonisation, particularly 
in Africa, NUSAS would need to present itself as representative of the majority of South Africa’s 
population and not as a white body (discussed in later chapters). However, Africanisation of its 
leadership was a thorny issue for colour-blind liberals and also smacked of tokenism. 
Africanisation also faced serious practical obstacles in its implementation. NUSAS offered 
Mhlambiso the presidency in 1962 but he declined as he realised that holding such a position 
under apartheid conditions was impossible for an African at that time.493 For example the 
application of the Coloured Labour Preference Area Policy in the Western Cape precluded an 
African even taking up office at NUSAS’s headquarters in Cape Town. In addition, Mhlambiso had 
been shown the door at JCE when, as NUSAS vice-president, he had attempted to address the 
student body there. His inclusion in the NUSAS delegation to Turfloop in 1962 was probably the 
reason for the cancellation of the visit by the college authorities. The 1963 NUSAS vice-president 
was Kenny Parker, a coloured UCT student sympathetic to the ANC, but with a useful background 
in the anti-NUSAS Unity Movement.494 In many respects, Africanisation seemed to be driven by 
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the traditional white middle-class radical leadership leaving the impression that black students 
would still not really lead the organisation.  
Despite the shortcomings of Africanisation, the presence on the NUSAS executive of Mhlambiso, 
a leading member of the ANCYL, in addition to close co-operation with the Youth League-led Fort 
Hare resistance and the NIYC and ANC at UNNE, could but only have drawn NUSAS closer to 
the ANC and the Indian Congresses and influenced the direction of the national union’s policy. By 
the mid-1960s, NUSAS appeared to view the ANC as a broad church composed of different 
ideological strands. The non-communist, non-Africanist component of the ANC, as epitomised by 
NUSAS’s honorary president, Albert Luthuli, was regarded by NUSAS as an ally. In a similar vein, 
the ANC seemed to view NUSAS, which with the LP was the most radical organisation still 
functioning legally in South Africa by 1962, as a useful instrument for partially filling the political 
vacuum left by the banning of the liberation movements. The very tentative suggestion by ASA in 
1964 that the moribund university section of ASA merge with NUSAS implied that NUSAS would 
fill the space left by the ANCYL which ASA had been created to fill in the first place. This type of 
thinking would be crystalised in a proposal that NUSAS transform itself into the student section of 
the liberation movement, presumably the ANC’s. Even before this scenario was debated within 
NUSAS forums, the topic of chapter nine, NUSAS had become too radical for the state to tolerate. 
In late 1963, Vorster fired the first shot in the government’s campaign to silence NUSAS without 
actually banning it. This will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Conclusion 
By 1966, NUSAS had failed to secure the official affiliation of any student body at any of the newly 
created ethnic universities while its relationship with Fort Hare students was far more tenuous 
than it had been in 1960. This can be explained by the proscription of NUSAS by the government 
authorities on all campuses under its control and the authoritarian and repressive environment 
prevailing at all institutions. The degree of oppression was greater at Fort Hare than elsewhere, 
where the task of moulding a compliant, docile, tribalised student body was more difficult given 
the college’s independent, liberal, missionary, multi-racial history. The banning of the liberation 
movements in 1960, followed by the national security crackdown in 1963, intensified the levels of 
repression on all campuses. Again, repression was more severe at Fort Hare than anywhere else 
because a core of ANC and PAC student activists were (or were suspected of) promoting radical 
change and participating in the Eastern Cape uprising. Thus any gains which NUSAS had made 
at the new universities by 1963, as, for example, in the establishment of the underground ‘Island 
Students’ Association’ at Salisbury Island, were reversed. Membership of NUSAS at Fort Hare 
dropped dramatically to a fraction of the student body in the mid-1960s. Ironically though, for a 
short time, the national union achieved far more influence on the Eastern Cape campus than ever 
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before. In the void left by the banning of the liberation movements, the proscription of all political 
activity and the absence of an SRC, the underground NUSAS Local Committee assumed the 
campus leadership role. With the exception of Fort Hare, where this became intertwined with ‘the 
resistance’, NUSAS’s campaign under Leftwich to make the new universities unworkable came to 
little. Though incidents concerning the abrogation of student rights were identified at Salisbury 
Island and Ngoye, these were not escalated to provoke a confrontation, the first step to 
unworkability. Students at the new ethnic colleges were ignorant of the characteristics of other 
universities and often unpoliticised too. Many were reasonably satisfied with college life – and 
some rectors, like Cook at Ngoye, were shrewd enough to cultivate an environment of relative 
contentment – and thus saw no reason to engage in political actions initiated by an organisation 
of which many were distrustful. Moreover, these actions had questionable chances of success 
and could lead to expulsion from the university and an end to any future prospects of a career and 
social mobility. Nonetheless, all ethnic college students vehemently resented the application of 
social apartheid on their campuses and the disdain with which many white staff members treated 
them, as well as the use of Afrikaans as the de facto campus lingua franca. It could be argued 
that the catalyst for the Soweto Uprising in 1976, namely, the use of Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction, had its origins at the new ethnic universities because graduates of these institutions 
would then enter the schools as teachers. Pointers to the future emergence of a separate black 
student organisation, like SASO, as a pragmatic means of forging contact with students at other 
black educational institutions also prohibited from participating in NUSAS, is discernible at 
Turfloop during the 1960s. So too - in the expression by some Turfloop and Ngoye students of an 
assertive Africanism and a suspicion of white liberals – is the development of the racially 
exclusive Black Consciousness philosophy and the refusal of its adherents to co-operate with the 
white liberal NUSAS. The establishment of the racially exclusive ASA and ASUSA, organisations 
which prefigured SASO, and which posed a challenge to NUSAS’s hegemony both nationally and 
internationally, was one of the most important reasons for NUSAS embracing a more explicitly 
activist role and then in 1964 undertaking a fundamental re-evaluation of its role in working 
towards a new democratic non-racial South Africa. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Nationalist assault on NUSAS and the establishment of the Federation of 
Conservative Students, 1963-1964 
 
Introduction 
The mid-1960s were years of crisis and turmoil for NUSAS. In a bid to engineer the eventual 
demise of what was by then one of the most radical organisations still operating legally in 
South Africa, the state and its allies initiated a full-scale offensive against NUSAS in 1963. 
Through relentless McCarthyist anti-communist tactics, John Vorster, the Minister of Justice 
and his allies on the far-right (the Hertzog Group) hoped to smear NUSAS so completely that 
NUSAS’s moderate student base would be sliced out from under it. This would free up a 
significant body of white English-speaking students who, it was realised, could be organised 
into new campus conservative societies and eventually incorporated into the Afrikaanse 
Studentebond (ASB) as the long dreamed of English Student Bond. This offensive formed 
part of the general security clampdown aimed at eliminating any remaining left wing dissent 
in South Africa, but was also a response to favourable developments on the NUSAS 
campuses which were exploited by the state and its allies for their own purposes. Since 
Sharpeville and the enactment of university apartheid, white English-speaking students, like 
white English-speakers generally, were believed to have moved to the right. Moreover, the 
ideological gap between the NUSAS leadership and its mass student base was widening as 
NUSAS pursued an ever more all-embracing, activist, anti-apartheid policy in response to 
the demands of its radical and black membership and developments both inside South Africa 
and abroad.  
The 1963 congress and the continuing radicalisation of policy 
Although Driver, NUSAS’s outspoken president, acknowledged that the pursuit of a non-
racial South Africa was becoming progressively more difficult to champion in the face of new 
government laws and prohibitions, the NUSAS congress of 1963 at Wits continued in the 
same radical vein as its deeply divisive predecessor. Maintaining a close watch over 
assembly deliberations for the Indian Congresses, and telling assembly delegates how to 
think, was an observer from the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress, Essop Pahad.1 Pahad 
was a student at Wits and later Thabo Mbeki’s right hand man both in exile and in the post-
apartheid government.2 Present too was a ‘representative’ of the PAC who referred to those 
who were not black Africans as ‘settlers’ and ‘by-products of the settlers’.3 The controversial 
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3 Gavin Williams via email, 26.11.2014.  
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‘degree motion’ of 1962 was revisited. This had led to an attempted disaffiliation at Rhodes 
and general dissatisfaction amongst students and the interested public concerned that 
NUSAS’s actions would provide the catalyst for an AAM boycott of South African graduates.4 
From NUSAS’s investigations, it was apparent that some overseas academic bodies were 
concerned about falling standards within South African universities,5 but nonetheless, there 
was little likelihood of South African qualifications not being accredited.6 Despite this 
reassurance, many students felt that NUSAS should remain silent on the subject and let 
sleeping dogs lie.7 NUSAS felt however that it would be failing in its duty to do so.8 Thus 
Roger Jowell and Mhlambiso, presidents of the UCT and UNNE SRCs respectively, moved 
that the 1962 resolution be re-affirmed but reformulated in an unambiguous fashion as it had 
‘been grossly misinterpreted’.9 During a heated three hour debate, Hugh Kowarsky, the PP-
aligned Wits SRC president and the conservative Michael Chapman of Rhodes, attempted to 
have NUSAS’s investigation into South African degrees confined to South Africa alone. This 
amendment was narrowly defeated and the original Jowell-Mhlambiso motion carried by 
thirty seven votes to nineteen with fourteen abstentions.10  
Severing all ties with the ASB at the 1962 Congress had also generated much unhappiness 
within NUSAS’s ranks. Rhodes and the PP-orientated JCE were actively pursuing white co-
operation: in the former by hosting inter-SRC meetings and in the latter by participating in 
the Transvaal Onderwys Kollege Studente Unie (TOKSU). The debate on the ASB was thus 
re-opened. With the exception of a radical minority at Wits, it was agreed that NUSAS would 
continue its practice of inviting the ASB to its congresses and executive meetings even 
though the ASB had made co-operation with NUSAS impossible. Finding less favour with the 
white co-operation campuses was the decision to exploit the dissatisfaction of many 
students with the ASB at the Afrikaans-medium universities and attempt to establish NUSAS 
branches there like the one recently founded at Stellenbosch.11 
Generating by far the most conflict and division at the congress was the proposal that 
NUSAS apply for observer status to the Soviet-aligned International Union of Students (IUS) 
from which it had disaffiliated in 1955. In the light of the Cold War and escalating anti-
communism domestically, this was a naïve and dangerous policy revision. Nonetheless, the 
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NUSAS leadership had been quietly preparing the ground for such an eventuality. In the 
capacity of an ‘unofficial NUSAS representative’, Martin Legassick was secretly permitted to 
‘feel out the situation’ at the controversial World Festival of Youth and Students co-hosted by 
the IUS and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) in Helsinki in 1962.12 The 
following year NUSAS decided that its own National Youth Movement, which it intended 
launching with other youth bodies, would be co-sponsored, both materially and otherwise, by 
both the WFDY and the Western-aligned World Assembly of Youth (WAY).13 Moreover, it 
was agreed that NUSAS could participate in a purely practical project with the IUS, but this 
explosive piece of information was kept from the training colleges, many of which were 
threatening disaffiliation.14 In seeking observer status it was perhaps following the example 
of its former international relations standard bearer, NUS, which, although leaving the IUS 
shortly before NUSAS, had continued to send observers to IUS gatherings.  
The international student world had changed substantially since 1955 when the anti/non-
communist International Student Conference (ISC), dominated by student unions from the 
Western democracies, coldly ignored their Eastern counterpart, the IUS, composed of 
students from the communist second world. In the interim, student bodies from the newly 
independent states of Asia and Africa joined the ISC and were instrumental in transforming it 
from its ‘students-as-such’ position and Western bias to a more activist and international 
orientation. Many of these student unions in the developing world adopted a non-aligned 
position in the Cold War by belonging to both the IUS15 and ISC, but at the same time 
seeking international student co-operation outside these structures. In this they could be 
seen to be following in the footsteps of those heads of independent states (including those 
from India, Indonesia, Ghana, Algeria, Congo (Leoploldville), the United Arab Republic and 
Cuba) who attended the Belgrade Summit of 1961 which inaugurated what became the Non-
Aligned Movement. In March 1963, the National Students’ Union of Tunisia hosted a seminar 
to discuss the means of achieving student co-operation outside Cold War student 
structures16 and a Round Table Conference in Africa was mooted to take this idea further.17 
Of concern to NUSAS was the greater affinity of some unions, particularly in Africa, to the 
IUS rather than the ISC. NUSAS was part of Africa and the developing world and needed to 
align itself to the aspirations of these students. It needed to initiate and build relations with 
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African students and those in the developing world generally and as such would require 
some form of participation in all international student forums. 
NUSAS’s disaffiliation from the IUS was one of the reasons cited by black students for their 
disaffiliation from NUSAS in the 1950s.18 International partisanship was less marked 
amongst black students of the 1960s than it was amongst their 1950 counterparts, but could 
still provoke conflict and division. For example, NUSAS worried about the repercussions at 
UNNE of its siding with India against China in a border dispute.19 The radical and difficult 
SACHED branch was in direct contact with the IUS and was asking a lot of tricky questions 
about NUSAS’s foreign policy. NUSAS feared that SACHED would ‘go too fast and mess up 
[NUSAS’s] careful[ly laid] tactical plans’ of ‘a gradual rapprochement’ with the IUS.20 
SACHED’s actions perhaps forced NUSAS’s hand with the result that the IUS issue was 
addressed sooner than NUSAS would have liked.   
The fierce two hour debate on seeking observer status of the IUS21 was opened by Jonty 
Driver who argued that ‘although he “hated” the IUS’ he supported the idea of a conditional 
and negotiated observer status for NUSAS. NUSAS, he believed ‘should follow the example 
of the Catholic and Protestant Churches, both of which sent observers to their respective 
conferences’.22 Robert Molteno of UCT said that ‘NUSAS had a duty to maintain contact with 
other students’ and in a bid to appease the right, added that observing the IUS in action lent 
NUSAS the ideal opportunity of ‘see[ing] just how dishonest’ the IUS was.23 For those like 
Raymond Suttner who would support such a motion in the future, it was not a ‘very 
ideological decision’ but ‘was basically a question of even handedness’ in that a ‘vacuum’ 
existed on the left with the proscription of the liberation movements.24 
Wits, JCE and Rhodes tried to delay this drastic policy change by suggesting that NUSAS 
discuss its differences with the IUS rather than negotiating observer status.25 Were the 
proposed motion passed, Wits SRC president, Kowarsky (later a lawyer in Israel) argued, it 
would create the impression ‘that NUSAS was taking a step towards communist affiliation’ 
and in so doing ‘would … imperil… [its] very existence’. These sentiments were echoed by 
Rhodes.26 The amendment was lost by twenty one to forty votes,27 following which Durban 
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attempted unsuccessfully to halt the vote on the original motion.28 Eventually the assembly 
decided by thirty six to twenty one that the NUSAS president be empowered to negotiate 
observer status with IUS officials under stringent conditions imposed by the national union.29 
For many assembly delegates, this change of policy meant that ‘NUSAS was doomed’.30 
One student felt - and this was probably the feeling of many others - that were NUSAS to 
send observers to the IUS Congress, it would be banned.31 He was partially right. The IUS 
motion would provide the big stick with which the state and its allies would beat NUSAS 
some months later. 
Another line of attack which the state would use against NUSAS was its profession of ‘Pan-
Africanism’. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was inaugurated in May 1963 in Addis 
Ababa shortly before the NUSAS Congress. The OAU pledged itself to work towards the 
political and economic unity of the African continent and inter alia to fight colonialism by co-
ordinating national liberation movements. In the case of the latter, it specifically targeted 
white minority regimes and thus called for the implementation of all-embracing, Africa-wide 
sanctions on both South Africa and Portugal.32 To coincide with the inauguration of the OAU, 
a Pan African Students’ Seminar, partially paid for by the IUS,33 was scheduled for the latter 
part of 1963 to which NUSAS was invited. Thus, NUSAS required firstly, a mandate from the 
assembly to pursue Pan-African student unity and secondly, as a predominantly white 
organisation, needed to pin its colours firmly to the mast of Pan-Africanism so as to establish 
its credentials with potentially hostile African student unions. As importantly, ASA and 
ASUSA, composed of South Africa’s African majority, posed a serious challenge to NUSAS’s 
claim to be South Africa’s national student union. NUSAS described ‘Pan-Africanism’ as 
‘loyalty to the African continent’, economic control by Africans for Africans, and ‘political and 
economic unity of the African continent’. An ‘African’ was described non-racially as someone 
‘who owe[d] allegiance to the continent of Africa’ and controversially in the South African 
political context, one ‘who accept[ed] majority rule by the people of Africa’.34 Pan-Africanism 
was adopted without dissent and with only nine abstentions.35 This was remarkable (and an 
assembly delegate who does not remember this debate concurs36) considering that firstly, 
the assembly effectively endorsed ‘one person one vote’ which as a policy was not 
acceptable to many PP-aligned NUSAS delegates and secondly, even more controversially, 
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the definitions of ‘Pan-Africanism’ and an ‘African’ were also those of the banned PAC,37 
though an addendum stated that the motion did not imply support for the PAC. 
Being as much of a red rag to a bull in the eyes of the state was the re-election of Albert 
Luthuli as the honorary president of NUSAS. He was again hailed as a South African 
embodying the spirit of non-racialism and as the only African to have won the Nobel Peace 
prize.38 The Durban delegation walked out of the assembly however, when their candidate 
for honorary president, Archbishop Dennis Hurley was turned down.39 
The 1963 Congress marked the first occasion during which the delegates went on a public 
protest march. During the assembly proceedings, three hundred pupils from Fordsburg 
Indian High School burst into the congress, the security police in hot pursuit. The protesters 
pleaded with NUSAS to intervene with the government which planned to close their school, 
the only Indian secondary institution in Johannesburg. After a fierce debate, all40 members of 
the NUSAS assembly decided to join an illegal march with the children to the Department of 
Education. On their return to Wits they were stopped and dispersed by the police.41 Judging 
by the fact that the march was listed as ‘controversial’ and ‘requiring clarification’ in some 
delegations’ report-backs to their student bodies,42 the march was evidently too much for 
many constitutionally minded white students. It was one thing to demonstrate against 
university apartheid and the Sabotage Bill, but quite another to make a public spectacle of 
oneself in the company of chanting, banner waving Indian school children.43 
Conservative campus reaction 
 
Shortly after the conclusion of the 1963 congress, Driver visited various NUSAS campuses 
and discovered that certain students criticised the national union for being ‘too political’.44 
The fallout had begun.  
 
By late 1962, a conservative, Nationalist clique (‘Dressing’ to the campus wags) led by 
Christopher Lessing, chairperson of rag (who described himself as ‘an officer and a 
gentleman’45) and Melvyn Drummond (who had a picture of Mussolini on his bedroom wall)46 
had taken control of UCT’s Day Students’ Council and its official mouthpiece. This afforded 
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them a platform from which to express their pro-apartheid, anti-liberal, anti-PP, anti-NUSAS 
and anti-SRC propaganda.47 ‘Dressing’ was at the forefront of successfully campaigning for 
a new electoral system48 which it optimistically and erroneously believed would break the 
power of the left and depoliticise the SRC, forcing the latter to follow a practical policy.49 On 
two occasions the clique was accused of attempting to create an all-white apartheid Day 
Students’ Council by unsuccessfully effecting the removal of, on a technicality, firstly an 
Indian student50 and then a radical white one.51 Following the 1963 NUSAS congress, 
Drummond launched a bitter denunciation of the ‘degrees motion’ and ‘Pan-Africanism’, 
alleging in the latter case that Africans were intellectually, administratively and technically 
inferior, thus vindicating colonialism and the white man’s presence in Africa.52 The Day 
Students’ Council and the right wing put up a slate of candidates for the 1963/4 SRC 
elections.53 Although they were over-optimistic in their prediction that the student body would 
return a largely conservative SRC,54 the right wing did substantially better than usual, 
prompting Ken Owen of the Argus to note the ‘ominous’ decline of the liberal spirit at UCT 
and the rise of a pragmatic conservatism which eschewed a statement of principles.55 
 
A similar situation pertained at Wits. The SRC immediately, though not unanimously, 
dissociated itself from the ‘degrees motion’56 but took no stand on the IUS decision. Anti-
NUSAS communist bashing became the mission of Roux Wildenboer,57 an Afrikaans-
speaking scion of an old Wits family,58 who was associated with the far-right wing of the 
ASB,59 was a NP organiser and former Pretoria University student60 and, somewhat later, a 
member of the Broederbond.61 Wildenboer became chairperson of the Wits Afrikaanse 
Studenteklub, progressively transforming it into an overtly political society.62 During the 1963 
SRC elections, Wildenboer topped the polls, winning the highest number of votes in Wits’s 
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history.63 On a manifesto devoted to ‘getting NUSAS out of Wits and Wits out of NUSAS’, 
Wildenboer won the support of conservatives from both within and outside the NP as well as 
the apathetic floating vote.64 Predictably, the ‘unpatriotic’ degrees and the ‘communist IUS’ 
motions were singled out for attention in addition to NUSAS’s professed liberalism. 
Wildenboer also lamented the declining moral standards and unchristian atmosphere 
prevailing at Wits as well as Wits’ poor facilities compared to those at the apartheid-
supporting, subsidy-rich Pretoria University. Like the conservatives at UCT, Wildenboer 
believed that the forty eight percent who did not vote in the election were anti-liberal and 
would eventually join the anti-liberal crusade.65 The left tried to downplay and rationalise this 
distinct move to the right.66 John Daniel would later argue that Wildenboer and his 
unforgettable name scored high on the campus ‘recognition scale’ amongst students who 
usually took only a ‘passing interest’ in student politics. Moreover, many voters selected only 
two candidates, Wildenboer and Derek Bostock, the latter NUSAS’s international relations 
vice-president, out of a concern for ideological balance on the SRC.67 Nonetheless, Wits 
Student did recognise that Wildenboer’s success represented a new and dangerous trend in 
Wits politics which could wipe out the last vestiges of academic freedom on the campus.68 
 
At nearby JCE, the PP-dominated SRC rejected the ‘degrees’ and IUS motions69 as well as 
the political direction of NUSAS policy and continued its pursuit of white student co-operation 
with the ASB and its affiliates.70 Rhodes followed a similar course, having made fruitful 
contact with Stellenbosch and Potchefstroom earlier in the year.71 Its new ‘middle-of-the-
road’ SRC72 with a few fervently anti-NUSAS members (‘hard nuts’)73 was determined that 
NUSAS would follow a conservative course in the future. A student body meeting voted to 
retain Rhodes’s individual membership to NUSAS and not revert to automatic affiliation.74 So 
strong was this feeling that an aspirant SRC candidate failed to be elected when she stood 
on a platform of automatic affiliation.75 At Pietermaritzburg, tremendous apathy as well as 
latent hostility and ignorance of NUSAS existed. In May 1963, a disaffiliation movement 
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crystalised but ultimately the student body voted against abandoning its automatic 
membership of NUSAS.76  
The far-right, white co-operation and NUSAS 
 
Exploiting these promising political developments on the NUSAS campuses was one of the 
reasons that motivated the state and its allies to launch a full scale offensive against 
NUSAS. This was orchestrated by the Broederbond, the ASB, the Minister of Justice, John 
Vorster, and the far-right wing, rabidly anti-communist ‘Hertzog Group’ which, as its name 
suggests, included amongst others, Albert Hertzog and his secret Pretoria-based study 
group, the Afrikaner Orde. The thinking of the Hertzog Group looked back to the radical right 
Afrikaner nationalism of the 1930s and 1940s, but also drew heavily on the ideas of the 
burgeoning American ultra-right. These ideas were disseminated by the South African 
Observer edited by S.E.D. Brown, a known anti-Semite and former South African Defence 
Force operative. The American ultra-right (like Hitler) drew its inspiration from the anti-
Semitic nineteenth century forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This long discredited 
document warned of a global Jewish conspiracy to effect world domination through the 
vehicles of international capitalism and communism, the Freemasons, the suppressed 
Enlightenment ‘Illuminati’ (advocates of secularism, free thought, liberalism and gender 
equality), and the Catholic Church.77 For this plot to succeed, ‘Western’ ‘Christian’ society 
had to be fatally weakened. For the ultra-right then, secular ‘Jewish’, ‘Illuminati’, ‘Freemason-
controlled’, liberal supranational bodies like the United Nations were believed to champion a 
‘new world order’ and a global communist government which threatened the continued 
existence of nations and Christianity.78 Secularism and internationalism went hand in hand 
with social liberalisation. Social liberalisation eroded family values and thus sapped the 
moral fibre of Christian societies making them susceptible to atheist communist penetration 
and takeover. Thus the American ultra-right and its South African counterpart devoted much 
energy to sniffing out and decrying so-called communists, liberals, internationalist 
organisations, sexual permissiveness, nudity, obscenity, blasphemy, pornography and also, 
slightly later, feminism, homosexuality, abortion and birth control. In South Africa this took 
the form of policing the morals of white society including, as will be seen, those attending the 
English-medium universities.  
 
The far-right rigorously upheld the censorship of books, magazines and films allowed for by 
the Publications and Entertainment Act of 1963 and would extend this vigilance to the 
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‘Sestigers’ too, a new generation of young avant garde Afrikaans writers like Jan Rabie, 
Ettienne le Roux and André P. Brink. The Sestigers, who won a following amongst young 
Afrikaners, broke with the realist parochialism of Afrikaans literature and ventured into new 
literary forms and embraced new philosophical movements often after encountering these in 
extended trips abroad.79  
 
The emergence of the Sestigers and its supporters signified the dramatic social, economic 
and ideological changes occurring within Afrikanerdom. It was quite clear that the multiclass 
alliance of Afrikaner nationalism was slowly coming apart. The far-right looked askance as 
the new self-confident Afrikaner business class, which, realising that its material interests lay 
with those of English capital, sought increasingly to find an accommodation with 
‘Hoggenheimer’, Afrikaner nationalism’s long-time enemy. With the attainment of the 
Republic, the numerically expanding, educated, urbanised and increasingly affluent middle 
class saw themselves as part of a wider environment than exclusive Afrikanerdom. This 
enlightened (‘verligte’) group became more open to new political and cultural ideas and 
embraced Verwoerd’s stated policy of a white South African nationalism.80 
 
The far-right believed that these developments threatened the purity and existence of the 
Afrikaner nation and the ideological integrity of apartheid. Thus, in early 1963, the Hertzog 
Group launched its smear campaign against those within the Afrikaner Nationalist 
establishment believed to hold even vaguely liberal or dissident views.81 In addition, it 
created a large number of front organisations and infiltrated key Afrikaans cultural 
organisations such as the ASB.82 John Vorster was not a member of the Hertzog Group. 
However, he had close ties to it and being vehemently anti-communist and anti-liberal and 
an unstinting securocrat (with a close relationship to his fellow Ossewabrandwag internee, 
General Hendrik van den Berg, head of the Security Police), was the Hertzog Group’s 
nomination for the premiership after the assassination of Verwoerd in 1966.83 Three years 
later the Hertzog Group (by then part of a much larger ultra-conservative grouping and 
discussed more fully in chapter ten) broke with Vorster because of the prime minister’s 
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pragmatic tinkering with apartheid and were subsequently expelled from the NP. The 
Hertzog Group would form the nucleus of the Herstigte Nasionale Party, a party committed 
to uncompromising baasskap apartheid and an Afrikaner state with Afrikaans as the only 
official language.84  
 
Piet Meyer, a leading member of the Hertzog Group until 1969 and head of both the 
Broederbond and the SABC, announced to the Broederbond in 1966 his belief that the 
Afrikanerisation and hence neutralisation of white English-speakers was crucial to the 
completion of the Afrikaner Nationalist project.85 Thus publicly he expressed himself in 
favour of a more inclusive white nationalism, in the student sphere at least. The 
interpretation and content of his understanding of white inclusivity was thus somewhat at 
variance to that of the other NP white co-operationists whose conception of white South 
African nationalism was based more on the equality of the two white language groups rather 
than the assimilation or domination of one by the other. Meyer wished then to organise 
English-speakers into a separate English section of a federal ASB which would in turn be 
Afrikanerised and politically indoctrinated. In so doing, a number of goals would be achieved. 
The cultural and ideological purity of the ASB would be preserved as Afrikaans-speakers 
would remain separately organised. Also, the threat of anglicisation and liberalism would be 
eliminated and Afrikaner domination secured in the student sphere. And, finally, the NP co-
operationists would be appeased as English-speakers would be part of one ASB. To achieve 
this, a sustained smear campaign from all fronts against NUSAS, the English universities 
and liberalism would be mounted. This would bleed NUSAS’s membership. In addition, 
NUSAS would be structurally weakened by cutting it off from its student base. The 
Broederbond identified NUSAS’s dependence on its automatic enrolment system for its 
numerical strength and its foreign funding for its financial strength. These weaknesses would 
be exploited by the establishment of new student organisations financed by the 
Broederbond.86 The growing conservatism of English-speaking students in addition to 
divisions within the UP Youth (between the liberal left wing and the almost NP right wing)87 
would be exploited so as to establish campus conservative student organisations. These 
would be associated with the ASB and would eventually be transformed into the ASB’s 
English Bond.       
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In May 1963, Piet Meyer announced to an ASB mass meeting at Pretoria University that the 
time was ripe for the establishment of an ‘English Student League’.88 At the ASB congress in 
July 1963, the more enlightened ASB president, Dirk Herbst proclaimed that NUSAS was not 
the natural home of patriotic English-speakers and for this reason the ASB would welcome 
them in its ranks.89 These moves were not only aimed at harnessing anti-NUSAS feeling on 
the English-medium campuses to the NP cause, but also, particularly in Meyer’s case, at 
breaking the incipient revolt at the Afrikaans-medium centres. Anti-ASB sentiment was 
running high even at Pretoria. In May 1963 an attempt was made there to abolish automatic 
membership of the ASB and create a new non-ideological, bilingual organisation for white 
students outside any of the existing student bodies.90 Moreover, the ASB’s idealistic ‘Self-
Help’ campaign which entailed replacing black domestic workers in the university and 
college residences with self-service dining halls and student cleaners was by July 1964 an 
abysmal failure.91 It was quite clear then that a significant number of Afrikaans-speaking 
students had little sympathy for the impractical, inconvenient ideological schemes of the ASB 
which moreover would serve to entrench rather than end Afrikaans-speaking students’ 
isolation from other groups within society. 
 
Early in 1963, left wing students, staff members and organisations at the NUSAS universities 
were subjected to an anonymous smear campaign. This coincided with the onset of the 
Hertzog Group’s anonymous ‘smear letter’ writing programme to Dagbreek, the Afrikaans 
Sunday newspaper edited by the enlightened Dirk Richard.92 Anonymous pamphlets 
libellously depicting the NUSAS leadership as communist were distributed at Wits and 
Durban93 and both campuses suffered a spate of anti-Semitic attacks.94 In addition, the Wits 
Human Rights Society’s exhibition was extensively vandalised.95 Alex Antonites of the 
Pretoria ASB and the Hertzog Group96 (and later a philosophy lecturer at Zululand and 
Pretoria) found these ‘troubles’ at Wits ‘gratifying’ because they indicated a right wing 
challenge to liberal hegemony and prepared the way for an ‘Afrikaans-orientated English 
Student Bond’.97 The smear campaign took on a more sinister aspect by the end of 1963 
when Denis Brutus, a banned and detained Wits SRC member and founder of SANROC  
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was shot at close range while escaping from custody.98 During 1964 and 1965, fifteen UCT 
students and staff members, as well as the NUSAS president, Osler, experienced inter alia 
threatening phone calls and letters, spray painted houses, office burglaries and their cars 
being dangerously tampered with.99 In addition, the car of NUSAS executive member and 
Pietermaritzburg LP activist, deeply involved in the 1963 Transkei elections, John Aitcheson, 
was petrol bombed.100 In separate incidents, two students narrowly escaped being 
deliberately run over and killed.101 Vigne believed that even during the 1960s an embryonic 
‘Third Force’, like that of the late 1980s and 1990s, was in existence.102 This probably had 
much to do with the establishment of Hendrik van den Bergh’s ‘Republican Intelligence’, the 
covert branch of the Security Police which was the predecessor of the frightening Bureau of 
State Security (BOSS). Not surprisingly then, the police made no headway in solving any of 
these cases.    
John Vorster’s attacks on NUSAS 
 
The second half of 1963 marked a new phase in the state’s security clampdown. The high 
command of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was arrested at Rivonia in July 1963 and charged 
with high treason. The disproportionately large number of Wits graduates amongst these 
SACP and ANC MK cadres who moreover had been active in student and even NUSAS 
politics, was not lost on the state. Arrests and bannings continued. A large cohort of Fort 
Hare students, including NUSAS and/or ANC activists were detained in August 1963. (See 
chapter seven.) A number of ANC, TIYC103 and LP members at UNNE, Wits and 
Pietermaritzburg were banned, including Mhlambiso104 and  Aitcheson.105  
 
John Vorster launched his first verbal attack on NUSAS at the NP Jeugbond Congress in 
Pretoria on 30 August 1963. The date is significant as campus SRC elections in which right 
wing candidates were contesting seats were reaching a climax. Moreover, this attack 
occurred shortly after the Rivonia and Fort Hare arrests and two weeks after the renewed 
and intensified national sabotage campaign of the National Committee of Liberation 
(NCL).106 Vorster alleged that the ‘recent [nationwide] unrest’ was not a ‘spontaneous 
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outburst’ but the work of certain white agitators. Specifically, the more sophisticated 
technology used by the NCL suggested to the state that a new organisation had been 
born107 and in view of Vorster’s racist reasoning, it could be construed that he would guess it 
had significant white involvement. Evidently then, in an attempt to link NUSAS in the public 
mind to subversion, sabotage and the recent arrests, Vorster cryptically threatened NUSAS 
with possible action against it ‘in the light of certain developments which will probably be 
discussed in the course of this year.’ Claiming that ‘liberalist and progressive ideas had 
taken root’ at the English universities which were attributable to NUSAS, Vorster appealed to 
the UP-supporting parents of students at the English universities to investigate NUSAS and 
its influence on their children.108 He presumably hoped that parents would then take action 
against the national union and that UP-supporting students would be frightened into voting 
the conservative anti-NUSAS candidates onto their SRCs.  
 
The Durban and Wits SRC responded in terms of defending the liberal freedoms of the 
university which encouraged students to think for themselves and not follow blindly the 
beliefs of their parents.109 The NUSAS vice-president, Parker, responded far more 
aggressively by reminding Vorster that cabinet ministers had been known to lie to and about 
NUSAS. He challenged Vorster to reveal his ‘developments’, substantiate his attacks, and 
desist from further innuendoes and smears that NUSAS was involved in illegal activities.110 
Taking advantage of the Rivonia raids, Albert Hertzog smeared the English universities the 
following day, accusing them of harbouring saboteurs and being hotbeds of subversion.111  
 
There were almost immediate reactions to these events on NUSAS campuses. Heralding the 
serious future problems for NUSAS at Durban, two members of the Durban NUSAS Local 
Committee moved, unsuccessfully, a motion of censure of Parker for his rude, ‘obnoxious’ 
and disrespectful reply to Vorster. The movers believed that student unions should be on 
harmonious terms with the government.112 At UCT, Lessing launched an attack on NUSAS 
in the Day Students’ Council’s newspaper, Trend, and recommended that UCT abolish its 
automatic membership to NUSAS.113 These sentiments were echoed on the UCT SRC a few 
days later when Lessing and Gerrit van Schalkwyk (UP)114 moved that UCT replace its 
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automatic membership to NUSAS with individual enrolment because of ‘the dissatisfaction of 
some students with certain NUSAS policies’. This was defeated by ten votes to five115 
following which Van Schalkwyk and Lessing attempted to convene a student mass meeting 
to discuss the issue, but failed to collect the requisite number of signatures to do so.116 
Subsequently, ten leading UCT students, led by Van Schalkwyk, resigned from NUSAS 
stating that because of its ‘open standpoint’, NUSAS had become the mouthpiece of ‘political 
organisations which present no practical or peaceful means of obtaining a change of 
government in South Africa’.117 Presumably because the right wing accused NUSAS of 
being ‘too political’, the NUSAS president found it noteworthy that the dissidents accepted 
that a national union had an overtly political function.118 Evidently NUSAS was not too 
political, it just pursued the wrong politics.   
 
On 14 September 1963, in the middle of the UCT events, Vorster made his second attack on 
NUSAS. For Vorster, ‘the big cancer’ in South African public life was ‘whites who agitated 
amongst blacks’.119 Evidently NUSAS was just such an agitator body, as Vorster claimed 
that NUSAS was ‘a cancer in the life of South Africa which must be cut out’ and that it was ‘a 
mouthpiece of liberalism and tinged with communism’. He went further by stating that ‘I 
cannot say that every member of NUSAS is a communist, but I can say that every 
communist at the universities is a member of NUSAS. I will reckon with NUSAS in my own 
good time’.120 NUSAS believed, and issued a statement to this effect, that Vorster’s latest 
verbal assault was an ‘attempt to try and prevent the anti-NUSAS move at the University of 
Cape Town from completely fizzling out’.121 The SABC entered the fray too, airing a talk by 
Ivor Benson (associated with Piet Meyer and the Hertzog Group and its future 
‘Volkskongres’ and the Council against Communism)122 lauding the resignations at UCT as 
an ‘assertion of a genuine South African spirit’ which stemmed from a ‘spontaneous revolt’ 
against the deliberate efforts of a small group of ‘fanatical leftists and liberals’ as well as 
‘communist and leftist lecturers’ to transform NUSAS into a political organisation hostile to 
‘our national cause’.123 Marais Steyn, the Transvaal UP leader came to NUSAS’s defence.124 
There were good liberal reasons for defending a legal organisation against government 
assault and though Steyn was a conservative, he was also a fiery anti-Nationalist. Perhaps 
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because of this intervention, Van Schalkwyk and four other members of the anti-NUSAS 
campaign did an about turn and withdrew their resignations from NUSAS. They explained 
this by saying they were not the government lackeys they were made out to be and while 
they still objected to some aspects of NUSAS policy, they would work within the organisation 
to change it.125 Altogether, sixteen ‘resignees’ returned to NUSAS, a great victory for the 
national union.126 
 
In a surprise move, the SABC acceded to NUSAS’s request to reply to Benson. This brief 
response stressed the democratic nature of the organisation and avoided a positive 
statement of beliefs.127 Immediately thereafter, a new attack by Vorster was aired. Vorster 
called on students who were ‘compulsory members’ of NUSAS to resign ‘for the sake of our 
country’.128 He took it as given that NUSAS was ‘communist’, listing as NUSAS activists 
some prominent communists who had never played a leading role in the national union. In 
addition, he labelled the international organisations with which NUSAS was associated even 
tangentially, such as the Algerian Union of Students and the IUS, as ‘communist’, 
‘revolutionary’ or ‘anti-South African’. The ‘degree motion’ and NUSAS’s alleged 
collaboration with SANROC in having South Africa ousted from the Olympic games, were 
denounced as ‘anti-South African’. Further, NUSAS was condemned for its endorsement of 
Pan-Africanism, ‘biological integration’ and a universal franchise, the latter a policy only of 
the SACP and LP129 - evidently a smear attempt to link the LP and NUSAS to the SACP. 
 
During much of this time, Driver was overseas and was not in a position to co-ordinate the 
response to Vorster. Thus SRC presidents, some of whom were PP-aligned, interpreted 
NUSAS policy according to their own individual or SRC beliefs. Durban and Rhodes, for 
example, portrayed NUSAS in a conservative ‘students-as-such’ light.130 In denying that 
NUSAS was communist, some SRCs claimed that NUSAS was anti-communist, falling 
directly into Vorster’s trap, in the opinion of the scathing Trotskyite left and the aggrieved 
UNNE SRC. UNNE also took exception to the absolute disowning of SANROC and its 
officers, Denis Brutus and John Harris, when NUSAS had policy on both non-racial sport 
(though not the sports boycott) and the banning order imposed on Brutus.131 UNNE also 
objected to Driver’s ‘16 point’ rebuttal of Vorster’s allegations as being ‘defensive’ rather than 
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a principled statement of NUSAS beliefs. Although technically NUSAS had radical policy on 
all aspects of South African life based on its acceptance of the Declaration of Universal 
Human Rights, Driver denied that NUSAS had a taken a stand on either the franchise or 
biological integration. Justifying this to UNNE, Driver explained that he was appealing to 
ordinary students not familiar with NUSAS policy, not to heed the directive of Vorster and 
resign from NUSAS. This required a factual and diplomatic approach, he believed.132  
 
Some weeks later, Vorster publicly associated NUSAS with the ANC and subversion by 
referring to NUSAS members as ‘Luthuli’s boys’ and casting aspersions on the newly 
inaugurated ‘Political Freedom Fund’.133 Vorster also publicly questioned the nature of talks 
Driver had conducted with representatives of the banned liberation movements in London.  
Though such meetings had taken place, these were more in the nature of rekindling old UCT 
friendships. A conversation with the ANC’s London representative, Mazizi Kunene, was 
largely restricted to poetry, though a worried Driver did overhear the PAC’s Nana Mahoma’s 
negotiations for the supply of machine guns. Thus, with the permission of the executive, 
Driver claimed no knowledge of such meetings, reasoning that for Vorster to pursue this 
dangerous to NUSAS line of questioning, he would face the embarrassment of having to 
admit that South Africans were placed under surveillance while travelling abroad.134 On 17 
October 1963, the police raided NUSAS’s offices, confiscating documents relating to the 
IUS, communism and the campaign against the General Law Amendment Act.135 In 
NUSAS’s opinion, Vorster had failed to break NUSAS with his smear campaign and had thus 
resorted to uncovering ‘damaging’ information to use against the national union.136 
 
Much was made by Driver and the sympathetic English press of the McCarthyist methods 
employed by Vorster and the far-right wing to smear NUSAS. Vorster, like McCarthy, 
equated liberalism with communism and levelled unfounded allegations of ‘communism’, ‘left 
taint’ and ‘fellow travelling’ at various groups in society, including university staff and 
students. These smears, it was hoped, would, as they had done in the USA, whip the public 
into an anti-communist frenzy137 allowing Vorster to do as he pleased with his adversaries, 
the English-medium universities and their institutions. 
 
                                                          
132 BC 586 B4.1, Jonty Driver to Bala (Mudaly), 14.10.1963. 
133 NUSAS Newsletter, 23.3.1964, p. 26. 
134 C.J. Driver, ‘NUSAS Presidency (1963-4)’, Unpublished memoir, pp. 8, 11. 
135 BC 586 B1 Presidential Report 1964, p. 25; NUSAS Newsletter, 23.3.1964, p. 25. 
136 NUSAS Newsletter, 23.3.1964, p. 25. 
137 Cape Times, 17.3.1963; Star, 30.9.1963; Dome Special NUSAS Edition, October 1963. 
333 
 
Though Driver predicted NUSAS would ‘suffer’ from Vorster’s ‘multiple untruths’ and could 
even face proscription138 of itself and its president (a deliberate ploy employed by the 
NUSAS president to goad even conservative students to the defence of NUSAS and its 
president),139 the Minister of Justice succeeded only in denting NUSAS but not breaking it. 
At Wits, more than three hundred students resigned from NUSAS following a concerted 
pamphleteering campaign by Wildenboer. At UCT there were over two hundred resignations, 
at Durban, thirty, and at Rhodes, where individual enrolment was followed, only three.140 At 
Pietermaritzburg, one hundred and fifty students repeated the earlier call for voluntary 
NUSAS membership in addition to the same number allegedly writing to Vorster supporting 
his standpoint on NUSAS.141 Students at Cape Town Teachers’ Training College abolished 
automatic membership142 and the Baptist Theological College and the Grahamstown 
Training College submitted their notices of disaffiliation.143 In early 1964, the Department of 
Education, Arts and Science forbade students at any institution falling under its jurisdiction, 
including those at the Johannesburg Arts and Crafts College and pre-primary training 
colleges, from associating with NUSAS.144 
 
The ASB executive took advantage of this situation. In October 1963, it commissioned an 
investigation into the possibility of establishing an organisation for students who had 
resigned from NUSAS which would eventually operate on a confederal basis with the 
ASB.145 At the same time, the NP Jeugbond announced that it would appoint a full-time 
organiser at UCT146 and an unsuccessful attempt was made to start a branch of the NP at 
Durban.147 During late November and early December, unsubstantiated reports reached 
NUSAS that moves were afoot in Johannesburg and Cape Town to establish some new 
organisation.148 
 
Despite these new developments and the damaging nature of the Vorster attacks, NUSAS 
did not dilute its radical policy in late 1963 or in the new academic year when it delivered its 
traditional speech to new students on its affiliated campuses. Apart from departing from its 
principles, a tactical move to the right would result in NUSAS losing its black and radical 
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membership. Moreover, international events necessitated NUSAS taking an even stronger 
left stand than previously. Its continued accreditation in international student forums like the 
ISC was potentially in jeopardy while in January 1964, the NUSAS representative had 
walked out of the Pan African Student Seminar in Dar es Salaam in protest at NUSAS being 
labelled unrepresentative and thus ineligible to participate in any regional or international 
forum. (This will be discussed in detail in chapter nine.) The Vorster attacks did however put 
a temporary brake on NUSAS’s rapprochement with the IUS. Driver’s mandated meeting in 
Europe with the IUS had not gone entirely according to plan, and in the light of the 
dangerous domestic situation in which NUSAS found itself, its outcome could be slanted 
positively or negatively.149 Ultimately, the executive voted four in favour and four against 
NUSAS attending the 8th  IUS Congress in an observer capacity.150 
 
The Volkskongres on communism 
 
Opposition to communism was becoming an even greater issue in South Africa. In order to 
‘champion’ the ‘hottest’ issue that united Nationalists,151 the Hertzog group began making 
preparations in November 1963 for its controversial ‘Volkskongres on the combatting of 
Communism: Christianity against Communism’ scheduled for March-April 1964 in 
Pretoria.152 Heavily influenced by ultra-right wing American fundamentalist Christians, 
Volkskongres speakers concentrated on, among others, ‘communist lies’, ‘communist 
brainwashing’, the communist ‘enslavement’ of the free nations of the world, and importantly, 
the ‘communist onslaught’ against the Afrikaans churches which would ‘render them 
defenceless against “liberal” and “communist” indoctrination’. In addition to the churches, it 
was alleged that youth and educational institutions were in danger of being transformed into 
‘tools for the communist revolutionary programme’.153  
 
For NUSAS this was an additional problem to be faced in the event of ‘startling revelations’ 
about ‘communistic and liberalistic organisations’ like NUSAS being made.154 Driver wrote at 
some length on the need to avoid making any statement which would project the national 
union as ‘anti-communist’. NUSAS was, he argued, ‘anti-totalitarian’ which necessarily 
implied opposition to communism. Moreover, an anti-communist policy would require 
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potential NUSAS members to declare their political affiliation which was incompatible with 
NUSAS’s open membership clause. Thus NUSAS was to remain ‘non-communist’ and ‘anti-
totalitarian’ and when attacked would embarrass the government by describing both Stalinist 
communism and apartheid South Africa as ‘totalitarian’.155 The Volkskongres was described 
by the press as ‘religious McCarthyism’. In Driver’s research into methods used in 
combatting McCathyism in the USA, he discovered the importance of moderates rather than 
radicals speaking up in the face of communist smear campaigns. He thus urged the 
moderate to conservative Rhodes SRC which already had an anti-communist policy in place, 
to pass a resolution on the dangers of McCarthyism to the universities, to students and to 
anyone opposing apartheid.156 It is not clear whether the SRC responded. After the 
Volkskongres accused the Students’ Christian Association of incipient communism157 and 
condemned its (superficially) multi-racial membership as ‘liable to encourage ideologies 
hostile to the church’,158 NUSAS again requested the moderate, religiously-inclined Rhodes 
SRC to respond to this.159 Ultimately the radical UCT SRC obliged160 but as a tactic against 
McCarthyism, it was probably as effective as if the allegedly ‘communistic’ NUSAS had 
responded itself.  
 
Both UCT and Wits were under attack for promoting ‘moral decay’, the breeding ground of 
communism. In the wake of both the Volkskongres and the Easter sermon of John Vorster’s 
brother, the Reverend Koot Vorster – a sermon devoted largely to the evils of UCT’s rag - 
‘alien’ and ‘immoral’ university rags came under sustained fire from the far-right wing NP 
press.161 It was alleged, inter alia, that scantily clad women at Wits and UCT and men attired 
in women’s underwear were pornographic and alluring and led to black immorality.162 More 
seriously, both the president of the UCT SRC, Joseph Levenstein, and the editor of Varsity, 
Morris Szeftel (later a renowned Marxist political economist), were charged with obscenity by 
John Vorster following the publication of an article in the student press entitled ‘How to 
seduce a freshette’.163 These attacks on the liberal universities, the NUSAS-affiliated SRCs 
argued, were some of the weapons used by the far-right and the Broederbond in their 
campaign to portray Wits and UCT as morally decayed and thus unAfrikaans, thus softening 
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up the public for the erection of a new Afrikaans university on the Rand for which they were 
fighting.164 
 
The Volkskongres introduced a whole new genre of anti-communist, far-right wing and 
conservative thought and literature to South Africa. These included Sceon Skousen’s 1958 
bestseller, The Naked Communist (Skousen was a Jehovah’s Witness and former US FBI 
agent), which exposed both the goals of communism and the methods required to combat 
these, the former being read into the US Congressional Record in 1963.165 The Naked 
Communist was quoted extensively by Wildenboer in justification for his attacks on rag and 
student life at Wits.166 Conscience of a Conservative written in 1960 by Barry Goldwater, a 
hawkish, anti-communist, anti-integrationist and McCarthy defender and 1964 US 
presidential hopeful,167 was distributed in Afrikaans as Gewete van ‘n konserwatis by a 
Hertzog front, ‘Sunergia Press’.168 Goldwater’s ideas were to come up quite frequently in the 
course of the development of the new conservative, anti-communist student societies in 
1964.169 These, NUSAS believed, formed part and parcel of the Volkskongres and ‘the 
whole McCarthyist move the government is attempting to engineer’170 which would 
consolidate NP support, eliminate political dissidents within and without the NP fold and 
muzzle the opposition press.171  
 
The South African Conservative Students’ Association (SACSA) at Wits 
 
The next step in the state’s campaign to break NUSAS by driving a wedge between the 
radical NUSAS leadership and its conservative student membership occurred in late 
December 1963 when unverified reports reached NUSAS that moves were afoot to establish 
some sort of national conservative student organisation. At a meeting in January 1964, 
attended by among others  Wildenboer and right wing UP Youth leaders, John Mendelsohn 
and Winston Hertzenberg, the South African Conservative Students’ Association (SACSA) 
came into being. The executive was composed of supporters of both the NP and UP172 and 
chaired by Anton Mostert, a successful, extremely intelligent lawyer in his early thirties who 
                                                          
164 Nux no. 3, March 1965; Trend, 17.5.1966. 
165 W. Cleon Skousen, The naked communist, C & J Investments, np., 2007, ebook, http://tekiah.co.za/e-
books/the-naked-communist-w-cleon-skousen.pdf accessed 4.12.2014.  
166 Witwatersrand Student vol. 16 no. 11, 15.5.1964; ‘M.R. Grundy’ to Witwatersrand Student vol. 16 no. 13, 
1.6.1964.  
167 Adam Clymer, ‘Barry Goldwater, Conservative and Individualist, Dies at 89’, New York Times on the Web, 
29 May 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/books/01/04/01/specials/goldwater-obit.html accessed 11.7.2013. 
168 J.H.P. Serfontein, op. cit., p. 31.  
169 Varsity vol. 23 no. 17, 12.8.1964. 
170 BC586 S9, Jonty Driver to SRC Presidents, 2.3.1964. 
171 Varsity vol. 23 no. 5, 9.4.1964. 
172 BC 586 S9, ‘The advent of SACSA - the dilemma of the United Party student’, Audax, Journal of the 
Witwatersrand Young Progressives. 
337 
 
was described either as a part-time Wits lecturer or Arts student. NUSAS suspected that he 
was connected to the NP but could find no proof of this or his membership (then or later) of 
the Broederbond.173 Mostert came from a bloedsap family, was intensely patriotic, was some 
years later to oppose censorship and in 1978 defied PW Botha and exposed the Information 
Scandal.174 
 
Much to NUSAS’s relief, SACSA tactically blundered right from the beginning.175 Despite 
chairing the SRC’s constitution committee, Wildenboer failed to submit the SACSA 
constitution for SRC ratification, thus forfeiting SACSA’s right to operate as a registered 
campus society during student registration and so embark on its recruitment campaign. 
Mostert demanded that the Wits authorities over-ride SRC standing rules on SACSA’s 
behalf, but the irate Wits principal, I.D. MacCrone, incensed at the arrogance and rudeness 
of Mostert, declined. After being threatened with disciplinary action when they continued 
putting up their posters, SACSA officers set up a table outside the university gates and 
through a loudhailer exhorted new and returning students to resign from NUSAS and 
complained of university and SRC discrimination.176 
 
Through its pamphlets, press releases and interviews, SACSA encouraged all conservative 
and ‘patriotic’ students, particularly those of NP and UP persuasion, to join SACSA and fight 
the forces of ‘liberalism’, ‘leftism’ and specifically, the unpatriotic and treasonous NUSAS. 
NUSAS was accused of trying to downgrade South African university qualifications and 
through its advancement of Pan-Africanism was guilty of the greatest treachery ever towards 
South Africa. Moreover, it allegedly included in its ranks the Rivonia trialists.177 SACSA 
believed that ninety percent of Wits students were conservative and if they could be roused 
from their apathy and lethargy to join the ‘national struggle’, could ensure that NUSAS and 
its ideology would be obliterated from the Wits campus.178   
 
Using technical legal language which neither the very worried Wits SRC nor the NUSAS 
president could understand, Mostert informed the Wits SRC that its automatic affiliation to 
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NUSAS was ‘ultra vires’.179 The SRC publicly announced its intention to oppose Mostert’s 
threatened legal action in court,180 but after taking legal advice, had privately, without 
informing the student body, decided to change its method of affiliation. Driver did not 
approve of this change.181 He, along with the previous executive had been thinking about 
converting NUSAS membership to individual enrolment so as to create a more activist union, 
but he believed to do this after the Vorster attacks would be tantamount to caving in to 
government pressure. 
 
Despite SACSA’s success (probably unknown to it) with Wits’s NUSAS affiliation, SACSA 
suffered a new setback. After SACSA’s prohibition on the Wits campus and its subsequent 
defiance of the Wits authorities, the divided UP Youth began to have second thoughts about 
its involvement in an anti-establishment, perceived to be illegal organisation and its alliance 
in it with the NP. Marais Steyn left the critical Bantu Law Amendment debate in Cape Town 
and rushed up to Johannesburg to intervene in the dissension.182 He issued a statement to 
the press denying that his party had ever been associated with SACSA which he alleged 
was Broederbond-inspired and dominated.183 UP members who remained in SACSA were 
secretly threatened with expulsion from the party.184 This was a great blow to Mostert and 
Piet Coetzer of SACSA. They denied the Broederbond allegations and accused Steyn of 
betraying the conservative cause in general and those English-speakers in particular who 
regarded the UP as their natural political home. Presumably SACSA realised that they had 
lost the majority of their potential supporters as most conservatives at Wits were UP-inclined 
rather than Nationalist. Even more galling perhaps, was the warning by Douglas Gibson and 
Dave Dalling of the left wing of the UP Youth that membership of SACSA was incompatible 
with the ideal of academic freedom and Wits’s traditional openness. In addition, they stated 
that if anyone ‘sincerely’ felt that ‘NUSAS was in need of reform, there were democratic and 
constitutional mechanisms available for so doing’.185 NUSAS was heartened that it still 
retained the support of a body as conservative as the UP Youth. 
 
Despite the UP setback, SACSA submitted its constitution to the SRC for approval, but this 
was rejected by everyone except Wildenboer. It abrogated the Wits SRC’s open 
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membership code as membership of SACSA was made conditional on resigning from 
NUSAS. SACSA’s aim was to ‘offer relentless opposition to the cause of Communism and 
Leftism….and to maintain the present constitutional form of government in South Africa.’ It’s 
‘interpretation clause’ which defined ‘Leftism’ as meaning adherence to ‘one-man-one-vote’ 
[sic], ‘communism’, ‘Pan-Africanism’ and ‘liberation struggles’ was severely criticised.186 
Some members of the SRC were unhappy that SACSA could not be recognised187 
presumably because the decision created the impression that SACSA was being victimised, 
something that NUSAS wished to avoid188 because it played directly into the hands of the 
right. It was also feared that Mostert could still ‘play his cards dangerously’189 and use other 
methods to get at NUSAS. SACSA appealed to the university authorities to overturn the 
SRC’s decision, to no avail.190 Ultimately the leadership of SACSA fissured. Piet Coetzer 
(third in command) resigned, citing Wildenboer’s disloyalty to Wits following his attack on rag 
(mentioned earlier) and the overtly political orientation of SACSA.191 Coetzer was said to be 
reconsidering his NUSAS membership as ‘it ha[d] yet to be proved that NUSAS [was] not 
loyal to South Africa’.192  
 
Altogether twenty students resigned from NUSAS due to SACSA’s efforts, bringing the total 
number of non-NUSAS members at Wits to two hundred in 1964,193 a third less than at the 
end of 1963. SACSA was also thwarted in its goal of becoming a national students’ union. 
NUSAS wished to avoid the emergence of a new national organisation at all costs and so 
leaked confidential information to the press to sabotage this (discussed later). NUSAS 
developed its approach to the SACSA threat by seeking the advice of Albert Geyser, 
professor of Divinity at Wits, whose expulsion and firing from the Nederduits Hervormde 
Church and Pretoria University on trumped up charges of heresy offered first-hand 
experience of NP aims and methods.194 NUSAS recognised that for a change it was ‘the 
establishment’ and was thus in a position of strength viz-a-viz the ‘anti-establishment’ 
SACSA.195 The Wits SRC was left to handle SACSA while NUSAS remained absolutely 
silent because, it was argued, issuing statements would have built up SACSA’s public 
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image. Nonetheless, some students at Wits did criticise NUSAS’s silence, interpreting it as a 
sign of fear.196 
 
The Conservative Students’ Association (CSA) at UCT 
 
Shortly after the launch of SACSA at Wits, a conservative student body made its appearance 
at UCT. It is difficult to gauge the origins and linkages of this new group because its founders 
constantly contradicted themselves and concealed information about its association to the 
Wits SACSA, the NP, the Broederbond and the source of its seemingly unlimited funds.197 
The NUSAS-supporting UCT press exploited this to the utmost as it realised that the 
conservative revolt of the previous year had been defeated because of student distrust of the 
motives and allegiances of its leaders.198 Thus the new body was portrayed as ridiculous 
(James Bond), fascist and British imperialistic (the Raj) and even more ‘political’ than it 
accused NUSAS of being.199  
 
From what can be established, the Cape branch of SACSA under Lessing and Drummond 
emerged shortly after the launch of the Wits SACSA and a visit to Cape Town by 
Wildenboer.200 However, Drummond denied the links to the Wits SACSA and alleged that 
the Cape SACSA was an entirely independent and spontaneous entity flowing from a 
decision taken the previous year to form such a body.201 Shortly after this, NUSAS became 
privy to SACSA’s confidential decision, taken in the presence of mysterious invited guests, to 
disaffiliate from Wits national SACSA because it was Broederbond-dominated. This was 
leaked to the Sunday Times by NUSAS in the hope of embarrassing Mostert and 
Wildenboer202 and presumably also nipping in the bud a fledgling national organisation as 
well as scaring off potential members at UCT and Wits opposed to the NP and the 
Broederbond. Cape SACSA denied this, but changed its name to the Conservative Students’ 
Association (CSA).203 The CSA declared its and SACSA’s aim to be the absolute destruction 
of NUSAS. Through the mobilisation of anti-NUSAS public opinion, the CSA hoped to induce 
students to resign from the national union. Drummond believed that NUSAS was ‘up to 
something’ illegal and that ‘by exposing NUSAS, [the CSA and SACSA would] create such 
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hell that the government [would] be forced to take action’.204 Parallel to this line of attack, the 
CSA alleged that its four person executive would be augmented in due course by a secret 
agent who they named ‘005’, a NUSAS turncoat and/or member of the UCT SRC who would 
spill the beans.205 This alarmed NUSAS somewhat because it thought it knew (but did not 
reveal) the identity of 005,206 but eventually 005, according to two different explanations, had 
either been too intimidated by the ‘liberalists’ or was too busy with other important work to 
reveal himself.207 
 
In NUSAS’s opinion, the CSA had learnt from the mistakes of SACSA at Wits and did not 
begin its operations at UCT until legally registered with the SRC.208 Chris Lessing submitted 
a constitution to the SRC which Drummond conceded was forced on the organisation.209 It 
had an open membership clause and was devoid of any overtly political aims other than 
exposing NUSAS, opposing multi-racialism, and advancing ‘multi-nationalism’ (apartheid) 
and conservatism.210 This was accepted by the SRC, the student press lauding the CSA’s 
recognition as a victory for UCT’s professed tolerance and liberalism.211  
Despite announcing its impending publicity campaign nothing was heard of the CSA212 until 
the ‘expose’ of NUSAS’s controversial ‘Botha’s Hill Seminar’ (discussed in the next chapter). 
Thousands of copies of a subtly edited version of Driver’s Botha’s Hill speech with additional 
commentary aimed at smearing NUSAS was printed on expensive, glossy coloured paper 
and was distributed on the campus by the CSA.213 By eliding the moderate proposals of 
Driver (NUSAS should Africanise its membership and leadership and become a more activist 
body) with those of other seminar contributors (extremely radical proposals which Driver had 
specifically rejected), the pamphlet created the impression that the NUSAS president 
championed the transformation of the national union into the ‘student wing’ of the banned 
liberation movements, in other words, a violent organisation operating largely underground 
involved with subversive ‘private activities’. Drummond refused to reveal the source of his 
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funding, claiming it might have come from CSA membership fees.214 In fact, NUSAS 
discovered it came from the NP and in the future would be financed by Antikom, a Hertzog 
group front.215 Varsity believed that the CSA’s ‘exposure’ of NUSAS had achieved nothing as 
far as augmenting the CSA’s membership or inducing students to resign from NUSAS 
(twenty seven resigned) as most UCT students realised that the controversial ideas 
contained in the Botha’s Hill documents were the personal views of the president or the 
ideas of people outside the national union.216 
It is difficult to determine the extent of the CSA’s support. Its membership was originally 
estimated at sixteen at the time of its registration, rose to two hundred after its Botha’s Hill 
campaign217 and dropped to one hundred and sixteen in September 1964.218 Some of those 
who joined were NUSAS supporters who planned to swamp the organisation and then sink 
it. In exasperation, the CSA announced that it might be forced to operate off the campus.219 
Resignations from NUSAS were also problematic as like in 1963, many were judged to be 
forgeries.220 
Other than an information meeting at which the CSA explained its aims and attempted to 
distance itself from the government and Broederbond, the CSA hosted no public 
functions.221 A NUSAS-CSA debate fell through because Drummond and Lessing failed to 
appear.222 Matters promised to pick-up with the arrival on the campus of Gert Van Zyl, an 
older part-time Law student who owned a photographic studio in a caravan on Signal Hill 
and had been employed previously as a mining compound supervisor in the Northern Cape. 
Although Van Zyl denied that he was the full-time organiser which the NP had earlier 
threatened to plant at UCT,223 he was a member of the NP Jeugbond and an aspirant NP 
Member of Parliament for Wynberg, Cape Town.224 He was unable to prevent - or was 
perhaps one of the reasons for - the fissure of the CSA along similar lines to that of the Wits 
SACSA.  
Before his death in a car accident,225 Lessing expressed his support (in theory) for racially 
open social functions at UCT in direct contravention of CSA policy.226 It is noteworthy that 
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Van Schalkwyk, leader of the 1963 NUSAS revolt who returned to NUSAS after the Vorster 
attacks, never became associated with the CSA. During the SRC’s debate on the ratification 
of the CSA constitution, Van Schalkwyk warned the CSA ‘not to sink into political 
disrepute’.227 He remained in NUSAS and unverified reports suggested that he wanted to 
split NUSAS at its next congress by nominating Sir De Villiers Graaff, leader of the UP, as 
honorary president of NUSAS in place of Albert Luthuli.228 
Conservatism at Rhodes  
Reforming NUSAS from within and orientating it towards a conservative, ‘students-as-such’ 
position was the aim of many students at Rhodes in 1963-4, but an embryonic right wing 
organisation did attempt to make an appearance there too in the first half of 1964. 
Denying that this had anything to do with the SACSA initiative at Wits,229 two members of the 
Rhodes Local NUSAS Committee, Adendorff and Ian Fife, requested SRC permission for the 
establishment of a new society which aimed at ‘reforming NUSAS from within’ so as to make 
it more acceptable to students. The society would lobby for a revised ‘student-as-such’ 
clause in the NUSAS constitution which would firstly deprive the NUSAS executive of ‘a 
platform for promoting their own political interests’ and, secondly, would ensure that NUSAS 
confined itself to providing practical student benefits.230 This met stiff opposition from the 
chairperson of the Local Committee, Renier Lock, who although a devotee of ‘students-as-
such’, believed that the proposal was fundamentally undemocratic and was ‘an attempt to 
takeover the functions of people duly elected and representative of students by people not 
elected and not representative of anybody’.231 Michael Bands, the SRC president, attempted 
to stall this initiative by suggesting successfully that ‘the reform NUSAS group’ work within 
the Local NUSAS Committee.232 The Local Committee successfully lobbied the SRC to 
adopt a ‘students-as-such’ attitude and it was on this basis that the NUSAS delegation, 
including ‘the reform NUSAS group’ attended the 1964 NUSAS congress.233 The NUSAS 
executive was concerned at this new development and suggested practical means by which 
the SRC chairperson could change this.234 Jonty Driver pointed out the inconsistency of the 
Local Committee and the student body for their surprising endorsement of NUSAS’s 
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campaign against the Bantu Law Amendment Act.235 This law was concerned with influx 
control and the rights of urban Africans and was thus of very little practical concern to white, 
middle-class, ‘students-as-such’ Rhodes students other than perhaps the number of 
domestic workers their parents were permitted to employ. Perhaps, as in the past, the real 
dissatisfaction with NUSAS was not that it was ‘too political’ but that it pursued the wrong 
politics as the UP had also rejected the Bantu Law Amendment Bill. 
‘Students-as-such’ was difficult to dislodge as it was championed by so many within the 
Rhodes student establishment.236 Rhodeo, deliberately misreported a speech delivered to 
the student body by Maeder Osler, NUSAS vice-president, claiming that he had said that 
NUSAS was ‘conservative’ and ‘not political’ whereas he had said precisely the opposite.237 
Most of the more than two hundred new students who joined NUSAS in 1964 (bringing the 
total number to more than two-thirds of the Rhodes student body) did so after Osler’s visit238 
but it is not clear whether they did so because they believed NUSAS to be radical or 
conservative.  
The inroads of a conservative students’ society at Rhodes was even less impressive than on 
other campuses. Like all NUSAS centres, the Rhodes SRC and interested campus 
organisations were invited by Mostert of SACSA to become part of a new nationwide, anti-
NUSAS conservative organisation.239 When it appeared that this plea had fallen on fertile 
ground, Driver intervened. He advised the Rhodes SRC chairperson to stress the 
parochialism and individualism of Rhodes in the hope that a Rhodes conservative society 
would not form part of a national organisation which NUSAS hoped would not emerge. 
James Willett-Clarke, a colonialist240 and a Nationalist and the suspected SACSA contact on 
the SRC,241 was persuaded to put a hold on his plans and eventually joined NUSAS so as to 
attend the 1964 NUSAS congress. As like many before him, he experienced a partial 
congress conversion.242 Through his contacts with the UCT CSA, Alan Charrington-Smith - 
another upper class colonialist, but a UP supporter, established the Rhodes Association of 
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Conservative Students (ACS).243 The ACS was officially launched in the Grahamstown 
Botanical Gardens in July 1964. Professor Bradshaw, a member of both Antikom and the 
SABC Board244 was its proposed president245 and was to provide the organisation with a list 
of ‘conservative aims’.246 When these materialised, they were similar to those associated 
with the American anti-communist ultra-right. The ACS’s founding members were largely 
theological students247 forcing the Anglican Students’ Club to officially dissociate itself from 
the ACS because of the surprising number of Anglican seminarians in the group.248 Despite 
its initially vague and undefined policy, the ACS’s two dozen members were united in their 
dislike of NUSAS and the re-election of Albert Luthuli as honorary president of the national 
union. 
NUSAS and the right wing at Durban 
Holding on to its radical left wing policy in the aftermath of the Vorster attacks,249 as well as 
the urgent need to break the student apathy at Durban, lent impetus to the nascent right 
wing anti-NUSAS movement at Durban.250 
Shortly after the arrival of SACSA at Wits, Dr Aubrey Levine appeared at Durban to 
spearhead the Natal conservative movement. Like Mostert at Wits and Van Zyl at UCT, 
Levine was also an older part-time student in his late twenties. However, unlike Mostert, 
whose political past and affiliations were unclear, Levine was definitely a Nationalist. He was 
then the chair of the NP’s Durban Point branch and was a past member of its Houghton 
branch. Whilst a medical student at Pretoria University he had served on the executive of the 
South African Union of Jewish and Zionist Students and despite his faith, on the ASB’s 
too.251 NUSAS regarded him as a dangerous, experienced and articulate opponent and like 
Mostert, far more intelligent than most right wingers.252 Rumours circulated that Levine was 
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a member of the Security Branch, which Levine denied.253 However, his subsequent career 
within the SADF during which time he perpetrated human rights atrocities 254 lent an air of 
veracity to this allegation.  
Durban, traditionally the most conservative university centre in NUSAS, appeared ripe for a 
right wing students’ organisation. There was very definite anti-NUSAS feeling on the 
campus, a hangover from the Vorster attacks, and an extreme apathy, on which, as noted 
with regard to conservative groupings on other campuses, the right wing intended 
capitalising. In October 1963, eighty students signed a petition objecting to Albert Luthuli and 
Sir Garfield Todd (liberal Southern Rhodesian politician) holding honorary offices in 
NUSAS.255 At a student mass meeting in March 1964, attended by only seventy five 
students, seven students (‘fascist fools’ in the opinion of Osler)256 supported a vote of no-
confidence in NUSAS. However, what was more significant about this meeting were the 
entirely different type of questions which Osler fielded from NUSAS dissidents. These 
related to NUSAS’s sources of funding, its method of enrolment and how it was possible for 
Fort Hare to continue playing an active role in NUSAS.257 As noted, the Broederbond had or 
would shortly identify NUSAS’s two weaknesses, namely its foreign funding and automatic 
affiliation and would target these to break the organisation. 
Shortly after the mass meeting, it was announced that fifteen Durban students supported 
Wits SACSA which still had pretensions of being a national body. It was believed that 
SACSA was ‘gathering momentum’ as ‘anti-left wing and anti-NUSAS feeling deepens’.258 A 
constitution for a ‘South African Students’ Association’ was placed before the Durban SRC 
for ratification. As with the CSA, Levine learnt from the blunders committed by the Wits 
SACSA. Thus his organisation was open to all, would promote (white) English-Afrikaans 
                                                          
253 Rhodeo vol. 18 no. 8, 4.6.1964.  
254 From the late 1960s onwards he headed the Psychiatric Unit of the SADF. He was responsible for the brutal 
overseeing of ‘social deviants’ confined at Voortrekkerhoogte and Greefswald (Mapungubwe). Even more 
controversially, he developed and oversaw the SADF’s electro-shock aversion therapy and gender reassignment 
programmes which were intended to ‘cure’ homosexuality and eradicate it from the army. Shock therapy was 
used on conscientious objectors too. Levine fled to Canada in 1995, allegedly with the help of his far-right wing 
North American contacts and refused to return to South Africa to answer to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. In 2012 he was found guilty in Canada of sexually abusing his male patients. C. Adams, ‘Timeline: 
Dr Audrey Levin (sic)’, Global News, 7.5.2013,  http://www.globalnews.ca/news/541532/timeline-dr-aut, accessed 
10.6.2013; C. McGreal, ‘Canadian psychiatrist “Dr Shock” stands trial on sexual abuse charges’, Guardian, 
10.10.2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/10/canadian-psychiatrist-dr-shock-trial accessed 
28.7.2013; L. Baldwin Ragaven, L. London, J. De Gruchy (eds), An ambulance of the wrong colour: health 
professionals, human rights and ethics in South Africa, UCT Press, Rondebosch, 1999, pp. 121-123; T. Jones, 
Psychiatry, mental institutions and the mad in apartheid South Africa, Routledge, New York and Abingdon, 2012, 
pp. 1-2, 124-131, http://books.google.co.za/books?id=CMJPJeTYQC8 accessed 28.7.2013; B. Munro, South 
Africa and the dream of love to come: queer sexuality and the struggle for freedom, University of Minneapolis 
Press, Minneapolis, 2012, pp. 98-100, http://books.google.co.za/books/id=vwes4feq7b4c8 accessed 28.7.2013.   
255 NUSAS Newsletter, 31.3.1964, p. 31.  
256 BC 586 A2.2, Maeder Osler to Jonty Driver, 13.3.1964, p. 2. 
257 BC 586 A2.2, na. (?) Maeder Osler, ‘Memo to Jonty on the Vice-President’s visit in March 1964’, nd., p. 11. 
258 Witwatersrand Student vol. 16 no. 3, 16.3.1964. 
347 
 
relations and was not affiliated to any political party.259 However, the SRC turned down this 
constitution because it was so vague that it was hardly a constitution at all and it felt there 
was no need for such a campus society.260 Levine subsequently complained of his 
victimisation to the Sunday press.261  
All was quiet on the Durban front until Driver addressed the student body on 5 May 1964. He 
told Durban students that they were members of a white tribal college and that their 
conservatism was negative and stemmed from laziness, fear and apathy.262 More damning 
however, was the misrepresentation of this speech in the national and student press. Driver 
was alleged to have said that ‘no racialists should belong in NUSAS’ and that ‘racialists in 
NUSAS were fools’ and should thus resign.263 What he did say was that NUSAS had open 
membership and did not ask members their political affiliations, but there was a contradiction 
when a racialist joined a non-racial organisation. The use of strong words and specifically 
‘fools’ was suggested by some on the Durban SRC to break the apathy on the campus and 
evoke some interest in NUSAS even if it was negative.264 Even more importantly, and this 
was not publicised at all, was the need to retain a radical stance in the face of criticism by 
UNNE. UNNE was the only legally affiliated black university centre in NUSAS and was under 
pressure from a powerful anti-NUSAS ASUSA lobby. UNNE believed that NUSAS was being 
pulled ‘backwards and downwards by conservatives’, specifically at Durban and wanted 
Driver ‘to pose a question on the UN.D [Durban] campus which might make certain members 
think about the apparent contradiction in being a racialist and belonging to NUSAS’.265 This 
‘fools’ speech created a furore and resulted in more students resigning from NUSAS and a 
number of SRCs contemplating passing motions of censure of Driver.266 Driver explained 
himself in person at Durban and UCT a few days later,267 but by then a much greater crisis 
had begun to unfold. 
A copy of Driver’s confidential and explosive paper on the future role of the South African 
student movement which he had delivered to the Botha’s Hill Leadership Training Seminar a 
few days before, landed up in the possession of Aubrey Levine. Levine had two thousand 
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copies268 of his subtly reworked anonymous version of the speech269 distributed at Durban 
just before Driver’s explanatory meeting on the campus. Levine then convened a meeting of 
his own in one of the residences at which he falsely claimed that NUSAS advocated violence 
and bloodshed270 in that it planned to submerge itself in the violent revolutionary liberation 
movements. This resulted in one hundred and fifty students resigning from NUSAS.271 The 
die was cast. Shortly after this, the Durban SRC disaffiliated from NUSAS. This was primarily 
because it was not privy to the ‘private activities’272 of NUSAS mentioned in the Botha’s Hill 
paper which presumably it believed were subversive (these were in fact a literacy project 
and a leadership training project in Botswana) but also because it believed that less than half 
the student body supported NUSAS.273 The chairperson of the NUSAS Local Committee 
resigned too, not because she was disillusioned with NUSAS as was initially thought, but 
because she had become totally overwrought by Levine’s harrying questions which she was 
unable to answer as she had not seen the original Driver speech. The powerful Accounting 
Students’ Society secretly decided to sever its ties with NUSAS should its inquiry into the 
national union recommend this.274 The precipitous decision by the SRC and other bodies 
demonstrates the tenuous position of NUSAS at Durban prior to Botha’s Hill and the 
consequent ease with which outside forces were able to manipulate this to their advantage. 
In the midst of this NUSAS vacuum, the Durban SRC approved the constitution of Levine’s 
new University of Natal Durban Students’ Association (UNDSA). UNDSA was a whites-only 
society which sought white English and Afrikaans student unity and was headed in an 
honorary capacity by Theo Gerdener, leader of the NP in Natal.275  
By the middle of June, the right wing had begun to lose some of its steam in Durban. 
Perhaps because of the intervention of Osler,276 the SRC rescinded its motion of disaffiliation 
until after it had seen what transpired at the forthcoming July NUSAS congress where it 
intended to push a conservative, reformist line.277 However, the student body was still to 
decide the fate of NUSAS on the campus.278 At a three hundred-strong mass meeting on 2 
June 1964, attended by Osler, no motion of disaffiliation was moved. However, Levine and 
his henchmen attempted to ‘lay down the conditions for the Durban delegation attending the 
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NUSAS congress’ which would effectively have precluded NUSAS from taking a stand on 
apartheid. However, this move failed dismally with only seven students supporting it.279 This 
was symptomatic of the ridicule and contempt in which Levine had come to be held at 
Durban and the general distrust students had of his motives.280 Nevertheless, Levine and 
UNDSA continued to plough their furrow speaking on the somewhat incongruous topic of 
English-Afrikaans white relations at a packed meeting at UNNE attended also by a hundred 
chanting, placard bearing, anti-Levine Durban students. The meeting was chaos, Levine 
complaining that his freedom of speech had been violated. However, the end result was 
positive for NUSAS. Critics of NUSAS at UNNE, even the rabidly ASUSA ones, were so 
outraged by Levine that NUSAS’s stock rose appreciably on the campus.281 This was 
certainly not the intention of Levine or UNDSA and ‘national’ SACSA which planned to open 
branches at the black universities with a view eventually to establishing a national ‘multi-
national’ conservative organisation.  
Black campuses were not spared the sinister attentions of the shadowy right wing. In 1964, a 
man named ‘Spies’, who claimed to have been both an editor of Pretoria University’s student 
newspaper, Die Perdeby and a member of the ASB executive, arrived at Johannesburg 
Training Institute for Indian Teachers (JTIIT) as a ‘student-staff liaison officer’. He seemed to 
get on well with the SRC282 and claimed to be working towards splitting the ASB and 
transforming it into a racially inclusive body. This would be achieved by JTIIT disaffiliating 
from NUSAS and joining the ASB. The ASB would then see that Indians were ‘also human’ 
and would then undergo a ‘racial reformation’. Osler was deeply suspicious of Spies and 
exposed the ASB and Spies’s scheme to the student body.283    
White co-operation and the Federation of Conservative Students 
The white student co-operation movement was on the march again. The UOFS SRC sent a 
telegram congratulating Durban on its disaffiliation from NUSAS284 and offered its co-
operation285 while members of the Rhodes SRC visited the Afrikaans-medium universities in 
May 1964.286 This resulted in an inter-SRC conference in early August 1964287 at which 
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Rhodes was encouraged to break with NUSAS and form an ‘English Bond’.288 More 
significantly, Dirk Herbst, the president of the ASB, unexpectedly approached Osler after a 
student body meeting at Wits in May 1964 and raised the issue of representation at what 
were presumably inter-SRC conferences envisaged by the ASB in the future.289 The deeply 
divided ASB was evidently under pressure to change. It was composed of, on the one hand, 
co-operationists and idealistic ‘total apartheiders’ and on the other, far-right wingers like Alex 
Antonites who in his capacity as international relations director had made contact with fascist 
and neo-Nazi groups in Europe and North America including the Klu Klux Klan.290 The theme 
of the ASB’s annual congress held in July 1964 was ‘Liberalism’. Like the recently concluded 
Volkskongres, delegates failed to differentiate liberalism from communism and descended 
into absurdity when discussing the political, social, cultural and religious dimensions of the 
concept.291 Piet Koornhof, a guest speaker and founder member of the Hertzogite ‘Sunergia 
Press’292 announced that ‘conservatism had come into its own’. He contended that the 
‘victories of 1948 and 1961’ had been ‘won in the classrooms’ and thus the ASB should be 
kept ‘pure’ so as to protect the volk.293 The congress heeded his advice and elected as its 
new president the ultra-conservative Paul de Beer,294 a Nederduits Hervormde Church 
theology student, chairperson of the Pretoria SRC, an anonymous Hertzog Group ‘smear 
letter writer’295 and later editor of the ‘openly’ anti-Semitic Hertzog Group publication, 
Boomerang.296 Nonetheless, the idealistic, more ‘verligte’ (enlightened) Herbst drew a 
distinction between a ‘liberal’ and ‘liberalist’,297 defended NUSAS in its fight for automatic 
affiliation, called ‘for a dynamic attitude in the mind of the Afrikaner student’298 and like many 
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before him, exhorted those present to accept the African student as an equal and not an 
inferior being.299 As far as white student relations were concerned, the congress discussed 
with the JCE observers the old NP dream of English-speaking students co-operating with 
their Afrikaans-speaking compatriots within a Christian National framework.300  
Shortly after the conclusion of the ASB congress, the SRCs of Stellenbosch and Pretoria 
announced that a conference would be convened in August 1964 to form a third national 
student organisation. This new grouping would oppose NUSAS and work in conjunction with 
the ASB and would specifically target the one thousand students who had recently resigned 
from NUSAS after Botha’s Hill.301 
In early August 1964, Gert van Zyl of the UCT CSA invited the SRCs of Durban, JCE and 
Rhodes to attend the ‘First Convention of Conservative Students of South Africa’ in Cape 
Town. There was much confusion regarding the invitations, evidence of competing forces 
with different aims and objectives operating tangentially to one another. JCE was informed 
that the ASB and all the SRCs were invited, and on the basis of this information, it would 
appear that NUSAS and the other NUSAS-affiliated SRCs decided that they too were eligible 
to attend the convention.  
It was noted by a number of observers that the coming together of all the Afrikaans- and 
English-medium SRCs (including UNNE’s) as well NUSAS and the ASB was, whether it was 
intentional or not, an historic occasion that had not occurred since the early 1930s.302 
However, after the conclusion of the opening speech by Kruger of the UCT CSA on the 
‘Twilight struggle against communism’ in which Kruger, like Barry Goldwater, equated 
liberalism with communism,303 the historic convention descended into chaos. With different 
agendas and invitations, no group was clear about the capacity in which it was invited or to 
what it had been invited. Of the English-medium centres, it seemed as if only the Durban 
SRC and the campus conservative societies were intended as delegates. Moreover, the 
ASB stated that it had come to a conference to launch an English conservative organisation 
and that those present were not representative of English conservative opinion. NUSAS was 
accused of deliberately attempting to sabotage the proceedings by including in its delegation 
a coloured student, Kenney Parker, the outgoing NUSAS vice-president.304 This was partly 
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true as Driver’s ‘main purpose in attending was to take a sufficiently strong line on non-
racialism to ensure that the ASB refused to co-operate’.305 With a rude chairperson and no 
standing rules of procedure, the conference soon fell apart.306 Levenstein of the UCT SRC 
then invited all SRCs to attend an inter-SRC conference at which NUSAS, the ASB and the 
campus conservative organisations would observe. After concurring with outsiders over 
lunch, the ASB and its affiliated SRCs agreed to this arrangement.  
At this new conference the ASB interrogated NUSAS about the Botha’s Hill Seminar and 
voiced its objections to NUSAS equating the ASB to the Broederbond, arguing that NUSAS 
could similarly be equated with communism. Wits and UNNE pursued the ASB-
Broederbond-NP connection and debate became heated, particularly after UNNE criticised 
the ASB for its support of racial inequality.307 The ASB then accused NUSAS of breaking the 
observer status agreement in that its two additional representatives remained at the 
discussion table with their name tags displayed while the ASB’s additional representatives 
had (recently) moved into the audience. In the opinion of NUSAS and its affiliates, the motive 
behind this contrived pettiness was that Parker was coloured. After informing Driver that he 
had wrecked the conference and that there could never be any co-operation between 
NUSAS and the ASB while he was at the helm of NUSAS, Paul de Beer and the rest of the 
ASB executive stalked out of the conference, never to return, followed shortly thereafter by 
the ASB SRCs.308  
To NUSAS and the SRCs of Wits, UNP and UCT, it was the ASB that had destroyed the 
conference, but JCE and some members of the Rhodes SRC did not entirely agree.309 JCE 
argued that NUSAS should not have appointed Parker to the delegation as he was firstly not 
a current member of the executive and secondly NUSAS knew that the Afrikaans centres 
would object to his race.310 NUSAS justified its decision by explaining that it had been invited 
to send three delegates, Parker was in Cape Town and available, he spoke Afrikaans and 
knew many of the Stellenbosch delegates personally.  
The ASB walkout did not mark the end of inter-SRC get-togethers. The following day, Van 
Zyl, the ASB and its SRCs convened a new conference. To this NUSAS and its affiliates 
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were not invited, and from this a national, whites-only Federation of Conservative Students 
emerged.311 The organisation immediately came under fire from within. Charrington-Smith 
from Rhodes resigned from the FCS because he alleged it was NP- and Broederbond-
inspired.312 Evidently in a bid to break the new federation, the UCT SRC president 
disingenuously questioned the anomaly of the FCS affiliating to the all-white ASB when one 
of its members, the UCT CSA, was open to all.313  
Conclusion 
Despite a sustained year-long, multi-pronged campaign, the state and its allies were unable 
to deliver the mortal blow to NUSAS by inducing its members to leave the organisation en 
masse. Though English-speaking students were believed to be more conservative and 
significantly more apathetic than in the past, the Universities of Cape Town and 
Witwatersrand, and to a lesser extent even Rhodes, Pietermaritzburg and Durban, remained 
bastions of liberalism. Few at Wits and UCT questioned the commitment to academic non-
segregation and a sizeable number rejected campus social segregation too, believing that all 
students had the right to attend and participate in all university social functions, including 
dances and sport and that no organisation had the right to discriminate and organise racially 
closed social events. It is thus not surprising then, in the light of the general campus political 
outlook and general student apathy bemoaned by student leaders across the ideological 
spectrum, that the new conservative societies made little headway at the NUSAS-affiliated 
centres. 
Campus conservatives, whether they identified with the new right wing societies or not, 
came from a variety of social and political/ideological backgrounds. This made it unlikely that 
they would successfully work together in one organisation for a sustained period of time. 
Many campus conservatives, mostly English-speaking, but including a small number of 
Afrikaans-speakers were supporters of the right wing of the UP. Many English-speaking 
conservatives identified with the NP, albeit sometimes grudgingly, many of them being 
actively or latently anti-Afrikaans and deeply suspicious of the Broederbond. Van Zyl 
recognised that the ‘Nationalist stigma’ was an impediment to the growth of both the UCT 
CSA and the FCS and for this reason announced that he would not seek re-election to 
leadership positions in either body as they needed to be seen to be led by English-speakers 
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with English names.314 Perhaps ‘Nationalist stigma’ was an euphemism for anti-Afrikaans 
sentiment.  Broederbond domination was the reason for the UCT CSA severing its ties with 
Wits SACSA and the Rhodes conservative society leader resigning from the FCS. It was 
also the stated reason for the UP pulling out of and dissociating from SACSA. 
One of the most important reasons for the inability of Vorster and the conservative student 
organisations to make deep inroads into NUSAS’s student base was the fact that NUSAS 
still had the backing of the UP. The UCT resignees returned to NUSAS after Marais Steyn 
defended the national union against Vorster and the SABC. The failure of Wits SACSA was 
partly because the UP withdrew from it. Once the UP abandoned NUSAS, NUSAS’s fortunes 
could change. The state and its allies realised this. In what was perhaps an attempt to 
embarrass the UP into disowning NUSAS, the NP newspaper, Die Vaderland, speculated 
about the allegedly close relationship of the UP to NUSAS, its ‘pet children’ 
(troetelkinders).315 
The state did not give up its bid to destroy NUSAS and the liberal ethos of the NUSAS 
campuses. The second stage in this campaign began in 1965 when the state threw the ball 
into the court of the university authorities and issued them a veiled ultimatum. The university 
administrations were given the invidious task of enforcing campus apartheid according to the 
even more stringent social apartheid laws being legislated and ensuring that student 
government was brought into line which included abandoning automatic affiliation to NUSAS. 
Failing to do this would leave the universities vulnerable to the withdrawal of their state 
subsidies and direct state intervention in their affairs. This will be examined in chapter ten. 
Securing the ideological rejection of NUSAS by its mass student base and so precipitating a 
conservative slideaway would require one or more of three new factors. Firstly, that the right 
wing societies developed a coherent ideology of conservatism and a programme of action 
which moved beyond simply opposing NUSAS and communism. Secondly, that NUSAS 
moved so far to the left that its policy became totally unacceptable to its SRCs. This NUSAS 
would come close to doing when it presented its seminar on the future of NUSAS and the 
South African student movement at Botha’s Hill in April 1964. Thirdly, that the state could 
prove conclusively, not just through smears, innuendoes and by association, that NUSAS 
was involved in illegal and subversive activities. The African Resistance Movement 
revelations discussed in chapter nine had the potential to do just that. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
In search of a relevant political role: the ‘Botha’s Hill Seminar’ and the African 
Resistance Movement, 1964-1965 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Forty years after its establishment, NUSAS faced the greatest crisis of its existence. In an 
attempt to transform itself into an activist organisation, the 1964 NUSAS National Leadership 
Seminar discussed a number of controversial models for a fundamental restructuring of the 
national union. This was demanded of it by firstly, its commitment to the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; secondly, its radical black membership; thirdly, the 
challenge posed to it by the creation of the new black African student organisations; and 
fourthly, the growing hostility of assertive Africanist student groupings on the African 
continent. The Botha’s Hill Seminar, as it came to be known, had unintended and far-
reaching negative consequences for NUSAS which played into the hands of those intent on 
destroying the national union: the government and the right wing. At the same time, a small 
but significant number of current and former student leaders, also seeking a meaningful role 
for themselves in the post-Sharpeville liberation struggle, were arrested and subsequently 
found guilty of participating in the sabotage organisation, the African Resistance Movement 
(ARM). This chapter will attempt firstly to understand why radical liberal student activists 
became increasingly more radical as the 1960s progressed, to an extent that many of them 
effectively abandoned some of the key tenets of liberalism, including liberalism’s 
commitment to non-violence. Secondly, the chapter will analyse the Botha’s Hill Seminar and 
its attempts to reposition NUSAS within the liberation movement. Thirdly, it will examine the 
ARM in terms of student involvement and the consequences of this for NUSAS. It will be 
argued that both Botha’s Hill and the ARM were different responses to Sharpeville and the 
increasingly repressive socio-political environment which followed it. Moreover, as in the 
case of the United States, where the Revolutionary Youth Movement and its extra-legal 
‘Weatherman’ off-shoot grew out of the radical, white, middle-class Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS), so too did the ARM, to some extent, have its incubation in 
NUSAS.  
  
Domestic factors leading to the radicalisation of white liberals 
 
What factors were responsible for the radicalisation of liberal whites, particularly students, to 
the extent that some of them disavowed the liberal tenet of non-violence? Firstly, the 
passage of the Extension of University and Fort Hare Transfer Acts led to a deep sense of 
disillusion and despondency among many politically conscious students that even opposition 
356 
 
on the scale and magnitude of the university apartheid campaign, sustained over a long 
period of time, had ultimately failed to persuade the government to alter course.1 Far more 
importantly, the belief that Sharpeville marked the beginning of the end of white rule in South 
Africa was sharply dashed by the violence of the uprising’s suppression and the subsequent 
steps taken to establish a police state. The banning of the liberation movements 
demonstrated that legal peaceful protest was becoming even more difficult to pursue.2 
Linked to this was the failure of the calls for a national convention in 1961 to peacefully 
negotiate South Africa’s future. Many liberals feared that the violence of apartheid and 
Afrikaner nationalism was pushing the African majority to a more extreme nationalism and 
that, were there not some timeous and drastic intervention to arrest this situation, South 
Africa would eventually be plunged into a race war out of which a negotiated peaceful 
settlement was unlikely if not impossible. After Sharpeville, Driver, editor of Varsity, wrote 
thus of his concern for the country’s deteriorating race relations: ‘There is so little time left; 
perhaps we should abandon social evolution in favour of something more direct’.3 On the 
eve of the May 1961 national convention stayaway, UCT’s Radical Society, established by 
NUSAS executive member and future ARM operative, Alan Brooks,4 commended the 
stayaway organisers for their continuing ‘dedication’ to non-violent change but warned that 
time was running out.5 While echoing the Radical Society’s sentiments, Mike Wade, editor of 
Wits Student and another future ARM recruit, went further by arguing that ‘Non-Whites’ were 
justified in turning to violence against a ‘minority dictatorship’.6 In what some interpreted as 
being an endorsement of violence, Adrian Leftwich condemned conventional anti-apartheid 
tactics and urged the LP at a gathering in Cape Town in 1961 ‘to break new ground’.7  
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Many liberals were considerably frustrated that they were unable to play a meaningful role in 
the liberation struggle8 and feared that the creation of a new South Africa might pass them 
by. Moreover, Leftwich and Randolph Vigne were desperate that all change should not be 
concentrated in ‘communist’ hands.9 They believed that the pressure on the South African 
government should be stepped up, for example, through SANROC. After his arrest following 
a Sharpeville commemoration demonstration in March 1961 - in itself a radicalising 
experience - Leftwich pondered new avenues of active student involvement in the anti-
apartheid struggle. He believed that as the ‘pressure’ built up, so too proportionately would 
the need for leadership, organisational abilities and money. NUSAS and the general political 
milieu of the universities would provide the catalysts for propelling students into the struggle 
and fulfilling these leadership and organisational roles.10 Similar ideas would find their 
expression three years later at the Botha’s Hill Seminar. In the meantime however, any kind 
of legal, non-violent political action became even more difficult following the passage of the 
General Law Amendment Act (Sabotage Bill) in 1962.11 Shortly after their arrest during 
NUSAS’s Sabotage Bill protest in June 1962, both Leftwich and Stephanie Kemp accepted 
recruitment into the ARM.12  
 
Notwithstanding the obstacles to peaceful protest and change embodied in the Sabotage 
Act, whites, unlike their black South African counterparts, still retained a degree of freedom 
of association and movement. Thus, after Sharpeville, liberal whites felt the responsibility fell 
on them to act. John Laredo, a future ARM operative, was asked by his post-graduate 
friends at UNNE what he was doing politically and thus felt the moral onus to do 
something.13 
 
The privilege and consequent guilt ensuing from having a white skin in apartheid South 
Africa bore down on many white liberals.14 After unthinkingly suggesting to Thami 
Mhlambiso that they watch a film at a whites-only cinema, Hugh Lewin never again set foot 
in a segregated cinema.15 Some radicals resorted to riding bicycles rather than utilising 
segregated public transport16 while others attempted to carve out an open world for 
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themselves, however superficial and artificial this might be.17 NUSAS was no exception, it 
actively pursued social integration and like SANROC attempted to organise non-racial sports 
events. 
 
Not only was political and social injustice keenly felt by many liberals, but also economic 
inequality. In 1963 the LP controversially adopted a mildly social democratic economic 
programme. This did not go far enough for the radical liberals, Leftwich, for example, arguing 
for a planned economy under a centralised socialist state.18 Ernie Wentzel suspected that 
younger Liberals were disillusioned and impatient with the moderation of the LP and to retain 
their loyalty drew them into drawing up a new economic policy, but in vain – they had already 
jumped ship.19 
 
The radicalising effect of events and developments abroad  
 
Though anti-communist - associating communism with Soviet totalitarianism - radical liberals 
were drawn to debates on new currents in Marxist thought emerging from the early ‘New 
Left’. (After the invasion of Hungary in 1956, the ‘New Left’ broke with the ‘Old Left’ and its 
association with Soviet communism and engaged with Marx’s earlier humanist writings.) As 
would be expected, UCT’s soon to be defunct Congress-aligned Modern World Society and 
Wits’ Students’ Fellowship Society discussed Marxism but by 1963, so too did the 
LP/NUSAS-aligned Radical Society.20 Marxist intellectuals were few and far between at 
South African universities but some like Jack Simons at UCT21 and Baruch Hirson at Wits 
were influential in shaping their students’ political development.22 Through Simons’ 
influence, some students came to realise the futility of reform and the necessity of a radical 
transformation of society.23  
 
Leftwich was influenced by the American neo-Marxist, Paul Baran,24 whose work on 
underdevelopment and dependency had particular relevance to Africa and the Third World. 
In 1962 Leftwich expressed his excitement that NUSAS had made a ‘breakthrough’ into 
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South America by cementing relations with the national student union of Paraguay, an 
avowedly socialist and avowedly anti-communist organisation.25 For Africa, the 1960s were 
‘heady’ times as colonial states achieved their independence. Radical students, both black 
(as noted earlier) and white were inspired by Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, while Ghana 
under Kwame Nkrumah was the symbol of the new Africa, the champion of African liberation 
and Pan-Africanism and a pioneer in post-colonial socio-economic development.26 Through 
their exposure to African issues like African Socialism debated in new journals such as the 
New African and Africa South as well as their attendance at Pan African conferences, Du 
Toit argues that radical liberals adopted a type of ‘Africanised liberalism’ and would refer to 
themselves as ‘white Africans’.27 This holds true for NUSAS activists too. Since 1957, 
NUSAS delegates had attended student Pan African conferences and as discussed in 
chapter eight, had, shortly after the inauguration of the OAU, adopted a policy of Pan-
Africanism. Moreover, since the formation of the black African-only ASA in 1961, NUSAS 
was concerned at constructing an inclusive definition of an ‘African’ which could include a 
‘white African’. 
 
Beyond the African continent, the overthrow of the Batista regime in Cuba by a small group 
of revolutionaries in 1959 inspired radicals the world over, particularly young people and 
students. South Africa was no exception. Politically conscious radical South Africans studied 
Che Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare which, surprisingly, was freely available to purchase at 
Stuttafords.28 In Cuba, education underwent a profound transformation during the early 
stages of the revolution. In 1961, a year-long National Literacy Programme was launched 
which expanded on the earlier efforts of guerrilla revolutionaries encamped and besieged in 
remote rural areas during the war of liberation. Hundreds of thousands of literate Cuban 
volunteers, both young and old, settled temporarily in the countryside and in addition to 
passing on their reading and writing skills, advanced the cause of the revolution too. The 
newly literate in turn taught others and by the end of the year, illiteracy in Cuba was virtually 
obliterated.29 The 1961 NUSAS congress welcomed the Cuban revolution in the sense that it 
opened up possibilities for free education and the extension of human rights30 while the 
following year, Jonty Driver delivered a speech on what he ‘romantically’ believed were the 
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‘virtues’ of the post-revolutionary Cuban education system.31 Though Driver in retrospect 
does not think that the Cuban experiment directly inspired it – it had more to do with 
experiences at Fort Hare32 - NUSAS under his presidency embarked on a literacy campaign 
which bore a striking resemblance to that of Cuba’s. So as to avoid alarming its conservative 
student membership33 (and those at Rhodes and JCE certainly were34), the programme was 
presented as one intended to facilitate reading and writing skills rather than the equally if not 
more important political literacy.35 The Pilot Literacy Project was launched in a couple of 
areas of the rural Transkei in 1963 by Templeton Mdalana, an ANC activist and a graduate 
of Fort Hare. ‘Each-one-teach-one’ as it came to be known,36 faced serious challenges. 
Suitable reading material was in short supply and the project had to run the gauntlet of 
operating outside the confines of the Department of Bantu Education. Moreover, its launch 
coincided with the 1963 security crackdown and Mdalana was well-known to the security 
police. Nonetheless, the project was able to take advantage of the Transkei elections and 
the large number of illiterate voters seeking reading help and presumably also political 
education.37  
 
Almost from its inception in 1962, NUSAS was associated with another potentially 
revolutionary project, Kupugani,38 the brainchild of LP visionary, Neil Alcock, who left his 
comfortable white existence and settled in a remote Zulu-speaking village in rural Natal. 
Kupugani was envisaged as a ‘network of not just food distribution but also of development’ 
in every part of the country. It was intended to be democratic and participatory and enraged 
De Wet Nel, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development.39 Neither the Literacy 
Project nor Kupugani were strictly speaking charity projects. While they might have been 
initiated from outside by philanthropists, the recipients were intended to make these projects 
their own and become the drivers of these and their own development. In the early 1970s 
the South African Students Organisation (SASO) would also embark on a radical South 
American-inspired literacy programme.   
 
Morally outraged, radical white, middle-class students in the USA were faced with similar 
dilemmas to their white English-speaking South African counterparts. In 1960, the African-
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American civil rights movement replaced quiet negotiation and legalistic tactics with direct 
confrontation using, for example, the sit-in. In the same year, the SDS was established by 
radical white idealistic activists, some of whom were involved in the Student Non-Violent Co-
ordinating Committee (SNVCC) organised by Southern black college students.40 SDS was 
non-ideological, like NUSAS, but became convinced of the bankruptcy of liberal reform and 
moved towards socialism. Its influential founding document, the 1962 Port Huron Statement, 
advocated participatory democracy41 based on the belief that every person could achieve 
self-development by participating in decision-making on issues which affected their lives.42 
During his visit to the USA in 1963, Driver discovered that white activists working within the 
SNVCC had begun faintly to discern a tendency towards black separatism and the exclusion 
of whites from SNVCC social functions. This was a problem similar to that faced by NUSAS 
with regard to the establishment of ASA and ASUSA and the feeling by Driver that few black 
students would remain much longer in the white-dominated and led NUSAS.43 Although 
subsequent developments within the SDS and white radical US student politics had no 
bearing on NUSAS, the parallels between the SDS and NUSAS remain striking. With the 
passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which lifted segregatory Jim Crow legislation in the 
South, the liberal civil rights movement gave way, as already discernible in 1963, to a racially 
exclusive Black Power. SDS welcomed this, but to its chagrin, was informed that black 
activists would relieve black oppression and that whites should henceforward work within the 
white community to combat white racism.44 Following this rejection, the increasingly 
revolutionary SDS split into a number of factions in 1969. The Revolutionary Youth 
Movement looked to Third World nationalist struggles as a model of socialist revolution and 
as ‘Weatherman’ turned to violence.45 Andries du Toit has argued that ARM ‘prefigured’ 
other groups such as the Revolutionary Youth Movement which grew out of the ‘moral 
outrage of middle class radicalism’.46 As far as NUSAS was concerned, the Botha’s Hill 
proposals regarding the radical restructuring and re-orientation of NUSAS (discussed later in 
this chapter) were a response to both the rise of ASA and Pan-Africanism and a search for a 
political role for those themselves who were not oppressed. 
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The radicalising influence of NUSAS’s black membership 
 
Searching for a new political role was also the consequence of the changing demographic 
profile of NUSAS. The return to NUSAS of UNNE in 1961 led to the injection of a strong 
dose of ANC and Indian Congress activism into the national union, one of the reasons for 
the radicalisation of NUSAS policy. On occasion, NUSAS was forced to take cognisance of 
the views and actions of its former affiliate, the Pius the Twelfth Catholic University College 
of Basutoland, for example, regarding its advocacy of an anti-republican boycott in 1961.47 
To NUSAS’s chagrin, it was unsuccessful in negotiating a confederal relationship with the 
fiercely Africanist National Union of Basotoland Students (NUBS) which had close ties to the 
Basutoland Congress Party and which in turn was closely associated with South Africa’s 
PAC. NUSAS was concerned too to win the loyalty of the new ethnic colleges and as 
discussed in chapter seven, took note both of a strong minority Africanist tendency at the 
UCON and the views of Turfloop students regarding the role of the student in society. The 
repressive environment at the ethnic colleges, particularly at Fort Hare, and the improbability 
of those student bodies ever securing legal affiliation to NUSAS, forced the national union to 
explore other avenues of membership and in the process ponder its restructuring. In 1963, 
the student body of the JIITT (renamed the Transvaal College of Education for Asiatics 
(TCEA) legally joined NUSAS. Even though TCEA was a state-aided institution and its 
student body was not as free as, for example, black students at the more liberal University of 
Natal, TCEA students had a radicalising effect on NUSAS and were to make tremendous 
personal sacrifices in the cause of the national union in the future. By far NUSAS’s most 
militant affiliate was the Johannesburg branch of SACHED. This was led by Thabo Mbeki 
(until he took up a scholarship in Britain in 1962), Abel Zwane (an ANCYL activist who 
departed for East Germany),48 and Mike Ngubeni, an ASA executive member who was 
convicted of sabotage in 1964.49        
   
As noted in chapter eight, the 1963 NUSAS congress continued in the radical direction of 
1962, but it did not go far enough for SACHED. Following the completion of its commission 
of inquiry into student organisations in South Africa, SACHED intended to host a conference 
with the Turfloop SRC around the theme of ‘The awakening Africa and the role of students’ 
which would interrogate the means of achieving student unity, presumably outside NUSAS. 
Although this did pose a challenge to NUSAS regarding continuing African membership of 
the national union, it was SACHED’s racism to which NUSAS took exception. The SACHED 
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report, debated angrily for seven hours, stated that SACHED regarded ‘all whites…as 
colonialists and settlers’ who would only be regarded as ‘Africans’ once they had ‘declar[ed] 
their allegiance’ to the black African majority.50 Following the rejection of its report and its 
expunction from the assembly minutes,51 SACHED walked out of the congress, never to 
return.52 In October 1963 it disaffiliated from NUSAS on the grounds that NUSAS was 
‘apolitical’.53 More specifically, SACHED believed that NUSAS’s policy on the IUS had not 
gone far enough (see chapter eight) and that the ‘integrity’ of its ‘representative’ had been 
‘damaged’ at the congress.54 Although NUSAS was politically dissatisfied with SACHED, its 
action could not have failed to make some impact on NUSAS and the need to politically re-
orientate the organisation.  
 
International student forums and anti-apartheid bodies abroad: their radicalising 
effect 
 
It was not only the internal NUSAS situation or the increasingly restricted environment in 
which NUSAS functioned in South Africa that led to its decision to interrogate its role, 
function, structure and tactics, but also events and circumstances abroad. 
 
By 1963 NUSAS effectively had a second centre of power which was located overseas. 
Since the 1940s the national union had mandated its former officers and student leaders 
studying abroad to attend student conferences there on its behalf. These ‘overseas 
representatives’ became a valuable if controversial source of advice and criticism to the 
internal NUSAS leadership regarding policy and tactics. Overseas representatives frequently 
took on a political life of their own. Through their inevitable contact with the exiled ANC and 
participation in the AAM, they moved increasingly to the left after Sharpeville and thus 
presented NUSAS policy as far more radical and militant than it actually was, to the potential 
detriment of NUSAS in South Africa. In 1963 NUSAS vastly expanded its overseas 
representatives in the UK, Europe and Africa, which culminated in the establishment of a 
permanent UK NUSAS Committee in 196455 - a NUSAS in exile in the event that it was 
banned in South Africa. Although this was never explicitly stated, one of the UK Committee’s 
functions was to rein in its representatives. Officially the UK committee was responsible for 
co-ordinating the overseas representatives, publicising and defending NUSAS, as, for 
example, during the Vorster attacks, distributing NUSAS newsletters and literature and 
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liaising with foreign student unions, particularly African ones, many of which were exiled or 
functioning abroad.56  
 
One of the committee’s unstated functions was maintaining the contact already initiated with 
the highly controversial AAM. In 1961, Martin Legassick, a UK overseas representative, 
convinced the NUSAS president of the necessity of NUSAS working with anti-apartheid 
groups abroad so as to ‘build up a breach between South Africa and the West’.57 
Accordingly, it was agreed that with the help of Oliver Tambo, NUSAS would unofficially 
make contact with the Committee of African Organisations (CAO), one of the original 
initiators of the economic boycott. This would be kept secret as an association with the CAO 
(and presumably also with Tambo) would be bad for NUSAS’s internal position and would 
thus not meet the approval of the SRCs.58 A policy on sanctions would also not find favour 
with the SRCs although many NUSAS members wanted one.59 Thus NUSAS became 
schizophrenic and very often secretive, following one line domestically and another abroad. 
It voted with the ISC for an economic boycott against South Africa in 196160 and in 1963 
secretly approved the sanctions campaign of the Norwegian Union of Students.61 By March 
1964, NUSAS’s role in South Africa was being ‘vastly exaggerated’, the national union being 
sold abroad by some as the ‘student wing of the liberatory movement’.62 This was the 
direction in which NUSAS policy was moving in early 1964. However, a number of events in 
Africa during 1963 and early 1964 were the catalysts for a radical reformulation of NUSAS 
structure and policy.  
 
As already discussed in chapter seven, the Algerian Students’ Union (UGEMA), the most 
powerful student body in Africa, came under communist control. Looking for an excuse to 
substitute its affiliation to the ISC with that of the IUS, it threatened to leave the ISC if 
NUSAS were to remain a member.63 This led to a panicky Driver, desperate to retain 
NUSAS’s international accreditation, putting forward a number of extremely radical solutions 
to this problem. Firstly, create a predominantly black delegation to the ISC composed of 
ASA, ASUSA and NUSAS; secondly, Africanise NUSAS’s delegation to the forthcoming 
Pan-African Students’ Conference by immediately organising an exit permit for Mdalana; 
thirdly, very cryptically, as it was not spelt out, ‘activise NUSAS internally’ and ‘go into 
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deeper commitment’; and fourthly, change to individual membership.64 Driver exhorted the 
NUSAS executive to ‘fight as hard as you can’, ‘it may be the end of NUSAS, or the start of a 
new role’.65 This was all rejected by Parker and other executive members. ‘Activising’ 
NUSAS, Parker believed, was ‘romantic’, ‘impetuous’, ‘suicidal’, ‘impractical’ and 
‘unthinkable’. The recent arrests and bannings at Fort Hare and UNNE demonstrated the 
drastic consequences of political activity. Creating an issue would result in ‘a five minute 
wonder’, ‘a few days press coverage’, the banning of NUSAS and personal lives shattered. 
Parker believed that NUSAS’s limited political programme and current structure were 
powerful and effective forces for change and should not be altered just because of external 
opinion, forces and events.66  
 
Nonetheless, Driver’s views would be aired again at the Botha’s Hill Leadership Seminar in 
April 1964. By the end of 1963, it appeared that the international crisis had passed. Nothing 
came of UGEMA’s threat,67 perhaps because of the intervention of Oliver Tambo (on good 
terms with Legassick) whom NUSAS had decided to approach.68 In addition, NUSAS had 
successfully persuaded the Preparatory Committee organising the Pan African Student 
Conference to adopt a non-racial definition of ‘African’ as the criterion for membership of its 
proposed new continental student structure. Vorster’s attacks on NUSAS also helped project 
NUSAS abroad as a radical anti-apartheid organisation. 
 
However, the bomb burst in early January 1964 in Dar es Salaam at the East, Central and 
Southern African Seminar hosted by the Tanganyika National Student Union and COSEC. 
The seminar came to be dominated by the IUS-aligned Union of Congolese Students.69 
However, there was also a strong racially exclusive Africanist element present which boded 
ill for NUSAS. The participants accepted that the role of the student in society was to 
‘articulate the aspirations of the people on the basis of objective and truthful analysis’. With 
regard to NUSAS however, it was argued that it could not ‘represent the aspirations of the 
majority’ of South Africans ‘while it [had] a largely white membership’. It had ‘no mandate 
from the African people and [was] therefore…paternalistic’. Moreover, it was alleged that 
NUSAS’s ‘white leadership [had] a vested interest in maintaining apartheid’ as were there no 
apartheid, they would not be in a position of power.70 Resolutions were prepared to the 
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effect that as NUSAS was unrepresentative, it should be barred from all regional and 
international forums if it did not take corrective action. 
 
The NUSAS representative, Legassick, canvassed hard for NUSAS. In private discussions 
most delegates were sympathetic to the national union and wanted it to be given the chance 
of reforming itself so as to remain in the international movement. NUSAS’s radical policy was 
found acceptable, but because of so much ignorance regarding South Africa, many found it 
impossible to believe that a white-dominated multi-racial organisation could have such a 
policy and such a record of anti-apartheid activity. Without offering NUSAS the possibility of 
reforming itself to avoid this eventuality, the final resolution banned NUSAS from all 
international gatherings because its ‘composition hardly reflected the aspirations of the 
majority of people’ of South Africa, its delegates were ‘quite out of touch with the struggles 
and activities’ of the majority and thus were ‘not competent to speak on behalf of the 
majority’.71 Legassick issued a very strong statement and challenge to the seminar before 
following the instructions of the NUSAS head-office in Cape Town and walking out 
permanently.72 He argued that NUSAS had done more in concrete terms than any of its 
critics present to secure the freedom of its country and had suffered the consequences in 
terms of media attacks and the arrest and harassment of its leadership. He challenged 
anyone to produce concrete evidence that NUSAS had not played its ‘correct role’ in terms 
of principles and tactics in the ‘liberation movement’. He claimed that the attacks on NUSAS 
were ‘based on emotionalism and ignorance of the complexities of the situation in South 
Africa and an exclusivist concept of Pan-Africanism verging on racialism’.73 
 
The events in Dar es Salaam filtered into South Africa via inaccurate press reports. Just as 
Driver had warned the seminar delegates by telephone what the consequences of their 
actions would be, the resolution played directly into the hands of NUSAS’s enemies. The 
crowing NP press reported sneeringly that the unpatriotic NUSAS, which had bent over 
backwards to be accepted by black students, had been thrown out of the seminar, while 
Legassick’s claim, so soon after the Vorster attacks, that NUSAS had played its role in the 
‘liberation struggle’ reinforced NUSAS’s image as a subversive organisation. Compounding 
this was Legassick’s ill-considered telephone call to the NUSAS head-office (both the office 
and phone line were bugged) indicating that he had approached representatives of the 
liberation movements in Dar es Salaam and that consequently NUSAS had the support of 
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the ANC and perhaps even the PAC in this crisis.74 However, it was to the monumental 
implications of the seminar’s resolution that NUSAS immediately turned its attention. 
Restructuring NUSAS became an absolute priority. Driver drew up a paper in response to 
Dar es Salaam and requested Legassick and Magnus Gunther, the latter a former NUSAS 
vice-president who subsequently worked for COSEC in the Netherlands, to do the same. 
These papers were to be discussed at NUSAS’s National Leadership Seminar at Botha’s Hill 
in April 1964 and the seminar findings regarding restructuring NUSAS would then be 
presented to the 1964 NUSAS congress for its consideration.75  
 
The Botha’s Hill Seminar, April 1964 
 
The seminar was attended by a cross-section of emerging radical student leaders, black and 
white, both pro- and anti-NUSAS. Representatives from NUSAS’s affiliated centres, its 
branches as well as all the ethnic universities were present76 while the political allegiances of 
participants varied between the ANC, PAC, LP and the Indian Congresses. There was also 
at least one police spy present.77 The highly representative nature of the gathering 
engendered a feeling of safety78 while the unusually large proportion of black students 
imbued black participants with the confidence to speak out.79 Nonetheless, there was 
unease on the part of some participants about recording in writing the highly controversial 
seminar discussions.80 
 
Though the proposals presented at this seminar were radical and controversial, they were 
not overly out of sync with radical liberal opinion, freely voiced in radical liberal publications 
and thus in the public domain. In a revealingly entitled article, ‘Liberals in the revolution’,81 
Patrick van Rensburg, the co-originator of the 1959 overseas economic boycott and to whom 
the NUSAS leadership repaired in Bechuanaland to discuss the organisation’s leadership 
training course, CADET,82 addressed many of the issues with which the Botha’s Hill 
participants grappled. There was little that Liberals could do which would directly result in 
African freedom, Van Rensburg contended. Liberals ought to be very junior partners to 
Africans working towards the transfer of power to the majority and ought to accept African 
nationalist leadership, leaving it to Africans themselves to decide which African nationalists 
should lead them. Liberals should accept the goal of Pan-African unity in addition to being 
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‘more forthrightly socialist’. Finally, and far more controversially, Van Rensburg argued that 
‘only if Liberals could offer an alternative and speedy means of liberation to violence and 
anti-whiteism would they be justified in condemning them.’ 83   
 
Legassick believed that NUSAS should become the student wing of the liberation 
movement.84 The restructured organisation would continue to provide leadership training but 
would in addition, complete tasks (unspecified) entrusted to it by the liberation movement. 
Legassick accepted the Dar es Salaam criticism that the leaders of NUSAS had a vested 
interest in apartheid and that NUSAS did not represent the aspirations of the masses. 
Moreover, he believed that whites controlled NUSAS and that black students holding 
leadership positions in NUSAS were merely tokens. He thus advocated an African-led but 
non-racial and socialist organisation which would represent the aspirations of the majority, 
enabling it to develop a genuine African socialist ideology in place of alien European 
ideologies like liberalism. He believed that a genuine student liberation movement could not 
include in its ranks the ‘oppressors’ thus making it imperative for NUSAS to switch to 
individual enrolment and in so doing, jettisoning the bulk of its white membership. It would 
endeavour to recruit students from both within and outside South Africa and because of the 
nature of some of its activities would probably have to operate in some instances as an 
underground organisation from outside South Africa.85 More than forty years later, Legassick 
would surmise that his proposals were ‘in a certain sense….a confused anticipation of the 
split of the South African Students’ Organisation from NUSAS….in 1969’.86 In the milieu of 
1964 however, it could be argued that Legassick was proposing that NUSAS become ASA: 
the only real difference between the proposed restructured NUSAS and the current ASA 
being the non-racial composition of the former. Brickhill and Brooks have argued that ASA 
was a bridge between the rise of SASO and black students participating in NUSAS.87 
Legassick’s and Driver’s proposals also fit this description.   
 
In his personal capacity, Driver questioned whether students in ASA and ASUSA, who were 
unable to forge unity among themselves, would voluntarily accede to NUSAS’s request that 
they join an organisation established by whites. Moreover, such an organisation would still 
be predominantly white given the demographics of South African students.88 He accepted 
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the imperative of Africanising NUSAS and thus suggested that the organisation open its 
membership to senior high school pupils.89 In addition to altering the racial profile of the 
national union, this would most certainly have radicalised it. African schools, particularly 
former mission institutions, remained in a permanent state of rebellion against Bantu 
Education, a fact not lost on ASA, which had already endeavoured to harness this militancy, 
as would, at the end of the decade, the Black Consciousness Movement.90 The seminar 
delegates accepted this racial engineering. Driver rejected the idea that an ideology should 
be discarded because it was ‘alien’, arguing that much of African Socialism and nationalism 
were based on Marxism, but believed that the test should be pragmatism and the ideology’s 
suitability for the conditions and context.91 
 
In what was a distinct departure from the past and demonstrated the influence of Pan-
Africanism, Driver formulated a new definition and understanding of non-racialism and 
African leadership. In the past, he explained, NUSAS’s attitude had been to ‘disregard a 
man’s [sic] race and judge him [sic] on merit alone’. However as everything in South Africa 
was determined by race, it was impossible to judge someone on merit alone and thus ‘those 
who are the most oppressed must therefore lead the liberation movement’.92 Similar views of 
black leadership and a non-racial definition of ‘black’ would be espoused by the Black 
Consciousness Movement some years later. To Driver, ‘African leadership’ did not imply that 
NUSAS should order black students to lead them – in other words, whites would remain in 
charge – but rather that white students should say to black students: ‘if you want to lead us, 
we will follow you’.93 For this Driver was ‘heavily criticised’. African students in particular 
accused him of ‘thinking through….[his] skin and not with [his] mind’.94  
 
Driver concurred with Legassick and Gunther that NUSAS’s core function was the 
identification and training of leaders95 who after university would ‘continue working through 
other organisations towards the same ends’ as NUSAS. NUSAS, Driver believed, had a 
‘radical role’ as ‘an active agent for change in South Africa’ which included working towards 
the ‘unity’ of the ‘liberation movement’.96 ‘Liberation movement’ was defined inclusively as 
organisations, both legal and illegal, working towards democracy.97 Unification would be 
undertaken by providing the framework for those with differing political viewpoints to co-
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operate together in one organisation. It would pursue its radical role through its ‘public 
activities’ and ‘private activities’, the former including the provision of loans and 
scholarships98 and the latter comprising SACHED, CADET, the Literacy Project, the Political 
Freedom Fund and the Prison Education Scheme.99 NUSAS’s minor functions entailed 
providing student benefits to its well-off, predominantly white membership and in so doing, 
educating white students by projecting NUSAS’s ideas. Left wing critics believed that the 
political education of white students was a waste of time, but Driver disagreed. He accepted 
that it would not bring about change in South Africa, but it would prepare and neutralise the 
potentially dangerous white minority for life under an inevitable and future black majority 
government. The other minor functions of NUSAS included offering practical experience of 
non-racialism and providing a vehicle for protest. Like other radicals, Driver was convinced 
of the inefficacy of protests, demonstrations and petitions as a means of securing change 
but argued that protest activity ‘activated’ the NUSAS leadership and its membership and 
thus provided an opportunity for student education and leadership training.100      
 
Driver argued that NUSAS was a dynamic and evolving organisation. For example, its 
policy-driving ‘power base’ had shifted from UCT and Wits to Fort Hare, UNNE and 
Pietermaritzburg101 (not explained). As NUSAS policy radicalised and South Africa became 
more oppressive and more whites withdrew into the laager, so too did conservative white 
students who responded by withdrawing from NUSAS. In the future, when a centre displayed 
conservative tendencies, individual enrolment would replace automatic affiliation. Thus 
incrementally, a smaller, more committed NUSAS would come into being.102 However, 
Driver, Gunther and the seminar rejected Legassick’s suggestion that NUSAS immediately 
jettison automatic affiliation103 as this would appear to be capitulation to Vorster and would, 
more seriously, sever the tie between NUSAS and the SRCs and student bodies, thus 
endangering its leadership training role and threatening its financial base.104 
 
The seminar not only interrogated the future role and structure of NUSAS but also the role of 
the university in society, imperialism and colonialism, African post-colonial development, 
African Socialism and Pan-Africanism.    
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Moving away from the liberal view of the role of the university and education, the seminar 
averred that African universities should reflect the social, political and economic values of 
the societies in which they were situated. Moreover, their primary goal ought to be the 
training of informed leaders, conscious of the peculiar needs of their societies. Universities 
ought to be involved in nation building as well as the development of a curriculum responsive 
to African needs. Evidently influenced by the SDS’s Port Huron Statement, the seminar 
believed that the changes required to make curricula relevant to post-colonial African 
societies could be undertaken by students themselves through their participation in 
academic and administrative university structures. In what would otherwise have amounted 
to a fundamental break with NUSAS’s understanding of academic freedom and university 
autonomy, the seminar narrowly rejected the proposition that the state, representing the 
aspirations of the people could effect these changes from above.105   
 
As far as the political economy of newly independent African states was concerned, the 
seminar envisaged strong, centralised, socialist governments which would drive rapid 
industrialisation so as to reverse underdevelopment and provide the basic needs of society. 
In what amounted to an approval of African Socialism, the seminar recognised the enabling 
role that African communalism could play in the development of a socialist state.106 
Demonstrating the influence of new writing on underdevelopment, the seminar expanded 
NUSAS’s policy on colonialism and imperialism by rejecting neo-colonialism too.107 No 
unanimity could be reached on the policy of Africanisation which was implicit in Pan-
Africanism. The majority believed that it was unreasonable to expect that the white 
population accept discrimination against it which was liable to occur in the early stages of the 
policy’s implementation.108 
 
The final public communique of the seminar recommended that NUSAS maintain its current 
structure and even endeavour to expand its membership if this did not compromise its 
principles. It should commit itself to the further development of its policy along the lines of 
the previous five years and in the words of the Dar es Salaam seminar, should pledge itself 
to make every effort to ‘articulate and realise the aspirations of the South African people’.109 
It believed that the Dar es Salaam resolution should be interpreted as ‘constructive criticism’ 
rather than a destructive ultimatum and rationalised that by NUSAS’s commitment to 
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achieving a democratic education in a democratic South Africa, the national union’s 
composition and leadership would eventually reflect the demographics of the country.110 
 
Even though the seminar did not accept Legassick’s proposals to restructure NUSAS as an 
exiled overtly political extension of the banned liberation movements, (though some aligned 
to the ANC did111) the seminar’s conclusions, if they were accepted by the student assembly, 
would commit NUSAS to pursuing fundamental change in South Africa, and within the 
context of the wide terms of reference of the Suppression of Communism and the General 
Law Amendment Acts, could even be construed as subversive. In expressing the opinion 
that one of the dual major functions of NUSAS should be ‘working towards unity among all 
forces working for democracy’,112 it was quite clear that the participants at the seminar 
believed that NUSAS should be aligned to the African nationalist liberation movement and 
with the seminar’s expressed commitment to non-racialism, whether it was reformulated or 
not, to what had earlier been identified as the non-ideological, non-communist wing of the 
ANC. The seminar’s commitment to socialism and, for example, nationalisation, was for 
‘practical purposes’ rather than an ‘ideological’ commitment to Marxism, similar to the early 
ideas of the American SDS. In this way the seminar distanced itself from dialectical 
materialism in general and the SACP in particular.   
 
Reaction to the Botha’s Hill Seminar 
 
According to the first reports after the conclusion of the six day seminar, it was a great 
success.113 Delegates described the occasion as ‘highly contentious yet highly 
successful’,114 ‘exhilarating’,115 ‘impressive’, ‘exciting’, ‘valuable’, ‘stimulating’ and ‘an 
experience of great importance’116 at which students of all colours could take part in ‘serious 
and committed political discussion’.117 Because the NUSAS executive realised that Driver’s 
paper on the future role of the student movement was highly controversial and could be 
misused if it fell into the wrong hands, participants were expected to return the numbered 
copies at the conclusion of the session. However, two were not returned. One was smuggled 
out by a student at Natal Training College, and, as mentioned in chapter eight, landed up in 
the possession of Aubrey Levine. Very soon, it was clear that the security police, the vice-
president of the Durban SRC who had resigned from NUSAS, and the Afrikaans press had 
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copies too, Die Transvaler publishing extracts of the speech.118 As noted in chapter eight, 
Driver’s speech, delivered in his personal capacity, was rewritten by Levine in such a way 
that Legassick’s views and Gunther’s hypothetical future scenarios for NUSAS were 
presented as those of Driver in his capacity as president of NUSAS and thus NUSAS policy 
itself. Levine and the right wing employed Driver’s operational definitions selectively. For 
example ‘revolution’ as defined by Driver as fundamental change that could be violent or 
non-violent was utilised to allege that NUSAS proposed violent, communist revolution. 
Driver’s definition of ‘liberation movement’ (previously discussed) was ignored, Levine 
presenting NUSAS as a liberation movement in its generally understood meaning of being 
the ANC and PAC. Much was made of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ or ‘secret’ activities of 
NUSAS. Without illucidating these as Driver had done, these were elided with Legassick’s 
subversive scenario of NUSAS operating as a public front in South Africa while its important 
work went underground. To all of this, Levine added that NUSAS was the front of the ANC 
and received its orders from the liberation movement via its ‘chief’, its honorary president, 
Albert Luthuli.    
 
This was perhaps the greatest crisis that NUSAS had faced since 1947-8 when all but two 
universities had disaffiliated. Driver’s speech, though not the seminar’s explosive post-
colonial policy recommendations, was circulated and published in various forms by the 
national press as well as by the campus conservative organisations, the latter urging 
students to resign from NUSAS. As noted in chapter eight, the SRCs of Durban and the 
Natal Training College temporarily disaffiliated from NUSAS, as did conditionally, that of 
JCE. The UCT SRC dissociated itself from the speech119 and after reconsidering its initial 
intention of censuring Driver, severely criticised him for jeopardising NUSAS by making his 
very personal ‘views public when his name was so closely linked with NUSAS’.120 Likewise 
the Wits and Pietermaritzburg SRCs dissociated themselves from the seminar,121 the Wits 
SRC ‘question[ing] the wisdom of the president in making statements on NUSAS in 
private’122 and Pietermaritzburg ‘plac[ing] on record its extreme disapproval of the speech… 
[of] Jonty Driver’.123 In addition, elements within the Pietermaritzburg student body 
unsuccessfully called for Driver’s removal as NUSAS president.124 Only the UNNE SRC 
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bucked the general trend. Presumably with the support of NEUM and ASUSA, the SRC 
hailed ‘the bold and radical stand of NUSAS against all forms of apartheid’ and ‘the courage 
and determination displayed by the leadership of NUSAS’. UNNE pledged itself to ‘fight tooth 
and nail’ for the retention of Driver and ‘people who think like him’ if, in the face of 
propaganda and smear campaigns, the anticipated attempt to force Driver to resign the 
presidency materialised at the forthcoming congress.125 Lawrence Gandar, the editor of the 
liberal Rand Daily Mail, also defended and lauded NUSAS and Driver. He declared that he 
found ‘nothing outrageous’ about Driver’s paper and ‘was delighted’ that student leaders 
were ‘capable of true radical thinking’ and in the true meaning of university education were 
able to think independently ‘beyond the familiar clichés of their time’ and ‘challenge… old 
assumptions’.126 
 
‘Botha’s Hill’ provided a lucky break for the state and its allies who used this as a new 
weapon with which to smear NUSAS. J.J.B. van Zyl, MP for Pretoria-Sunnyside, claimed in 
parliament on 14 May 1964 that NUSAS was ‘the Communist Party of South Africa in 
disguise’.127 This was reinforced by Jaap Marais, Hertzog Group-aligned MP for Innesdal, 
when he alleged that ‘NUSAS and the ANC are in complete agreement with each other in 
regard to communism, the liberation movement and revolution in South Africa’.128 Like 
Vorster some months earlier, Jan de Klerk, Minister of Education, attacked the system of 
automatic affiliation to NUSAS and ominously for the future, threatened to withdraw the 
state’s subsidy to the NUSAS universities.129 Driver and Osler were summoned to parliament 
to be ‘grilled’ by the UP and a baffled Sir De Villiers Graaff. Graaff was convinced that Driver, 
a poet, was mad.130 Marais Steyn warned NUSAS that it would be unable to continue 
defending it unless it could adequately explain its ‘secret activities’ and the role it envisaged 
playing in the liberation movement.131 Not only Steyn, but many students too, found it hard to 
believe that Driver’s misfortunately named ‘private activities’ were as innocuous as a 
leadership training programme in the High Commission Territories and a Prison Education 
Scheme known to the authorities who had given NUSAS permission to administer it.  
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Damage control and managing the ‘Botha’s Hill crisis’ 
 
As soon as the Botha’s Hill crisis broke, NUSAS began damage control. Driver visited all the 
NUSAS campuses and explained his speech to the SRCs and student bodies and 
conducted the Botha’s Hill Seminar with the individual Local Committee members.132 This 
had the effect of averting much harsher action by SRCs and student bodies, making them 
‘less hysterical’ about ‘liberation movements’.133 Attesting to the success of the damage 
control exercise and the enduring strength of liberal ideas at Wits, even in the face of an 
aggressive campaign by SACSA to persuade students to resign from NUSAS, Driver 
received a five minute ovation in what was regarded as one of the largest mass meetings on 
the campus in some years.134 The Standing Committee of SRC Presidents met in 
Johannesburg shortly after the crisis broke. Driver offered to resign because he had 
‘foolishly endangered NUSAS.’135 However, this was not accepted, presumably because of 
Osler’s private warning to SRCs that Driver’s forced resignation, which some SRCs were 
working towards, would probably lose NUSAS its black membership.136 The Standing 
Committee publicly reaffirmed that NUSAS was an organisation open to all points of view 
and did not advocate uniformity and as such valued discussion and criticism. It justified 
Driver’s paper as one expressing personal opinions which were intended to generate 
academic discussion rather than craft future policy.137 Like the Wits SRC138 and a UCT SRC 
member who claimed that it ‘smacked of inverted racialism’,139 the Standing Committee 
rejected the Africanisation of NUSAS, and publicly reaffirmed the importance of NUSAS as a 
non-racial organisation.140 
      
The Botha’s Hill crisis and the sudden opportunistic activation or re-activation of the new 
campus conservative societies dragged on towards the end of the second term and into 
preparations for the annual NUSAS congress. From across the political spectrum, this 
fortieth congress was judged to be a ‘crisis congress’ in which the crises of the past NUSAS 
year, namely the Vorster and right wing attacks, the emergence of the conservative campus 
organisations and, most serious of all, the Botha’s Hill Seminar and its consequences would 
be deliberated.141 It was generally agreed that NUSAS had reached a turning point and 
would split along right and left lines, with most pre-congress commentators predicting a shift 
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to the right.142 The government hoped that the congress would witness the end of NUSAS 
while the UP hoped that the organisation would ‘wipe its slate clean’, particularly as far as its 
current leadership was concerned.143 The Wits SRC believed the congress would be 
concerned at restoring ‘responsibility’ and ‘realism’ to the national union. Melvyn Drummond 
of the UCT CSA stated that for NUSAS’s own good, Driver should be forced to resign. 
Drummond’s own preferred scenario entailed NUSAS taking the radical route144 of Driver 
and Legassick and presumably then splitting and in so doing, enabling the conservative 
campus organisations to absorb the bulk of its membership. Much of what could happen 
would depend on the large delegations of Wits and UCT. Until Botha’s Hill, the UCT SRC 
was after UNNE, NUSAS’s most radical full affiliate and as such had given the NUSAS 
executive much trouble as hinted at in the correspondence over the previous NUSAS 
year.145 However, this changed after Botha’s Hill, the UCT SRC and particularly the hitherto 
radically outspoken Joseph Levenstein and David de Keller, taking a strong censorious line 
against Driver and his carelessness. Moreover, in the wake of the conservative challenge, 
Levenstein was particularly keen on supplanting Driver with someone ‘more malleable and 
less out-spoken’.146 As previously noted, the Wits SRC had moved to the right in 1962 and 
consequently its congress delegation was ‘packed with conservative Progressives’ but did 
include a ‘couple of lone radicals’ as alternative delegates. As was mentioned earlier, 
Rhodes had a conservative ‘students-as-such’ mandate while Durban and JCE were 
threatening disaffiliation. Osler privately feared that the congress would be ‘very very tough’ 
and that the current NUSAS leadership would need ‘all fighters and all supporters’.147 
Nonetheless, the NUSAS executive bravely spun for public consumption, that though the 
congress occurred at a ‘difficult time in NUSAS’s …history’ and would be ‘a test of the 
conviction, commitment and cohesion of the national union’, it predicted that NUSAS’s basic 
principles based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would nevertheless be 
reaffirmed.148    
 
The ‘crisis congress’ of 1964 
 
Leo Marquard, founder of NUSAS and doyen of South African liberalism, opened the fortieth 
anniversary congress of the national union. He urged NUSAS members not to ‘shrink from 
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politics’.149 As enfranchised citizens who could also serve in the military, students had the 
right to engage in politics and as young people as yet unencumbered by the demands of a 
career and a family, they had the responsibility to be idealistic and represent the views of the 
future. As liberal-minded people, students had principles in which they believed, ‘a great 
cause in front of them’, ‘a great tradition’ behind them and though liberalism might be a 
minority outlook, Marquard argued, quoting Thoreau, it was ‘never powerless unless it 
conform[ed] to the majority’.150 
 
The first item on the agenda was the Botha’s Hill Seminar and Driver’s paper. In what was 
perhaps an attempt to pre-empt both the threatened action of forcing Driver to resign and a 
divisive discussion of the contents of his paper, UNNE and the radical Stellenbosch 
delegate, Gavin Williams, proposed a motion deploring the fact that the Botha’s Hill Seminar 
had been used to smear NUSAS. The motion rejected the accusations that the seminar 
either determined NUSAS’s policy or that Driver’s paper expressed the policy of NUSAS, 
regretted that Driver and the NUSAS executive had not ensured that Driver’s personal 
opinions would not be associated with NUSAS policy but nonetheless upheld the right of all 
NUSAS members to express their ideas about the national union and its policy.151 Early on 
in the heated four hour debate,152 a far harsher amendment censuring Driver and the 
executive for not accurately ‘gauging the possible consequences of Driver’s actions thereby 
irresponsibly jeopardising the functioning of NUSAS’ was adopted by thirty seven votes to 
nineteen.153 However, the final resolution was passed nem con154 with UNNE, Stellenbosch 
and the Fort Hare proxy abstaining.155 
 
In order to ensure that there was no repeat of Botha’s Hill and presumably also no repetition 
of the misinterpretations of policy by some SRC presidents following the Vorster attacks, 
NUSAS tightened up and centralised policy interpretation and public statement-making. The 
assembly reiterated the current position which permitted only the president and vice-
presidents making public pronouncements on NUSAS156 and in addition, prohibited any 
executive member, whether in their public or private capacity, from issuing a public 
statement on NUSAS which did not accord with the national union’s policy.157 The overseas 
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representatives and presumably also the former ones, were reined in too, the assembly 
declaring that they could ‘in no way’ ‘determine the policy of NUSAS’.158 In order to ‘guide 
NUSAS through the [anticipated] difficult times ahead’ as well as to provide continuity and 
stability to the executive which had a rapid turnover of leadership, NUSAS established an 
Advisory Board composed of leading liberals.159 
 
The recommendation of the Botha’s Hill Seminar that NUSAS include senior secondary 
school pupils in its ranks received a lukewarm if not hostile reception. By a slim majority of 
only five votes, the assembly did however agree to investigate with the Advisory Board, the 
‘possibility and advisability’ of this proposed drastic change of policy.160  
 
No mention was made of Botha’s Hill’s fundamental reformulation of the role of education 
and the concept of academic freedom even though the ISC had also recently taken a small 
step away from the liberal understanding of these concepts by aligning university education 
with development.161 The NUSAS assembly unanimously restated its belief that the role of 
university education was the ‘unprejudiced pursuit of truth’ which was ‘far more important 
than the transitory aims of party-politicians or the temporary fears of electorates’162 but 
divided on the issue of the limits of university autonomy. In a lengthy debate which split 
those aligned with the PP from the radicals, UNNE, TCEA, Stellenbosch, Driver and a 
number of individual radicals argued that any higher education institution, whether public or 
private, which discriminated against anyone in its admission policies on grounds other than 
academic merit, violated academic freedom. In so doing it would effectively forfeit its 
autonomy163 as ‘any truly democratic government’ upholding academic freedom would be 
entitled to ‘interfere’ with an institution’s autonomy.164 Far from unanimously then, the 
assembly adopted an amendment which excluded private institutions and restricted state 
interference to state-aided ones only. UNNE walked out for fifteen minutes in protest.165  
 
Generating as much dissension as university autonomy and racial admissions was the long- 
standing contentious ‘degrees motion’. This was reintroduced in a modified form to the effect 
that NUSAS would continue its investigations into the standards of South African degrees 
but would limit this to South Africa. An amendment by Alan Murray, the NUSAS international 
vice-president and Levenstein of UCT, that the investigation had so far proved ineffective 
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and should thus be abandoned, was adopted by one vote after an initial tense tie. 
Henceforward the NUSAS executive would merely keep a watchful eye over developments 
in higher education in South Africa.166 Those opposing what was effectively the demise of 
the ‘degrees motion’ included Driver, UNNE, Stellenbosch and some delegates from 
Pietermaritzburg.167 Notwithstanding this capitulation to the PP-inclined right (right-wing by 
NUSAS standards), NUSAS shifted further to the left when it decided, for the purposes of 
procuring overseas scholarships for South African students, to co-operate with the London 
AAM,168 the organisation which many students feared might capitalise on the NUSAS degree 
motion and accordingly campaign for the non-accreditation of South African qualifications.  
 
NUSAS’s equally contentious decision of seeking observer status in the IUS was not 
abandoned despite the unrelenting anti-communist smear campaign. In an attempt to 
ridicule ‘the communist by association’ smear, it was argued that observing at IUS 
gatherings made NUSAS no more communist than was the USA which traded with the 
Peoples’ Republic of China. However, the decision was effectively postponed for another 
year as NUSAS had to ensure through renewed negotiations that the IUS accepted its 
stringent conditions for taking up this status.169 NUSAS moved closer to a non-aligned 
international policy and a less pronounced Western Cold War sectarianism when it decided 
not to seek full membership of the newly reconstituted ISC,170 the body to which it had 
hitherto pledged its utmost loyalty. 
 
The allegedly subversive ‘secret’ or ‘private activities’ of NUSAS received a thorough airing 
at the congress. Marquard himself expressed his dislike of secrecy but condoned the 
‘overcautious’ actions of student leaders who had lived their entire adult lives in what he 
termed a ‘Security Branch country’.171 The assembly voted to continue and expand 
SACHED, CADET and the Literacy Project and pledged itself to raising substantial sums of 
money for the Political Freedom Fund, renamed the more innocuous-sounding Student 
Defence and Aid Fund. With the conclusion of the ‘secret activities’ debate, the threatened 
disaffiliations of Durban and JCE which had hung like a ‘sword of Damocles’ over the 
congress, melted into nothing.172 Ian Robertson, the PP-aligned vice-president of the Durban 
SRC pronounced himself entirely satisfied that NUSAS was not involved in any subversive 
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activities, that the organisation was entirely open and that there was no truth in allegations 
that NUSAS was ‘communist’ or ‘communist influenced’.173      
 
Ultimately NUSAS did not split along left and right wing lines, or, in the opinion of post-
congress commentators, swing to the right. No attempt was made to unseat Albert Luthuli, 
who was re-elected honorary president, and replace him with Sir De Villiers Graaff. The 
congress reaffirmed its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in a 
veiled rebuke of Botha’s Hill, its belief in the fundamental importance of non-racialism. Some 
of its earlier contentious decisions, used by the state and its proxies to break NUSAS, were 
modified or abandoned altogether, but balancing this out was the further though quiet 
radicalisation of policy and a decision to adopt a more aggressive approach to right wing 
attacks. The new executive was a masterpiece of ideological, regional and grievance 
balancing. For the first time, the preponderance of executive members from the large 
centres of Wits and particularly UCT was noticeably absent, power having shifted to Natal. 
Ten executive positions, including the presidency, vice-presidency and new deputy 
presidency, went to student leaders from Natal whose political orientation ranged from the 
PP and LP to the Natal Indian Congress and ANC. The president-elect, Osler174 was 
believed to be more moderate than Driver, but he was certainly radical too. However, as a 
popular former president of the Pietermaritzburg SRC and as a South African Universities 
rugby player, was probably more in touch with ordinary students than his bookish, politically-
driven, Cape-based predecessors, Driver and Leftwich.    
 
Right wing societies were despondent that NUSAS had not shattered. JCE did not disaffiliate 
from NUSAS but remained dissatisfied with NUSAS policy regarding, for example, white co-
operation even though NUSAS had partially reopened channels of communication with the 
ASB were the ASB to initiate contact.175 Durban decided to remain in NUSAS and continue 
its automatic affiliation. The Durban SRC elections were a clean sweep for NUSAS, the new 
SRC president, Ian Robertson playing an increasingly prominent role in NUSAS affairs 
including becoming one of its staunchest public defenders. The Local Committee swelled in 
size and capacity, fifty new members joining in the new academic year.176  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
173 Cape Times, 16.7.1964. 
174 BC 586 B1 Presidential Report 1965, pp. 5-6. 
175 BC 586 A2.1, Dave Adler to Maeder Osler, 29.8.1964, pp. 2-3; B1 Presidential Report 1965, pp. 32-33.   
176 BC 586 B1 Presidential Report 1965, pp. 38-39. 
381 
 
NUSAS, the National Committee for Liberation and the African Resistance Movement  
 
Though NUSAS survived its ‘crisis congress’, the arrests and convictions of former NUSAS 
officers and current student radicals on charges of sabotage threatened to utterly destroy the 
national union.  
 
The National Committee of Liberation (NCL), which became the African Resistance 
Movement (ARM) in 1962 was a small, predominantly white, middle class, underground, 
anti-communist organisation broadly committed to the attainment of a democratic non-racial 
socialist state.177 Through the perpetration of symbolic acts of sabotage against state 
installations, the ARM hoped to contribute to the creation of a revolutionary climate which 
would eventually ignite a popular revolution. The ARM was a national organisation with 
branches in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown. Through 
the use of more sophisticated technology than their black counterparts, ARM operatives 
toppled electricity pylons, dynamited a dam wall, blew railway signalling systems and mined 
a radio mask.178 Their final operation in June 1964 was a defiant protest against the 
conviction of the high command of MK at the conclusion of the Rivonia trial.179 
 
Like MK, the ARM traced its origins to Sharpeville and the banning of the liberation 
movements. Three different groupings/ideological strands came together as the NCL in late 
1961. A radical liberal-ex-communist grouping loosely led by John Lang coalesced in the 
Johannesburg Fort during the 1960 state of emergency and linked up with the African 
Freedom Movement, a dissident Africanist ANC grouping likewise formed in detention.180 
 
Right from the beginning, staff and students at the liberal universities and, more importantly, 
former and current NUSAS members were participants in ARM. John Lang’s NCL made 
contact with the Trotskyite Socialist League under Wits physicist, Baruch Hirson, which in 
turn had tenuous links to a group of independent Marxist activists linked to UCT’s Modern 
World Society, such as Hillel Ticktin, Anthony Eastwood (later convicted of ANC sabotage) 
and Neil Talbot.181 Lang’s NCL and Hirson’s Socialist League connected with the anti-
republican Natal Separatists and what became known as the United English Speaking South 
Africans (UNESSA). Some of UNESSA’s members were arrested in May 1961 and charged 
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with planning a campaign of disruption or sabotage, the police having discovered a cache of 
explosives.182  
 
A few months before the UNESSA arrests, Brain Sharpe, a Natal NUSAS executive member 
and founder of the Anti-Republican Youth Front183 (see chapter six) walked into the NUSAS 
head office in Cape Town and presented Leftwich with a beret184 – the beret would become 
synonymous with Che Guevara and the Cuban revolution. Sharpe claimed to be on his way 
to Rhodesia to procure arms for his military groups (not spelt out but these were perhaps the 
Youth Front) in Natal and Cape Town, which with the support of the UP would defend the 
declaration of independence when the Natal Provincial Council voted to secede from the 
soon to be declared Republic. Though Colonel Arthur Martin of the (disbanded) UFP claimed 
that a formal agreement had been concluded between his party and the PP, UP and the 
‘Horticulturalists' that Douglas Mitchell would lead Natal out of the Republic,185 Leftwich was 
not necessarily to know this and simply concluded that Sharpe was mentally unstable and a 
potential hazard to NUSAS.186 Insanity was not necessarily considered a negative quality 
amongst radical liberals at that time and was the subject of Michel Foucault’s 1961 study.187 
David Evans, a Natal ARM member who assisted NUSAS by providing accommodation for 
black congress delegates, averred in the New African in 1962 that there was a ‘quality 
missing from the LP’ – ‘a dash of madness’. ‘Had Castro been completely sane, he would 
not have taken Cuba’.188 Notwithstanding Leftwich’s reservations about Sharpe and his 
political activities and perhaps to test the veracity of his sensational claims, Leftwich 
requested to meet the Cape Town grouping.189 Whether he did so is unknown but this 
grouping was probably not the Cape Town NCL branch led by LP members Vigne and 
former NUSAS president, Rubin. Leftwich himself was recruited into the NCL by Rubin 
during the final phase of the former’s 1962 NUSAS presidency190 and following Rubin’s 
departure to London in 1963, assumed a leading role in the organisation both locally and 
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nationally.191 The NCL/ARM ‘provided an outlet for the frustration and hopelessness’ 
Leftwich felt about conventional forms of resistance.192 
 
Leftwich cast his net among radical student activists who felt the same way as he did for 
potential recruits. His approach to Roslyn Traub, NUSAS’s long-serving General Secretary 
and Jann Parry, an executive member, bore no fruit.193 Driver angrily turned down Leftwich’s 
invitation because he was still a pacifist and believed that ARM was tactically ‘premature’,194 
would jeopardise NUSAS195 and given his high public profile as NUSAS president would 
place the sabotage body in unnecessary danger. However, Driver did, on occasion, act as a 
messenger for the organisation and rented a post office box for Rubin196 which, unbeknown 
to Driver, was probably intended to receive the dynamite and plastic explosives mailed from 
the Witwatersrand and the UK.197 While in London in 1963, Driver had a ‘mysterious’ 
discussion with Lang on what Driver worriedly realised was the means by which Nelson 
Mandela and other political prisoners could be rescued from Robben Island.198   
 
From the beginning, the ARM was desirous of co-operation with the liberation movements 
and like the Botha’s Hill proposals, wished to effect unity between them.199 It sensed the 
political (and perhaps eventually revolutionary) potential of the rural areas and so as to build 
up a mass movement, sought to deepen the links with rural activists already forged by LP 
members, Patrick Duncan and Vigne during the 1960 Pondoland Revolt and later the 
Transkei elections.200 Lang’s purchase of a torpedo boat in London was intended both to 
assist in committing acts of sabotage as well as to offload arms on the Pondoland coast.201 
Shingler, associated with, but not a member of ARM, had already cut his teeth in liberation 
politics, assisting Ganyile, a leader of the Pondoland Revolt to escape to Basutoland in 
1961.202 Following Ganyile’s kidnapping by South African agents in late 1961, a distraught 
Mhlambiso persuaded NUSAS to take up the plight of his former Fort Hare compatriot. To 
establish the facts of the case, Leftwich contacted Duncan who had visited Basutoland to 
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investigate the case203 and who, in 1962 relocated (like SACP operative and former Fort 
Hare ANCYL activist, Joe Matthews) to this neighbouring state. Duncan’s border-sited 
trading stores were intended to supply the political networks (linked to the LP) which would 
infiltrate the Transkei.204  
 
Following from the above, it could be speculated that Leftwich wished to both Africanise and 
‘Cubanise’ ARM and it could be further surmised, this could be partially achieved by bringing 
the Fort Hare resistance into the sabotage body. At the NUSAS executive meeting cocktail 
party in December 1963, Leftwich unsuccessfully approached Mdalana and Winston Nagan, 
the latter the chairperson of the Fort Hare NUSAS branch. Nagan had learnt to distrust 
Leftwich, was not interested in any foolish and rash operations and was in any case a 
member of the ANC.205 Legassick too would play no part in ARM because it was not linked 
to the ANC.206 Nonetheless, by 1964, Leftwich had successfully recruited a number of UCT 
students into the Cape Town branch of ARM. These included UCT SRC member and 
firebrand, David de Keller, who himself tentatively approached Nagan and Gavin Williams207 
at the controversial 1963 NUSAS congress208 by explaining to them how easy it would be to 
blow up Cape Town’s Southern Suburbs railway line.209 Stephanie Kemp and Alan Brooks 
were two of De Keller’s notable catches. Both Kemp and Brooks became members of the 
underground SACP, making them probably the only active communists in the distinctly anti-
SACP ARM.210 Committed Zionists also participated in the organisation. The ARM’s medical 
officer was Sidney (Toffee) Katz,211 a former NUSAS international vice-president, who, 
during the 1956 Arab-Israeli War announced his intention of abandoning his studies to join 
the Israeli army.212  
 
In Johannesburg, Rosemary Wentzel, ex-wife of Ernie Wentzel, recruited Lewin, another 
former NUSAS international vice-president who in turn brought in both John Lloyd, a former 
Natal NUSAS officer and John Harris, president of SANROC and former Wits SRC 
member.213 Rosemary Wentzel and the fiery former editor of Wits Student, Michael Wade, 
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paid a visit to Grahamstown to provide training and raise the morale of the group there.214 
This group included Gillian Gane, NUSAS Eastern Cape secretary, who along with three 
other Rhodes students fled South Africa in the wake of the ARM arrests.215 Lorna 
Symington, a former NUSAS Eastern Cape secretary (who like Gane had cultivated close 
ties with Fort Hare students), and Norman Bromberger, a radical Christian and former UCT 
SRC member who lectured at Rhodes’s Port Elizabeth campus were part of an ARM 
grouping in Port Elizabeth.216  
 
The ARM’s overseas operatives included Gunther, who attempted to transport the ARM 
torpedo boat to Mombasa217 and who, with Shingler, embarked on a fund raising campaign 
for the organisation by unsuccessfully tapping on student groupings associated with COSEC 
in Europe, North America and North Africa.218 Contact between ARM operatives in South 
Africa and abroad was facilitated by NUSAS business which also provided a legitimate cover 
for ARM activity. While attending an ISC meeting in the Netherlands on behalf of NUSAS in 
September 1963, Leftwich was able to meet the London Committee219 and plan the ARM’s 
future. In the event the organisation survived another six months. 
 
‘The fourth of July raids’ and their consequences for NUSAS  
 
‘The fourth of July raids’, as the ARM arrests came to be known, formed part of a general 
post-Rivonia sweep which aimed to obliterate ‘almost as a species’,220 the white left – 
Communist, Congress of Democrats, Liberal, Progressive and Black Sash.221 Even Leo 
Marquard was not spared. His house was raided while he was away at the NUSAS 
congress.222 Leftwich and Lewin were arrested during the course of the congress223 while De 
Keller, was seized from his bed at the congress itself.224 The shocked NUSAS assembly, 
together with the NCFS, embarked on a twenty four hour hunger-strike in protest against 
these detentions.225 Driver and others in the know, suspecting that the arrests were 
connected to the ARM and not wanting to link NUSAS to the sabotage grouping, prevailed 
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upon the delegates not to take stronger and more ostentatious action.226 The press 
announced the discovery of explosives and began speculating on the possibility of new 
sabotage trials on the scale of the recently concluded Rivonia trial. Shortly after this, John 
Harris, one of the few remaining ARM operatives still at large in South Africa, violated the 
organisation’s code of avoiding human casualties and planted a bomb on Johannesburg 
station, killing one woman and maiming another after the railway police deliberately ignored 
his telephone call warning them to clear the platform.227 Some weeks later, Driver too was 
arrested and detained without trial. Like the white South African public, students at NUSAS 
campuses were outraged by the ‘station bombing’ and many believed that those detained, 
including Driver, were guilty of sabotage and thus deserved their incarceration.  
 
Coming so soon after Botha’s Hill and with so many current and past NUSAS officers in 
detention, NUSAS too, was by association, also implicated in sabotage, subversion and 
even terrorism.228 Again the task of managing the crisis and distancing NUSAS from any hint 
of illegal activity devolved to Osler, the president-elect. Moreover, ‘a line’ which linked 
subversion ultimately to the consequences of apartheid had to be given to bewildered and 
defensive SRCs and student bodies229 who, confronted with sabotage so soon after Rivonia, 
were entirely out of their comfort zones230 and were issuing statements such as ‘I will fight 
sabotage’ and ‘I will fight the ninety day clause’.231 Like the LP,232 which found itself in the 
same compromising situation as NUSAS, NUSAS, after consulting the Standing Committee 
of SRC Presidents,233 publicly stated that it would condone neither violence, terrorism, 
politically motivated vandalism, nor, significantly, police brutality. However, political violence 
and terrorism it believed, flowed from the desperation of people continually thwarted by the 
government to bring about change through peaceful and democratic means. Harking back to 
the national convention resolution of 1961, NUSAS accordingly called for a series of 
meetings or consultations between the leaders of all sections of the community.234     
 
The NUSAS executive, in conjunction with the Standing Committee embarked on a tightly 
managed damage control exercise. In an attempt to deflect attention away from ARM and 
the actions of university students, NUSAS and its affiliated SRCs focussed on the General 
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Law Amendment Act, the proven psychological dangers of detention without trial and solitary 
confinement, police brutality and the continuing Nazification of the state. Moreover, NUSAS 
decided to say little and respond only if challenged, thus avoiding appearing overly 
defensive. Mass protests and sometimes demonstrations were organised on the campuses 
to protest Driver’s and other students’ arrests.235 In what was a considerable coup, the 
usually anti-NUSAS Dr Duminy, goaded into action by a police raid on a visiting overseas 
academic’s home, agreed to co-host with the SRC and UCT Staff Association a protest 
meeting at which a call was made to the government to either charge or release the detained 
members of the UCT community.236 For this Duminy earned the opprobrium and vilification 
of the NP who had hitherto regarded him as one of their allies, John Vorster alleging that the 
English universities harboured subversives.237 Driver’s detention and NUSAS’s tactics 
regarding ARM unexpectedly paid dividends at Durban where NUSAS’s stock rose 
considerably. Students’ natural antipathy for the police asserted itself and at a mass meeting 
protesting Driver’s detention, Aubrey Levine was loudly howled down while on a ‘hysterical 
rant’ about the Johannesburg station bomb.238 JCE was not won over. Its SRC president had 
to be tactfully prevented from making a ‘wishy-washy’ statement on detention without trial, a 
measure which he personally believed was justified in some circumstances.239 
 
After five weeks, Driver was released from prison even though the police had considered 
charging him (an anti-communist), under the Suppression of Communism Act. The 
authorities were unable to prove a link between NUSAS and ARM and revealed to Driver 
that they did not suspect NUSAS of being involved in any extra-legal activity.240 This, 
coupled to his relative kid glove treatment vindicated Osler’s earlier publicly expressed belief 
that Driver’s detention was intended solely to intimidate Driver and NUSAS.241 However, the 
national union could not sit back. It had to prepare itself for potentially devastating 
revelations threatened by the upcoming ARM trials as well as raise funds for its impecunious 
Defence and Aid Fund which it suspected, would finance, for example, the legal costs of 
Lewin’s defence.242  
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In what many believed was a surprisingly and indecently short space of time, Leftwich 
cracked under interrogation and not only spilt the beans on ARM, but also agreed to turn 
state witness against his co-conspirators in exchange for immunity from being charged with 
sabotage which carried a potential death sentence.243 However devastating this personal 
betrayal was to NUSAS members who knew him,244 and however damaging to morale his 
‘caving in’ to the triumphant Security Police was,245 it was the evidence led in the Cape Town 
trial that Rubin had recruited Leftwich into the NCL while the latter was still president of 
NUSAS, that imperilled the integrity of NUSAS. Although NUSAS publicly distanced itself 
from the actions of its former officers in a new, amended ‘Increase of tension and violence’ 
statement,246 it was still faced with a moral and tactical dilemma. As was customary, the 
office of honorary life vice-president was conferred on a NUSAS president on the conclusion 
of his or her term of office. Osler believed that both Rubin and Leftwich should be stripped of 
their honorary positions for violating NUSAS’s policy of non-violence – Leftwich for involving 
himself in ARM while still president and Rubin for his ‘inexcusable’ action of recruiting 
Leftwich while the former was still serving NUSAS. Osler believed NUSAS should safeguard 
itself and had a lot to lose and little to gain by retaining them.247 Stripping Rubin of his 
honorary vice-presidency when he would not have his day in court, Adler and Osler 
uncomfortably248 realised, placed NUSAS in the morally ambiguous position of violating the 
principle that someone was innocent until proven guilty. Moreover, Rubin was well-known 
and highly thought of abroad. As such, removing him could prove difficult to justify, 
particularly as ‘overseas’, presumably the NUSAS UK Committee and the overseas 
representatives, were opposed to any steps being taken against him. Considerably 
compounding the problem was the fact that the right wing at UCT was unduly interested in 
what action NUSAS intended taking.249 The UCT SRC adopted an ‘Increase in tension and 
violence’ resolution, but because it was forced to compromise with its four right wing 
members who included Van Zyl of the CSA, it was somewhat weaker than the NUSAS 
executive’s statement. Van Zyl threatened to ‘play….up hell…in NUSAS affairs’ and 
proposed, unsuccessfully, that the SRC commend the actions taken by the government 
against ‘terrorist’ organisations which he alleged, through violence and the shedding of 
innocent blood, were fermenting social disorder to further the cause of establishing a 
communist state in South Africa.250  
 
                                                          
243 A. Leftwich, ‘I gave the names’, op. cit., pp. 17-21. 
244 BC 586 B1, Maeder Osler to the Student Assembly, 8.6.1965, Addendum to Presidential Report, pp. 82-83.  
245 Gavin Williams via email, 26.11.2014. 
246 BC 596 B3 Executive Minutes 1964, p. 13; B4.1, Maeder Osler to the Executive, 2.11.1964. 
247 BC 586 A2.1, Maeder Osler to Dave Adler, 9.11.1964. 
248 Maeder Osler telephonically, 8.12.2014. 
249 BC 586 A2.1, Maeder Osler to Dave Adler, 9.11.1964; Dave Adler to Maeder Osler, 9.11.1964. 
250 BC 586 O5.1, UCT SRC Minutes, 17.11.1964, pp. 2-5. 
389 
 
Ultimately a postal motion of NUSAS SRCs ratified the executive’s decision to strip Leftwich 
and Rubin of their honorary offices, a somewhat different decision arrived at by the LP 
conference which voted against the expulsion of its ARM members.251 That a significant 
minority of SRC voters, including half of the new Durban SRC and the entire UNNE SRC 
opposed these punitive measures,252 suggests that some student leaders had qualms about 
abrogating due process for the sake of NUSAS’s public image and/or accepted the 
inevitability and justification of extra-legal activity. In rationalising its dissociation from the 
postal motion, UNNE argued that Leftwich should be deprived of his honorary position 
because he had betrayed his friends and followers. However, to take action against Rubin, 
UNNE reasoned, was unfair, because NUSAS’s decision to do so was based on the 
evidence of the ‘undisciplined’ Leftwich and not Rubin himself. In a cryptic and ambiguous 
rebuke of NUSAS, which could be interpreted as tacit approval of the armed struggle, UNNE 
stated that it was ‘quite possible that what history may record of men like Rubin, might be 
contrary to what NUSAS has already recorded’.253 In the event, Rubin voluntarily resigned 
from NUSAS sparing the executive the unpleasant task of removing him. However, the 
honorary vice-presidency issue caused a rift between NUSAS and UNNE and was perhaps 
one of the reasons for UNNE’s later disaffiliation. Nonetheless, NUSAS survived 1964, its 
worst year ever, intact. 
 
The commencement of the ARM trials in November - the end of the academic year - was 
fortuitous in that it prevented NUSAS’s right wing student critics from rallying their forces and 
so sparing NUSAS from having to issue any statements and so digging itself deeper into a 
political, moral and tactical grave. Vigne has remarked on the striking contrast between the 
ARM and the Rivonia trials. In the latter case, Mandela and his fellow accused emerged as 
heroes,254 whereas the ARM trial with its images of ‘broken lives’, ‘betrayed friendships’ and 
‘emotional breakdown’ presented a picture of complete ‘ignominy’. In Du Toit’s opinion, the 
defeat of ARM was symbolised not by the imprisonment of its operatives but rather by ‘the 
spectacle of Leftwich betraying his friends, himself and the ideals he stood for’.255 Leftwich 
was held in very high esteem by black students,256 making his fall all the more tragic.257 
Being well known to the ANC, his actions were particularly damaging to it258 and presumably 
also impacted on NUSAS’s credibility with the exiled organisation. Leftwich’s betrayal was 
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‘grist to the NEUM mill’,259 proving spectacularly what NEUM had always said about 
herrenvolk liberals: that they could not be trusted.  
 
The prominent role played over many years by Rubin and Leftwich in NUSAS and student 
affairs led to many people questioning the character, integrity and genuineness of NUSAS’s 
leadership, its membership and even policy. In what the NUSAS executive believed 
amounted to blackmail, Vorster offered early release from prison of all convicted ARM 
members whose parents could prove that their children had been led astray by ‘the offspring 
of vipers’, ‘the last four presidents of NUSAS’.260 University administrations, even the usually 
sympathetic Wits authorities, were ‘devastated’ by the ARM trial revelations and appalled too 
that students (and staff) should have used the universities as a base and cloak from which to 
indulge in criminal activities - activities which, in their opinion, could only play into the hands 
of the government and the universities’ enemies.261 The Wits authorities took harsh action, 
firing staff members implicated in sabotage while at UCT’s December graduation ceremony, 
J.P. Duminy, principal of UCT, launched an attack on NUSAS and warned the public to 
differentiate between ARM and the universities.262 More worrying for NUSAS was the 
evidence of a co-ordinated campaign by university principals to end automatic affiliation to 
NUSAS on their campuses (discussed in chapter ten). Many more principals of NUSAS 
affiliates declined their customary invitation to serve as honorary vice-presidents of the 
national union,263 while the slow repair of the relationship with E.G. Malherbe of Natal, 
damaged by the ‘degree motion’, again soured with the events of 1964. He again refused an 
honorary vice-presidency and more seriously, a position on the NUSAS Advisory Board,264 a 
body that NUSAS had great need of in the anticipated difficult times ahead.  
 
Osler suspected that the new year would bring fresh attacks on NUSAS from which the 
national union would not emerge unscathed. NUSAS could deflect these attacks, destroy its 
enemies and inspire its friends, Osler believed, if all NUSAS officers and, by extension, all 
NUSAS student bodies, became fully conversant in NUSAS’s and South Africa’s history and 
the reasons why people resorted to extra-legal activity. To safeguard the organisation, 
executive members who felt that their personal political activities could endanger NUSAS, 
were requested to resign their office.265 Accordingly too, Rubin was not asked to attend 
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Zambia’s independence celebrations on NUSAS’s behalf, nor was Gunther retained as an 
overseas representative.266 Presumably in the event of its proscription, NUSAS made 
provision for its dissolution and the redistribution of its assets,267 urged the strengthening of 
regional committees ‘in the event of disruption in Cape Town’268 (the NUSAS head office) 
and cryptically, found a place of safekeeping. 
 
The feared banning of NUSAS seemed to inch inexorably closer when the Minister of Justice 
proscribed ‘listed communists’ from teaching at state-aided institutions like universities 
because, he alleged, they indoctrinated and misled students. Those affected were Professor 
Jack Simons of the Department of Comparative African Government and Law at UCT and 
Professor Eddie Roux of the Wits Botany Department (expelled earlier from the CPSA),269 
who were banned under the Suppression of Communism Act in December 1964. Many 
students suspected that Van Zyl had something to do with these developments. Simons’s 
course, religiously attended by Van Zyl, was the only subject the CSA leader managed to 
pass in 1964. Protests against these intended measures were immediately launched by 
students and staff at UCT, Wits and Natal in late 1964.270 At UCT these were almost 
immediately nipped in the bud by the UCT authorities who, with their Wits counterparts, 
attempted to persuade Vorster to rescind these decisions arguing that contrary to what the 
minister alleged, Roux and Simons did not air their personal political beliefs in class. In this 
endeavour they failed, leaving the way clear for student action in 1965.271 Osler felt strongly 
that all campuses should mount some kind of protest and that these could be used to gauge 
student opinion and the strength of NUSAS’s support in the wake of the events of 1964.272 
Conservatives, liberals and radicals united behind these political persecutions and new 
violations of academic freedom273 with one and two thousand-strong mass meetings 
assembling at UCT and Wits respectively.274 The strength of this anti-government protest 
was one of the reasons prompting the staging of a five thousand-strong anti-communist and 
‘academic freedom’ march by the Pretoria University branch of the ASB in April 1965.275 
 
The right-wing, as Osler predicted, resumed its offensive against NUSAS in 1965. The CSA 
at UCT produced a recruitment pamphlet which listed inter alia all the former NUSAS officers 
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arrested or implicated in sabotage and again misquoted Driver’s Botha’s Hill speech.276 A 
forged NUSAS pamphlet purportedly issued by Margaret Marshall, chairperson of the Wits 
Local Committee, but believed to be the work of Johannesburg Nationalists, appeared on the 
campus in April 1965. It outlined the ‘projects’ the Local Committee was allegedly co-
ordinating which included the rehabilitation of Mau Mau prisoners, securing ‘clean’ living 
conditions for Winnie Mandela, the wife of jailed ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, providing 
financial assistance to the dependents of PAC-Poqo prisoners, securing the release of all 
political prisoners, facilitating an economic, cultural and sports boycott of South Africa and 
unveiling a John Harris Memorial Fund for the ARM member recently hanged in Pretoria. 
These were discussed in Die Transvaler as fact. NUSAS indignantly dismissed the contents 
of this forgery,277 but except for the more absurd suggestion regarding the Mau Mau, many 
of these projects were quite plausible and consistent with NUSAS’s radical policy and were 
to a lesser extent activities similar to those in which NUSAS was in any case involved. This 
was the dilemma and challenge for NUSAS at the end of 1964. It had sought to redefine, re-
orientate and restructure itself and its policy, but in vain. Maeder Osler expressed the 
‘frustration’ and ‘despair’ of NUSAS activists when he stated in early 1965 that ‘we all feel 
the vacuity of the situation we are in and the difficulty of our direction’.278 The following years 
would prove to be even more difficult for NUSAS. In the face of concerted attacks against it 
by the state and the university authorities, NUSAS would need to do all in its power to 
maintain and consolidate its present policy and membership and would thus have little space 
in which to develop further its ‘radical role’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The failure of the campaign against university apartheid, the authoritarian post-Sharpeville 
political environment, the interaction with radical black students, black separatism and 
shifting international dynamics all posed challenges to NUSAS. Thus the Botha’s Hill 
seminar interrogated NUSAS’s aims, structure and functioning and commited the 
organisation to a ‘radical role’. More importantly, and in some ways prefiguring SASO, 
NUSAS grappled with the almost impossible: marrying African leadership in a predominantly 
white organisation with non-racialism. Ultimately NUSAS committed itself to incremental 
Africanisation of its leadership and membership and the retention of its colour-blind 
understanding of non-racialism, there being too much opposition to ‘non-racialism in an 
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African context’. Facing similar challenges to NUSAS, and driven by the desire, like 
NUSAS’s radical leadership, to play a meaningful role in the struggle for liberation, some 
students and current and former NUSAS officers concluded that extra-legal methods were 
the only means of effecting this. The close association of many ARM members with the by 
then undeniably radical post Botha’s Hill NUSAS was almost fatal to NUSAS, already under 
siege from the state and its right wing allies, the conservative student associations. NUSAS 
survived 1964, the worst year of its forty year existence, structurally intact but severely 
dented and lacking in direction. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
Academic freedom, segregation and the consequences of adaptation for 
survival, 1965-1970 
 
  
Introduction 
 
NUSAS survived the ARM trials and Botha’s Hill by tight management of the two crises as 
well as by the adoption of a progressively more ‘students-as-such’ orientation. The latter 
provided the national union with the requisite space to continue functioning in the ever more 
oppressive environment which was unfolding during the second half of the 1960s. NUSAS 
was faced with new external threats to its existence. Legislation regarding social segregation 
had the potential of mortally wounding NUSAS and other multi-racial political parties, 
organisations and institutions. Through its proxies, the conservative students’ societies and 
later by co-opting the cowed university authorities, the state continued its campaign aimed at 
severing the still radical NUSAS leadership from its mass student base. Shortly before the 
arrival in South Africa of United States senator, Robert Kennedy, the keynote speaker at 
NUSAS’s high profile Day of Affirmation of Academic and Human Freedom, the 1966 
NUSAS president, Ian Robertson, was issued with a banning order. This punitive action 
marked the onset of a whole series of restrictive measures imposed on NUSAS officers 
which were intended to weaken the national union. In the face of this onslaught, NUSAS 
attempted to expand its membership. It exploited the growing ideological cleavages within 
the NP in an effort to establish NUSAS branches on the ASB-controlled campuses. At the 
same time, NUSAS’s prospects of securing greater participation of black South African 
students in its forums appeared more positive than in the past. The student body at the 
UCON voted to join NUSAS after abandoning its bid to affiliate with the Africanist-inclined 
ASUSA. Fort Hare students, goaded out of their fear and apathy of the previous few years 
by the introduction of even harsher measures of control at the college, embarked on mass 
protest action against the university authorities and called on NUSAS and its affiliated 
student bodies for assistance. Students at the affiliated NUSAS campuses engaged in 
protest action against further inroads into academic freedom. This militant protest action 
inspired, like at Fort Hare, by the 1968 student revolts in the USA and Europe, masked the 
growing conservatism of NUSAS. This was marked by a shift in policy and emphasis, from a 
proactive search for a meaningful role for students in the struggle against apartheid, to a 
reactive defence of the abrogation of liberal freedoms, particularly at the universities. This, 
coupled to NUSAS’s inability and/or reluctance to circumvent the almost all-pervading social 
segregatory measures, as well as the almost insurmountable obstacles to ethnic college 
participation in NUSAS, led to the establishment of the SASO - an exclusively black student 
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organisation initially envisioned as a black caucus within NUSAS. Although NUSAS was 
devastated by what amounted to its rejection by black students, and though much of 
NUSAS’s liberal activist core refused to recognise SASO and the need for the existence of 
such a body, nonetheless the relationship between certain NUSAS and SASO leaders was 
initially cordial and friendly. By assisting in its restructuring, some within SASO actively 
ensured that NUSAS would not fall into the hands of conservatives wishing to transform it 
into a non-political vehicle for essentially white student co-operation.  
 
Statutory social segregation, automatic affiliation to NUSAS and conservative campus 
societies  
 
During the first part of 1965, serious rumours of the introduction of an Improper Political 
Interference Bill surfaced, which, though aimed primarily at thwarting the multi-racial PP’s 
participation in the forthcoming separate coloured elections, was believed to be applicable 
also to non-racial bodies like the LP, NUSAS, the Black Sash, and the SAIRR. This 
legislation was only introduced in parliament in 1966, but in January 1965, Proclamation 26 
was issued banning racially mixed audiences at sports functions, places of entertainment 
and even churches. This had an immediate impact on student activities at universities and in 
addition Osler believed it could affect the 1965 NUSAS congress.1 Despite strong protest 
action by Rhodes students2 and attempts by the Rhodes university authorities to have the 
university exempted from the application of Proclamation 26, Africans were banned from 
spectating at university rugby matches,3 rag was limited to the white Grahamstown public4 
and the NUSAS Local Committee’s African choir concert had to be abandoned.5 
 
The whole question of student bodies’ and SRCs’ method of affiliation to NUSAS remained 
an issue. In 1965 NUSAS followed the Wits SRC’s example and replaced automatic 
affiliation with centre affiliation.6 This meant that SRCs would henceforward join NUSAS on 
behalf of their student bodies in the same manner as they would, for example, affiliate to the 
SAIRR. Thus students as individuals would no longer be members of NUSAS. This had the 
effect of removing the anomaly of people resigning from NUSAS, but as members of their 
SRCs still attending NUSAS congress and making policy for the national union.7 Predictably, 
this new method of affiliation did not satisfy university authorities who, compelled by the 
                                                          
1 BC 586 B4.1, Maeder Osler to the Executive, 26.1.1965, p. 3. 
2 Rhodeo vol. 19 no. 8, 6.5.1965; no. 10, 20.5.1965; no. 11, 27.5.1965; E. Webster, ‘Rebels with a cause of their 
own: a personal reflection on my student years at Rhodes University, 1961-1965’, African Sociological Review 
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4 Rhodeo vol. 19 no. 8, 6.5.1965 Varsity vol. 20 no. 9, 12.5.1965. 
5 Nux no. 5, 1.6.1965. 
6 BC 586 B1, E. Webster, ‘Rhodes University: Chairman’s Report to Congress, July 1965’, p. 3; Nux no. 8, 
September 1965.  
7 BC 586 B3 Executive Minutes, 1964, pp. 13-14.  
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state and right wing student organisations, were anxious also to sever NUSAS from the 
SRCs and its student and financial base. In this regard, Osler believed, university authorities 
were conducting a very co-ordinated campaign in favour of individual enrolment. When 
Durban decided to remain in NUSAS, Malherbe without success urged the SRC to switch to 
individual enrolment and even offered the facilities of the university administration to 
expedite this.8 The Natal authorities also investigated the constitution of the UNNE SRC to 
establish whether its automatic affiliation to NUSAS was legal.9 Duminy of UCT was more 
forthright. As mentioned in chapter nine, he made a negative observation about NUSAS at 
the UCT graduation ceremony in December 196410 and in March 1965 explicitly called for 
the introduction of individual enrolment. This coincided with the announcement by Gert van 
Zyl that he would go to court to stop the UCT Council from paying UCT’s affiliation fees to 
NUSAS because he claimed the affiliation was ultra vires.11 Van Zyl’s action, which 
continued in a long drawn out correspondence over the next few years between the 
university and Van Zyl’s lawyers, Lombard and Truter12 (a legal firm with Broederbond 
members in the Groote Kerk Building in Cape Town),13 probably marked the onset of the 
Broederbond’s campaign to financially cripple NUSAS.14 In late 1964, the University of the 
Witwatersrand Students’ Association, a reincarnation of the defunct Wits SACSA, won 
official SRC recognition and began secretly plotting with the assistance of Anton Mostert and 
Aubrey Levine to renew SACSA’s earlier campaign against Wits’s affiliation to NUSAS.15 
 
The University of the Witwatersrand Student Association did not seem to have ties with the 
openly Hertzogite Wits Afrikaanse Studenteklub (ASK) which was on a head-on collision 
course with the Wits SRC regarding the latter’s political activities. After the intervention of 
Professor Abel Coetzee, the SRC was forced to accept that Afrikaans culture was political 
and thus the ASK was entitled to disseminate Hertzogite literature from the anti-Semitic 
Boomerang publishers on campus and host far-right anti-communist film shows too.16 As 
mentioned in chapter nine, a new spate of anti-NUSAS smear pamphlets appeared at Wits 
in 1965, some carrying the American far-right ‘Congressional Record’ of the aims of 
communism. Many suspected these were the handiwork of Johannesburg Nationalists or a 
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14 ibid., p. 147. 
15 BC 586 B3 Executive Minutes 1964, p. 19. 
16 BC 586 B1 Alan Murray, ‘Report to the 41st Congress of the National Union of South African Students, 
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Pretoria Nationalist, ‘Marais’17 (probably Jaap Marais, the Hertzogite MP and later leader of 
the Herstigte Nasionale Party), which could implicate the ASK too. Later smear pamphlets 
bore the insignia of the Joint South African Universities Right Wing Students, a paper 
organisation that was later revealed as a Hertzogite anti-NUSAS front.18 NUSAS did not take 
these anonymous attacks lying down and reported these matters to the police, ultimately 
fruitlessly,19 and took legal advice on suing the printers of the pamphlets. 
 
Offensive against the ASB and exploiting divisions within ASB-affiliated student 
bodies 
 
In the face of continued verbal assaults against it by the ASB, NUSAS adopted a far more 
aggressive approach towards the Afrikaans organisation20 which it regarded as a lunatic 
fringe body and a front of the government.21 Accordingly, NUSAS decided to exploit the 
deepening internal divisions within the ASB and within student bodies at the Afrikaans 
universities brought on by the brewing verligte-verkrampte (enlightened-narrow) struggle 
and, in so doing, attempt to expand its membership onto the Afrikaans campuses. It thus put 
out feelers at the Universities of Pretoria, Potchefstroom and the Orange Free State.   
 
Many Afrikaans-speaking students were disillusioned with the ASB and the antics of the far-
right. At the University of Pretoria, the concerted campaign by the Hertzogite group to rid the 
university of theologian, Professor Ben Marais, and classicist, Professor P.V. Pistorius, was 
met with dismay by some Pretoria students as well as active opposition from staff and 
students loyal to the non-Nationalist academics.22 So too did the five thousand-strong anti-
communist, anti-liberal, anti-NUSAS, anti-Catholic ASB march in Pretoria in 1965 which 
precipitated a counter-demonstration in a side street.23 On the eve of the Pretoria march, 
Osler called on Afrikaans students to return to NUSAS. At the same time he exposed the 
duplicity and dangerous liaisons of the ASB’s international arm. In addition to smearing 
NUSAS overseas, the ASB was claiming to be anti-racist so as to acquire a seat at the ISC, 
but was simultaneously consorting with far-right wing neo-Nazi and fascist organisations in 
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24 no. 5, 14.4.1965. 
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Europe and the USA like the British National Front and the Klu Klux Klan.24 The revelations 
regarding the Klu Kux Klan were dynamite. The American South had many parallels with 
South Africa. This was not lost on NUSAS which in 1964 and 1965, endorsed the campaign 
against desegregation in the South and noted the difficulties experienced by civil rights 
groups there.25 In the face of sometimes violent opposition from white Southerners intent on 
defending the white Southern ‘Christian’, anti-communist way of life, African-Americans 
embraced increasingly militant tactics in demanding the franchise and defying racist Jim 
Crow segregation on public transport, private businesses and in schools and universities. In 
June 1964, three civil rights activists were kidnapped and murdered by the Klu Klux Klan in 
Mississippi.26 The Klan generally operated with impunity in burning black churches and 
lynching and murdering African-Americans, but the fact that two of the June 1964 victims 
were white, raised a huge national outcry. This was one of the factors precipitating the 
passing in 1964 and 1965 of both the Civil Rights Act (lifting Jim Crow segregation) and the 
Voting Rights Act (enfranchising African-Americans of the South), hitherto vetoed by 
Republican and Southern senators. The Klan murders also contributed to the overwhelming 
defeat of Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate (and darling of the South African far-
right) in the 1964 presidential elections. The large Klan show trial, which included the 
indictment of a Mississippi sheriff, some policemen and a Baptist preacher, got underway in 
December 1964.  
 
Support for the American right by the ASB (largely dominated by the Hertzogites) and the 
ASB’s not unexpected opposition to the Civil Rights Movement, was well known. While the 
Pietermaritzburg SRC welcomed the integration of the University of Mississippi with the 
enrolment of its first African-American student, James Meredith, in 1962, the ASB at Pretoria 
University sent a telegram of support to the white racist student body27 which was violently 
opposing this.28 However, within the context of the recent events in the American South, 
public knowledge of the ASB’s association with the Klu Klux Klan was potentially very 
damaging. Evidently getting wind of NUSAS’s impending exposé, Paul de Beer, far-right 
ASB president, made an uncharacteristic overture of friendship to Maeder Osler.29 The 
ASB’s international policy received wide publicity and opprobrium in both the student and 
national press, including at the Afrikaans-medium universities. The ASB remained silent for 
some weeks until Boy Geldenhuys (later an NP MP), issued a weak justification of the 
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organisation’s international policy to the effect that the ASB would rather co-operate with 
fascist organisations than the liberal and communist ones with which NUSAS consorted.30  
 
In August 1965, the student body at Stellenbosch voted by a two-thirds majority to replace 
automatic membership to the ASB with individual enrolment. The stunned ASB-controlled 
Stellenbosch SRC refused either to accept or act upon this student body directive.31 Three 
weeks later, following more than a year of spadework by NUSAS officers at Wits and former 
Pretoria students and with the support of Professor A. Van Selms (who resigned from the 
Theological Faculty of the University of Pretoria in protest against Albert Geyser’s defrocking 
and was himself then defrocked), a NUSAS branch was established at the University of 
Pretoria.32 Half the branch was Afrikaans-speaking33 although presumably a large proportion 
of its twenty five members were Jewish as the SRC christened the organisation ‘JEWSAS’ 
and only apologised for this anti-Semitic slur following complaints from anti-NUSAS Jewish 
students at the university.34 Far more Pretoria students wanted to join NUSAS, including 
more Afrikaans-speakers, but were prevented from doing so by their parents. The political 
orientation of the branch is unclear, but the groundwork was laid by a member of the PP 
Youth35 and another member was earlier assaulted by his fellow residence mates for his 
support of the PP.36 The formation of the NUSAS branch led to a dispute between the ASB-
dominated SRC and the official campus newspaper, Die Perdeby, regarding freedom and 
control of the student press. The SRC claimed that Die Perdeby had no right to discuss, 
even in the unfavourable manner in which it had done so, the formation of the NUSAS 
branch as it lent the branch too much publicity.37 Even though the ASB had earlier 
challenged NUSAS to organise on the ASB-affiliated campuses, claiming that these were far 
more tolerant of dissenting views than their NUSAS-controlled counterparts, the Pretoria 
SRC, after six months of prevarication, finally refused the branch official recognition because 
the national union would not denounce communism, elected Albert Luthuli its honorary 
president, and smeared South Africa overseas.38 
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The post-ARM congress: whither NUSAS 
 
The 1965 congress was regarded as a very important event in that support for NUSAS in the 
aftermath of the ARM trials would be gauged and the organisation would decide on its future 
direction. Many congress delegates were very concerned about NUSAS’s negative public 
image39 although commentators from both inside and outside the organisation believed that 
NUSAS had become more ‘responsible’ since its change of leadership after Botha’s Hill. 
Policy continued in many respects along the same path as previous years, but a change in 
emphasis in NUSAS activities is discernible from 1965 onwards. With a mounting police 
state and pressure from its conservative student base as well as a feeling of foreboding that 
things would only get worse before they got better, NUSAS under the guidance of Osler 
‘attempted to formulate a policy which would commit the organisation to its principles but 
enable it to carry on its work in the present South African environment’.40 In the opinion of 
Contact, a LP-inclined journal, it was most unlikely then that NUSAS would make an alliance 
with anti-apartheid groups as such an alliance would require of its membership more than 
‘lip-service’. So Contact concluded: if NUSAS did not move right at its 1965 congress, it 
certainly did not move left.41 
 
Thus NUSAS did not abandon its attempt to acquire observer status at the IUS, but the 
initiative made no further progress.42 It continued to denounce imperialism, colonialism and 
neo-colonialism,43 lent its support to the campaign for multilateral nuclear disarmament44 
and despite the hostile anti-communist environment and pressure from right wing students, 
refused to denounce communism.45 Controversially, given the large number of militantly 
patriotic Rhodesians at South African universities, the assembly expressed by a large 
majority its opinion that the impending Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by 
Rhodesia posed a threat to peace.46 Rhodes and JCE dissociated from the motion47 as did, 
after UDI, the UCT SRC. NUSAS however, reiterated its opposition to this illegal action of 
the Rhodesian government.48 NUSAS’s policy on university autonomy became more radical 
than that of 1964, when it was accepted that a democratic state could interfere with any 
university’s autonomy whether state-aided or private, if the university in question employed 
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non-academic admission criteria.49 The assembly split over the impending cultural boycott of 
South Africa launched by the British AAM in association with British actors and playwrights. 
A motion was eventually passed urging overseas artists to allow their plays to be performed 
in South Africa, and ‘if at all possible’, in front of non-segregated audiences.50  
 
Reflecting a change in the emphasis of NUSAS policy, the 1965 assembly elevated 
NUSAS’s trade union activities (demoted at Botha’s Hill) to one of the three core functions of 
NUSAS namely, leadership training and political education. To enhance the political 
education of students, the Research Department was reinstated and provision made for the 
appointment of a full-time paid research officer who would undertake and publish research 
on educational matters.51 Further restructuring was accepted when it was agreed that 
regional directors would be vested with augmented powers and their numbers increased.52 
This had the effect of decentralising the executive, diluting the power of what many people 
believed was an over-powerful top leadership, bringing on board the smaller and more 
conservative centres and having in place a second tier of leadership should the top 
leadership be banned or imprisoned. Presumably this restructuring was intended to make 
NUSAS more democratic and its leadership more accountable to its conservative student 
base thereby putting a brake on the leadership’s radicalisation. 
 
The defence and pursuit of academic freedom also received renewed prominence. In 
addition to its campus-based Academic Freedom Weeks initiated in the 1950s to raise 
awareness of impending university apartheid, NUSAS inaugurated an annual campus and 
National Day of Affirmation and Human Freedom in 1963.53 On a given day, the NUSAS 
executive, the presidents of the SRCs of all its affiliated campuses, the chairpeople of the 
NUSAS branches and representatives of the ethnic colleges, would process into a particular 
university great hall, clad in academic gowns and listen to a keynote address delivered by a 
champion of academic and/or human freedom.54 Speakers at local and national days of 
affirmation during the 1960s included: Albert Geyser;55 Professor A. van Selms;56 Catholic 
Archbishop Rupert Hurley, a human rights champion;57John Hamilton Russell, who had 
resigned from the UP in protest against his party’s support for the General Law Amendment 
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Act;58 Beyers Naudé of the Christian Institute;59 Helen Suzman of the PP;60 and Alan Paton 
of the LP. This address would be followed by those assembled rededicating themselves to 
working towards the re-attainment of both academic freedom lost in 1959, and the 
attainment of human freedom in a democratic South Africa without which, NUSAS believed, 
true academic freedom was not possible.61 A torch of academic freedom would then be 
doused, not to be relit until the universities were free again – a ‘profound’62 and almost 
religious, ritualistic occasion.  
 
Day of Affirmation: Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy  
 
In a bid to elevate the status of both the national and local days of affirmation, NUSAS and 
the campus Academic Freedom Committees, the latter composed of both students and staff, 
looked beyond South Africa’s borders for keynote speakers. Durban invited Willie Brandt, the 
mayor of West Berlin and a leading figure in the German Social Democratic Party and 
outspoken critic of communism and totalitarianism to deliver its Day of Affirmation address,63 
while Pietermaritzburg invited theologian, Martin Niemoller, president of the World Council of 
Churches and Nazi concentration camp survivor to deliver the E.G. Malherbe lecture.64 The 
Civil Rights Movement was ‘huge’ amongst liberal South African students65 and thus it was 
also to the icons of this struggle that Day of Affirmation organisers turned. In June 1965, the 
UCT Local NUSAS Committee embarked on a civil rights campaign.66 Inspired by the 
passive resistance campaigns aimed at desegregating facilities like lunch bars in the USA, 
small racially mixed groups of South African students similarly patronised whites-only 
beaches and restaurants.67 The UCT Academic Freedom Committee proposed that Martin 
Luther King Jr, an African-American theologian, founder of the civil rights organisation, the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, winner of the 1964 Nobel Peace Prize and at 
that point leading a campaign for the desegregation of Birmingham, Alabama,68 deliver the 
UCT T.B. Davie Memorial speech. The UCT principal and vice-principal effectively vetoed 
this decision by threatening to boycott the occasion were King to be present.69 Despite this 
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drawback, the NUSAS assembly, not without dissent,70 voted to invite King to open the 1966 
NUSAS congress and Senator Robert Kennedy to deliver the 1966 National Day of 
Affirmation address.71 Kennedy, like King, was an inspired choice for a lecture on academic 
and human freedom to university students. He represented the ‘younger generation of 
political leaders and the new ideas of youth’.72 As attorney-general in the presidential 
administration of his assassinated brother, John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy had become a 
civil rights champion, had sent in the troops to ensure the enrolment of James Meredith at 
the University of Mississippi in 1962, and was the driving force behind the pursuit and 
prosecution of the Klu Klux Klan members believed to be behind the June 1964 Mississippi 
murders.  
 
These invitations, particularly to King, provoked a political furore. The UP, some members of 
the PP, as well as the anti-government press, believed that NUSAS’s actions were 
irresponsible and provocative. Members of the government, particularly the Hertzogites, 
following their racist right wing American counterparts, denounced the black Nobel Peace 
Prize winner as a communist and a member of a large number of allegedly communist front 
organisations. Moreover, the ASB called on the government to take action against NUSAS.73 
Both King and Kennedy accepted their invitations, leaving the divided cabinet the task of 
deciding whether to issue them visas or not. Not surprisingly, King’s visa application was 
turned down, presumably because the state feared the challenge posed to white domination 
flowing from the visit of the world renowned black civil rights activist, a man who apparently 
inspired even Albert Luthuli. However, Robert Kennedy, a possible future presidential 
candidate and in reality a moderate by South African anti-apartheid standards, posed a 
serious dilemma to the state. By refusing him entry, the government risked straining its 
relationship with its powerful Western ally and would prove South Africa’s critics correct in 
their assertion that the Republic was a police state which suppressed all liberal and 
democratic rights.74 After lengthy deliberations, the government finally permitted Kennedy’s 
visit, provided it did not coincide and interfere with the Republic’s fifth birthday celebrations 
in May 1966 and that there was no accompanying press team.75  
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Banning of Ian Robertson 
 
On 11 May 1966, just a few weeks before Kennedy’s expected arrival in South Africa, the 
government banned the president of NUSAS, Ian Robertson, under three counts of the 
Suppression of Communism Act.76 This, Daniel argues, was a last ditch desperate attempt 
to stop Kennedy coming to South Africa. As a presidential hopeful, Kennedy could not afford, 
in the anti-communist milieu of the contemporary USA, to be tainted with communism by 
consorting with allegedly ‘communist’ organisations like NUSAS. However, this ‘ploy’ 
backfired spectacularly.77 The government could not have anticipated the outraged reaction 
of students and the general public in both South Africa and abroad to its actions. In a rare 
display of unity the UP, PP and LP all condemned the banning, De Villiers Graaff worrying 
that it could have international repercussions.78 With the exception of Duminy of UCT, who 
stated that ‘sensible’ and ‘responsible’ government officials would not take such harsh 
measures unless they believed they were justified, earning him even greater opprobrium 
than before from UCT students,79 all the principals of NUSAS-affiliated universities spoke out 
against the order.80 At an emergency meeting of the Standing Committee of SRC 
Presidents, it was decided that Robertson would not be replaced before the end of his term 
of office and plans were laid for a national and international campaign highlighting the plight 
of both Robertson and NUSAS, aimed at securing the lifting of the banning order. Large 
gatherings in the form of meetings, marches, demonstrations and torchlight vigils,81 
sometimes attracting violent right-wing counter reactions as at Pietermaritzburg,82 took place 
at all NUSAS campuses. Even though black critics wryly noted that it took the banning of a 
white student leader to prompt mass student protest,83 black students did protest too, often 
at great personal risk to themselves. The student body at the TCEA was banned from any 
further association with NUSAS and individual students were threatened with expulsion 
following their participation in a Robertson demonstration at Wits.84  
 
The nature of protest changed too, becoming Americanised and showing the influence of 
both the American Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War Movements. Demonstrations, often ‘sit-
ins’, were accompanied by the strumming of guitars and the singing of folk and civil rights 
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songs like ‘We shall overcome’.85 Folk-singing in itself was regarded as subversive and 
communist in South Africa, the Pretoria SRC banning the folk singing club because it 
suspected it was NUSAS in disguise. South Africa’s first ‘teach-ins’ – open-ended, 
participatory, action-orientated discussion groups – were staged at UCT and Durban, Helen 
Suzman being invited to participate in the first event.86 These were presumably inspired by 
the anti-Vietnam War teach-ins originally initiated by the SDS at the University of Michigan 
but made famous at the University of California, Berkeley, in September 1965 during the 
‘Free speech protests’.  
 
American student bodies were some of the forty seven overseas universities, student unions 
and student organisations which expressed their solidarity with NUSAS and Robertson 
and/or sent cables, telegrams and letters to Verwoerd and Vorster deriding the government’s 
action.87 Perhaps shocked at the intensity of the national and international reaction, 
unrivalled since the university apartheid campaign, Vorster agreed to meet a deputation of 
NUSAS leaders who pleaded with him to either charge or release Robertson. This was to no 
avail. However, Vorster conceded that people who were not communists (Robertson was 
anti-communist) could be banned under the Suppression of Communism Act and that 
Robertson was banned in his personal capacity and not because of his association with 
NUSAS.88 In answer to questions in parliament from Suzman, Vorster justified his actions by 
alleging that he had had to ‘prevent a second Leftwich affair’.89 Following further 
parliamentary probing, it transpired that Vorster had probably not even read the intelligence 
briefings, flawed as they were, on which he had made his decision. Robertson’s supposedly 
subversive visit to Bechuanaland turned out on closer inspection to be a meeting in Mafeking 
with Leo Marquard and British government officials to discuss CADET. He had never visited 
Swaziland as he was alleged to have done by Vorster, while his trip to Lesotho was for the 
no more subversive purpose than attending the Rembrandt Group-financed Moral 
Rearmament Conference.90 That Robertson was regarded as subversive, was in the words 
of the UCT SRC ‘absurd’. He was probably the least radical NUSAS president since the 
early 1950s91 and was, moreover, the first president to come from NUSAS’s most 
conservative affiliate, Durban. In addition, he was a local chairperson of the PP Youth92 and 
continued to hold his PP, vehemently anti-communist and anti-sanctions views even after 
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leaving South Africa to pursue further studies at Oxford and Harvard, the latter facilitated by 
Robert Kennedy.93 Quite clearly then, as NUSAS and the sympathetic anti-NP press 
believed, Robertson’s banning was a spiteful, vindictive response by the government to 
NUSAS’s invitation to Robert Kennedy and an attempt to prevent the visit, while Vorster’s 
parliamentary replies were quite simply a continuation of his McCarthyist smear campaign 
against the ‘communist’ NUSAS. 
 
Vorster’s and the government’s actions had the opposite effect to what they had intended.  
Robertson’s banning, coupled to Kennedy’s forthcoming tour of South Africa, raised 
NUSAS’s popularity and public profile both on and off campus and effectively dispelled its 
negative public image derived from the Botha’s Hill and the ARM revelations. The ranks of 
the NUSAS Local Committees were swelled by new recruits,94 conscientised by the 
sustained Robertson protests which attracted up to three thousand students at a time. This 
was the ‘activised’ university environment into which Kennedy arrived on 13 June 1966, not 
in any way deterred by Robertson’s banning. 
 
Ten thousand students, university staff and members of the public packed Jameson Hall and 
ten lecture theatres at UCT to hear Kennedy speak at NUSAS’s National Day of Affirmation 
on 13 June 1966.95 Kennedy praised NUSAS for its dedication to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and as a rebuke against the apartheid government’s oppressive policies 
and banning of Robertson, declared that ‘the way of opposition to communism is not to 
imitate its dictatorship but to enlarge the development of individual human freedoms’. He 
stressed that the road to equality and freedom was not easy and evidently influenced by the 
events at American universities like Berkeley, stated that in a revolutionary world, it was the 
youth who would take the lead.96 In what became one of his most famous statements, he 
warned of the ‘danger of futility’; ‘the belief that there is nothing one man or one woman can 
do against the enormous array of the world’s ills… Many of the world’s great movements of 
thought and action have flowed from the work of a single man’.97  
 
In a whistle stop tour around the country, he addressed meetings at Wits and at Durban and, 
to the anger of the SRC, which had initially successfully blocked his coming, at Stellenbosch 
too.98 To a large audience hosted by Willem van Drimmelen, the head student of Simonsig 
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residence and one time chairperson of the Stellenbosch NUSAS branch, Kennedy urged 
Afrikaners, like their white American counterparts, to share with their fellow black citizens 
that same freedom for which they had nobly fought colonial tyranny.99 Having been briefed in 
the United States by Shingler and  Coombe about the South African political situation,100 
Kennedy and his wife visited a number of African townships. In addition they met NUSAS’s 
banned president and honorary president,  Robertson and Luthuli respectively, Kennedy 
describing the latter as the most impressive man he had ever met.101 This was perhaps the 
most significant aspect of the visit. As a foreigner, Kennedy could with impunity give a voice 
to the banned and silenced Luthuli and so relayed his message to the people of Soweto, 
though what was said could not be reported in South Africa. The ANC president, Kennedy 
stated, was ‘saddened’ and ‘distressed’ that ‘the black man does not have the same 
opportunities as the white man’ and believed that ‘the only change for the better will be 
brought about by God’ and by peaceful means.102 
 
Failure to align NUSAS to the UP: the 1966 congress 
 
The Kennedy visit flowed inexorably into the 1966 NUSAS congress. Despite the bannings 
of Robertson and then his deputy vice-president, Mewa Ramgobin, the assault and arrest of 
Fort Hare students at a ball, the continuation of the smear campaign against NUSAS, and 
the axe hanging over all multi-racial organisations, the congress was described as ‘business 
as usual’.103 It was dubbed on the whole a ‘damp squib’104 enlivened only by the provocative 
interventions of Winston Hertzenberg. Hertzenberg, a right wing UP Youth leader and a 
leading member of SACSA before Marais Steyn’s intervention, founded a ‘Conservative 
Club’ at Wits in 1965. This was effectively a UP front in that it was committed to ‘moderate 
reform in order to maintain the traditional social conditions, government system and civilised 
standards of South Africa’.105 Hertzenberg and his Conservative Club successfully 
campaigned for positions on the SRC and used this body as well as the student press as a 
platform for advancing opposition to the ‘unpatriotic’ NUSAS and breaking the ‘liberalist 
clique’ at Wits.106 They failed, however, to win official SRC recognition for their proposed 
‘Federal Students Organisation’ because this anti-NUSAS body had pretensions of being a 
national and not merely a Wits-based organisation, and more importantly, though it upheld 
                                                          
99 H.J. Rudolph, ‘A rhetorical analysis of Robert F. Kennedy’s university addresses in South Africa, June 1966’, 
DPhil thesis, Ohio State University, 1973, pp. 287-289.  
100 BC 596 B4.1, Ian Robertson to the Executive, 24.1.1966, p. 2. 
101 Trend, 14.6.1966. 
102 H.J. Rudolph, op. cit., pp. 200, 240-241.  
103 Witwatersrand Student vol. 18 no. 16, 29.7.1966. 
104 ibid. 
105 ibid. vol. 17 no. 18, 13.8.1965. 
106 BC 586 B3 Executive Minutes 1965, p. 18; Witwatersrand Student vol. 17 no. 20, 27.8.1965; Varsity vol. 24 
no. 20, 1.9.1965; David Said to Witwatersrand Student vol. 17 no. 21, 3.9.1965; Richard Tait to Witwatersrand 
Student vol. 17 no. 24, 24.9.1965; Winston Hertzenberg to Witwatersrand Student vol. 17 no. 24, 24.9.1965.  
408 
 
the open membership policy of the SRC, once admitted, members would be segregated into 
racially separate sections.107  
 
At its 1966 congress, Hertzenberg proposed that NUSAS dissociate itself from those clauses 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which conferred equal rights on all individuals 
and upheld a universal franchise. In this, and his other endeavours to turn NUSAS into a 
kind of UP, he failed spectacularly, no delegate being prepared to support him on the 
Universal Declaration.108 In a gesture of ‘rank chauvinism’, some believed, and certainly 
most provocatively considering that most NUSAS-affiliated SRCs had remained aloof from 
the recently concluded Republican festivities because of their racist nature109 and black 
universities had boycotted them,110 Hertzenberg suggested that NUSAS fly the South African 
flag at future congresses and Days of Affirmation. This proposal was greeted with a barrage 
of protest and almost unanimously defeated. It was argued that the flag represented the 
South African government and a segregated South Africa, that it was viewed with hostility by 
the majority of South Africans and thus it could only hinder race relations were it flown at a 
racially integrated function like NUSAS congress.111 These opinions on the flag were entirely 
consistent with current government thinking, a NP politician explaining that the 1966 
electoral slogan ‘one flag one country’ referred to white South Africa only.112 Not surprisingly, 
this debate unleashed a storm of protest in the press as well as accusations that NUSAS 
was anti-South African and unpatriotic, probably Hertzenberg’s intention. Consequently, the 
new NUSAS president, Margaret Marshall, was obliged to implement damage control. She 
explained, that with the exception of many black students, some of whom had been 
forbidden even to touch it, most students did not object to the flag as such or hold it in 
contempt, but that NUSAS had never flown a flag before and that few students saw the 
necessity of doing so.113 This might have been a good public relations exercise as far as the 
white public was concerned, but the flag issue alienated black students. For Steve Biko, the 
founder of SASO and instrumental in the black exodus from NUSAS in the early 1970s, the 
flag debate revealed ‘that even liberal whites ultimately identified with the regime’.114   
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Another debate in which Fort Hare and radicals from Wits and UNNE did not participate and 
from which six abstained from voting, was a resolution condemning the academic boycott of 
South African universities proposed by the British AAM.115 The origins of this academic 
boycott were known to the NUSAS executive to be mired in controversy. It emerged from a 
petition circulated by the AAM requesting endorsement of protest action against the South 
African government’s treatment of Professors Simon and Roux. Many British academics 
signed this petition and then discovered that they had inadvertently endorsed an academic 
boycott of South African universities too.116 The proposed boycott was roundly condemned 
by the ‘open’ universities and the liberal press in South Africa as counter-productive as it 
would serve only to entrench apartheid rather than hinder it and would only affect the 
apartheid-opposing universities.117 South African students studying abroad who supported 
the boycott as ‘morally right’ and ‘politically sound’, believed that those who deplored it were 
concerned about white students only.118 Ultimately the NUSAS executive left it in the hands 
of its overseas representatives in London to subtly kill the initiative.119  
 
Another deeply divisive motion of the 1966 NUSAS congress which had the support of 
perhaps slightly more than half the assembly but was not in the end voted on, opposed the 
intervention of the United States in South Vietnam against the will of the Vietnamese people 
and called for democratic elections to be held there.120  The influence of American student 
preoccupations is clearly visible in NUSAS’s Vietnam motion – there was an anti-Vietnam 
war picket at the Kennedy address – but perhaps the election of Marshall as the second only 
female president of NUSAS,121 suggests a faint reverberation of the emerging women’s 
movement in the United States. Marshall’s three part programme of action moved NUSAS to 
the right. It focussed primarily on building up NUSAS’s welfare functions and then increasing 
its membership, promoting contact between black and white and English- and Afrikaans-
speaking whites and, in an extraordinary departure from the early 1960s, initiating dialogue 
with the ASB.122 Whether Marshall would be able to carry out her programme effectively was 
debatable.  
 
NUSAS’s continued existence did not look promising either in the light of current political 
developments or at a structural level. Most of the 1965/6 executive resigned during their 
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term of office, a trend which would continue in the future.123 There were a number of reasons 
for this, one being that executive members were often also members of their SRCs – 
structures which had evolved into vast administrative machines consuming up to fourteen 
hours per day of their incumbents’ time124 – thus making it almost impossible to do justice to 
other commitments like NUSAS. Whatever the reasons for the resignations, these indicated 
a lack of commitment to NUSAS by student leaders and, at an administrative level, seriously 
hampered the functioning and delivery of their departments – a problem which was 
exacerbated by Robertson’s banning. In what was also to become a trend,125 only five 
members of the UCT SRC were willing and/or able to attend the 1966 NUSAS congress. At 
most universities in the past, there was intense competition for delegate status to this 
formerly prestigious event, which was in 1966, as mentioned earlier, dismissed as a ‘damp 
squib’. Posing an even greater challenge to NUSAS’s effective future functioning was the 
sudden announcement by Roslyn Traub of her impending (early) retirement, brought on 
partly by the stresses accruing from the ARM trials and leadership bannings. As General 
Secretary for thirty seven years, Traub had effectively run NUSAS, providing it with the 
stability and institutional memory that it lacked with its rapid turnover of leadership, and 
moulding it into what was believed to be one of the most efficient student unions in the 
world.126  
 
Adding to NUSAS’s woes was its looming financial difficulties. In the past, NUSAS’s Travel 
Department had provided the national union with a lucrative source of income and capital 
accumulation, and even with the cessation of overseas tours during the Second World War, 
allowed the organisation to survive the war financially intact. By 1967, its tour income had 
declined.127 Moreover, from the late 1950s onwards, NUSAS expanded the scope of its 
activities to include, for example, the administration of overseas scholarships.128 It became 
increasingly dependent on the NSA (secretly funded by the CIA), which financed the 
phenomenally expensive leadership training seminars129 and, from 1963, paid the salary of 
the vice-president too.130 In 1964, and again in 1967, NSA experienced financial crises 
which in turn impacted negatively on NUSAS. For example, NSA failed to transfer the funds 
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for the vice-president’s salary in 1967.131 Moreover, the UCT authorities, still embroiled in the 
Van Zyl battle, refused to pay over to NUSAS the UCT affiliation fee as a sanction for the 
SRC not adopting individual enrolment.132 The result of this financial crisis was that in 1967 
NUSAS was forced to cut its costs. The duration of the annual congress was shortened133 
and the number of executive posts was reduced by merging departments.134   
 
Politically, the southern Africa of 1966 could not present any liberal with any degree of 
optimism of the likelihood of democratic change. In the 1966 general election, the NP won 
the largest electoral majority of any political party since Union,135 while the UP continued to 
haemorrhage its right wing to the NP and wither away. The PP again returned Suzman alone 
to parliament and remained the party of choice only for the tiny minority of wealthy urbanised 
English-speakers. The LP did not even contest the election, its party and personnel crippled 
by bannings and prohibitions.136 From the extra-parliamentary left there was silence. Its 
adherents were banned or languished in prison and the great trials which gave voice to its 
aspirations came to an end. The exiled movements, even if they did make any progress 
outside South Africa, left hardly a ripple within it. Increasingly the voice of Suzman, the 
champion of the rightless or those whose human rights had been trampled on, filled the void, 
in NUSAS affairs too. Across the Limpopo, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by 
Rhodesia was an inspiration to white South Africans and a justification for the racial 
domination of the ‘White African’ minority.137 Staff and students at the University College of 
Rhodesia were detained by the Rhodesian Front government and the college’s future as a 
multi-racial institution, like its liberal counterparts in South Africa, looked bleak. NUSAS, as a 
non-racial forum, which many believed had become the organisation’s most useful and 
important function,138 was also in jeopardy.  
 
Social segregation, segregatory legislation and the Conservative Students’ 
Association 
 
With the opening of the new post-election parliament in August 1966, the government finally 
introduced the dreaded Prohibition of Political Interference Bill which threatened the very 
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existence of NUSAS and other organisations as multi-racial or non-racial entities. Even more 
drastically, having direct applicability to NUSAS and the liberal universities, two more bills, 
the Extension of University Education and Universities Amendment Bills, were tabled which 
would implement apartheid within the universities. These were all held over to the next 
parliamentary session following the assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd.  
 
These bills had their origins in the continuing conflict during the 1960s over social 
segregation and mixed dances at the open universities, particularly at UCT. Successive 
SRCs, as well as a significant section of the UCT student body, remained at loggerheads 
with the UCT principal and University Council regarding the latter’s 1958 ‘wish’ that social 
functions, specifically dances, be segregated to accord with prevailing ‘social mores’ 
(discussed in chapter five). Arguing that the social mores of Cape Town were towards 
integration and not opposed to mixed social functions – the Cape Town City Council refusing 
to implement apartheid in halls/areas under its jurisdiction – successive SRCs continued to 
uphold the right of all to attend all social functions.139 Over the years NUSAS and student 
mass meetings upheld these decisions. An agreement was almost reached between the 
SRC and the university authorities in early 1965 when the University Council applied to the 
government for a blanket exemption under Proclamation 26 for the holding of mixed 
functions, but this was not granted.140 Finally, in August 1965, one thousand students of a 
one thousand two hundred-strong UCT mass meeting which included the heads of the 
sports union and most sports codes (excluding rugby), rag, most student societies and the 
residences, endorsed the SRC’s earlier decision that no dances would be held at UCT at all 
until they were open to all.141  
 
Not everyone agreed with these decisions,142 although the voting at meetings does not 
reflect this, conservatives being notoriously apathetic. UP supporters at both UCT and Wits – 
the latter’s SRC having banned the 1964 rag ball and the Wits Medical Students Council 
having refused to host any segregated functions since 1960143 – did not feel that their social 
lives should suffer because of the ‘slavish adherence to inflexible principles’144 or for the 
sake of a few and dwindling number of black students who in all probability were not even 
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interested in attending a university dance. Others, using more sophisticated reasoning, 
argued that the SRCs were depriving them of their right to freedom of association and the 
right to hold segregated social functions. The PP too upheld the right of those who so wished 
to segregate themselves.145 The dance issue provided an ideal opportunity to the newly 
formed UP-orientated Independent Students’ Union (ISU)146 to advance its cause at UCT 
and, far more dangerously, the UCT Conservative Students’ Association and ultimately the 
government.147  
 
The origins of the government’s intervention regarding social segregation at the liberal 
universities can be traced to the National Seminar of the Federation of Conservative 
Students (FCS) held in July 1965. This was a Volkskongres and anti-NUSAS event 
addressed by Jaap Marais, Andries Treurnicht (later the leader of the 1982 right wing 
breakaway Conservative Party), and Dr John Allen148 of the apartheid-supporting Church of 
England in South Africa and vice-chairperson of the National Council to Combat 
Communism.149 Here the Conservative Students’ Associations of Pretoria and Stellenbosch 
disaffiliated from the national body because they were unable to secure for themselves 
official SRC recognition, ostensibly because some FCS affiliates, notably the UCT CSA, had 
racially open membership150 – a requirement for the CSA’s registration at UCT. In August 
1965, Van Zyl announced that because of the problems faced by the Pretoria and 
Stellenbosch conservative associations, the UCT CSA had elected to become a whites-only 
body. In addition, in direct contravention of SRC policy, he stated that the CSA would hold a 
whites-only dance in Jameson Hall.151 He claimed that both the SRC’s constitution and its 
policy on societies and social functions were ultra vires as they ran counter to government 
policy and would accordingly be defied.152 Moreover, he argued that black students at UCT 
were not really students but were only there on sufferance in a temporary capacity to 
complete their academic courses.153 The SRC issued an ultimatum to the CSA: reverse the 
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racist decision or face dissolution.154 A week later the CSA ceased to exist and Van Zyl 
appealed to the principal to over-rule the SRC’s decision.155 At this point, the SABC, as was 
its want, entered the fray. It claimed that the CSA was fighting for its right to exist against a 
tyrannical NUSAS-controlled SRC. For the sake of a handful of black students, this SRC, it 
argued, was depriving freedom of association to those with whom it differed, even to the 
extent of banning student dances. Moreover, in contravention of government policy it was 
enforcing racial integration on those who did not wish to be integrated.156 Verwoerd followed 
this up at the Transvaal NP congress by issuing a veiled warning to those liberal students 
propounding multi-racialism that they might find themselves forced to accept government 
policy.157 
 
In February 1966, at the beginning of the new academic year, the University Council publicly 
made known its decision to uphold the SRC’s rulings regarding the holding of dances and 
the non-recognition of the CSA.158 Nonetheless, the CSA, operating under a temporary 
reprieve until then,159 refused initially to vacate its whites-only table. It defiantly attempted to 
recruit students to both the CSA and the Afrikaanse Studentekring, newly designated whites-
only too. It also used this platform to advertise its whites-only dance as well as sell the 
Hertzog group’s sanctions-busting Rhodesian petrol coupons.160 However, the University 
Council’s decision effectively marked the demise of the CSA at UCT. Two of its executive 
members resigned during 1965,161 one joining the NUSAS Local Committee as Director of 
Research.162 Van Zyl retired from UCT for a time to focus on his election campaign as a NP 
candidate for Wynberg which he fought on an anti-NUSAS and anti-liberal UCT ticket.163 
Following his electoral defeat, he returned briefly to UCT to muster his troops (five in all) for 
a counter-demonstration in favour of Ian Robertson’s banning.164 However, despite Van Zyl’s 
limited student appeal, his legacy and that of the CSA’s lived on and were almost fatal to the 
open universities and NUSAS.  
 
Shortly after the demise of the CSA, Senator Jan de Klerk, the Minister of Education, 
attacked the ‘unbridled liberalism’ of the UCT SRC and the ‘untenable position’ existing at 
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UCT and threatened to introduce legislation to prevent social mixing on white campuses.165 
In an attempt to appease the government, although Duminy denied that this had anything to 
do with the minister’s announcement, the UCT Council hurriedly appointed a commission of 
inquiry to investigate the SRC constitution.166 At the same time the university administration 
attempted to sever the SRC from NUSAS by refusing to pay over to NUSAS the UCT 
affiliation fees until the SRC agreed to abandon centre enrolment.167   
 
While the SRC was engrossed in the Council’s year-long commission of inquiry which was 
aimed at drastically curbing student power, De Klerk made good on his threat to end the 
‘untenable position’ pertaining at the liberal universities and, as mentioned earlier, tabled his 
two apartheid measures, the Extension of University Education Amendment and the 
University Amendment Bills in the House of Assembly in August 1966. These would have 
the effect of barring black students from any campus organisation which was not specifically 
connected to a student’s academic studies, including religious associations and NUSAS, and 
enabled the state to cut-off its subsidy to any university which either prevented or 
discriminated against those who wished to be segregated.168 In addition to putting an end to 
racial mixing, these two bills could be seen within the context of the new National Education 
Plan. This Plan was introduced in 1967, and, like the Bantu Education Act applicable to 
African education, was intended to seize control over all aspects of white education and 
mould it into Christian National conformity. John Daniel, NUSAS’s vice-president, denounced 
the De Klerk Bills as the ‘most drastic pieces of legislation dealing with student affairs to be 
introduced by the government’, as they destroyed the last vestiges of academic freedom and 
spelt the end of organised freedom of association at universities, including the continuing 
existence of NUSAS. He paid tribute to the spirit of democracy at the liberal universities 
which refused to bow to government policy, thereby requiring ‘all the might of a totalitarian 
government to bend these students…to its will’.169 
 
SRCs and student bodies affiliated to NUSAS immediately rallied. But, at UCT, to the 
probable satisfaction of the government, which through its planting of spies perhaps had 
something to do with this, there was no university-wide unity, all was conflict, division and 
confusion. The UP-orientated students were demanding their dances while the SRC and 
Varsity were attacking Duminy. Ironically, given the foregoing, the president of the deeply 
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divided, back-biting SRC, bowing to pressure from the university authorities, fired the editor 
of Varsity for his refusal to adequately apologise to Duminy for Varsity’s sustained and 
scathing attacks on his hypocritical attitude to academic freedom and his response to 
Robertson’s banning. 
 
Clipping the wings of student power at UCT and Durban 
 
In January 1967 the new UCT SRC constitution was unveiled. It allowed the University 
Council to terminate the office of the SRC and in a probable attempt to depoliticise and 
deliberalise future SRCs, stipulated that half its representatives would in future come from 
faculties rather than the general student body as in the past. However, ‘Clause 17’ was the 
real bone of contention in that it allowed for clubs and societies to limit their membership to 
one race group only. This constitution met the satisfaction of the government, which 
consequently dropped the De Klerk Bills.170 Student commentators believed that the 
government was reluctant to legislate, preferring the university authorities to do its dirty work 
for it. Segregatory legislation, it was argued, would create a negative impression of the new 
‘Outward Policy’171 of Verwoerd’s successor, John Vorster. This new policy courted the 
friendship of black African states, freed black African diplomats from the strictures of petty 
apartheid and opened the way for the selection of a multi-racial South African Olympic team. 
 
Even though they had been preparing for this for nearly a year, the still deeply divided SRC 
had clearly no plan on how to proceed when the new constitution came into effect. During a 
series of meetings with the conservative172 University Council, the SRC managed to win a 
number of concessions but on Clause 17 the Council would not budge.173 Thus the SRC 
decided to reject the new constitution, explain why and then continue to operate under it. 
This seemed like capitulation to NUSAS. Because this had such far-reaching implications for 
the future of all student government and ultimately of NUSAS, the NUSAS executive, the 
Overseas Committee and the Standing Committee secretly advised the UCT SRC to take a 
radical ‘last stand’. This entailed refusing to work under the new constitution and then 
securing an endorsement from the student body for their defiance of the University 
Council.174 The SRC was however reluctant to follow this confrontational and unpredictable 
course and instead secured a student body mandate to draw up its own constitution and 
continue negotiations with the Council.175 This resulted in the resignation of its radical 
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members, Mary Simons (daughter of Jack Simons), Gerry Derby-Lewis (brother of convicted 
Hani murderer, Clive Derby-Lewis) and Raymond Suttner, the latter who objected to the 
SRC president’s tendency to negotiate with an ‘open agenda’ rather than on the basis of 
‘non-negotiable principles’.176 When these negotiations deadlocked, the SRC made a 
‘unilateral declaration of independence’, becoming an unofficial body operating under its old 
non-racist constitution outside the ambit of the University Council.177 Far from everyone on 
either the SRC or within the student body accepted what many, including the NP press, 
designated the ‘illegal’ actions of the SRC.178 Arguing that the new constitution was in force, 
the CSA endeavoured to reconstitute itself179 while societies attempted to host segregated 
dances.180 Matters came to a head following the 1967 elections. On assuming power 
unofficially on the basis of the old constitution, the SRC indignantly refused Duminy’s 
directive that it serve as an interim student council at his discretion.181 Shortly before this, 
Duminy had banned Varsity because of its NUSAS-endorsed investigation into the academic 
incompetence of the Sociology Department. With student affairs rapidly descending into 
chaos, Duminy took long leave and retired from office at the end of 1967.  
 
Dr E.G. Malherbe also retired from his long principalship of Natal University. His place was 
taken in 1967 by Owen Horwood, who though later a NP Minister of Finance, committed 
himself to upholding academic freedom. Almost immediately it was clear that this was not 
the case and fears were expressed that he planned to entirely restructure student affairs 
according to his own hitherto unrevealed plan. Following months of conflict with the SRC and 
the editor of the student newspaper, Dome regarding the powers of student government and 
the freedom of the press, Horwood suspended both the Durban SRC and Dome, banned 
student gatherings of more than twenty five students and severely restricted the campus 
activities of a number of student leaders including Peter Mansfield, a former NUSAS vice-
president. Claiming that political agitators had infiltrated the university – untruthfully – the 
conflict was precipitated by a protest over the quality of residence food and Horwood’s 
unprecedented interference in ‘Freshers’ Reception’ and fuelled by the prohibition of hockey 
and drum majorettes tours, Horwood appointed a commission of inquiry in May 1967 to 
investigate the SRC constitution and the necessity for a student newspaper.182 As 
                                                          
176 Raymond Suttner via email, 2.12.2014. 
177 BC 586 B1 Ian Hume, ‘University of Cape Town Student Council: Report to NUSAS Congress, 1967’; Trend, 
4.4.1967; 18.4.1967.  
178 Argus, 23.3.1967. 
179 Cape Times, 8.4.1967. 
180 NUSAS Newsletter no. 3, 1967, p. 5. 
181 Trend, 20.9.1967. 
182 BC 586 A3.10, Owen Horwood to Margaret Marshall, 5.5.1967; 19.5.1967; 18.9.1967; Margaret Marshall to 
Owen Horwood, 30.5.1967; B1, B. Budke, ‘University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg Centre Report’, Appendices B 
and C, p. iv, 1967;  C. Leeman, ‘NUSAS Local Committee, Durban: Report to Annual National Congress’, p. 2, 
1967; R. Ragaven, ‘National Union of South African Students 43rd Student Assembly: University of Natal, UNNE 
418 
 
ominously, the editors of both the Durban and Pietermaritzburg student newspapers were 
interviewed by the security police.  A mass meeting to discuss Horwood’s actions was 
banned resulting in a student body sit-in outside the administration building.183 Some months 
later all protest meetings were proscribed at UNNE too.184 The Standing Committee and 
NUSAS again rallied.185 Marshall attacked the abrogation of academic freedom at Durban 
during the National Day of Affirmation at Pietermaritzburg attended also by Horwood.186 
Campus newspapers were sent to Durban to counteract the suspension of Dome, Wits 
Student carrying details of the Durban conflict in an article written by David Hemson, Dome’s 
suspended editor.187 
 
Durban and UCT were not alone in experiencing conflict with their administrations and 
administrations which moreover appeared keen to remain on the right side of the 
government. The editors of Wits’s ‘Loo’, a ‘newspaper’ pasted to the university walls, were 
found guilty by the university court of actions liable to incite racial ill-feeling and bring the 
university into disrepute after the ASK and the government-supporting press complained 
about the ‘publication’ of a satirical article mocking racial purity and apartheid.188 At Rhodes, 
students censured the University Senate for devaluing honorary degrees by vastly 
increasing the number conferred. Moreover, they protested the award of such degrees to 
Duminy of UCT and Nico Malan, the administrator of the Cape, and questioned the motives 
of the Rhodes authorities in continuing to bestow such honours on NP politicians whose 
contributions to academic and national life were debatable.189 
 
These events at UCT, Durban, Wits and Rhodes, occurred against the backdrop of the 
massive student-administration standoff at the London School of Economics (LSE). This was 
precipitated by student protest against the appointment of Dr Walter Adams, the former 
principal of the University College of Rhodesia as the institution’s new director and the 
subsequent suspension of ‘foreign agitators’, including the South African-born president of 
the Students’ Union, David Adelstein.190 Like at Berkley, LSE students called for the 
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democratisation of education and an end to ‘gerontocracy’ and embraced international 
socialism and neo-Marxism. At a NUSAS-convened meeting of the Standing Committee in 
June 1967, fears were expressed that all SRCs and student bodies risked interference in 
their activities and the amendment of their constitutions.191 From this flowed the ‘Conference 
on students in the modern university’ in July 1968, at which students and academics called 
for greater autonomy for student government as well as the bridging of the ‘generational gap’ 
between ‘gerontocracy’ and students. In June 1967, shortly before his newspaper’s 
suppression, the editor of Dome suggested that students seek direct representation on the 
sub-committees of the University of Natal.192 In a far more radical vein, echoing the 
disenchantment of the European and North American New Left with traditional western 
power structures and modes of consciousness, the Dome editorial averred that everyone 
was imprisoned. Students needed to act as free agents and size up the dogmas of 
government. More radically, the editorial argued, once students had extricated themselves 
from Western society they could conceptualise their Africanness. This resonated with the 
soon to emerge Black Consciousness thought (UCT’s Radical Society journal, Radical 
engaging with Franz Fanon193 whose ideas on psychological colonialism would infuse Black 
Consciousness) and the much later attempt by radical white NUSAS activists to respond 
positively to black exclusivity. This also challenged NUSAS’s defence of Western values and 
democracy when opposing apartheid measures. The editor of Wits Student and future 
NUSAS president, Neville Curtis, resurrected the dying and suppressed history of the 
congresses and infused it with new methods of struggle. On the sudden and suspicious 
death in 1967 of Albert Luthuli,194 Curtis urged Wits students to stage effective protests like 
those undertaken in the past by Luthuli and thus, instead of weak banner waving 
demonstrations, embrace passive resistance and sit-ins.195 These radical ideas were limited 
to a very small grouping of students, the bulk of student bodies edging closer to the right as 
will be seen. However, it could be argued that a fear of local campus conflict escalating to a 
full-scale challenge of university and perhaps even state authority in the manner of the 
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northern hemisphere student revolts, had a bearing on the stabilisation of campus student-
administration conflict,  Marshall having endorsed current criticisms of suspensions and 
other ‘stern measures’ in relation to events at the LSE.196  
 
In early 1968 Sir Richard Luyt, the former governor of Guiana, assumed the vice-
chancellorship of UCT. Luyt was cast in a more independent, open-minded and flexible 
mould than his older predecessor. At Luyt’s inauguration he laid down a challenge to the 
government by declaring that ‘in spite of huge financial support from the state, universities 
should be left to run their own affairs’.197 At the same time, a workable though controversial 
solution to the constitutional crisis was found. Although Clause 17 remained, the principle of 
open membership of clubs and societies was entrenched in the SRC’s standing rules and 
orders.198 Soon after this, integrated dances resumed at UCT.199 Why the government did 
not intervene at this stage and re-introduce the De Klerk Bills is open to conjecture. Its 
integrity regarding its outward looking international policy was perhaps one reason, as was 
the fact that Horwood was proving to be a reliable agent in the fight against ‘unbridled 
liberalism’ and perhaps it really was committed to some very limited reform of apartheid. 
However, the most probable reason was its pre-occupation with the intensifying verligte-
verkrampte war.  
 
The verligte-verkrampte war and dialogue with the ASB and its affiliated student 
bodies  
 
The brewing verligte-verkrampte war over relations with the outside world and non-
Afrikaners, immigration, and the pragmatic dilution of apartheid200 burst into the open in 
1966. At the ASB’s annual congress that year, Sam de Beer201 (brother of Paul de Beer) and 
Roux Wildenboer were instrumental in the organisation expressing a motion of thanks to 
S.E.D. Brown, the editor of the Hertzogite monthly English newsletter, the South African 
Observer. His newsletter had launched a series of scathing attacks on more verligte 
Afrikaner Nationalists like Rembrandt’s Anton Rupert  (reproved as ‘new money’202) and H.B 
Thom, rector of Stellenbosch University, dismissing them as liberals and unAfrikaans.203 This 
ASB motion attracted much negative publicity in both parliament and the press. It prompted 
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more than a thousand Stellenbosch students into signing a petition repudiating the Brown 
motion and then convening a mass meeting to affirm this when Boy Geldenhuys, president 
of both the Stellenbosch SRC and ASB ruled the petition unconstitutional.204 A new 
Stellenbosch group, the ‘Students’ Union’, headed by among others, Van Drimmelen, Robert 
Kennedy’s Stellenbosch host, established a campus newspaper which was critical of 
aspects of ASB policy and, significantly, was affiliated to the NUSAS-aligned South African 
National Students’ Press Union.205 The reaction to the ‘Brown motion’ was less dramatic on 
other ASB campuses although the Pretoria SRC, which had originally initiated and voted 
unanimously for the motion at the ASB congress, did an about turn due to intense 
pressure206 and dissociated itself from both the Observer’s attacks on prominent Afrikaners 
as well as the newspaper’s editor.207 Significantly, following an approach by the Wits SRC 
president, the first meeting in thirty years between the Pretoria and Wits SRCs took place in 
August 1966. The delegates discussed practical issues such as rag and intervarsity.208 
 
It was in this promising environment that NUSAS initiated its dialogue with the ASB. Initially 
this made little progress, the ASB cancelling a debate at Wits in 1966.209 However, the 
NUSAS president believed that the fallout from the ‘Brown motion’, coupled to Vorster’s new 
outward policy and wooing of English-speakers, put pressure on the ASB to adopt a new 
image in 1967.210 Thus Geldenhuys finally agreed to debate Marshall at Stellenbosch in April 
1967.211 However, because of the application of segregation at Stellenbosch, this took place 
in front of an entirely white audience, an abrogation of NUSAS principles which courted 
controversy at the next NUSAS congress (discussed later). To a capacity audience, 
Geldenhuys hotly refuted the excited press’s designation of the historic event as an attempt 
to patch up the differences between NUSAS and the ASB, declaring that the two 
organisations were entirely incompatible. To great acclaim, Marshall stressed the practical 
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student benefits derived by NUSAS members. Geldenhuys was critically quizzed on the 
ASB’s practical student benefits, or lack thereof. In reference to NUSAS’s vibrant Travel 
Department and perhaps alluding to the Hertzog Group and the hold of the North over the 
ASB, one student sarcastically remarked that the ASB was always travelling to Pretoria.212 
Not surprisingly, the NUSAS Stellenbosch branch grew in size after this debate.213 At the 
follow-up debate at UCT, Geldenhuys agreed to appear before a racially mixed audience.214 
Marshall cautioned against viewing these overtures to the ASB as overly significant – they 
were billed inaccurately as the first debate between the opposing student unions in thirty 
years – unless they led to improving white co-operation, which they did not. However, later 
developments on the Afrikaans campuses did look promising to UP-aligned students in the 
ISU at UCT and the newly formed national body, the South African Students’ Union (SASU), 
which were both committed to ending the dominance of NUSAS and the ASB on the English- 
and Afrikaans-medium campuses respectively. Though SASU was banned on the Afrikaans 
campuses,215 it claimed to have strong support at Stellenbosch.216   
 
Challenges to ASB and NUSAS hegemony  
 
The verligte-verkrampte war heated up in February 1968 when Vorster relieved Albert 
Hertzog of one of his cabinet portfolios.217 In May 1968, against the background of the 
student revolts in France, a three thousand-strong Stellenbosch mass meeting voted to 
disaffiliate from the ASB and then facilitate the establishment of a ‘democratic’ ASB to which 
students could join as individuals. Louis du Plessis, later fired as chairperson of the 
Stellenbosch student NP branch, dismissed the ASB as nothing more than ‘a clique of 
unemployed verkramptes’ who were ‘as stupid as they were verkrampt’. At the ASB’s recent 
conference, Du Plessis stated, ‘delegates had spoken in a disgusting way about English-
speaking students and speaker after speaker had been cheered for calling for only one 
language in South Africa’ which, he argued, was in direct contravention of the Vorster 
government’s policy of equal rights for both white language groups.218 The SRC reluctantly 
gave notice of Stellenbosch’s disaffiliation from the ASB, the Pretoria SRC elected to 
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investigate it, while Potchefstroom and the Orange Free State remained firmly loyal.219 
Publicly, the NUSAS president welcomed the developments at Stellenbosch as perhaps 
ushering in a new period of English-Afrikaans co-operation.220 Privately however, he 
believed that NUSAS would derive no benefit from these on the Afrikaans campuses as they 
did not represent a liberalisation of student opinion, but rather a split within the NP between 
those who supported Vorster’s more open policy and those who did not. Nonetheless, the 
Stellenbosch NUSAS branch was encouraged to re-apply for official campus registration.221      
 
 
In the pursuit of white co-operation, the ISU and the SASU decided to make good on the 
disarray in Afrikaner student ranks and engineered a disaffiliation bid of UCT from NUSAS in 
June 1968.222 To achieve this, they identified and exploited the most controversial issue to 
white students of the day, namely the 1967, SRC-endorsed NUSAS resolution on 
Rhodesia.223 This condemned inter alia the Rhodesian government’s policies of racial 
discrimination, detention without trial, the indiscriminate use of the death penalty and the 
abrogation of freedom of the press and movement, and pledged NUSAS’s support to all 
those working for a non-racial and democratic Rhodesia.224 The UCT SRC refused to 
dissociate itself from the Rhodesian motion and the one thousand-strong mass meeting 
decided not to change its method of affiliation.225 This was surprising given how closely white 
society (and students)226 observed the unfolding liberation war in Rhodesia. Alarmingly, this 
came closer to home in December 1967 with the inclusion of MK combatants in the ‘Wankie 
Campaign’ and on the opposing side, the assistance given to the Rhodesian government by 
South African forces. 
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Disaffiliation bids along similar lines to that of UCT materialised at Durban,227 
Pietermaritzburg and Wits, provoking some heated responses.228 The Pietermaritzburg SRC 
had already dissociated itself entirely from the Rhodesian resolution at the 1967 congress 
because it argued, nearly forty percent of those it represented were Rhodesian and would 
not support the sentiments of the resolution.229 As tellingly, the Local NUSAS Committee 
restructured itself into a less political body to make it more representative of (conservative) 
student opinion.230 The Pietermaritzburg student body was also comparatively conservative 
and hostile to NUSAS231 but nonetheless narrowly voted to remain in the national union.232 
Believing that it could oust NUSAS from the university, the Conservative Club, possibly with 
help from the state, mounted a very strong challenge to the national union at Wits.233 Anti-
NUSAS smear pamphlets appeared on the campus234  and some members of the 
Conservative Club, particularly those at JCE where the organisation was strong, had links to 
the state and the police.235 NUSAS had to pull out all the stops to retain its strong position at 
Wits.236 A mass meeting only narrowly voted to retain Wits’s NUSAS affiliation237 though a 
subsequent referendum (during which suspiciously a ballot box went on fire) delivered a 
greater vote of confidence in the national union.238  
 
Formation of the University Christian Movement (UCM) 
 
Coinciding with the emergence of the ISU and SASU and their right wing challenge to 
NUSAS, was the establishment in 1966/7 of the radical, non-racial ecumenical University 
Christian Movement (UCM). Though the UCM posed no threat to the secular NUSAS and 
moreover, there were close ties between it and NUSAS at both leadership239 and 
(overlapping) membership240 level, its formation was important. As Brickhill and Brooks have 
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argued, the UCM was, like ASA and ASUSA, a bridge and transitional phase between the 
multi-racial NUSAS and the exclusively black SASO, the latter established in 1968.241 In 
many respects, the UCM embodied the principles and ideas of the radical, non-racial, though 
secular student organisation envisaged by Driver at Botha’s Hill. 
 
Since 1960, NUSAS had earmarked religious groups as a potential growth area for NUSAS, 
particularly as they were a possible avenue of entry into the ethnic colleges where 
organisations such as the SCA were permitted to function. Establishing a radical, non-racial 
Christian students’ organisation was the aim of Basil Moore, NUSAS’s 1962 president-elect. 
What was perhaps the first step towards such a venture occurred in August 1962 when the 
Rhodes SCA broke away from the national body because the latter’s racist organisational 
structure was incompatible with Christianity. The secessionists subsequently formed 
themselves into a Students Christian Fellowship242 and hoped thereby to establish firm 
relations with Fort Hare, UNNE and the Lovedale Seminary.243 NUSAS saw in the events at 
Rhodes both an opportunity to broaden its anti-apartheid student base, as well as the first 
step towards the establishment of a radical Christian student organisation similar to those in 
the USA associated with the Civil Rights Movement.244 Thus from behind the scenes, 
NUSAS investigated the possibility of other campus SCAs disaffiliating from the national 
organisation and together with their Anglican societies, joining the Rhodes initiative.245 
However, most campus SCAs were luke-warm if not downright hostile to such a proposal, 
many fearing, like the bilingual UCT branch which had ties to the Dutch Reformed Church, 
that contact with Afrikaans-speaking students would be forfeited as a result.246 After being 
forced to abandon the NUSAS presidency, Basil Moore continued to pursue his aim of 
establishing a radical Christian student organisation from his position as parish minister on 
the Rand.247 By 1964, the World Student Christian Federation had adopted an all-embracing 
anti-apartheid policy and expected the South African SCA to do likewise. The SCA 
subsequently disaffiliated from the world body, split into racially separate organisations and 
adopted an exclusive, theologically conservative, evangelical profession of faith.248 Fearing 
the religious and racial polarisation flowing from this, the English churches facilitated the 
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establishment, in 1966, of the non-racial ecumenical UCM under the leadership of Moore 
and the chaplain to the NCFS, Colin Collins.249 Although banned at many black campuses, 
the UCM very quickly became black-dominated and black-led like the restructured NUSAS 
envisaged at Botha’s Hill. The UCM introduced innovative styles of worship, secular theology 
and from the USA, Black Theology. Like NUSAS, it also introduced leadership training 
programmes and a South American-inspired, multi-facetted literacy programme. The literacy 
programme of Paulo Freire was based on the understanding that true literacy was not just 
the acquisition of reading and writing skills but entailed ‘the construction of the autonomous 
selves’.250 The role of literacy teachers was to conscientise their learners so that once 
conscientised, they would work for social transformation.251 This political consciousness-
raising literacy programme was adopted by the racially exclusive black SASO.252  
 
Social segregation at NUSAS congresses 
 
One of the reasons for the emergence of SASO was the social segregation prevailing at 
NUSAS’s annual congresses. The staging of a congress on a non-racial basis was an 
organisational nightmare and virtually impossible to achieve. As the 1960s progressed, 
university authorities bowed to the state’s ever more restrictive social segregatory legislation 
and were cowed by real and perceived fears of government intervention were they to 
circumvent or flout these measures.  Despite NUSAS’s efforts since the late 1950s to avoid 
this, black students were generally accommodated separately at NUSAS congresses, either 
in black university residences like Douglas Smit at Wits or Alan Taylor at UNNE,253 or off-
campus at black hotels like the Tafelberg in Cape Town254 or in private homes. In 1958, all 
congress delegates resided in the Rhodes hostels. However, this remarkable precedent was 
broken in 1961 when the Rhodes authorities accepted the Eastern Cape Group Areas Board 
ruling that black delegates to the 1962 NUSAS congress could not be accommodated on the 
white campus.255 Students at UNNE recommended that NUSAS secure an alternative 
venue, but without success, Leftwich contending that there was insufficient time (three and a 
half months) to do so.256 In 1960, the ostensibly liberal Catholic Archbishop of Cape Town, 
Owen McCann refused to allow black congress delegates to reside in Kolbe House, the 
Catholic student chaplaincy on the UCT campus, although black NCFS conference 
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delegates were permitted to do so.257 After another segregated congress in 1965,  Osler 
called on future convenors to embarrass the relevant university authorities into opening the 
university residences to all,258 to no avail.  
 
Dining was more straightforward. From at least 1960, and probably before that too, meals, 
even at Durban,259 were taken on an integrated basis. To ensure that all congress social 
activities were open to all, NUSAS hosted no official balls after 1947,260 although unofficial 
non-racial dances were held off campus. However, the new racial laws and restrictions of the 
mid-1960s took their toll on NUSAS congresses too. The unofficial farewell party at Osler’s 
home in 1965 was raided by the police261 while delegates commented regretfully on the ‘lack 
of cohesion’ among congress goers because of the obstacles placed in the path of inter-
racial social mixing on the UCT campus.262 In May 1967, the Wits SRC overwhelmingly 
rejected a motion calling for the integration of all campus social functions (though public fund 
raisers could remain segregated) because the practical implications had not been 
considered.263 Moreover, Robin Margo, SRC president, declared that there would be no 
forced integration at Wits264 echoing the stand of the UP and the conservative wing of the 
PP. Following the campus outcry led by Neville Curtis, editor of Wits Student at what 
amounted to capitulation to apartheid and the reversal of Wits’s traditional policy, the SRC 
was forced to take their decision to the student body. A student mass meeting voted that all 
student social functions including rag would be open to all,265 Margo conceding that though 
very difficult to achieve, integrated social functions were not an impossibility at Wits but 
would probably be in the future.266  
 
Nonetheless, NUSAS optimistically believed that its 1967 congress at Rhodes would be 
entirely integrated.267 As is well known, this was not the case. The relevant state authorities 
refused to countenance an integrated congress and even warned the Rhodes administration 
that the presence of black students at the congress in itself was illegal.268 The overly 
cautious Rhodes University Council again bowed to government authority and prohibited 
black students – forced to reside in unspeakably ‘appalling’ conditions in a Grahamstown 
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church269 – from even taking their meals on the campus with the white delegates or 
attending the traditional opening tea-party there with them.270  
 
An unprecedently angry reaction to this insult came from an unexpected quarter, the ultra-
loyal chairperson of the UNNE Local NUSAS Committee, Steve Biko. When Biko, an 
avowed non-racist and political moderate (he rejected Fatima Meer’s endorsement of the 
academic boycott)271 took up the reins of the Local Committee in late 1966, he vowed to 
bring ninety percent of the 1967 freshers into NUSAS272 – a feat he evidently achieved when 
the SRC was required to hire two buses to transport all the interested UNNE students to the 
NUSAS Day of Affirmation in Pietermaritzburg in June 1967.273 Moreover, in an historic first 
(possibly a reaction to Horwood), the three branches of Natal University decided to break 
free from their officially imposed structural and racial separation and come (as far as 
possible) as one Natal delegation to the 1967 NUSAS congress.274 In the words of UNNE 
SRC president, Baldwin Ben Ngubane (later a member of the Inkatha Freedom Party and 
Minister of Arts, Culture and Science in the Mandela government): ‘a united front’ 
demonstrating ‘multi-racial efforts and co-operation’.275 Bouyed by such optimism, idealism 
and goodwill, Biko’s reaction to this sordid let-down was not surprising. Censuring the 
negligence of the NUSAS Head Office for neither alerting delegates of the situation nor 
finding a new venue for the congress even though they knew sufficiently well in advance to 
do both, he called for the adjournment of the event until a multi-racial venue could be 
found.276 These did exist – the Anglican Church had a retreat centre at nearby Stutterheim277 
while the Anglican Students’ Federation met at the Anglican school, Michaelhouse, in 
1967.278 After a five hour debate into the early hours of the morning,279 Biko’s motion was 
defeated, the assembly electing instead to embark on a twenty four hour hunger strike in 
protest at the racist actions of the Rhodes authorities.280 The NUSAS executive then 
effectively closed down discussion on social segregation and its culpability in the matter by 
introducing a motion deflecting responsibility away from itself and pinning fault on the 
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university authorities.281 While Mzamane et al argued that this executive action was 
motivated by a desire ‘to avert an open schism along racial lines’,282 Biko argued that it in 
fact precipitated a division amongst the ‘outwitted’ black delegates283 thus weakening their 
opposition.  
 
The issue of segregation did not go away but rather came to dominate the entire 
congress.284 After a four hour debate, a strongly worded resolution introduced by Biko 
rejecting all campus social segregation and censuring any university institution or university 
structure which practised it, was passed by forty two to two votes with twenty abstentions.285 
One of those who abstained, presumably for ‘pragmatic reasons’, was Margo of the Wits 
SRC.286 Many black delegates also abstained because they felt that the Biko motion was an 
empty gesture as it would not be put into effect.287 This demonstrated a growing cynicism 
amongst black students about the gap between principle and practice in NUSAS. 
 
The recently concluded debate between the presidents of NUSAS and the ASB under 
conditions of segregation, suggested that for some in NUSAS, dialogue with apartheid-
supporting whites was more important than upholding NUSAS’s principles and the rights of 
its black membership. Black students, Biko was warned by Robert Schrire, leader of the 
UCT delegation, after the former’s failed adjournment of congress, ought to be careful not to 
alienate their white counterparts particularly as NUSAS was attempting to woo students from 
the Afrikaans-medium universities into the organisation. ‘The only road to liberation’, Schrire 
conservatively argued ‘was through the persuasion of whites’.288 Regarding the NUSAS-ASB 
debate then, the student assembly censured Stellenbosch University for hosting a 
segregated event, but not the NUSAS president for taking part in it. Future debates and 
contact with the ASB were to be welcomed the assembly ruled, but in a veiled criticism of the 
executive’s conduct, added the proviso that these should not ‘breach’ any ‘tenet of NUSAS 
policy’,289 specifically that of non-segregation.290   
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The executive elections were not devoid of controversy. In what radical black students 
interpreted as an ineffectual gesture aimed at healing the racial wounds of the congress and 
an attempt by white delegates to salve their guilty consciences, Ben Ngubane of UNNE was 
elected to the vice-presidency.291 Ngubane was subsequently persuaded by students at 
UNNE to resign his NUSAS office.292  
 
As has been well documented, the events at the Rhodes congress precipitated a self-
interogation by Biko of the relevance to black students of NUSAS. The ‘appalling’ 
accommodation to which black congress delegates had been subjected was evidence to 
Biko of how little NUSAS valued its black membership.293 Moreover, Biko and other 
disenchanted black students questioned whether white students, members of the privileged, 
oppressive ruling class, who presumed to speak on behalf of black students, could ever 
really understand and appreciate their concerns and problems. Like other liberal whites, 
NUSAS activists, it was argued, sought to salve their guilty consciences and prove their non-
racism by hosting multi-racial tea parties. These did nothing to further black liberation but 
served as a palliative to apartheid and held back liberation.294 To add insult to injury, in April 
1968, the Pietermaritzburg student body chose the serving of alcohol over the presence of 
black students at the University of Natal graduation ball.295 Nevertheless, at a NUSAS-
facilitated reconciliation meeting between the UNNE and Pietermaritzburg SRCs – the 
former having severed all ties with the latter296 – Biko staunchly defended both NUSAS and 
non-racialism.297  
 
The organisers of the 1968 NUSAS congress ensured that there would be no repeat of the 
fiasco of 1967. John Kane-Berman, president of the Wits SRC (and later of the SAIRR) and 
son of Torch Commando leader, Louis Kane-Berman, successfully acquired the legal 
opinion required by the Wits principal, I.D. MacCrone for permitting the congress to be held 
unsegregated on the campus. Biko was kept minutely informed of these developments 
through Kane-Berman’s specially arranged trips to Natal.298 Thus all congress delegates 
dined together on the Wits campus inviting the unwelcome observations of the NP press 
regarding the messiness of the dining hall and the poor attire of NUSAS delegates.299 Black 
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students were nonetheless still accommodated separately in a boarding house in 
Fordsburg,300 the black Wits residence having closed some years earlier due to dwindling 
black university enrolments.301 Heated debate raged throughout the congress about 
NUSAS’s commitment to liberation in general and social integration in particular. Many 
students argued that non-racial venues were available, like those used by NUSAS for its 
leadership training seminars, but for convenience as well as whites not being prepared to 
forego their luxuries of, for example, hot and cold running water, NUSAS chose to host its 
congresses at the universities. In other words, NUSAS chose practicalities and white 
privilege and comforts over principles.302 Almost unbelievably considering the fate of ‘the flag 
motion’ in 1966 and how distanced white NUSAS delegates appeared to be from white racist 
society and its symbols, particularly those of Afrikaner nationalism, white NUSAS delegates 
stood up patriotically to sing the official white national anthem, ‘Die Stem’, at the conclusion 
of the formal congress dinner. Biko remained silently seated until the end, after which he too 
stood up and defiantly sang ‘Nkosi sikelel iAfrika’,303 the hymn which would become the 
national anthem of the future democratic South Africa. For Biko, black students were present 
at the congress in name only. None felt part of the proceedings and unlike in the past, did 
not pose a counter challenge to, in Biko’s opinion, the continuing rightward movement of the 
national union.304   
 
Congress delegations from the predominantly white campuses certainly were more 
conservative than in the past. Following the recently concluded nation-wide referenda on 
NUSAS affiliation, determined efforts were made to assemble representative delegations 
who reflected campus opinion.305 Over the next few years, a significant number of white 
radicals withdrew from or ‘dropped out’ of formal student governing structures like the SRCs 
and NUSAS. This was variously attributed to the influence of New Left philosophy, exposure 
to the horrors of apartheid like the Limehill forced removals of 1969306 and, ironically, 
participation in NUSAS’s highly effective political education and leadership training 
seminars.307 Nonetheless, despite this growing conservativeness which resulted in NUSAS 
reflecting a more centrist liberal position,308 the 1968 NUSAS congress did not sell out to the 
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right. A renewed attempt to limit NUSAS motions to South Africa and exclude international 
ones related to, for example, Vietnam and Rhodesia, again failed.309 In addition, the 
assembly debated inviting Kenneth Kaunda and Daniel Cohn Bendit (‘Red Danny’), 
president of Zambia and leader of the student uprising in West Berlin respectively, to 
address student gatherings in South Africa. However, following the predictable uproar in the 
NP press that this provoked, NUSAS hastened to assure the public that the invitation to 
Cohn Bendit was really a joke.310 Of more immediate concern, SRCs were urged to register 
strong concrete opposition to a new assault on academic freedom and university autonomy 
at UCT.311 
 
The ‘Mafeje affair’ at UCT 
 
In April 1968, the UCT Council appointed Archie Mafeje, a former UCT student completing a 
doctorate at Cambridge University, to a senior lectureship in the Department of 
Anthropology.  Almost immediately, the government indicated its displeasure at what it 
believed was ‘tantamount to flouting the traditional outlook of South Africa’312 and the 
abrogation by the UCT Council of an unwritten agreement that staff at the ‘open’ universities 
would be white.313 Evidently under pressure from the verkramptes within the NP,314 the 
Minister of Education, warned UCT that should it proceed with the appointment, the 
government would have no choice but to introduce legislation to ensure compliance, 
something it was loath to do because it would tarnish the new image it wished to project 
abroad.315 The Council caved in, as they had with the SRC constitution, and did ‘the dirty 
work’ of the government.316 When this became public, NUSAS urged its SRCs to mount a 
strong protest against this new assault on academic freedom and the right of the university 
to decide who would teach.317 In response to the call for radical action made by Radical 
Society member, Rafie Kaplinsky (‘Red Rafie’), UCT students marched on the Bremner 
administration building and occupied it for nine days. This sit-in had all the hallmarks of 
those in Paris, West Berlin and the USA which had inspired it and of which students felt a 
part.318 Telegrams of support were received from the LSE and the Sorbonne319 underlining 
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the global connections. Civil rights songs were sung and teach-ins conducted320 – the latter 
introducing students to Neo-Marxism and New Left concerns of power structures, student 
power and ‘free love’.321 Country-wide sympathy demonstrations occurred simultaneously. 
Wits students were pelted with tomatoes, eggs and a dead cat by their counterparts from the 
Rand Afrikaans University322 and while the SRC deputation to the Minister of Education in 
Pretoria escaped injury from the paraffin ‘fire bomb’ intended for it,323 its members were 
captured by students from the University of Pretoria and had their heads shaved.324 At the 
request of conservative UCT students, students from Stellenbosch arrived at UCT to storm 
the hastily barricaded Bremner Building.325 In the midst of this potentially violent standoff, the 
sit-in was called off, the protesters accepting an offer by the university authorities to erect a 
plaque to academic freedom and create a ‘Mafeje visiting fellowship’.326  
 
The sit-in won the sympathy of the PP and, to the acute embarrassment of the government, 
received huge publicity and support abroad327 (the work of NUSAS), effectively destroying 
the good image it was attempting to project. Vorster denounced sit-ins as ‘communist’328 and 
threatened to ‘thoroughly’ put down the UCT protest329 but was then almost immediately 
confronted with a protest and a sit-in at Fort Hare.  
 
Fort Hare protest, August 1968 
 
The Fort Hare protests opened up the possibility of continuing and intensifying the nation-
wide campus solidarity protests once the Mafeje affair had subsided and perhaps also 
igniting a nation-wide anti-apartheid student uprising reminiscent of student uprisings 
abroad. More importantly, the Fort Hare protests presented NUSAS with the opportunity for 
consolidating the progress it had already made towards re-establishing itself at Fort Hare 
after its virtual demise following the security clampdown of 1963-65. Thus by 1967, NUSAS 
could estimate that it had the sympathy of half the Fort Hare student body, though only fifty 
four were official members of the NUSAS branch. All were senior students, freshers being 
subjected to sustained indoctrination by the college authorities. As in the past, fear of 
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informers and reprisals by the administration were additional factors deterring NUSAS 
participation. In 1967, fourteen students (many of them post-graduates) were refused re-
admission to the college on the empty grounds of drunkenness, womanising330 and being of 
the wrong ethnic group. Amongst these were four members of the NUSAS leadership 
committee and three ordinary NUSAS members331 and of these some were office bearers in 
the UCM.  
 
That the new generation of students, products of Bantu Education and indoctrination, were 
politically cowed was proved wrong in August 1968 with the arrival at Fort Hare of Professor 
J.W. de Wet, the new rector appointed to succeed the retiring Ross. Reminiscent of the 
government takeover almost a decade earlier, De Wet - a Broederbond ideologue from 
Potchefstroom and in the opinion of a white staff member, ‘a little Nazi’ - was greeted on the 
campus by placards bearing slogans such as ‘Fort Hare for Africans not for Afrikaners’, ‘We 
do not want Potch boere scum’, ‘Fort Hare not a rubbish bin for Potchefstroom scum’, 
‘Verwoerd remains cursed’ and ‘Vorster is identical to Hitler’. De Wet’s installation took place 
against the background of booing and shouting by the student body boycotting the event 
outside the venue. Those believed to be the ringleaders were hauled before De Wet and 
were then interrogated by the security police. Greater restrictions were imposed on the 
social lives of students.  
 
Following a mission by the UCM to Fort Hare in August 1968 in which Biko participated, the 
student body compiled a list of grievances and demands, including the right to join the UCM. 
De Wet refused to attend a student mass meeting to answer to these grievances and 
demands. Against the background of the student revolts at the University of California, 
Berkley, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Fort Hare students embarked on a sit-in 
during which time they sang ‘We shall overcome’ and the hymn, ‘Nkosi sikelel iAfrika’. In 
other words, students demanded civil rights and liberation in addition to, like student 
revolutionaries abroad, the democratisation of university structures and an end to 
authoritarianism. Two days later, the police, armed with tear gas and dogs, intervened and 
three hundred and fifty students were subsequently expelled.332  
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NUSAS, the Standing Committee and the UCM, responded to the plea for help by the Fort 
Hare students.333 Mass meetings, pickets and demonstrations were held on all NUSAS-
affiliated campuses protesting the expulsions and calling for the reinstatement of the affected 
students.334 Demonstrations at UCT and JCE were broken up by off-duty naval recruits and 
students from the Rand Afrikaans University respectively.335 Convoys of students from 
Rhodes, Wits, Pietermaritzburg and UCT set off for Fort Hare to seek an interview with De 
Wet.336 However, fearing a confrontation with the huge police reinforcements pouring into 
Alice and the possible banning of both NUSAS and the UCM, the majority of students 
remained in Grahamstown for a sit-in, leaving a small deputation of NUSAS executive 
members and SRC presidents to go to Fort Hare. After eventually managing to evade the 
police, the group, accompanied by staff members from the Federal Theological Seminary, 
climbed Sandile’s Kop and laid a wreath at the memorial to James Stewart, the founder of 
Fort Hare, to symbolise the death of his vision for the college and in protest at the expulsions 
of Fort Hare’s students.337  This was a somewhat ritualistic symbolic act reminiscent of 
NUSAS’s Day of Affirmation ceremonies. The NUSAS president was seemingly disappointed 
at what the national union had achieved at Fort Hare, Biko attributing this failure to the 
‘rather poor response from the half-committed student world’.338  
 
Threats of further state action and the retreat of NUSAS  
 
The Fort Hare protest and its linkup with the NUSAS-affiliated campuses was however 
sufficiently disturbing to the government to goad it into taking further action against students. 
In the long term this would result in the conferring of full university status on the new ethnic 
colleges in 1970. By delinking them from UNISA, an institution believed to have a measure 
of autonomy from Christian Nationalism, the ethnic colleges would be cut off academically, 
intellectually, socially and geographically from other students, institutions and patterns of 
thought and totally subsumed into Bantu Education and the world of the Bantustans. As far 
as the white NUSAS-affiliated student bodies were concerned, the government announced 
its intention of appointing a judicial commission of inquiry into the white universities and 
student life.339 Many believed that this would mark the end of organised student government 
and NUSAS, their place taken by the sports and exercise classes included in the terms of 
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reference of the commission.340 NP politicians warned too that the student revolts like those 
overseas would not be tolerated in South Africa. More alarmingly, the issue of segregated 
student societies raised its head again when Vorster intimated his intention of reintroducing 
legislation to allow for this.341 Already branches of the ASB had been established at Wits342 
and Durban in preparation for this change of policy.343 The withdrawal of the earlier 
segregatory University Amendment Bill in the wake of the introduction of the new UCT 
constitution as well as the relieved and surprising discovery that the Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act of February 1968 which led to the dissolution of the LP was not applicable 
to NUSAS, had evidently not been a sign of a more tolerant attitude to NUSAS and student 
politics under the suddenly reformist Vorster.  
 
In December 1968, the NUSAS executive publicly unveiled its plan to establish an ‘Action 
Front’. This was intended to fight and defy Vorster’s attempts to legislate social apartheid in 
the universities as well as to protest the restrictions placed on NUSAS officers in the form of 
bannings, deportations and passport denials.344 The punitive measures of the latter, used to 
brilliant effect in silencing the LP and the Congress Alliance, Daniel argued, informed the 
state’s new strategy of cutting NUSAS away from its mass base by deterring potential 
recruits from taking up leadership positions in the organisation.345 Thus, by the end of 1968, 
John Sprack, the 1967-8 president-elect had been stripped of his South African citizenship 
and deported, the 1968 deputy vice-president, Andrew Murray, was also deported346 while 
John Daniel and Duncan Innes, presidents in 1966-7 and 1968-9 respectively, were refused 
passports,347 as were Rafie Kaplinsky and Kemal Cassojee of UCT. Rogers Ragaven, a 
deputy vice-president, was banned,348 as was Professor Raymond Hoffenberg of the UCT 
Medical School and chairperson of the NUSAS Advisory Board.  
 
NUSAS’s defiant protest plan against government harassment of its officers and the 
implementation of social segregation was stalled in early 1969. In his New Year address 
Vorster reiterated his warning that the government would not countenance the occurrence of 
a student revolution in South Africa like those abroad and would accordingly introduce 
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legislation to outlaw student protest.349 NUSAS and the Standing Committee feared that 
government propaganda regarding protests would ensure the failure of the militant 1969 
campaign by deterring cowed students from participating.350 Thus the NUSAS executive and 
the Standing Committee successfully sought an interview with S.L. Muller, the Minister of 
Police, in which the delegation promised to suspend the proposed protest action if 
government would agree to lift its restrictions on student leaders,351 many student leaders 
proclaiming themselves anti-communist during the course of proceedings.352 NUSAS 
deliberately ensured353 that this meeting was hailed in the non-NP press as a breakthrough 
in government-NUSAS relations which marked the ‘dawn’ of a ‘new era’ of ‘tolerance’ and 
co-operation between the two parties.354  
 
The left in NUSAS, newly radicalised by exposure to New Left ideology and methods of 
struggle during the Mafeje and Fort Hare protests, was horrified by this retreat. The Wits 
Local NUSAS Committee threatened to secede from NUSAS355 and some members actually 
resigned356 while Kaplinsky and other radicals on the UCT SRC stated that their SRC had no 
moral right to associate itself with NUSAS’s and the Standing Committee’s radical change of 
action without first securing a student body mandate to do so.357  Far more damaging, this 
incident probably fuelled the desire of black students to establish a separate organisation. 
Former NUSAS officers interpreted this meeting as the national union having lost its way and 
further evidence of the organisation’s move to the right. To them it seemed shocking that 
NUSAS officers should ‘divorce’ the ‘minor sufferings’ of white students from the real 
deprivation and oppression experienced by the majority of South Africans and seek 
‘preferential treatment’ for themselves.358  
 
However, it was more complicated than that. It can be inferred that this meeting was the first 
stage of a sophisticated public relations exercise aimed at convincing students and the 
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public of the justification of militant protest by demonstrating the futility of putting one’s trust 
in an untrustworthy government and attempting to co-operate and negotiate with it359 – in the 
words of the UCT SRC president, ‘put[ting] the government to the test’.360 As was expected, 
none of the restrictions were lifted and NUSAS felt no compunction in also breaking its side 
of the agreement and lifting its moratorium on protests361 – vast campus-wide protests 
marking the tenth anniversary of the passage of the Extension of University Education and 
Fort Hare Transfer Acts. Legassick and Saunders have suggested that the change of course 
regarding protest and the visit to Muller was intended to relieve the pressure on Fort Hare.362 
This is entirely plausible. In July 1969, black students were to criticise NUSAS for its reactive 
protest after the fact which merely achieved the victimisation of student leaders at the black 
colleges.363   
 
Formation of the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO) 
 
Shortly after the conclusion of the 1968 NUSAS congress, Biko attended the UCM 
conference in Stutterheim. Here again black students, unlike their white counterparts, were 
subject to apartheid restrictions in the form of the pass laws. Biko convened a separate black 
caucus to discuss the immediate pass law issue as well as the general needs, concerns and 
problems of African, Indian and coloured students. After conferring with the remnants of ASA 
and ASUSA at the various black higher educational institutions, a decision was taken to 
convene a conference of black student leaders at Mariannhill, Durban (Biko’s old school) in 
December 1968. Though there was growing hostility to NUSAS in some quarters of UNNE364 
(notably amongst those aligned to the PAC), Duncan Innes, the 1968-9 NUSAS president, 
who was well regarded by Biko,365 was kept informed of the latter’s plans. In fact, Innes had 
discussed the conference at the various black campuses during his nation-wide executive 
visit during the second half of 1968 and offered to share his and those SRCs’ thoughts and 
suggestions for the agenda of the conference.366 There was also a debate as to whether 
NUSAS should be invited to Mariannhill, though Biko himself thought that the event should 
be an entirely black affair,367 which it eventually was.  The conference, Biko informed Innes, 
aimed to establish contact with the black ethnic colleges which had been grossly neglected 
by both UNNE and the ‘privileged centres’ (presumably the NUSAS affiliates) and that while 
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‘closer [organisational] unity’ among black centres would be discussed and would be a 
desirable result of the conference, this would not replace NUSAS.368 In the event, Mariannhill 
gave birth to the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO) an exclusive black body. 
Speaking at some length on the origins of SASO, Biko stated that SASO was formed ‘under 
protest’. ‘Much as they did not want to form any organisation, this was…discovered to be the 
only way in which effective contact [with other black centres] could be effected’.369 An 
exclusive black membership was the means of realising this limited contact. SASO denied 
that it was formed in opposition to NUSAS. For the purely pragmatic reason that it was 
proscribed at the black ethnic colleges, NUSAS would have to be by-passed if the envisaged 
black student contact were to be strengthened and maintained. Thus as Mzamane et al 
argued, SASO was intended to be a kind of black ‘pressure group’ within NUSAS.370 
Relations between NUSAS and SASO remained cordial, NUSAS relaying this information to 
student unions abroad in April 1969.371 
 
Further proof of the necessity for creating a forum for black students outside NUSAS was 
found in events at the UCON in May 1969. Shortly after being forbidden to hold a meeting 
expressing sympathy with Fort Hare in August 1968, the Turfloop student body unanimously 
voted to seek affiliation to NUSAS372 and at the same time elected to shelve its quest for 
affiliation to ASUSA until more favourable circumstances prevailed.373 Though this decision 
was motivated more by a desire to break its isolation and seek contact with other university 
students rather than any great attachment to NUSAS,374 this was a remarkable step forward 
for NUSAS and was largely the work of Horst Kleinschmidt, who during his term of office as 
NUSAS regional director for the Transvaal, increased NUSAS’s black representation in the 
student assembly to almost fifty percent.375 However, not unexpectedly, the UCON Senate 
refused to countenance any association with NUSAS,376 precipitating a protest march by 
two-thirds of the student body to the university administration buildings in May 1969.377 Innes 
and Kleinschmidt attempted to discuss the issue of Turfloop’s affiliation with the acting 
rector, Professor F.J. Engelbrecht, but in vain. After two failed attempts, the two NUSAS 
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leaders managed to enter the heavily guarded campus, but were immediately threatened 
with arrest, ordered off the premises by Engelbrecht and issued with a police order banning 
them from the Pietersburg Tribal Trust Area. In what was reminiscent of the NUSAS 
executive visit of 1962, their car tyres were slashed outside their hotel in Pietersburg.378 
 
It was probably because of these events that no-one stood in for the ill Duncan Innes, 
originally invited to attend SASO’s inaugural conference at Turfloop in July 1969.379 Despite 
being banned from the precincts of the campus, the presence of NUSAS representatives at 
the conference could have placed its staging in jeopardy. Engelbrecht’s agreement to the 
event being hosted and financed by Turfloop and his promotion of SASO,380 was based on 
the belief that this new black body heralded the longed for break with multi-racial and liberal 
organisations like NUSAS and the emergence of a student movement organised on 
apartheid principles. Moreover, SASO’s inauguration overlapped with that of the NUSAS 
congress – the latter a logistical nightmare following the last minute prohibition of its staging 
at Durban (probably the doing of Horwood)381 – making it physically impossible for NUSAS 
members to be in two places at once.382  
 
SASO’s newly adopted constitution set out its organisation’s aims and rationale for existence 
in pragmatic terms. It aimed to ‘represent non-white students nationally’ because ‘owing to 
circumstances beyond their control, students at some non-white centres are unable to 
participate in the national student organisation of this country’.383 The conference placed 
much emphasis on facilitating black student contact whether through sport or inter-campus 
visits in defiance of what they believed was their deliberate state-imposed isolation from one 
another.384 NUSAS was recognised as the ‘true’ national union of South Africa, SASO 
making no claim to such a title itself.385 In his address as newly inaugurated president, Biko 
stated that SASO’s future was dependent on a number of factors, including developments in 
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NUSAS. He predicted a swing to the right on the white NUSAS campuses which would result 
in either the death of the national union or the virtual exclusion from it of all black students. 
He urged ‘all sensible people’, including SASO members, to strive to avert this, but felt that 
NUSAS’s demise was inevitable. Then, he warned, it would fall solely to SASO to cater for 
the needs of black students and significantly also, to facilitate contact between various 
colour groups,386 including presumably whites. Thus it would seem that neither overt hostility 
towards NUSAS nor strident racial exclusivity motivated SASO’s formation, at least from 
Biko’s side. It could be argued then that SASO’s formation was based on the assumption 
that NUSAS was a failing organisation in two senses: firstly, as a vehicle for black contact 
and secondly, as a non-racial forum and students’ union. Thus SASO was called into being, 
in the first instance to cater for the peculiar interests of black students, but once established, 
would have to position itself to take on the mantle of a non-racial student forum or even a 
national student union. 
 
Thus in this cordial co-operative spirit, the SASO conference wished NUSAS a ‘successful 
and fruitful congress’387 and mandated the Turfloop delegation at the NUSAS congress to 
act in SASO’s interests there.388 
 
The response of NUSAS to the formation of SASO, 1969-1970 
 
The generosity of SASO towards NUSAS at the former’s inaugural conference was not 
reciprocated by the latter. Although much of NUSAS’s senior leadership was sympathetic 
towards SASO and understood the need for its existence, the 1969 NUSAS congress 
refused to recognise the separate black organisation,389 two motions to this effect (one 
proposed by Horst Kleinschmidt and Margaret Broster) being withdrawn.390 Maimela notes 
that LP members of the NUSAS Advisory Board, Paton, Brookes and Marquard, threatened 
to withdraw their support for the national union were it to recognise the new black 
organisation.391 For liberals, SASO was a racist movement which played into the hands of 
the government and by organising separately, betrayed the principle of non-racialism which 
meant that all races worked together to combat apartheid.  
 
The 1969 NUSAS congress became locked in conflict and not only regarding SASO. White 
students attacked the NUSAS president for allowing Thami Mazwai, a former Fort Hare 
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student and PAC member recently released from prison, to address student body meetings 
on various campuses around the country.392 For black students it was clear that many white 
students would not support their legitimate aspirations for freedom because this would entail 
supporting the banned liberation movements and in so doing, committing a criminal offence. 
Moreover, black students who had few if any rights and freedoms could not identify with the 
outraged reactions of white NUSAS delegates to further inroads into individual freedom 
enacted by the NP government over the previous year.393 Black students from UNNE, UCT 
and TCEA walked out of the assembly hall when a debate on academic freedom and the 
‘Mafeje affair’ reached an impasse394 presumably regarding the UCT SRC’s climb down and 
acceptance of a plaque to academic freedom and a visiting fellowship in place of Mafeje’s 
appointment. 
 
The privileged class position occupied by whites in South African society and thus also in 
NUSAS, came under scrutiny from a separately convened black caucus. In a statement 
signed by black delegates,395 including NUSAS loyalists and SASO sceptics Ben Ngubane 
and Goolam Abrams,396 it was argued that ‘the white can afford to indulge in conceptualising 
for he always has access to material sufficiency [whilst] the first priority for blacks is physical 
existence. The implications of this have been on Congress floor where debates have been 
initiated on premises arising from white backgrounds’.397 Black students subsequently 
indicated their intention of withdrawing entirely from NUSAS.398  
 
The challenge posed to NUSAS by its black membership, the perception that NUSAS was 
little more than a centrist liberal pressure group ignored by the left and right,399 and the 
complete unravelling of the congress early in its proceedings, convinced delegates of the 
need to restructure the national union.400 The assembly devoted much of its attention to 
education401 and adopted a New Left-inspired ‘Education ’70’ national project which aimed at 
the entire overhaul of university structures.402 Some students speculated on the possibility of 
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a restructured NUSAS confining itself primarily to education,403 in other words, a reversion to 
a conservative, students-as-such position and a retreat from principles.404 
 
The restructuring and reorientation of NUSAS in 1970 
 
The new NUSAS president, Neville Curtis, was cast in a different mould to that of many of 
his predecessors. Coming from a distinctly more humble background than most NUSAS and 
student activists – he attended a state school, his father started his working life as a miner 
and became involved in the Springbok Legion and the Labour League405 – Curtis used his 
editorship of Wits Student to disseminate his socialist political views and commitment to non-
racialism.406 Curtis believed that NUSAS was a failing organisation: its ‘morale [was] low, [its] 
image bad and [its] impact and effectiveness limited’.407 If the national union were to survive 
as a meaningful and progressive entity, it would have to undergo radical transformation. To 
undertake this daunting task, Curtis and his executive enlisted the help of SASO and, 
specifically Biko, as well as the UNNE SRC.408 SASO was ‘vitally interested’ in the fate of 
NUSAS and thus agreed to participate in NUSAS’s reorganisation conference409 at the 
Redacres Catholic Mission in Howick, Natal, in April 1970.410 Elaborating on his earlier 
expressed opinion on the growing conservatism of NUSAS (discussed earlier), Biko feared 
that the reorganisation project could facilitate a right wing takeover of the national union, 
preparations for which he believed, were already ‘dangerous[ly]’ discernible at Durban and 
elsewhere.411  
 
Presumably these dangerous preparations stemmed from developments in the Western 
Cape as well as a widely reported ASB-initiated white co-operation conference at the Rand 
Afrikaans University in May 1969 attended by Anton Porsig, national chairperson of the ISU 
and Renier Schoeman, ASB executive member412 and a leading light in conservative circles 
at Durban.413 After six years of authoritarian college authority and NEUM-induced isolation 
and political inactivity (after its dramatic opposition to the Republic in 1961), the student body 
of the University College of the Western Cape (UCWC) (including Jakes Gerwel, later 
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principal of the university and presidential advisor to Nelson Mandela) refused to accept that 
coloureds comprised a separate ‘nation-in-the-making’, elected an SRC, attempted to join 
NUSAS and began to engage with other student bodies.414 The verligte Stellenbosch SRC, 
freed from its affiliation to the ASB, initiated a dialogue with its coloured neighbour.415 
Though UCWC rebuffed Stellenbosch’s ‘political missionary’ endeavours,416 white co-
operationists at both UCT and Stellenbosch fervently hoped that a federation of the three 
Western Cape universities, in which, significantly and ominously, a restructured NUSAS 
would participate, would come into being.417 Thus, to ensure that NUSAS did not fall into the 
hands of the conservative co-operationists, Biko urged Curtis to restrict voting on the re-
organisation to NUSAS delegates.418 It was probably for this reason that the NUSAS 
president believed that the national union might be forced to close down altogether.419      
 
In preparation for NUSAS’s reorganisation conference, SASO’s first National Formation 
School in December 1969 drew up a critique of the national union. NUSAS, it argued, had no 
long term programme of action. It merely reacted with opportunistic, publicity-seeking 
protest. Re-iterating its earlier expressed views on the advisability, efficacy and 
consequences of reactive protest, SASO recommended that these be abandoned. NUSAS 
was urged to stage ‘national days’ such as a commemoration of Sharpeville which, through 
the provision of informative literature, would serve to politically educate students. In addition, 
extensive self-education of NUSAS members was thought to be a critical priority. NUSAS, 
SASO believed, ought to develop practical projects like, for example, a literacy 
programme.420  
 
The reorganisation conference was structured in such a way as to ensure a progressive 
outcome. Guest participants, in addition to Biko, included Mewa Ramgobin (recently 
unbanned421 and reviver of the Natal Indian Congress in 1971)422 and Rick Turner who 
introduced student participants to Satyagraha (passive resistance) and the relationship 
between capitalism and apartheid, respectively.423 In his contribution, Curtis argued that 
students needed to break free from the shackles of their apartheid socialisation as well as 
the inflexible strain of liberalism practised in South Africa. They would then have to develop 
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a new consciousness which would allow them to realise their full human potential, act 
ethically and, through a vehicle like NUSAS, assert their responsibility to society.424 Students 
had the intellectual responsibility of acquiring knowledge, formulating opinions and 
disseminating them.425 Evidently influenced by black students’ criticism that NUSAS 
preached non-racialism but many white NUSAS activists rarely put this into practice, Curtis 
stated that students should ‘formulate….a sense of morality….and try to live by it’.426 Their 
knowledge, intellectual vigour and morality would then be infused in the practical projects 
and campaigns which they undertook.427   
 
At its annual congress in July 1970 (no longer held at a university campus for reasons of 
segregation), NUSAS delegates agreed in principle to a radical restructuring of its 
operations. The national union was transformed into a body composed of a number of 
smaller, more autonomous entities aimed at effecting real and practical change in peoples’ 
lives.  Importantly, the primary responsibility of students was restated in student-in-society 
terms as that of working for change in society.428  
 
Another issue that required resolution was NUSAS’s relationship with SASO. In December 
1969, Biko had stated that SASO would not formally affiliate to NUSAS because SASO ‘had 
a specific role to play in non-white interests’.429 However, in May 1970, Biko reopened 
discussion on this subject with Curtis.430 Curtis reflected that the relationship between the 
two student organisations should be cordial and based on mutual recognition whether 
officially or unofficially. He recommended that NUSAS and SASO co-operate closely with 
one another and where possible embark on joint planning and co-ordination.431 This seemed 
to be coming to fruition in May 1970 when the student assembly was asked to ratify by 
postal vote, the election of Harry Nengwhekulu, past president of the Turfloop SRC and later 
a member of the SASO executive, as NUSAS deputy vice-president,432 thus fortifying 
relations between SASO and NUSAS.  
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At the 1970 NUSAS congress, Paul Pretorius and Horst Kleinschmidt, the former a new 
generation Afrikaans-speaking radical from Durban (Durban by then was NUSAS’s most 
radical affiliate probably because of the close ties radical Durban students had with their 
counterparts at UNNE as well as the influence of Durban political philosopher, Rick Turner), 
proposed that ‘while expressing disagreement with the principle of racial exclusion in any 
student organisation, [NUSAS] recognises SASO as the body best able to represent the 
views and needs of black students’. Echoing Curtis’s earlier expressed opinion, Pretorius’s 
motion suggested that the NUSAS executive enter into discussions with the SASO executive 
with a view to establishing maximum contact and co-operation.433 This almost split NUSAS 
in two and the motion was hurriedly withdrawn but not before the Wits and UCT delegations 
had threatened to walk out. Biko did walk out. After an all-night caucus, a compromise was 
hammered out and accepted by the student assembly. This read that SASO was ‘well able’ 
rather than ‘best able’ to represent the interests of black students.434 Though objections to 
the first motion by, for example, Wits SRC president, Ken Costa (an evangelical Christian 
and PP activist who mounted a one-person demonstration to commemorate the tenth 
anniversary of Sharpeville435) were probably based on a defence of non-racialism or multi-
racialism (the two terms were by then used inter-changeably) and a rejection of organised 
racial exclusivity on apartheid lines,436 it was the patronising attitude of white student leaders 
who presumed, probably unconsciously, that they had the right to permit SASO to exist that 
offended black students and some of their white sympathisers.437 In the opinion of white 
SASO sympathisers, the ‘best able’ debate marked the final parting of the ways between 
NUSAS and SASO and demonstrated a substantial failure on the part of NUSAS congress 
goers to appreciate the feelings and concerns of black students.438     
 
However, even before this fateful congress, the substantial degree of co-operation between 
the two student presidents – which even included a request to NUSAS for its inputs 
regarding the subject matter to be discussed at SASO’s annual congress and the content of 
its working papers439 – appeared to be coming to an end. In May 1970, against the 
background of the national student strike in the USA precipitated by the shooting of students 
at Kent State, Ohio by the National Guard as well as US military aggression in South East 
Asia, NUSAS embarked on a campaign to protest the serial detention under the Terrorism 
Act of twenty two ANC/Congress-aligned activists (including Winnie Mandela, wife of 
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incarcerated Nelson Mandela) accused of attempting to re-establish the ANC. In defiance of 
the chief magistrate’s prohibition, Wits students and staff marched to John Vorster Square, 
the headquarters of the infamous security police, and demanded that the detainees held 
there be either charged or released. The mass arrest of more than three hundred and fifty 
participants received much publicity and whetted students’ appetite for further action.440 
Believing that white students had demonstrated the ability ‘to disturb the unquestioned 
exercise of the state’s legal and extra-legal powers’, NUSAS decided to capitalise on this 
and invited other student organisations, including SASO, to join it in sustained protest. SASO 
angrily rejected this proposal. Biko objected to white students presuming to speak and act on 
behalf of the black majority and presuming to lead the struggle against racial oppression, 
thereby denying black agency.441 Not long after this, NUSAS discovered that it was no 
longer welcome to observe the July 1970 SASO conference.442    
 
Although not mentioned, these events were perhaps additional factors motivating the 1970 
SASO conference to pass a motion that ‘the commitment of white students to the principles 
of NUSAS was limited to a few individuals’ and that in its ‘principles and makeup’, NUSAS 
‘can never find expression for the aspirations of black students’.443 At the same time, the 
term ‘Non-White’ was denounced as negative and replaced with the positive term ‘Black’444 
and a motion passed urging SASO to establish contact with the Student Non-Violent Co-
ordinating Committee, the student organisation championing the Black Power movement 
that was then sweeping the USA.445 These decisions signified a shift in the thinking of black 
students. Until then SASO adherents were still attached to non-racialism and felt uneasy 
about their organisation moving against that spirit. Moreover, SASO initially made little 
headway at Fedsem446 and Fort Hare where residual ASA and ANC attachment remained.447 
Even at SASO’s UNNE birthplace, where PAC activist and Biko confidante, Aubrey 
Mokoape, pushed a strong racially separatist nationalist line,448 Ben Ngubane could claim 
during the second half of 1969 that opposition to ‘my local fascists’ (SASO) was so strong 
that he had merely to ‘pack a hall’ with coloured and Indian students to get a motion of 
centre affiliation to SASO kicked out’.449 However, this opposition began to dissipate with the 
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understanding that ‘Black’ was defined non-racially (the contribution of ASA) to indicate all 
ethnic groups oppressed by apartheid and racial domination.  
 
Critiques of liberalism as the cloak of white privilege were already current amongst black 
students, but at the same time, white radicals, influenced by the continuing world-wide 
student revolts also discussed the poverty and limitations of liberalism as an ideology and an 
organising strategy. In August 1970, SASO mounted a devastating demolition of liberalism 
and liberals (‘liberal’ defined broadly by SASO as any white opposed to the NP, including UP 
adherents450),  the latter that ‘curious bunch of non-conformists’ and ‘do-gooders’ who 
claimed to have ‘black souls wrapped up in white skin’.451 The idea that South Africa’s 
problems could be solved through a ‘bi-lateral approach’ of black and white operating 
together was rejected as were too non-racial student organisations like NUSAS, which 
‘insist[ed] on integration not only as an end goal but also as a means’.452 Multi-racial, 
integrated bodies, it was argued, entrenched both white domination and black feelings of 
inferiority. ‘Integration’ meaning black assimilation into white society on a basis of 
established white norms was rejected as was too the imposition of an ‘entire set of values’ 
on ‘indigenous people’ by a ‘settler minority’.453 Racism was not a ‘black problem’ but a white 
problem, a problem of which liberals were a part. The role of a ‘true liberal’, SASO asserted, 
was to fight for justice within white society and educate it for the possibility of life in a social 
order where colour was irrelevant.454 This accorded with one of the subsidiary roles of a 
restructured NUSAS conceptualised by Driver at Botha’s Hill.  
 
Not surprisingly given this trenchant critique of NUSAS and integration, SASO broke off all 
ties with the national union and other multi-racial bodies in 1971.455 This, and the increasing 
acceleration of black students out of NUSAS (UNNE disaffiliated in 1971456), was a 
devastating blow to NUSAS. However, the 1971 NUSAS assembly reluctantly accepted this 
separation and passed a resolution by forty two to sixteen with nine abstentions affirming its 
commitment to remaining open to all students but accepting that it would play no role on the 
black campuses unless requested to do so by SASO or any of SASO’s affiliated student 
bodies.457 From then on, a small core of NUSAS activists, many of whom embraced 
Marxism, participated in a range of New Left-inspired educational, cultural, social-action and 
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later labour programmes,458 not as the ‘instruments of change’, but on the understanding 
that they were ‘instrumental to change generated elsewhere’.459 In reaction to SASO’s and 
the Black Consciousness Movement’s preoccupation with race and identity, NUSAS 
increasingly focussed on class. Building on the programme begun in the late 1960s of 
investigating the wages of campus workers, NUSAS established Wages Commissions as a 
means of facilitating the unionisation of black workers, what Lunn argues was akin to the 
student-worker alliance of the Paris student uprising of 1968.460 
 
In terms of its explicitly political aim, its community-orientated programmes and the 
abrogation of a leadership role for white students, NUSAS’s restructuring was a response to 
SASO but could also to some extent be seen as the implementation of the Botha’s Hill 
proposals. The Botha’s Hill proposals themselves prefigured the thinking on which SASO 
was based. Other similarities and links between NUSAS and SASO existed. Black and white 
students were part of the same generation. All had lived their entire lives under apartheid 
and were conditioned by it and from the late 1960s some were influenced by the ideas of the 
New Left. SASO assimilated New Left ideas regarding psychological and cultural liberation 
and consciousness.461 Its important vehicle for the development of a political consciousness, 
the Literacy Programme, traced its lineage back to the UCM but had similarities to NUSAS’s 
Transkei Literacy Project. NUSAS’s important political education and leadership training 
vehicle, the national and regional seminars, were adopted by SASO, again via the UCM, as 
its ‘formation schools’. Through these, both NUSAS and SASO groomed students for a 
political leadership role in the communities and professions they entered after graduation. 
Both NUSAS and SASO were committed to the creation of a new South African society not 
founded on race, though NUSAS, unlike SASO, was committed to non-racial means of 
achieving this. Nonetheless, SASO’s definition of ‘black, was non-racial in the sense that it 
included Africans, Indians and coloureds.  
 
Conclusion 
 
By the end of 1969 NUSAS found itself in a similar situation to that of 1964. The 
establishment of SASO in 1968, like that of ASA and ASUSA at the beginning of the decade, 
threatened NUSAS with the loss of its entire black membership. Thus it became imperative 
that NUSAS restructure and re-position itself, though, unlike in 1964, not so as to retain its 
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black membership but rather as a de facto white organisation working in meaningful and 
practical ways towards a new non-racial South Africa in some kind of partnership with, or 
under the leadership of separately organised black students. How had this come about? The 
state continued its assault on NUSAS in the hope of mortally weakening it. Social 
segregation became a weapon for right wing groups such as conservative societies - 
whether proxies of the state or not - to challenge NUSAS and its principles. Moreover, 
through the threat of a further loss of university autonomy and state subsidies, the 
government intimidated university authorities into implementing campus racial segregation 
and in so doing opened up an additional hostile front against NUSAS and its affiliated SRCs. 
In the face of the rising security state, the disappearance of internal black opposition, 
increasing white economic prosperity and the threats posed to white rule beyond South 
Africa’s borders, the white electorate moved to the right, further consolidating NP power. So 
too did NUSAS’s mass student base as demonstrated by the nation-wide disaffiliation bids of 
1968. Thus the necessity for pursuing a policy which was realistic and possible within the 
political and security climate of the time became increasingly evident. To prove its 
respectability, NUSAS increasingly claimed to be upholding Western values and 
democracy,462 something its leadership had carefully refrained from doing during the radical 
early 1960s when it wished to identify with anti-colonialism and Cold War non-alignment. 
NUSAS moved slowly and inexorably away from a ‘student-in-society’ orientation towards 
that of a ‘student-as-such’ one.  Instead of concerning itself with liberation as it had 
increasingly done during the early 1960s, NUSAS focussed on education in general and the 
universities in particular. Elaborate pageants affirming its commitment to academic freedom 
were staged. So as to meet the demand of its student membership for white co-operation, 
NUSAS exploited the increasingly obvious divisions within the Afrikaner Nationalist student 
world by seeking dialogue with the ASB and NP-inclined student bodies, sometimes in the 
process abrogating its non-racial principles. This was not lost on NUSAS’s black 
membership. Coupled to this was the national union’s failure to put into practice its 
continuously stated rejection of social segregation and find alternative congress venues no 
matter how impractical, uncomfortable and inconvenient this was to white delegates who 
took their comforts for granted. 
 
While NUSAS attempted to steer a course congruent with the realities of the South African 
situation, so too did black students. Realising that the state intended that they remain 
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permanently isolated from one another and that students at the ethnic universities would 
never be permitted to affiliate to NUSAS, black students took the practical decision to 
establish their own racially separate student body which would both facilitate contact 
between black students and address their peculiar needs, needs different to those of white 
students. SASO was thus established not to replace NUSAS but rather as a separate black 
caucus within NUSAS. Black students remained committed to non-racialism and were thus 
reluctant to embrace a racial separatism which seemingly accorded to apartheid. The refusal 
on liberal grounds of many within NUSAS to either accept or understand the need for SASO, 
combined with racial assertiveness tendencies within SASO and its adoption of Black Power, 
led to the revocation of SASO’s recognition of NUSAS as South Africa’s national student 
organisation.     
 
Ironically, this occurred against the background of the growing radicalisation of some 
politically active, mainly white students influenced by the 1968 student revolts and the rise of 
the New Left. NUSAS’s decision to mount a series of demonstrations against detention 
without trial in 1970 was an anathema to SASO because these were reckless and would 
only court retaliatory action against black students.  Moreover, they were premised on white 
arrogance and the assumption that whites would lead the struggle.    
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
Conclusion 
 
SASO’s indictment of NUSAS, its liberalism, its policy, its membership and much of its 
leadership was a devastating blow to the national union from which it never fully 
recovered. In 1970, the end point of this study, it was quite clear that it was only a matter 
of time before NUSAS would revert to being the almost wholly white student organisation 
it was in 1956, the starting point of this thesis. That it was possible to retain in one 
organisation privileged white students wedded to the political status quo together with 
radical black students clamped down in the rural reserves proved false in the late 1960s 
when racial separation and apartheid authoritarianism were reaching their zenith. 
  
This study has attempted to demonstrate how NUSAS successfully crafted a 
sophisticated, broad-based, national and international campaign against university 
apartheid founded on the tactically inclusive but limited defence of academic freedom and 
the autonomy of the university from state interference. The return of Fort Hare to NUSAS 
on the eve of the introduction of the Separate University Education Bill into parliament 
was a triumph for NUSAS and the united front it was endeavouring to construct. 
Henceforward, it could quite legitimately claim to speak on behalf of both black and white 
students in expressing its opposition to government educational apartheid measures. 
Though Fort Hare returned to NUSAS for tactical reasons – to be associated with a 
powerful, well-resourced, ruling class organisation which had a chance of thwarting 
government plans – it was argued that events in wider society also had a bearing on this 
decision. The ANC – much weakened by security legislation, bannings and the Treason 
Trial – was shedding much of its assertive African nationalism and calling for a non-racial 
united front of all those opposed to apartheid. 
 
The presence of Fort Hare in NUSAS forums and the hope that other black centres would 
re/affiliate necessitated that the national union assume a more activist political orientation.  
For this purpose, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted 
as the foundation of future policy. The wide international endorsement of the Declaration, 
together with NUSAS’s deliberate efforts to downplay the document’s commitment to a 
universal franchise and second generation socio-economic rights ensured that even 
NUSAS’s most conservative affiliates, Durban and Rhodes, accepted this as the basis of 
their policy. The near impossible was achieved for a time: bringing together radical black 
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and apolitical and conservative white students in one organisation in a common 
commitment to a democratic education in a democratic society.   
 
NUSAS drew closer to the Congresses. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
echoed the demands of the Freedom Charter, a document which only two years earlier 
NUSAS had rejected on the grounds of its overly political nature. Liberal abhorrence of 
unconstitutional methods of struggle waned somewhat, NUSAS electing to defy the 
provisions of the ‘church clause’ of the Native Law Amendment Act, a measure which 
even more than university apartheid threatened the organisation’s continued existence as 
a non-racial forum. As university apartheid loomed menacingly closer, and prompted by 
its enlarged black constituency, NUSAS abandoned the tactically expedient but morally 
bankrupt defence of university autonomy as the basis of its academic freedom campaign. 
The equally ethically ambiguous anomaly of upholding a colour blind admissions policy at 
Wits and UCT while at the same time maintaining a social colour bar was also called into 
question, found wanting and ultimately rejected. From henceforth, as was demonstrated, 
NUSAS and its SRCs embarked on a campaign of total campus desegregation. This was 
a somewhat futile and symbolic gesture as black students would in any event disappear 
from the previously open universities following the implementation of the 1959 legislation. 
NUSAS moved further along the road of defying apartheid measures. It actively 
endeavoured to facilitate the enrolment of as many black students as possible at Wits and 
UCT before their racial closure and set-up SACHED as an alternative to the new 
apartheid colleges. As was argued, NUSAS controversially attempted to provoke crises at 
these new institutions as a prelude to rendering them unworkable. NUSAS’s efforts at 
securing, or in the case of Fort Hare, retaining a presence at the ethnic colleges meant 
that NUSAS leaders forged a close working relationship with the banned and semi-legal 
Congresses, a radicalising experience.   
 
Sharpeville marked a turning point in NUSAS’s history. These events which fleetingly 
appeared to mark the demise of white rule in South Africa - like in the rest of the 
decolonising continent - and which led to the banning of the ANC and PAC, set NUSAS 
on a path towards full participation in the liberation struggle and away from the world of 
the predominantly white universities and their preoccupations. Along with the ANC, 
remnants of the Congress Alliance and the LP, NUSAS called for a national convention to 
deliberate a new dispensation for a democratic South Africa. Though the national 
convention was endorsed by NUSAS’s affiliates – often because of its association with 
anti-republicanism with which many white English-speakers identified – much of NUSAS’s 
white membership became more conservative after Sharpeville. White fears in the wake 
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of Sharpeville spawned a white co-operation movement which challenged the hegemony 
of the national union. At the same time, new exclusively black student groupings (ASA, 
ASUSA and PNSO) emerged aligned to the banned liberation movements which 
threatened NUSAS with the loss of its black membership. 
 
The university experiences of black and white students, as well as their political 
aspirations, diverged even more sharply as the 1960s progressed. As university apartheid 
became a reality, fewer students at the formerly open universities had direct experience 
of racially open institutions and fewer felt the need to fight for these. Most black students 
were involuntarily cloistered in physically isolated, oppressive apartheid colleges. Many 
believed, as attested to by the views of those enrolled at the UCON, that students should 
play a leading role in the struggle for liberation and that student unions should adapt 
accordingly. The ever-radicalising NUSAS leadership aligned itself with the aspirations of 
its black membership, with potentially detrimental consequences for the national union’s 
continued existence as a mass organisation.  
 
NUSAS continued to inch closer to what remained of the Congresses. To identify more 
closely and win credibility with them, a number of measures were taken. Albert Luthuli 
was elected as NUSAS’s honorary president while the Indian Youth Congresses were 
invited to participate in NUSAS forums, providing these marginalised groups a platform to 
express their views as well as an opportunity to influence the direction of NUSAS policy. 
The controversial ‘degrees motion’ was an attempt to appease the demands of ANC-
aligned SACHED students that NUSAS endorse the academic boycott proposed by the 
AAM, a movement from which NUSAS was officially dissociated. Re-establishing links 
with the East-bloc aligned IUS was motivated by a desire to meet the demands of 
NUSAS’s radical black membership as well as the recognition that to consolidate 
relations with student unions on the rest of the African continent, it would be necessary to 
adopt their non-aligned international orientation. For similar reasons, as it was argued, 
NUSAS endorsed Pan-Africanism and by implication the transfer of power to the black 
majority, a universal franchise and Africanisation. NUSAS’s practical programmes such 
as the Transkei literacy project and CADET were potentially revolutionary political 
education and development programmes influenced by events at Fort Hare, the political 
uprising in the Eastern Cape and developments abroad. Defence and Aid and the Prison 
Education Scheme were intended to aid students engaged in political activity – an explicit 
alignment with the banned liberation movements.  
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The banning of the liberation movements, the construction of a police state after 
Sharpeville and the virtual demise of ASA in the wake of the security crackdown of 1963-
4 led black students increasingly to view NUSAS as a potential vehicle for their political 
aspirations. At the same time however, it was clear to NUSAS that the desire for black 
separatism had not abated. Hence, as it was demonstrated, NUSAS grappled with the 
almost unsolvable problem of how as a predominantly white organisation it could play a 
meaningful role in the liberation struggle, Africanise its membership and leadership while 
simultaneously retaining its commitment to non-racialism. As was shown, it was the 
recommendation by the Dar es Salaam Seminar of 1964 that NUSAS be barred from all 
continental and global student forums because, in its racial composition, it could not 
reflect the aspirations of the black majority that precipitated the radical interrogation of 
NUSAS’s structure and goals at the Botha’s Hill Seminar of April 1964. The seminar 
rejected the proposal that NUSAS reconstitute itself into the student wing of the liberation 
movements (the ANC) – in effect transform itself into a non-racial ASA. It rejected too 
Driver’s far-reaching reformulation of non-racialism and African leadership, that those 
who were the most oppressed because of their race should take a leadership role, a 
reformulation, it was argued that prefigured that of SASO’s. The seminar elected instead 
to retain NUSAS’s colour blind definition of non-racialism. NUSAS, the seminar accepted, 
had a ‘radical role’ as an agent of change, a facilitator of the unity of the liberation 
movements and a provider of leadership training. One of its minor functions was the 
political education of white students and their preparation for life under a future black 
government, a role that was later assigned to it by SASO.  
 
The desire for an effective role in the liberation movement, one of the reasons for the 
convening of the Botha’s Hill Seminar,  together with the failure of conventional methods 
of struggle in dismantling apartheid was, it was argued, the motivation too for some 
current and former NUSAS leaders accepting recruitment into the ARM. The ARM 
disclosures and the leading role played in the organisation by students, together with the 
explosive and deliberately distorted Botha’s Hill proposals, provided potent ammunition to 
NUSAS’s enemies. The state and its allies, the new campus conservative societies, used 
these political windfalls to slice-away from NUSAS its conservative white student 
membership, some of it already alienated by the radical direction of NUSAS policy and 
softened up by Vorster and the right wing’s 1963-4 smear campaign. Through a system of 
tight management, NUSAS survived what was arguably the most serious crisis of its forty 
year existence. However, the national union was substantially weakened, and, more 
critically, rendered directionless in the process. Of necessity, it was forced to abandon 
any pretensions it might have had of being a liberation movement and diluted its radical 
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role. As it was argued, NUSAS retained its commitment to the pursuit of human rights but 
this commitment was predicated on a more realistic anti-apartheid programme given the 
authoritarian environment in which it was forced to operate. Increasingly, NUSAS came to 
focus on issues affecting the university rather than those of wider society. NUSAS 
reaffirmed its commitment to working towards the restoration of academic freedom and 
for this purpose inaugurated both national and campus Days of Affirmation of Academic 
and Human Freedom. Despite the fact that these ritualistic and symbolic occasions posed 
little threat to the security of the state, the 1966 Day of Affirmation resulted in the banning 
of the NUSAS president, Ian Robertson under the Suppression of Communism Act.  By 
this measure, the government hoped to intimidate NUSAS and deter its keynote speaker, 
US presidential candidate, Robert Kennedy from coming to South Africa as the guest of 
an allegedly ‘communist’ organisation.  
 
The state continued its assault on NUSAS, by then one of the most radical organisations 
still operating legally in South Africa, despite its retreat into a more students-as-such 
position. The government also directed its attention to social integration at the English-
medium universities. For this purpose, it utilised not only the campus conservative 
societies but also the university authorities, the latter threatened by the loss of their state 
subsidies and further inroads into their autonomy should they fail to comply. University 
principals attempted to weaken NUSAS by persuading student bodies, through 
increasingly coercive means, to abandon their automatic affiliation to NUSAS. Following 
the failure of the UCT CSA to transform itself into an officially white body, the government 
introduced the University Amendment Bill prohibiting racially open campus societies, 
including by implication, NUSAS. The Bill was only withdrawn when the UCT Council 
imposed a new racist constitution on the SRC.  
 
It was the application of full social segregation by the Rhodes Council on the 1967 
NUSAS congress, and the failure of NUSAS to find an alternative venue in the face of 
expectations that it had raised of hosting a fully integrated event that precipitated the 
black student break with NUSAS. Though, as argued, SASO was not founded in 
opposition to NUSAS, but rather as a forum for black students prevented from 
participating in the national union, the events at Rhodes set in place much soul-searching 
amongst NUSAS’s black membership about the national union and their place within it. 
Black students questioned whether the commitment of NUSAS members to non-racialism 
went beyond mere words and whether non-racialism was the most effective means of 
challenging apartheid. Moreover, they pondered whether the white-dominated NUSAS, 
with its focus on white student issues and academic freedom, the latter a luxury of which 
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black students in their authoritarian university colleges had no experience, was relevant 
to their particular needs. Nonetheless, as it was argued, much of SASO’s membership 
had no wish to see the demise of NUSAS or its takeover by conservatives and 
accordingly, some of its leadership actively assisted in the national union’s restructuring. 
By the end of 1970, NUSAS had committed itself to working actively for change and 
returned to a student-in-society approach. 
 
Student politics is by its nature a limited form of political engagement. It is concerned with 
education, universities, student welfare and other issues of importance to students. A 
student organisation which operates within the limited framework of student politics 
enjoys many advantages. These include a platform for propounding its views, a 
potentially large membership, access to the organs of student government and to the 
financial and material resources these control as well as, above all, legitimacy.  An 
organisation regarded as legitimate by a large number of students, the university 
authorities as well as perhaps wider society can be powerful and effective, even, as 
NUSAS discovered, to the point of being free to engage in some limited form of political 
activity not necessarily fully supported by its membership. Many students were severely 
critical of NUSAS during the mid-1960s. Nonetheless they regarded NUSAS’s existence 
as legitimate and were prepared to come to its rescue when it came under attack, 
demonstrated for example by the thousands who rallied to NUSAS’s cause (including the 
Wits Conservative Club) following the banning of Ian Robertson. Likewise, the UP came 
to NUSAS’s defence following Vorster’s 1963 smear campaign. A student organisation 
which moves outside the confines of student politics and engages with wider society and 
its political concerns risks forfeiting its legitimacy as well as its campus-based 
advantages. NUSAS was fully cognisant of this when it deliberated its restructuring and 
re-orientation at Botha’s Hill. For this reason, it decided against switching immediately to 
individual enrolment because in so doing it would transform itself into a small, marginal 
and probably weak and impecunious activist organisation cut off from the vast majority of 
students as well as their well-resourced SRCs.  Activist organisations risk alienating 
university authorities. Even the relatively benign Fort Hare missionary authorities would 
not countenance the launch of PSASU on their campus in the mid-1950s while few 
universities tolerated the existence of overtly political student societies or campus 
branches of national political parties. During the 1960s, university vice-chancellors and 
principals signalled their disapproval of NUSAS’s policy by declining the national union’s 
honorary offices customarily bestowed on them as well as working actively towards 
weakening the organisation.   
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SASO at its establishment was a non-militant organisation focussed largely on student 
issues. This, together with its seeming acquiescence to apartheid and its disavowal of the 
white liberal NUSAS, won it the approval of the ethnic college authorities who permitted it 
to organise on their campuses, and, in some instances, even provided it with financial 
and material assistance to aid its growth. When SASO emerged from its docility and 
challenged firstly educational apartheid and then the entire system of racial domination, it 
was proscribed on the campuses and its leaders expelled. Ultimately it faced the full 
wrath of the state. Like the office-bearers of ASA, ASUSA and PSNO a decade earlier, 
SASO leaders were banned, imprisoned, tortured and charged with treason, while some 
like Steve Biko and Abram Tiro were brutally and cold-bloodedly murdered. This could 
perhaps have been the fate of NUSAS and its leadership too had the organisation 
continued on the radical political course it had embarked on in 1963-4. The LP was 
effectively immobilised by bannings and prohibitions even before its dissolution in the 
wake of the passage of the 1968 Prohibition of Improper Political Interference Act, a 
measure which was originally applicable to NUSAS when it was first mooted in 1965. 
That NUSAS and its officers were not banned, it could be argued, was because of the 
organisation’s retreat from radical political engagement to a more student and university-
focussed approach. For this reason, it still enjoyed a significant degree of student and 
campus legitimacy. Moreover, it could be argued that NUSAS’s privileged, white middle 
class membership offered the national union and its officers a degree of protection from 
state harassment. The government, it could be surmised was hesitant to take action 
against an organisation representative of a powerful section of the ruling class.  Maimela 
has argued that the mutually dependent relationship which existed between SASO and 
white liberal organisations was driven from SASO’s side not only by a desire to access 
these organisation’s superior resources but also the degree of protection from state 
harassment that an association with such ruling class bodies afforded. Thus, in the 
security state environment of the 1960s, NUSAS had little choice but to limit the scope of 
its activities and retreat into a ‘students-as-such’ position.  
 
Circumventing social segregation was exceptionally difficult after 1965, particularly for 
very public events like NUSAS congresses. However, NUSAS too readily accepted this 
situation and shifted responsibility to the state and the university authorities for its failure 
to put its commitment to non-racialism into practice. Already in 1962, black students had 
requested that a new venue be found for the annual congress when it was discovered 
some months beforehand that it would be a segregated affair. This was rejected as 
entirely impractical. The price that NUSAS paid for placing practicalities above principles 
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and limiting its political engagement to the universities (white mainly) was the loss of its 
black membership.   
 
Nonetheless, despite its compromises, NUSAS’s vision of a new apartheid-free South 
Africa remained as clear as ever. Though the mass protests, demonstrations, sit-ins and 
confrontations between NUSAS’s affiliated student bodies and their university authorities 
in the latter half of the 1960s were propagated in defence of academic freedom and 
students’ rights, they were still protests against the prevailing racial order, and, being 
inspired by New Left student radicalism sweeping the northern hemisphere, indicated that 
NUSAS had the potential to play a far more meaningful role in the general struggle 
against apartheid. Moreover, even in the face of extreme pressure and a campus-wide 
disaffiliation movement, NUSAS refused to abandon either its denunciation of white 
minority rule in Rhodesia or its endorsement of the actions of all those working towards a 
free, democratic and non-racial Zimbabwe – by implication an endorsement of the South 
African liberation movement. Thus, as Nelson Mandela declared in February 1990, ‘even 
during the darkest days’ of South Africa’s history, NUSAS ‘held the flag of liberty high’.  
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